Peirce, Wittgenstein and Davidson: Anti-skeptic Coincidences”. This paper shows some similarities among Peirce’s, Wittgenstein’s and Davidson’s answers to skepticism. In each case, the response to Cartesian skepticism consist in pointing out the contradictory character of the skeptical doubt in itself.More specifically, those philosophers agree on the following points: (i) in order to face the challenge of skepticism we have to examine its bases without conceding the terms of the challenge; (ii) the skeptic cannot doubt without assuming some propositional contents as true. In this sense, the skeptic commits performative contradiction; (iii) in his challenge, the skeptic omits the practical dimension of language and knowledge. That is the source of his difficulties. / Este artículo pone de manifiesto algunos puntos comunes en lasrespuestas al escepticismo de Peirce, Wittgenstein y Davidson. En cada caso, la respuesta al escepticismo cartesiano consiste en señalar el carácter contradictorio de la misma duda escéptica. Más específicamente, los tres filósofos están de acuerdo en los siguientes puntos: (i) a fin de hacer frente al desafío escéptico,debemos examinar sus bases sin conceder los términos en los que se plantea el desafío; (ii) el escéptico no puede dudar sin asumir algunos contenidos proposicionales como verdaderos. En este sentido, el escéptico incurre en contradicción performativa; (iii) en su desafío, el escéptico omite la dimensión práctica del lenguaje y del conocimiento. Ese es el origen de sus dificultades.

A presente dissertação busca analisar como a concepção de representação é desenvolvida na filosofia de Leibniz tendo como pano de fundo a crítica que o filósofo faz ao modo como Descartes e Locke compreendem o conceito. Tomaremos como ponto de partida a crítica que Leibniz formula ao conceito de ideia tal como ele se encontra em Descartes, e a reformulação do conceito que ele opera a partir da compreensão da ideia como um gênero expressão. A partir dela, podemos compreender em que sentido Leibniz se vale do paradigma imagético da ideia em um sentido completamente diverso de Descartes. Ademais, ele nos permitirá compreender como, aos olhos de Leibniz, as noções de representação em Descartes e Locke se aproximam, por mais que suas concepções sobre a origem das ideias sejam opostas. Pretendemos com isso mostrar que, apesar da doutrina leibniziana da representação estar implicada em seu sistema, ela é profundamente marcada pela oposição ao cartesianismo e ao empirismo de Locke. / The following thesis aims to study how the concept of representation is developed in the philosophy of Leibniz having as a background the philosophers critic of the way Descartes and Locke understand the concept. We will take as our starting point the critique that Leibniz formulates the concept of idea as it is in Descartes, and the reformulation of this concept understanding the idea as a genre of expression. From this, we can understandin what sense Leibniz make use of the imagetic paradigm to understand the representative content of the idea in a completely diferente sense as Descartes. Furthermore, it will allow us to understand how, in Leibniz point of view, the concept of representation in Descartes and Locke are similar, albeit the description of its origins differ completely in both philosophers. We intend to show that despite the fact that Leibnizian doctrine of representation is implicated in his system, this doctrine is deeply marked by the opposition to cartesianism and Lockes empiricism.

