Thesis (M.A.)--Denver Conservative Baptist Seminary, 1995. / This is an electronic reproduction of TREN, #090-0010. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 139-143).

My aim in this thesis is to show how Plato differentiates the everlastingness of eternity from the everlastingness of time in the cosmogony of his Timaeus, where time is classified as the everlasting ‘moving image’ of ‘eternity-remaining-in-unity’ (Tim. 37c 6-d 7). Of course, as many scholars know, this distinction between eternity and time follows from his distinction between unchanging Being and ever-changing Becoming, so much so that our understanding of what it is that makes time the ‘image’ of eternity—and yet also something other than eternity—proves fundamental to our understanding of Platonic ontology. However, our understanding of Being and Becoming and the relation between them is complicated by the view that what exists in time was and is and will be, whereas what exists in eternity ‘is’ alone (Tim. 37e 4-38a 8). Does this mean that eternity is temporal, given that it ‘is’ in some sense? Or is eternity atemporal, given that it is itself distinguishable from time? Also, if eternity is atemporal, how should one conceive of atemporality in this particular respect? Does this entail existing altogether apart from time? Or can one speak of eternity as just another type of time, a timeless time, as it were? Not surprisingly, it has long been a matter of controversy among scholars whether the eternal ‘is’ is actually tensed or tenseless, temporal or timeless. So too, the very fact that eternity is said to be ‘remaining in unity’ has led some scholars to conceive of eternity as durational, and thus temporal in some sense, on the assumption that duration entails temporality. But then again, still other scholars speak of eternity as an ‘eternal present’ which is non-durational, precisely because it has its being ‘in unity’. By contrast, I argue that the Platonic distinction between Being and Becoming entails a twofold notion of everlastingness, the one temporal, the other extra-temporal, where the latter is signifying timelessness unqualifiedly. For I show that Plato conceives of time and temporal passage as the imperfectly everlasting image (aiônios eikôn) of eternity whilst understanding eternity to be perfectly everlasting (diaiônios), since eternal Being is subject to no passage from its essential being. Only in this way can one explain how the temporality of Becoming is akin to—yet also distinguishable from—the extra-temporality of Being, and then again why it is that both should be thought of as durational. Hence the scholarly assumption that duration entails temporality, an assumption commonly encountered in modern thought, is foreign to Plato. Nor again does it make sense to speak of an ‘eternal present’ apart from everlastingness, and thence apart from duration. So as to clarify this twofold notion of everlastingness it has proven necessary for my argument to touch upon another controversy surrounding the cosmogony of the Timaeus, namely, whether the universe, the realm of Becoming, has had a beginning at some time in the remote past (i.e., at the very first moment of time) or has had no single beginning, at least in a temporal sense (i.e., that it will have come into being ‘always’ (aei)). Scholars have given various arguments for both of these readings. However, I argue that one can resolve this issue by more closely analysing the possible meanings of the verb gegonen (viz. ‘It has come into being’), which is said of the universe as well as time (Tim. 28b 7, 38b 6). With respect to gegonen, the temporal ambiguity of its perfect aspect means that it might refer to a past event in the immediate past no less than in the remote past. Hence one can speak of the generation of time and the universe as everlasting, as a process of genesis having no single, distinct beginning at a time or even in time, but infinitely many beginnings, extending from the infinite past into the ever-emerging present. And that gegonen is ambiguous between past and present time is shown by the cosmological argument at Tim. 28b 2-c 2 and the status of god relative to creation. All in all, this reveals that time, being generate, is a feature of Becoming, not Being. It also reveals that time and the universe need not have had a beginning at some first moment of time.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1990. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 145-148).

Thesis advisor: Boyd Taylor Coolman / Thesis advisor: Dominic F. Doyle / Thesis (STL) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry. / Discipline: Sacred Theology.

Dissertation (DTh)--University of Stellenbosch, 2008. / Bibliography. Also available via the Internet.

