Thesis (MBA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / In June 2009, there were 56 244 not-for-profit organisations registered with the Department of Social Development in South Africa. In addition, there are about 100 000 informal (non-registered) not-for-profit organisations in South Africa. The budget allocation of these organisations varies from R100 thousand to R20 million. The South African not-for-profit sector comprises of three types of organisations, namely the Section 21 companies, trusts and voluntary associations. The Non Profit Organisations Act, No. 71 of 1997, came into effect on 1 September 1998 to assist and guide the not-for-profit sector in improving its governance practices. Globally and in South Africa, we see a shift in the focus of governance in the not-for-profit sector. In 2005, a broad forum of South African organisations, donors and government representatives developed a code of good governance for not-for-profit organisations. The forum focused on the need of profit-motivated organisations to invest in community and social developments that exhibit good governance practices. Corporate governance in South Africa has its foundation in the first King Report of 1994. This report, King I, was the result of the work of a committee, formed to address a code of good practices for corporate governance. Its purpose was to promote the highest standard of governance in South Africa, and it is not enforceable by law. In 2009, the third version of the King Report, King III, was released to enhance the current set of governance practices. In the South African context, the King Report is the key piece of best practices that drives governance in the for-profit sector. The not-for-profit sector in South Africa is transforming and adapting to the changing external environment. There is a requirement to have good governance practices in the sector. The size and nature of the organisation would determine the areas of governance that the organisation would apply. The “apply or explain” principles of King III provide each not-for-profit organisation with the flexibility to apply good governance practices.

Thesis (MBA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / The introduction of King III has resulted in many changes to corporate governance practices. The changes inevitably have implications and challenges for organisations. If the changes introduced by King III as well as the implications and challenges are not well understood, implementing King III could be a very challenging exercise. This research report outlines the key differences between King III and King II. The research report also highlights the major implications and challenges of implementing the King III principles. In addition, those aspects of King III that are covered in the new Companies Act have also been outlined. In analysing the changes between King II and King III, and the implications and challenges of King III‟s principles and recommendations, the author followed the layout of the chapters in King III, namely ethical leadership and corporate citizenship, boards and directors, audit committees, the governance of risk, the governance of information technology, compliance with laws, codes, rules and standards, internal audit, governing stakeholder relationships and integrated reporting. The differences between King III and King II were analysed through a study and comparison of the King III and King II Reports. The implications and challenges were analysed through reading literature on King III and corporate governance in general. Aspects of King III covered in the Companies Act were analysed through a study of King III and the Companies Act. The author analysed the differences, implications and challenges of both the principles and the recommended practice in the King Reports. No distinction was made between principles and recommended practices. The main changes introduced by King III relate to the composition and role of the board, the board committees and the new topic on IT governance and the need to publish an integrated report. Though discussed in different chapters, King III has emphasised the link and interplay between ethics, corporate social responsibility, governing stakeholder relationships and integrated reporting. In addition to the above, the most contentious change is probably the applicability of King III to all entities regardless of form of incorporation. King III has also attempted to bring about a physiological change in the way companies perceive King III by changing the “comply or explain” concept to the “apply or explain concept”. The direct implications and challenges brought about by King III relate to the time, efforts and costs needed to implement the various King III principles and recommendations. King III could also result in an increase in the size or diversity of the board, and companies are likely to find it challenging to get qualified people to fill directorship posts. Integrated reporting is going to change the way companies view corporate social responsibility and the way they report non-financial information to stakeholders. Despite the challenges, there is no doubt that King III goes a long way to ensure that South Africa‟s corporate governance system is at par with the rest of the world.