Submitted by Fabio Sobreira Campos da Costa (fabio.sobreira@ufpe.br) on 2016-07-21T14:17:22Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Dissert_RodrigoLaclércio_BC.pdf: 1549443 bytes, checksum: 32be05c37a9c2114041601b9ae1e2093 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-21T14:17:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Dissert_RodrigoLaclércio_BC.pdf: 1549443 bytes, checksum: 32be05c37a9c2114041601b9ae1e2093 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-08-25 / CAPEs / O presente trabalho tem como escopo uma abordagem da moral cartesiana encontrada no Discurso Sobre o Método; pretendemos discutir o conceito de morale par provision estabelecido por Descartes como o código moral que ele pretende seguir na condução de sua vida e mostraremos que as declarações de Descartes na sexta parte do Discurso são o resultado dessa moral. Para evitar a irresolução na vida prática, esse código deveria possibilitar a Descartes tomar sempre a decisão melhor possível. Sua fundamentação, diz Descartes, está no fato de que ele tirou essas máximas do método exposto na segunda parte desse mesmo texto. Inicialmente fazemos uma breve genealogia do método, comparando-o com aquele exposto nas Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii. Mostrado que o método de Descartes não sofre alterações significativas entre as Regulae e o Discurso, o nosso texto passa então a uma análise das quatro máximas morais à luz do método, buscando verificar a possibilidade de afirmar, como quis Descartes, que esse código moral foi extraído do método. O texto segue então sua análise voltando-se agora para o conceito e significado da morale par provision. Qual teria sido a intenção de Descartes em acrescentar o par provision após decidir falar no texto sobre sua moral? A essa altura discute-se se esse termo teria o sentido de provisório/temporário, opinião muito aceita entre os ―cartesianos‖ dedicados a esse tema; ou se teria o sentido de provedor/mantenedor, opinião da qual partilhamos e que oferecemos, além de uma fundamentação sustentada em importantes comentadores, nossa interpretação a cerca do tema. Discorrer-se-á ainda, sobre o alcance dessa moral provedora na sustentação das ações de Descartes como filósofo e homem de ciência. Por fim, pretendemos mostrar que há outros momentos na obra em que encontramos um traço moral, todavia, não no mesmo sentido que encontramos na terceira parte, haja visto que lá Descartes fundamenta os preceitos de sua moral, enquanto que (principalmente) na primeira e sexta parte do Discurso ele põe-na em prática a partir da produção filosófica e científica que é o Discurso e seus textos subsequentes. Por isso sustentamos, enfim, que o Discurso tem uma moral mais bem constituída e sólida do que comumente se tem defendido. / Le présent travail a pour finalité une abordage de la morale cartésienne rencontrée dans le Discours de la Méthode; nous souhaitons discuter le concept de morale par provision établi par Descartes comme le côde moral qu‘il prétend suivre à la conduite de sa vie et nous montrerons que les déclarations de Descartes à la sixième partie du Discours sont le résultat de cette morale. Pour éviter l‘irrésolution dans la vie pratique, ce code devrait permettre à Descartes de prendre toujours la meilleure décision possible. Son fondement, dit Descartes, est dans le fait qu‘il a obténu ces maximes de la méthode décrite dans la deuxième partie du même texte. Initialement nous faisons une brève généalogie de la méthode, la comparant avec à celle exposée dans Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii. En montrant que la méthode de Descartes ne subit pas des modifications importantes entre les Regulae et le Discours, notre texte passe alors à une analyse des quatre maximes morales à la lumière de la méthode, tout en cherchant à vérifier la possibilité d‘affirmer, comme voulu par Descartes, que ce côde moral a été extrait de la méthode. Le texte suit alors son analyse en se penchant maintenant vers le concept et le sens de la morale par provision. Quelle aurait été l'intention de Descartes à ajouter le par provision après avoir décider de parler dans le texte sur sa morale ? À ce stade, nous discutons si ce terme aurait le sens du provisoire/temporaire, une opinion très acceptée parmi les ―cartésiens‖ interessés à ce thème; ou s‘il aurait le sens de pourvoyeur/mainteneur, l‘opinion que nous partageons et que nous offrons, au-delà d‘un fondement soutenu par des commenteurs importants, notre interpretation concernant le sujet. Il sera discuté davantage sur la portée de ce moral pourvoyeur à l'appui des actions de Descartes comme un philosophe et homme de science. Enfin, nous avons l'intention de montrer qu'il ya d'autres moments dans l'oeuvre dans lesquels nous trouvons un trait moral, cependant, pas dans le même sens que l'on trouve dans la troisième partie, compte tenu du fait que Descartes fonde ses préceptes de morale, tandis que (surtout) dans la première et sixième partie du Discours qu'il en met en pratique a partir de la production philosophique et scientifique, qui est le Discours et ses textes subséquents. Aissim, nous soutenons finalment que, le Discours a une morale plus constituée et solide contrairement de la façon dont il s‘est couramment défendu.

