Product management as an organizational system has a long history of practice, which predates most modern academic management research. Its activities span the external environment of the firm, while simultaneously spanning across internal functional specialties of the organization. Thus product management obtains, codifies, simplifies and stores external information making it available to a responsive organization, which uses it to establish competitive advantage and ultimately superior performance. Building on the resource based view of the firm and boundary theory, these spanning activities, which are heterogeneously dispersed across firms, are considered organizational capabilities. Drawing upon the extant product management literature, this research uses product management as a proxy for boundary spanning capabilities of the firm. These capabilities are then empirically measured against two well established firm capabilities; market orientation and firm-level innovativeness. This research addresses a gap in the literature by establishing product management as a set of firm-level capabilities, distinct from the well established constructs of market orientation and innovativeness. Results indicate that external product management capability, defined as channel bonding activities, fully mediates the market orientation – firm performance relationship, while firm level innovativeness continues to have a small mediating effect on performance. Internal product management capabilities, defined as market and technical integration are shown to negatively moderate the external product management capability - firm performance relationship. Theoretical implications include establishing a link between boundary theory and the resource based view of the firm. Practical implications include the strong relationship between external spanning capabilities and firm performance and the dampening effect of cross-functional integration on firm performance. This empirical link between product management boundary spanning practices and how firms ultimately perform could assist practitioners in allocating resources and managing the relationship between the marketing and technological factions of the organization. Most importantly this research establishes the hereto untested link between product management capability and firm performance.

This study primarily investigates the determinants of CEO membership of New Zealand (NZ) boards, and the effect of CEO board membership on firm performance, for publicly-listed NZ firms between 1997 to 2008. The project is conducted using a unique hand-collected panel dataset containing information about CEO participation on the board, firm characteristics, firm performance, ownership, and firm governance. The sample covers the twelve-year period. The sample statistics of CEO board membership reveal that on average, approximately 30% of NZ CEOs do not sit on their company board. In addition, the number (percentage) of incidences of CEOs off their company board has been increasing. Specifically, the percentage of CEOs off the board was approximately 20% in 1997 but 42% in 2008. Models examining the determinants of CEO board participation indicate that the probability of CEO board membership is significantly related to the opacity of firms' information environment and the strength of firms' governance environment. Specifically, the probability of CEO board membership is significantly affected by firm size, firm age, percentage of independent directors, board ownership, and multiple directorships in independent companies. In particular, firm size and percentage of independent directors on the board possess economic significance. The negative association between the probability of CEO board membership and the strength of firms' governance environment is consistent with CEO utility maximization. I also find that although CEO board membership is positively related to ROA, ROE and Jensen's alpha in basic regression models, the positive effect observed in accounting performance models disappears after controlling for self-selection. In other words, firms with better accounting firm performance tend to appoint their CEOs on the board. This may attribute to the possibility that CEO board membership is optimally determined by shareholders. The evidence from a market-based model also reflects shareholder interests after controlling for the negative self-selection behavior. As an additional analysis, I examine the determinants of different degrees of CEO board involvement where CEOs on the board are categorized into CEO-director and CEO duality (the CEO also holds the position of the chairman of the board). This analysis shows that a number of explanatory variables have a non-linear relationship with the degree of CEO board involvement. For example, CEO board involvement is negatively related to firm age and multiple directorships in independent companies but positively related to their squared terms. To the contrary, CEO board involvement is positively related to Tobin's Q ratio and percentage of independent directors but negatively related to their squared terms. Moreover, basic regression results examining the effect of the extent of CEO board involvement on firm performance reveal that dual firms and CEO-off-the-board firms are associated with lower accounting firm performance than CEO-director firms, but dual firms are associated with better Jensen's alpha and CEO-off-the-board firms are associated with lower Jensen's alpha. The robustness analysis finds that the negative effect of CEO duality on operating performance is significantly mitigated by self-selection and the effect of CEOs off the board on operating performance is intensified by self-selection. In other words, after taking into account the self-selection bias, CEO duality status provides strong evidence for CEO utility maximization whereas CEOs off the board are optimally chosen given the underlying characteristics. However, the results from the market-based models show the exact opposite story after controlling for the self-selection bias: CEO duality is optimally chosen whereas the costs of CEOs off the board are greater than their benefits in firms with CEOs off the board, providing evidence for CEO utility maximization.

