No description available.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Hamburg, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.

Despite most educated people now accepting Darwinian explanations for human physical evolution, many of these same people remain reluctant to accept similar accounts of human behavioural or cognitive evolution. Leftists in particular often assume that our evolutionary history now has little bearing on modern human social behaviour, and that cultural processes have taken over from the biological imperatives at work elsewhere in nature. The leftist view of human nature still largely reflects that of Karl Marx, who believed that our nature is moulded solely by prevailing social and cultural conditions, and that, moreover, our nature can be completely changed by totally changing society. Ethical philosopher Peter Singer challenges this leftist view, arguing that the left must replace its non-Darwinian view of an infinitely malleable human nature with the more accurate scientific account now made possible by modern Darwinian evolutionary science. Darwinism, Singer suggests, could then be used as a source of new ideas and new approaches that could revive and revitalise the egalitarian left. This thesis defends and develops Singer’s arguments for a Darwinian left. It shows that much modern leftist opposition to evolutionary theory is misguided, and that Darwinism does not necessarily have the egregious political implications so often assumed by the egalitarian left – even in such controversial areas as possible ‘biological’ differences between the sexes or between different human populations.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2008. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 285-298) and index.

No description available.

In this thesis, I use a Darwinian approach to explore the role of sexual-dimorphism in human behaviour across development and into early adulthood, and its impact on adult mating-strategies. In Studies 1-2, I explore the importance of heredity and developmental stability of facial characteristics in light of theories of sexual selection. Using family photos, judgements of faces of parents and offspring revealed that facial sexual-dimorphism is passed on from father to son and mother to daughter, while inheritance of attractiveness is apparent only in daughters. I also examine the stability of facial appearance across development (infancy, childhood, young-adult), and find that sexual-dimorphism remains stable for both sexes, while attractiveness is stable only in females. Feminine characteristics are perceived as attractive in infant faces, and feminine characteristics have been perceived as looking more neotenous. In light of these data, I develop a theory for increased preferences for neoteny in human infants (Chapter 4). In studies 3-4, I examine the developmental milestones, puberty and first sexual intercourse in relationship to adult mate-choice strategies. Women who experience first coitus early prefer increased facial-masculinity in potential mates. In men, both early coitus and early puberty relate to increased preferences for facial-femininity in potential mates. In study 5, I look at attributions of peri-pubertal children (aged 11-12 years) to peer faces manipulated on sexually-dimorphic features. Children's attractiveness judgements show evidence of adult-like preferences, with boys preferring feminine girls' faces and girls preferring feminised boys' faces. Both girls and boys attribute the negative stereotype of bullying to more masculinised boys' faces. Study 6 concerns the relationship between two modalities of sexual-dimorphism, pheromones and facial characteristics. Adults indicate preferences from a continuum of sexually-dimorphic face-shapes, in addition to rating sex-specific pheromones on pleasantness. Individuals who prefer sex-typical facial characteristics in opposite-sex faces also judged the sex-typical pheromone as more pleasant.

Nos últimos séculos a Ciência vem produzindo uma série de respostas para problemas que afligem a humanidade. São descobertas que procuraram mudar e continuam mudando a relação do ser humano com a Natureza, a divindade e com ele próprio. Mas é inegável que em momentos passados, a crença excessiva no poder da ciência e da razão conduziu a ideias e argumentos de cientificidade questionável, como o darwinismo social, a sociobiologia, o eugenismo e tantas outras. Outros problemas também podem provir de insinuações de estudiosos proeminentes de que os seres humanos são apenas um monte de neurônios ou apenas veículos para a propagação de genes, ou ainda, que somos somente máquinas. Parece que esse tipo de reducionismo presta um desserviço aos seres humanos, à sociedade e à ciência. Como tentaremos mostrar no decorrer desta tese, a propagação do conhecimento científico para o senso comum, nos parece impregnada desta concepção determinista de se pensar e fazer ciência. Encontramos nos mais diferentes campos de saber científico, da psicologia à sociologia, da economia à engenharia, uma série de argumentos comuns, baseados na Biologia genética e evolucionária e que, nas últimas duas décadas, vêm ganhando um espaço surpreendente de argumentação nos saberes acima. É como se houvesse uma determinação biológica para tudo e para todos. Foi da análise do material informativo e formativo circulante no senso comum, e da posterior constatação desta impregnação, que surgiu a necessidade e a inquietação em produzir um estudo crítico e mais aprofundado sobre estas questões, buscando ouvir alguns dos mais reconhecidos pesquisadores do campo para saber se há algum fundamento no que é noticiado e, muitas vezes, publicado oficialmente sobre o tema.