Topical Issues of Remuneration of Members of Governing Bodies of a Joint Stock Company Abstrakt Purpose of the thesis is to identify recommendation of changes in remuneration system of members of bodies of a joint stock company which are required by past financial crisis. Thesis evaluate the ways by which recommendations was reflected to Czech legal system. Because there is change of acts of private law, second goal of the thesis is to find and analyze changes in approach to remuneration and possible disputable questions in law. Thesis gather available specialized sources and case law regarding remuneration a analyze recommendation given by foreign authorities. Thesis is dividend to three chapters. First chapter explains basic concepts of remuneration for purposes of this thesis. Differences between past and new law is highlighted. Second part of first chapter describes remuneration law in past code and answers questions raised from case law. Second chapter pursues to analysis of financial crisis and main ways of reaction chosen by USA, OECD and EU. Last chapter describes main changes in remuneration in new law. Chapter evaluate how successfully are recommendations applied to the new law. Accent is on business corporation act and law of financial sector also. Conclusions are made in final chapter with few...

Chu Kwok Hei Derek. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 97-103). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgements --- p.iii / Table of Content --- p.iv / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- Some Conceptual Issues --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1. --- PPE holding and shareholders' return --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2. --- Mis-management of Corporate Real Estate --- p.7 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- Determinants of Real Estate Holdings --- p.12 / Chapter 3.1. --- Growth opportunities --- p.12 / Chapter 3.2. --- Size --- p.13 / Chapter 3.3. --- Firm focus and real estate holding --- p.14 / Chapter 3.4. --- Level of Debt --- p.15 / Chapter 3.5 --- industrial effect --- p.15 / Chapter 3.6. --- Imperfect capital market and Real Estate decision --- p.16 / Chapter 3.6.1. --- Dividend payout --- p.17 / Chapter 3.6.2. --- Cash flow --- p.17 / Chapter Chapter 4. --- Measuring Corporate Governance --- p.20 / Chapter 4.2. --- Management ownership --- p.21 / Chapter 4.3. --- Outside Blockholder ownership --- p.22 / Chapter 4.4. --- Executive compensation structure --- p.24 / Chapter 4.5. --- Board composition --- p.26 / Chapter 4.6 --- DUALITY --- p.28 / Chapter Chapter 5. --- "Data, Sample and Empirical Analysis" --- p.29 / Chapter 5.1. --- Data and Sample --- p.29 / Chapter 5.2. --- Empirical Analysis --- p.31 / Chapter Chapter 6. --- Summary Statistics and Regression Results --- p.33 / Chapter 6.1. --- Summary Statistics --- p.33 / Chapter 6.2. --- Regression result --- p.35 / Chapter Chapter 7. --- Robustness check --- p.40 / Chapter 7.1. --- Full Sample Splitting --- p.40 / Chapter 7.2. --- Regression result --- p.41 / Chapter Chapter 8. --- Concluding Remarks --- p.44 / Appendices --- p.46 / Appendix 1 --- p.46 / Split full sample into single industry that sample size is larger than 30 --- p.46 / Appendix 2 --- p.52 / "Results after excluding firms in sector of Transportation, communication and Utility" --- p.52 / Appendix 3 --- p.53 / Non-monotonic relation between managerial ownership and agency cost --- p.53 / Appendix 4 --- p.55 / Comparison of previous literatures-1 --- p.55 / Appendix 5 --- p.56 / Comparison of previous literatures-2 --- p.56 / Appendix 6 --- p.61 / List of Tables --- p.61 / Appendix 7 --- p.95 / Variables description: --- p.95 / References --- p.97

Nesta dissertação entende-se Governança Corporativa como um conjunto de práticas empresariais potencialmente relacionadas com o desempenho operacional e o desempenho frente ao mercado de capitais, seguindo estudos que têm sugerido essa relação. A pesquisa se propôs a investigar, no caso das companhias abertas brasileiras, a significância do pertencimento aos segmentos diferenciados de listagem da Bolsa de Valores do Estado de São Paulo (BM&FBOVESPA) sobre os indicadores de resultado operacional das empresas listadas no Brasil, mais especificamente em relação aos retornos sobre ativos (ROA) e sobre patrimônio líquido (ROE), e a outros indicadores lastreados no lucro antes de juros e impostos (EBIT) e no lucro antes de juros, impostos, depreciação e amortização (EBITDA). Empregaram-se, aqui, métodos quantitativos em um modelo de regressão linear. O trabalho teve como