A presente dissertação tem dois objetivos que se entrecruzam. De um lado pretendemos analisar a maneira pela qual as paixões humanas foram compreendidas por Descartes, Hobbes e Espinosa. Pois em oposição a tradicional concepção segundo a qual a dimensão afetiva do homem, isto é, suas paixões são vícios e distúrbios da natureza, portanto, opostas à razão e à virtude, os três filósofos defendem o seu caráter natural. Em outras palavras, as paixões são intrínsecas ao homem, têm causas necessárias e determinadas, e não podem ser suprimidas de sua natureza, pois fazem parte da sua condição de ser no mundo. No entanto, pela força que exercem sobre o homem e suas ações devem ser conhecidas. A partir desse primeiro objetivo, e de maneira concomitante, pretendemos demarcar a singularidade do pensamento de Espinosa com relação ao de Descartes e Hobbes, pois se é certo que, como eles, Espinosa defende a naturalidade das paixões, é certo, na mesma medida, que assume um pensamento bastante singular, sobretudo ao operar com os conceitos de ação e paixão para explicar a relação que há entre mente e corpo: estes são ativos ou passivos juntos, o corpo não atua contra a mente, nem a mente contra o corpo. Isso evidencia sua ruptura não apenas com a tradição, mas também com seus contemporâneos. / The thesis hereafter aims to fulfill two interweaving goals. On the one hand, we pretend to analyze the way in which human passions were understood by Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza. As opposed to the traditional idea of mens affective dimension (i.e. their passions as vices and disturbances affecting nature, therefore opposed to reason and virtue), the three philosophers defend their natural characteristics, that is to say, that passions are intrinsic to men, have necessary and determined causes, and cant be stripped of its very nature, for they are part of their being within this world. However, given the force they exert upon men and their actions, they must be studied and known in order to be tempered. On the other hand, concomitantly, and guiding ourselves by the first goal, we pretend to pursue a second objective, which consists of highlighting the distinctiveness of Spinozas thinking in relation to Descartes and Hobbes. Whereas it is true that, as they also do, Spinoza advocates for the naturalness of passions, it is also true that he takes on a rather singular thinking, especially when dealing with action and passion concepts to explain mind-body relationships: these are either both active or passive, neither the body goes against the mind, nor vice-versa. This shows his rupture with tradition as well as with his contemporary fellows.

Nosso objetivo principal foi esclarecer o papel e o estatuto ontológico dos corpos dos seres vivos no leibnizianismo. Para tanto, partimos da ontologia cartesiana que transforma os corpos em substâncias cuja essência é a extensão entendida geometricamente. Depois disso, analisamos as críticas que Leibniz fez a esta ontologia, bem como a nova ontologia de forças e mônadas que usa para superar todas as limitações e erros do cartesianismo. Enfim, terminamos considerando que, devido a todas as críticas realizadas contra a extensão cartesiana, não existe, como sustentam alguns comentadores, uma noção de substância corporal que reabilite a materialidade ou a extensão; na verdade, a substância corporal leibniziana tem que ser entendida segundo uma ontologia idealista. Nesse percurso, também pudemos constatar alguns dos desdobramentos científicos que a nova ontologia leibniziana acarretava, como, por exemplo, o surgimento de uma física dinâmica e a tese da pré-formação dos seres vivos no âmbito da fisiologia. / Our main goal was to elucidate the role and ontological status of bodies of living beings in Leibnizianism. To do this, we start from Cartesian ontology which transforms bodies in substances whose essence is the extension comprehended geometrically. Then, we analyze the critics made by Leibniz to this ontology as well as the new ontology of forces and monads that he uses to surpass all the limitations and errors of Cartesianism. Ultimately, we finish with the consideration that, due to all critics made against the Cartesian extension, there is no, as some commentators sustains, notion of corporeal substance which rehabilitates the materiality or extension; actually, the leibnizian corporeal substance has to be understood according to an idealistic ontology. Along the way, we could also perceive some of the scientific developments which the new Leibnizian ontology brought about, as, for example, the appearing of a dynamic physics and the thesis of pre-formation of living beings in the field of physiology.