L'éthique de J. Rachels, qu'il en viendra à présenter comme un utilitarisme « à stratégies multiples », concilie la maximisation du bien-être global sur Terre avec une attention pour la variété des éléments qui le composent. De plus, le jugement moral relève des caractéristiques pertinentes des individus impliqués, eu égard au traitement envisagé, et non des espèces auxquelles ils appartiennent. Un tel Individualisme Moral fait donc dépendre le bénéfice de considérations morales, non plus seulement de facultés mentales développées, mais d'une variété de capacités, telle la sensibilité, dont sont dotés de nombreux animaux. À travers cela, l'auteur s'oppose, plus fondamentalement, à la tendance en éthique à vouloir poser des limites a priori à l'ensemble des êtres susceptibles de bénéficier de considérations morales pour eux-mêmes (les patients moraux). Ces limites sont généralement rapprochées de capacités telles que la rationalité ou la sensibilité – tout ce qui existe au-delà de cette « frontière » présentant une valeur moindre ou étant réduit à l'état de chose. Pour Rachels, en revanche, le statut moral ne dépend pas d'une caractéristique unique à portée générale : nous devrions plutôt convenir qu'il existe une variété de critères pertinents pour une variété de circonstances. C'est dans le cadre de cette réflexion autour de la considérabilité morale des objets de la nature, outre ses travaux sur l'euthanasie, que l'auteur publie Created from Animals: the Moral Implications of Darwinism (1990). « Darwinisme » s'entend ici comme une pensée tant proche de celle de C. Darwin en son temps qu'informée des derniers progrès dans notre compréhension de l'évolution des espèces, où la sélection naturelle joue un rôle clef : une pensée du changeant, du progressif et de la contingence qui succède à un monde ordonné et finalisé, où l'homme a une valeur spéciale, et à la conception essentialiste des espèces. Il ne s'agit rien plus que de s'assurer, sur le modèle d'une cohérence globale de la connaissance (naturalisme inspiré de W.O. Quine), de la compatibilité de la réflexion philosophique avec notre compréhension la plus complète des origines du vivant. Or, avec Darwin, plutôt que des ruptures brutales entre espèces, se découvre un motif complexe de similitudes et de différences qui reflète une ascendance commune. Un tel continuisme biologique, s'il n'en établit la fausseté, vient saper les bases de la « logique de frontières » sur le plan éthique, c'est-à-dire de cette stratégie consistant à justifier des régimes de traitement entièrement différents pour des individus d'espèces distinctes en arguant d'une radicale différence de nature. Cet argument essentiel consolide donc la pensée animaliste, notamment l'argument des « cas marginaux ». Mais on voit à travers lui que l'éthique animale elle-même est susceptible d'entretenir un biais anthropocentriste : étendu aux êtres sensibles, le statut moral demeure attaché à une caractéristique unique, que l'homme valorise d'autant plus volontiers qu'il en fait l'expérience intime. Cette démarche extensionniste ne ferait donc jamais que recréer de nouveaux critères d'exclusion, dont on peut désormais soupçonner le caractère arbitraire. Pour P. Taylor ou H. Rolston, en effet, une attitude de respect envers la vie en général n'a rien d'absurde. On devrait pouvoir envisager ainsi, dans le prolongement de la pensée de Rachels, de ne pas resserrer la communauté morale autour de la seule faculté sensible ; de mettre un terme au mouvement d'expansion de la communauté morale constaté à travers les siècles, non pas par une nouvelle frontière, mais en envisageant la dissolution de toute frontière. Ne rien considérer de ce qui appartient à la biosphère seulement comme une ressource, et se disposer à entretenir envers tout existant un rapport respectueux en adéquation avec ses propriétés réelles, en tenant compte de l'ensemble des circonstances : ce serait là le principe d'une « éthique de toutes choses ». / James Rachels' ethics, which he will finally present as a « multiple strategies utilitarianism », reconciles maximisation of global welfare on Earth and attention for the variety of elements which compose it. Furthermore, the moral judgement is related to the relevant characteristics of the individuals who are involved, in view of the considered treatment, not the species of which they belong. According to such Moral Individualism, the benefit of moral considerations will depend, not of developed mental faculties only, but of a variety of capacities, such as sensibility, which many animals have. Through this, the author opposes, more fundamentally, the tendency in ethics to define a priori limits to the beings which are likely to benefit from moral considerations for themselves (moral patients). These limits are generally associated with capacities such as rationality or sensibility – any existing being beyond this “frontier” having a lesser value or being reduced to a mere thing. For Rachels, however, moral status cannot depend on a unique characteristic with general scope: rather, it should be admitted that there is a variety of relevant criteria for a variety of circumstances. It is in the context of this reflection about the moral considerability of natural objects, besides his work on euthanasia, that the author publishes Created from Animals: the Moral Implications of Darwinism (1990). “Darwinism” shall be understood here both as a thought close to Darwin's in his days and informed of the last progresses in our understanding of species evolution, where natural selection plays a key role: ideas of changingness, gradualness and contingency are succeeding to an organized and finalized world where man has special value, and to the essentialist understanding of species. The point is nothing more than to ensure, on a global coherence of knowledge model (naturalism inspired by W.O. Quine), of the compatibility of the philosophical thinking with our most complete understanding of the origins of life. But now, after Darwin, rather than sharp breaks among species, we discover a complex pattern of resemblances as well as differences that reflect common ancestry. Such a biological continuism, if not proving its falsity, is undermining the basis of the “logic of frontiers” on the ethical field, that is to say, of this strategy which consists in justifying entirely different schemes of treatment for individuals belonging to distinct species by putting forward a radical difference in nature. This crucial argument makes stronger indeed the discourse in favour of animals, notably the argument from “marginal cases”. But we can see through this that animal ethics itself is likely to reproduce an anthropocentric bias: while extended to sentient beings, moral status remains associated with a unique characteristic that man is all the more likely to value since he experiences it intimately. This extensionnist approach, then, is nothing else than recreating new criteria of exclusion, which now we can suspect of being arbitrary. For P. Taylor or H. Rolston, indeed, a respectful attitude toward life in general is nothing like an absurdity. We should be able to consider then, in the wake of Rachels' thought, not to restrict the moral community to the sentient faculty only. And we should consider the possibility of putting an end to the expansion movement of the moral community observed throughout the centuries, not with another frontier, but in contemplating the dissolution of all frontiers. Do not consider anything of what belongs to the biosphere only as a resource, and be prepared to develop toward any being a respectful relationship in alignment with its real properties, taking into account the entirety of the circumstances: this would be the principle of an “everything ethics”.