referência principal o artigo de Brown e Caylor (Corporate Governance and Firm Operating Performance, 2009). Os resultados foram mistos e inconclusos em termos de significância, ao modelar ROA, ROE e indicadores baseados em EBIT e EBITDA, contra os segmentos de listagem, mesmo empregando variáveis de controle como o valor de mercado, a razão entre o patrimônio líquido e o valor de mercado, e o endividamento das empresas. Recomenda-se, assim, para estudos futuros, aprofundar a análise e a determinação das variáveis de controle, além de buscar atenuar as limitações devidas à endogeneidade e à causalidade reversa, pelo uso de variáveis instrumentais, e pelo emprego de métodos econométricos mais robustos, como equações estruturais. / In this research, we understand corporate governance as a set of corporate practices potentially related to the operational performance and to the capital market performance of the firm, following several studies that have suggested such a relationship. The research intended to investigate whether there is a significant relationship between the listing in BM&FBOVESPA’s higher corporate governance segments, and the operational indicators of listed Brazilian companies, more specifically, return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), as well as other earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) related indicators. Quantitative methods – linear regressions – were employed. The main reference for the research was Brown and Caylor’s article (Corporate Governance and Firm Operating Performance, 2009). The results were mixed and not conclusive in terms of significance, when modeling ROA, ROE and the other performance indicators in relation to the listing segments, despite market value, equity divided by market value, and debt to equity ratio as control variables. The study recommends future deeper analyses and selection of control variables, as well as addressing endogeneity and reverse causality limitations through the use of instrumental variables, and more robust econometric models such as structural equations modeling (SEM).

Chung Chi-man. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 91-94). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.ii / 摘要 --- p.iii / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Table of Contents --- p.v / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction / Chapter 1.1 --- Agency Theory --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Separation of Large and Small Shareholders --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Role of Auditing in Corporate Governance --- p.5 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- The Framework of Corporate Governance and External Auditing in Hong Kong / Chapter 2.1 --- Corporate Governance in Hong Kong --- p.9 / Chapter 2.2 --- External Auditing in Hong Kong --- p.12 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Construction of the Data / Chapter 3.1 --- Assembly of the Primary Data --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2 --- Traces of the Identities of the Ultimate Owners --- p.17 / Chapter 3.3 --- Construction of the Industry-Adjusted Audit Rate Data and Some Descriptive Statistics --- p.19 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Ownership and Control Patterns / Chapter 4.1 --- An Improved Research Methodology --- p.24 / Chapter 4.2 --- Discussions of Ownership and Control Patterns --- p.26 / Chapter 4.3 --- Ownership and Control by Owner Types --- p.30 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Examples of Typical Ownership Patterns / Chapter 5.1 --- The Li Ka-Shing Business Group --- p.35 / Chapter 5.2 --- The Swire Group --- p.40 / Chapter 5.3 --- The Kuok Khoon-Ean Business Group --- p.41 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Regression Analyses / Chapter 6.1 --- The Variables --- p.43 / Chapter 6.2 --- Regression Results and Discussions --- p.46 / Chapter 6.3 --- A Restricted Model --- p.52 / Chapter Chapter 7 --- Some Concluding Remarks --- p.55 / Tables / Table 1 Description Statistics of the Unadjusted Auditing Rate Data --- p.57 / Table 2 Separation of Ownership and Control Rights --- p.58 / "Table 3 Control of Publicly Traded Companies, by Owner Types" --- p.59 / Table 4 Description of Regression Variables --- p.60 / Table 5 Regression Results on the Relationship between Industry- Adjusted Auditing Rates and the Largest Shareholders' Ownership and Control (Full Sample) --- p.63 / Table 6 Regression Results on the Relationship between Industry- Adjusted Auditing fee and the Largest Shareholders' Ownership and Control (Family-controlled or Corporate-Entity-controlled Firms Only) --- p.66 / Figures / Figure 1 The Structure of Hang Seng Composite Index --- p.68 / Figure 2 The Relationship between Different Types of Large Shareholders --- p.69 / "Figure 3a The Li, Ka-Shing Group" --- p.70 / Figure 3b Details of the Calculations of the Concentrated Ownership and Control Stakes --- p.71 / Figure 4 The Connections of the Chinese Government and a Diverse Corporation (Swire Group) --- p.72 / "Figure 5 The Kuok, Khoon-Ean Group (An Example of Flat Structure)" --- p.73 / Appendices / Figure A1 HSBC Holdings PLC --- p.74 / Figure A2 The Bank of East Asia --- p.75 / Figure A3 JCG Holdings Limited --- p.76 / Figure A4 Moulin International Holdings limited --- p.77 / Figure A5 Yue Yuen Industrial (Holdings) Limited --- p.78 / Figure A6 Orient Overseas (International) Limited --- p.79 / Figure A7 Sun Man Tai Holdings Company Limited --- p.80 / "Figure A8 The Lee, Shan-Kee Group" --- p.81 / Figure A9 China National Aviation Company Limited --- p.82 / Figure A10 ICBC (Asia) Limited --- p.83 / Figure A11 MTR Corporation --- p.84 / "Figure A12 The Liu, Lit-Man Group" --- p.85 / Table A1 Summary Description of the Data --- p.86 / Bibliography --- p.91

Using a sample of firms listed in China's A-share stock market, this study investigates whether the regional institutions and CEO's political connectedness will affect the listed firms' hiring and firing decisions about CEOs, and what are the channels of these effects. I find that, for state-owned enterprises, politically connected CEOs are less likely to be nominated to firms in industries with more specific knowledge, with more competition, cross-listed in Hong Kong stock exchange, and in regions with stronger institutions. However, there is no such pattern for non-SOEs. Second, as a consequence, CEOs' political connectedness of CEOs in SOEs reduces the sensitivity of their turnover to firm performance for SOEs. There is no such political connectedness effect on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in non-SOEs. Third, the reduction on turnover performance sensitivity is mitigated by stronger institutions. The additional analysis finds evidence partially explaining why the politically connected CEOs are less likely to be dismissed because of their poor performance, that is, SOEs with politically connected CEOs can (1) get more subsidies from the governments when their performance is poor, and (2) tend to hire more employees when the regions in which they locate suffer from severe unemployment problem. / Yuan, Qingbo. / Adviser: T.J. Wong. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2123. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-57). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

The problem area was identified due to the fact that research within internal audit is fragmented and insufficient, simultaneously to internal audit becoming more common in the public debate. Crises and scandals in companies such as Enron in the US and Skandia in Sweden have resulted in new regulations regarding how companies should be governed. These regulations have been established in Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in the US, and in Sweden the Swedish code for corporate governance will be implemented in 2005. The regulations imply that companies must provide sound internal control and to accomplish that, companies should have an auditing and consulting internal audit function. The Swedish code for corporate governance denotes that companies can decide to comply or explain why the code is not complied. SOX on the other hand require that the regulation is being followed. The raised question is how internal audit is performed. International research has thrown light upon this question but few studies have been made in a Swedish perspective. The purpose with this thesis is to describe the role of internal audit in Swedish companies, to examine if the role is perceived as a watchdog or as a consultant, and to analyze to what extent present regulations affect internal audit. The choice of method in the thesis has taken the form of a profound qualitative research in three companies accompanied by a quantitative research to examine if the results from the qualitative study could be confirmed. The qualitative research consisted of interviews with three companies, which all have an established internal audit function. The interviews were followed by a questionnaire presented to all companies listed on the Swedish stock exchange most traded A-list. The results show that of the companies listed on the Swedish