Le but de ce travail est de comprendre les différents aspects du processus de figuration dans la philosophie de Descartes, en particulier pour une connaissance des corps de la nature. La notion de figure revêt différentes fonctions, des premières œuvres de Descartes jusqu’aux plus tardives : fonction méthodique de représentation conventionnelle des relations entre nos notions, objet géométrique, mode de l’étendue assigné par la métaphysique à la réalité des corps, délimitation externe de corps sensibles ou de corpuscules invisibles dans la physique. Nous cherchons à rendre compte de ces dimensions dans leur ensemble pour comprendre comment la pensée de Descartes évolue des Regulae aux textes plus tardifs et s’efforce de répondre à un problème nouveau qui ne se posait pas pour la scolastique, celui de la connaissance de la figure de corps déterminés. Ce problème peut se poser parce que la métaphysique à la fois établit la figure comme mode essentiel de l’étendue des corps et refuse a priori de recourir à la sensation pour la connaissance, mais il se pose aussi en termes purement épistémologiques pour la constitution d’une physique. Nous montrons qu’une clé de ce problème réside dans la théorie de la vision présentée dans la Dioptrique, mais que ce texte appelle en partie son propre dépassement en direction d’une physique corpusculaire qui met en jeu un usage spécifique de l’imagination et de l’expérience. Ceci doit nous permettre de repenser, à partir de la notion de figure, ce qu’il a été convenu de considérer comme un aspect de la mathématisation de la nature opérée au XVIIe siècle. / My aim, in this dissertation, is to explore the various aspects of the process of figuration in Descartes’ philosophy, particularly with respect to the knowledge of natural bodies. Moving from Descartes’ early to his more mature works, we find that the notion of figure (or shape) played a variety of roles: it possessed a methodological function, as a conventional representation of the relations between our notions, but also designated, respectively, a geometrical object, a mode of extension assigned by metaphysics to the reality of bodies, and an external delimitation of sensible bodies or of invisible corpuscles in physics. In analyzing these different functions, my aim is to understand how Descartes’ thought evolved from the Regulae to later texts, while trying to answer a new problem that did not exist for the scholastics, namely that of the knowledge of the shape of determined bodies. This problem arose partly because Descartes’ metaphysics had established shape as an essential mode of bodily extension, while at the time refusing a priori to appeal to sensation for knowledge, but it also emerged for purely epistemological reasons in the process of constituting a new physics. In my thesis, I argue that one key to this problem is to be found in the theory of vision, presented in the Dioptrique, a text that moves, however, towards a corpuscular physics that relies on a specific use of imagination and experience. From this analysis of the notion of figure or shape, we are able to shed a different light on what so far has been considered an integral aspect of the 17th century’s mathematisation of nature.

La thèse aborde une question importante d’actualité et de vie qui lance à la société moderne des défis qui semblent n’autoriser aucun droit à l’erreur. Il s’agit de la définition du rapport de l’homme à la nature. Pour résoudre cette épineuse question, plusieurs réponses ont été proposées. Notamment Arne Naess qui professe une éthique biocentrique et Hans Jonas qui met au centre de toutes nos préoccupations la vie des générations futures. Mais ces solutions aboutissent par contre à une négation de la morale en faisant la promotion des régimes politiques totalitaires. En analysant le rapport de l’homme à la nature selon Descartes, nous avons découvert une philosophie de l‘écologie pour aujourd’hui, capable de contenter même le plus exigeant des écologistes. Bien que le nom de Descartes soit souvent associé à la crise écologique, notre thèse s’est donnée pour objectif d’abord de montrer que le rapport à la nature lui a permis de remarquer les capacités de découverte et de créativité de l’homme et ensuite que sa proposition est une véritable éthique de responsabilité qui répond à une exigence de l’homme tout entier. C’est une sagesse qui permet à l’homme d’utiliser le pouvoir que lui confère la technoscience de manière à atteindre un haut degré de sécurité, d’utilité, de bien-être, de plénitude des valeurs. Elle invite l’homme à faire bon usage de son libre arbitre de telle sorte que son pouvoir tienne toujours compte du développement de l’être humain en responsabilité, en valeur et en conscience. C’est pourquoi, la philosophie de l’éco-responsabilité viable de Descartes est un appel fait à l’homme pour passer de l’irresponsabilité à la responsabilité. / This doctoral thesis addresses an important issue of everyday life that launches to modern society challenges that seem to allow no room for error. It’s about the definition of the relationship of man to nature. To solve this thorny question, several answers have been proposed. In particular Arne Naess professes a biocentric ethics and Hans Jonas puts the lives of future generations at the center of all our concerns. But these solutions lead to a negation of morality by promoting totalitarian regimes. By analyzing the relationship of man to nature according to Descartes, we have discovered a philosophy of ecology for today, capable of satisfying even the most demanding ecologists.Although the name of Descartes is often associated with the ecological crisis, our thesis aims at raising two things: first to show that the relationship to nature has allowed him to notice the discovery capacity and creativity of man and second, that his proposition is a true ethics of responsibility that meets a requirement of the whole man. It is a wisdom that allows man to use the power given to him by technoscience so as to achieve a high degree of security, utility, well-being, fullness of values. It invites the man to make good use of his free will so that his power always takes into account the development of the human being in responsibility, in value and in conscience. This is why Descartes' philosophy of sustainable eco-responsibility is a call to man to move from irresponsibility to responsibility.