<p>This thesis is an analysis of Martin Buber's famous work I and Thou. The primary aim of the thesis is to interpret or translate Buber's unique, impressionistic account of human existence into a coherent and revealing argument, one that is philosophically engaging and accessible to the common or everyday reader. In addition to providing a clear outline of Buber's work, this thesis also contains a short critique of Buber basic argument, i.e., his distinction between the two spheres or modes of our being, the I-It or active mode and the I-You or passive mode. In short, it argues that what results from Buber's dualistic understanding is division or separation between ourselves and the world, between an individual human being and the beings it engages, and not the genuine or authentic unity that Buber believes his position can inspire.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

While this analysis of the Old, Middle, and Early Modern English translations of De Consolatione Philosophiandamp;aelig; provides a brief reception history and an overview of the critical tradition surrounding each version, its focus is upon how these renderings present particular moments that offer the consolation of eternity, especially since such passages typify the work as a whole. For Boethius, confused and conflicting views on fame, fortune, happiness, good and evil, fate, free will, necessity, foreknowledge, and providence are only capable of clarity and resolution to the degree that one attains to knowledge of the divine mind and especially to knowledge like that of the divine mind, which alone possesses a perfectly eternal perspective. Thus, as it draws upon such fundamentally Boethian passages on the eternal Prime Mover, this study demonstrates how the translators have negotiated linguistic, literary, cultural, religious, and political expectations and forces as they have presented their own particular versions of the Boethian vision of eternity. Even though the text has been understood, accepted, and appropriated in such divergent ways over the centuries, the Boethian vision of eternity has held his Consolations arguments together and undergirded all of its most pivotal positions, without disturbing or compromising the philosophical, secular, academic, or religious approaches to the work, as readers from across the ideological, theological, doctrinal, and political spectra have appreciated and endorsed the nature and the implications of divine eternity. It is the consolation of eternity that has been cast so consistently and so faithfully into Old, Middle, and Early Modern English, regardless of form and irrespective of situation or background. For whether in prose and verse, all-prose, or all-verse, and whether by a Catholic, a Protestant, a king, a queen, an author, or a scholar, each translation has presented the texts central narrative: as Boethius the character is educated by the figure of Lady Philosophy, his eyes are turned away from the earth and into the heavens, moving him and his mind from confusion to clarity, from forgetfulness to remembrance, from reason to intelligence, and thus from time to eternity.

The following writings contain different segments about the concept of time. To best describe certain feelings and thoughts concerning my ideas and work I have used poetry and short stories in a prosaic manner. I also felt it necessary to include some historic facts about the history of time and its measuring devices.

Ao afirmar que a sua filosofia vê na duração o próprio tecido de que a realidade é feita, no último capítulo de A evolução criadora, Bergson explicita o seu projeto de construção de uma nova metafísica. Sabemos que a originalidade de sua empreitada está fundamentalmente nessa exigência da apreensão do tempo, sua transitoriedade e fluidez, como aquilo de que a realidade é feita. Trata-se de declarar a realidade temporal como definição da própria existência do mundo e da experiência humana sem a duração, não se pode falar em causalidade efetiva ou livre escolha. Sendo assim, a exigência de uma metafísica da duração se colocaria de imediato em contraposição não a uma filosofia somente, mas à história da filosófica como um todo, cuja crítica é essencial para a construção e consolidação do pensamento bergsoniano. Contudo, pensamos que, na tradição filosófica, destaca-se um autor com quem Bergson dialogou intensamente, declaradamente ou não, e que pouco esteve presente nos trabalhos dos estudiosos do seu pensamento: Espinosa. Pretendemos reconstituir esse diálogo a partir de um campo de comunicação que possibilite revelar seus pontos de entrecruzamento, confrontação e encontro. Talvez assim, o desencontro maior - entre uma filosofia da duração e, outra, da eternidade- mostre-se, ao fim e ao cabo, apenas aparente. / By stating that his philosophy \"sees in duration the own tissue that reality is made\" in the last chapter of Creative Evolution, Bergson explains his project to build a new metaphysics. We know that the originality of his work is based in this exigency of the sense time, its transience and fluidity, as that from which reality is made. It is time to declare the temporal reality as definition of the own existence of the world and human experience without the duration one can not speak in effective causality or free choice. Thus, the requirement of a metaphysics of duration is put immediately in opposition not only to one philosophy, but the history of philosophy as a whole, whose criticism is essential to building and consolidating of the Bergson\'s thought. However, we believe that, in the philosophical tradition, there is an author with whom Bergson spoke intensely, openly or not, and that little was present in the work of scholars of his thought: Espinosa. We intend to reconstruct this dialogue from a communication space that allows to reveal their points of intersection, confrontation and meeting. Perhaps then the biggest mismatch - between a philosophy of duration, and another, of eternity-shows, after all, only apparent.