stock exchange most traded A-list only 32 percent have an internal audit function. This can be perceived as low when previous studies in the area have shown that internationally it is a common function. In the companies where there is an internal audit function, the role has mainly transformed back to a watchdog perspective from previously been heading towards a consulting role. This shift in the role of internal audit mostly derives from the exceeded regulations within corporate governance. / Det identifierade problemområdet tar sin början i att forskning inom internrevision är fragmenterad och ofullständig samtidigt som internrevision har blivit allt vanligare i den allmänna debatten. Kriser och skandaler i företag som till exempel Enron i USA och Skandia i Sverige har lett till nya regleringar hur företag ska styras och förvaltas. Dessa regleringar har tillkommit i form av Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) i USA och i Sverige kommer Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning att implementeras under 2005. Regleringarna säger bland annat att företaget måste tillgodose en god intern kontroll och att företagen för att uppnå detta, bör ha en granskande och konsulterande internrevisionsfunktion. Den svenska koden anger dock att företaget kan välja att i stället förklara varför koden inte efterföljs, detta till skillnad från SOX som kräver att regelverket följs. Frågan väcks hur internrevisionen i företag ser ut. Viss internationell forskning har belyst denna fråga, men studier i ett svenskt perspektiv lyser med sin frånvaro. Syftet med uppsatsen är att beskriva internrevisionens roll i svenska företag, att undersöka om rollen upplevs som övervägande granskande eller konsulterande, samt att analysera i vilken utsträckning aktuella regelverk påverkar internrevisionen. Metodvalet i uppsatsen har tagit sig uttryck i en djupgående kvalitativ undersökning av tre företag, åtföljt av en kvantitativ undersökning för att undersöka om resultaten från den kvalitativa studien bekräftas. Den kvalitativa undersökningen består av intervjuer med tre företag som alla har en väl etablerad internrevisionsfunktion. Efter dessa intervjuer formulerades ett antal frågor som sammanställdes i en enkät. Dessa frågor ställdes till företag på Stockholmsbörsens A-lista, mest omsatta. Resultaten som framkom, visar att av företagen på Stockholmsbörsens A-lista, mest omsatta, är det enbart 32 procent som har en internrevisionsfunktion vilket kan anses som lågt då tidigare studier inom området pekar på att det internationellt är en vanlig funktion hos företagen. Där det finns en internrevisionsfunktion har dess roll till övervägande del gått tillbaka till att bli alltmer granskande, från att tidigare ha varit på väg mot en konsulterande roll. Detta skift i internrevisionens roll har framförallt sin grund i den ökade regleringen inom corporate governance.

Författare:                   Marcus Davidsson, Camilla Johansson och Johanna Nilsson Handledare:                 Ola Nilsson Titel:                             Hur hanterar företagen kravet på revisionsutskott? – en studie av fem svenska börsföretag Bakgrund:                   Under sommaren 2008 blev Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning obligatorisk för samtliga svenska företag som är noterade på den svenska börsen. Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning stadgar bland annat att företagens styrelser skall inrätta ett revisionsutskott. Företagen kan dock välja att inte inrätta ett revisionsutskott och då förklara varför, enligt principen ”följ eller förklara”. Syfte:                            Syftet med studien är att öka kunskapen kring hur företag hanterar Svensk kod för bolagsstyrnings krav kring revisionsutskott samt vilken nytta revisionsutskottet upplevs tillföra i styrelsearbetet. Metod:                          En kvalitativ intervjustudie har genomförts. Studien omfattade fem styrelseledamöter från fem börsnoterade företag på OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm. Slutsats:                        Studien visar att fyra av de fem företagen som ingått i studien har valt att inrätta revisionsutskott. Majoriteten av dessa har inrättat revisionsutskotten som ett resultat av strävan att följa Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning. Vidare har studien visat att styrelserna har satt samman revisionsutskott på olika sätt, både vad gäller ekonomisk kompetens och oberoende. Merparten av företagen i studien ställer höga krav på vad revisionsutskotten skall utföra för uppgifter och upplever att utskotten tillför nytta i styrelsearbetet.