Our thesis explores aspects of the geometrical work and thought of Isaac Newton in order to better understand and re-evaluate his approach to geometry, and specifically his synthetic methods and the organic description of plane curves. In pursuing this research we study Newton's geometrical work in the context of the changing view of geometry between the late 16th and early 18th centuries, a period defined by the responses of the early modern geometers to a new Latin edition of Pappus' Collectio. By identifying some of the major challenges facing geometers of this period as they attempted to define and practice geometry we are able to contrast Newton's own approach to geometry. The themes emerging from the geometrical thought of early modern geometers provide the mathematical context from which to understand, interpret and re-evaluate the approach taken by Newton. In particular we focus on Newton's profound rejection of the new algebraic Cartesian methods and geometrical philosophies, and the opportunity to focus more clearly on some of his most astonishing geometrical contributions. Our research highlights Newton's geometrical work and examines specific examples of his synthetic methods. In particular we draw attention to the significance of Newton's organic construction and the limitations of Whiteside's observations on this subject. We propose that Newton's organic rulers were genuinely original. We disagree with Whiteside that they were inspired by van Schooten, except in the loosest sense. Further, we argue that Newton's study of singular points by their resolution was new, and that it has been misunderstood by Whiteside in his interpretation of the transformation effected by the rulers. We instead emphasise that it was the standard quadratic transformation. Overall we wish to make better known the importance of geometry in Newton's scientific thought, as well as highlighting the mathematical and historical importance of his organic description of curves as an example of his synthetic approach to geometry. This adds to contemporary discourse surrounding Newton's geometry, and specifically provides a foundation for further research into the implications of Newton's geometrical methods for his successors.

No description available.

The contemporary personal identity debate has divided into two entrenched positions. One supports the supposedly naive and unpopular Bodily Criterion (the view that personal identity requires physical continuity). The other school is the Psychological Criterion (the view that personal identity requires psychological continuity). This has acquired the status of virtual orthodoxy. The British Empiricists, John Locke and David Hume, are both supposed to give historical weight to this orthodoxy. This thesis argues this is a dramatic misrepresentation of history. Locke is supposed to found the personal identity debate in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, arguing that personal identity is sameness of consciousness. It is argued that Locke in fact responds to a prevalent Cartesian View, called here the Compositional Account. The Compositional Account is the belief that a Human Being is composed of a Mind and a Body. Hume, in responding to Locke, is also responding to the Compositional Account. In opposition to widely established readings both philosophers are argued to be highly sympathetic to the Compositional Account. Chapter 1 establishes Descartes' version of the Compositional Account and explains why Descartes needs no philosophical treatment of personal identity. These problems emerge only for the Empiricists, Locke and Hume. Locke's sympathies for the Compositional Account are established in Chapter 2, drawing on material prior to the Essay and normally uncited passages in the Essay. Chapter 3 argues that Hume presumed the Compositional Account in his Treatise Concerning Human Nature. This is argued to explain Hume's famous later recantation of his theory. The thesis concludes by sketching a role for the Compositional Account in contemporary debate. The Compositional Account is argued to give strong support to a recently developed position known as Animalism. This provides the conceptual materials to move beyond the orthodox dichotomy between the Bodily Criterion and the Psychological Criterion.