A pesquisa intenta verificar como se dá o itinerário de ascensão do conhecimento da verdade e das ciências, conforme a descrição apresentada no De libero arbítrio, com apoio nos paralelos constantes dos diálogos De ordine e De quantitate animae, compostos por Agostinho no período Cassicíaco-Roma (386-396 d.C). Tomando como referência a ascensão intelectual apresentada no livro II do De libero arbitrio, e tendo por base as noções de condução/guia e julgamento/instituição aplicadas à razão, verificamos como o itinerário da alma no conhecimento probatório da realidade divina apresenta, para além da escalada em subida hierarquizante do sensível até Deus, o conhecimento como o movimento de perfazimento da realidade conhecida em eternidade, dado que a razão assenta e está fundamentada na verdade eterna e imutável, e todo ato cognitivo é por ela conduzido/orientado e adjudicado/instituído, o que, em última instância, equivale a afirmar que a eternidade se perfaz na realidade conhecida, precisamente no átimo temporal do instante em que se reconhece qualquer conhecimento como verdadeiro. Para tanto, trata-se de verificar como, em cada nível do conhecimento em ascensão, o passo seguinte está suposto - na verdade o contém e perfaz, fundamentando-o - no anterior, de maneira que a etapa posterior, necessária e permanentemente, ratifica e adjudica a etapa anterior. E, assim como o instante, ao instituir a totalidade temporal, é figuração da eternidade2, o conhecimento em ascensão perfaz e figura a absolutidade na veracidade, através da percepção imediata e perenemente simultânea ao seu perfazimento da totalidade da ordenação harmoniosa e universal dos seres (De ordine); da funcionalidade do ato imaginativo presente na simultaneidade verificada entre as percepções sensível/concreta e interior/espiritual (De quantitate animae); bem como nos sobreditos atos de condução e julgamento efetuados no perfazimento do conhecimento universal (De líbero arbitrio) / This dissertation intends see the occurrence of the itinerary of souls ascension in the knowledge of truth and science, according to the description given in De libero arbitrio, with suport in the parallels lectures presents in the dialogues De ordine and De quantitate animae, composed in the Augustines Cassissiacum - Rome period (386-396 AD). Referring to intelectual ascension exposted in Book II of De libero arbitrio, and based on the notions of driving/guide and judgment/institution, in the rational way, we verified like the itinerary of the soul in probatory knowledge of divine reality shows, in addition to climbing \"hierarchical elevation\" of a sensibility to God, the knowledge of how the movement of factoring of reality known in eternity, as the reason rests and is founded on the eternal and unchangeable truth, and every cognitive act is driven/oriented and award/established by reason, which, ultimately, is equivalent to saying that eternity is known totals in this reality, precisely in the temporal instant that one recognizes any knowledge as true. For this purpose, it is to see how, at each level of knowledge on the rise, the next step is supposed to - actually contains and makes up reasons it - the previous, so that the subsequent necessary step and permanently, ratifies and awards the previous step. And just like the instant, by introducing the temporal totality, is like a previous or figuration of eternity, also knowledge and totals rising figure the absoluteness truthfulness through the immediate perception - and its perennially simultaneous factoring - the totality of universal and harmonious ordering of beings (De ordine); the functionality of the imaginative act in this concomitance observed between sensitives perceptions and interiority (De quantitate animae); as well as the aforesaid acts of conduct and judgment made in making of universal knowledge (De libero abitrio)