<p>The problem area was identified due to the fact that research within internal audit is fragmented and insufficient, simultaneously to internal audit becoming more common in the public debate. Crises and scandals in companies such as Enron in the US and Skandia in Sweden have resulted in new regulations regarding how companies should be governed. These regulations have been established in Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in the US, and in Sweden the Swedish code for corporate governance will be implemented in 2005. The regulations imply that companies must provide sound internal control and to accomplish that, companies should have an auditing and consulting internal audit function. The Swedish code for corporate governance denotes that companies can decide to comply or explain why the code is not complied. SOX on the other hand require that the regulation is being followed. The raised question is how internal audit is performed. International research has thrown light upon this question but few studies have been made in a Swedish perspective.</p><p>The purpose with this thesis is to describe the role of internal audit in Swedish companies, to examine if the role is perceived as a watchdog or as a consultant, and to analyze to what extent present regulations affect internal audit.</p><p>The choice of method in the thesis has taken the form of a profound qualitative research in three companies accompanied by a quantitative research to examine if the results from the qualitative study could be confirmed. The qualitative research consisted of interviews with three companies, which all have an established internal audit function. The interviews were followed by a questionnaire presented to all companies listed on the Swedish stock exchange most traded A-list.</p><p>The results show that of the companies listed on the Swedish stock exchange most traded A-list only 32 percent have an internal audit function. This can be perceived as low when previous studies in the area have shown that internationally it is a common function. In the companies where there is an internal audit function, the role has mainly transformed back to a watchdog perspective from previously been heading towards a consulting role. This shift in the role of internal audit mostly derives from the exceeded regulations within corporate governance.</p> / <p>Det identifierade problemområdet tar sin början i att forskning inom internrevision är fragmenterad och ofullständig samtidigt som internrevision har blivit allt vanligare i den allmänna debatten. Kriser och skandaler i företag som till exempel Enron i USA och Skandia i Sverige har lett till nya regleringar hur företag ska styras och förvaltas. Dessa regleringar har tillkommit i form av Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) i USA och i Sverige kommer Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning att implementeras under 2005. Regleringarna säger bland annat att företaget måste tillgodose en god intern kontroll och att företagen för att uppnå detta, bör ha en granskande och konsulterande internrevisionsfunktion. Den svenska koden anger dock att företaget kan välja att i stället förklara varför koden inte efterföljs, detta till skillnad från SOX som kräver att regelverket följs. Frågan väcks hur internrevisionen i företag ser ut. Viss internationell forskning har belyst denna fråga, men studier i ett svenskt perspektiv lyser med sin frånvaro.</p><p>Syftet med uppsatsen är att beskriva internrevisionens roll i svenska företag, att undersöka om rollen upplevs som övervägande granskande eller konsulterande, samt att analysera i vilken utsträckning aktuella regelverk påverkar internrevisionen.</p><p>Metodvalet i uppsatsen har tagit sig uttryck i en djupgående kvalitativ undersökning av tre företag, åtföljt av en kvantitativ undersökning för att undersöka om resultaten från den kvalitativa studien bekräftas. Den kvalitativa undersökningen består av intervjuer med tre företag som alla har en väl etablerad internrevisionsfunktion. Efter dessa intervjuer formulerades ett antal frågor som sammanställdes i en enkät. Dessa frågor ställdes till företag på Stockholmsbörsens A-lista, mest omsatta.</p><p>Resultaten som framkom, visar att av företagen på Stockholmsbörsens A-lista, mest omsatta, är det enbart 32 procent som har en internrevisionsfunktion vilket kan anses som lågt då tidigare studier inom området pekar på att det internationellt är en vanlig funktion hos företagen. Där det finns en internrevisionsfunktion har dess roll till övervägande del gått tillbaka till att bli alltmer granskande, från att tidigare ha varit på väg mot en konsulterande roll. Detta skift i internrevisionens roll har framförallt sin grund i den ökade regleringen inom corporate governance.</p>