Nos últimos séculos a Ciência vem produzindo uma série de respostas para problemas que afligem a humanidade. São descobertas que procuraram mudar e continuam mudando a relação do ser humano com a Natureza, a divindade e com ele próprio. Mas é inegável que em momentos passados, a crença excessiva no poder da ciência e da razão conduziu a ideias e argumentos de cientificidade questionável, como o darwinismo social, a sociobiologia, o eugenismo e tantas outras. Outros problemas também podem provir de insinuações de estudiosos proeminentes de que os seres humanos são apenas um monte de neurônios ou apenas veículos para a propagação de genes, ou ainda, que somos somente máquinas. Parece que esse tipo de reducionismo presta um desserviço aos seres humanos, à sociedade e à ciência. Como tentaremos mostrar no decorrer desta tese, a propagação do conhecimento científico para o senso comum, nos parece impregnada desta concepção determinista de se pensar e fazer ciência. Encontramos nos mais diferentes campos de saber científico, da psicologia à sociologia, da economia à engenharia, uma série de argumentos comuns, baseados na Biologia genética e evolucionária e que, nas últimas duas décadas, vêm ganhando um espaço surpreendente de argumentação nos saberes acima. É como se houvesse uma determinação biológica para tudo e para todos. Foi da análise do material informativo e formativo circulante no senso comum, e da posterior constatação desta impregnação, que surgiu a necessidade e a inquietação em produzir um estudo crítico e mais aprofundado sobre estas questões, buscando ouvir alguns dos mais reconhecidos pesquisadores do campo para saber se há algum fundamento no que é noticiado e, muitas vezes, publicado oficialmente sobre o tema.

This thesis focuses on the role of the Czech philosophy in the 20th century and the way it affected the formation of an environmental approach. It unveils the mutual connections betweens the natural sciences and philosophy and highlights the importance of a close link between various ideas about man and the world. An analysis of the content of selected books by Erazim Kohák and Josef Šmajs emphasizes the existential threat arising from a critical relationship between man and the world at large. Finally, it reminds of the change in the scale of human values as well as the need for man to redefine his position in the world today.