This study investigates the relation between family firms and acquiring firm performance for our sample of Taiwanese mergers and acquisitions between 1999 and 2013. We find that cumulative abnormal returns of family acquirers on average outperform those of nonfamily acquirers by 2.17% three days around the announcement. Family acquirers obtain greater abnormal returns even after controlling for both firm characteristics such as firm size, book to market, prior return, public target and deal characteristics such as year dummy and mode of payment. Furthermore, we explore the potential impact of the deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights on family acquiring performance. In the sample of Taiwanese mergers and acquisitions, the deviation is not the significant factor to cause a negative influence. As a result, family acquirers with the advantage of eliminating agency problems may generate more benefits than nonfamily acquirers.

What operational factors can explain the performance differences between manufacturing firms? Scholars have produced a significant volume of research that examines the linkages between operational factors (resources and practices) and firm performance. There is agreement that organizational capabilities mediate the relationship between operational factors and firm performance. However, due to the numerous and sometimes contradictory definitions of organizational capabilities in the literature and because organizational capabilities includes non-operational factors, it has been suggested that operational capabilities, as a sub construct of organizational capabilities, is more appropriate for establishing an empirical relationship between operational factors and firm performance. Scholars have argued that process improvement practices facilitate the development of operational capabilities, which can consequently lead to improved firm performance. Other scholars have argued that process improvement practices facilitate organizational knowledge creation, which can also influence firm performance. We integrate these two theoretical perspectives into a single conceptual model that better explains the relationship between knowledge-creating practices and firm operational performance. Specifically, we argue that knowledge-creating practices play a significant role in developing a firm’s operational capabilities, which in turn, influence firm operational performance. This research investigates the existence of a relationship between organizational knowledge creation and firm operational performance that is mediated by operational capabilities.

This paper determines the relationship between the crude oil price and the financial performance of International Oil Companies (IOCs) of the Eurozone during the last decade (from 2004 to 2013). This study is conducted around a multiple regression model with panel data with the financial performance ratios (ROA, ROE, Profit Margin) as dependent variables and the crude oil price as independent variables. A knowledge gap is visible since the crude oil price was never used as an independent variable in relation to the financial performance ratios of IOCs. In addition, the IOCs in the Eurozone have not been studied since most studies focuses on the United States and Asia. Moreover these studies focus on stock returns rather than financial performance. The research follows a quantitative approach by assessing the relationship of the crude oil price with financial performance of IOCS during the 10-year period (from 2004 to 2013) for 11 companies from 10 countries. The purpose of the study is to determine the effect of the crude oil prices on the financial performance of oil producer companies on a 10-year period using a multiple regression model with panel data. The research question therefore is:What is the relationship between the crude oil price and the International Oil Companies’ financial performance in the Eurozone during the last ten years (2004-2013)?The empirical results show that the crude oil price has a negative relationship with the financial ratios and that the crisis had an impact during that time period on the financial performance of the IOCs. It is also noted that the debt level and the size of IOCs have a strong relationship with their financial performance. The findings on the relationship between the crude oil price and the financial performance of IOCs are opposed to the results of Dayanandan & Donker study (2011). The findings of this research paper are relevant for investors and researchers looking to assess the performance of the Oil & Gas Industry so as its determinants.

My dissertation focuses on foreign entrepreneurs—individuals who establish firms outside of their native countries. Despite the prevalence of foreign entrepreneurs, their strategic choices have received little attention in the research literature. For example, when starting a firm, an entrepreneur must decide whether to manage the business personally or hire a local manager, yet we know little about how this choice affects firm performance. To examine this issue, in the first study I use a novel dataset of foreign entrepreneurial firms in Russia and a visa policy change as an instrument for the owner-manager choice. Contrary to the expectation that foreign entrepreneurs would underperform local managers due to the liability of foreignness, I find that foreign owner-managers can benefit their firms: Exogenous assignment of a local manager in place of a foreign owner-manager reduces profits. Foreign owner-managers benefit their firms by hiring cheap native-country labor as well as through reduced agency costs. The second study examines how private benefits of occupying a managerial position affect an entrepreneur’s choice between owner-management and hiring an agent. I show that foreign entrepreneurs with a strong desire to reside in a host country are more likely to become owner-managers. These results are consistent with the idea that entrepreneurs expecting to gain private benefits from managing their firms are more likely to become owner-managers. Moreover, I demonstrate that entrepreneurs are willing to substitute the non-pecuniary benefits associated with relocation for firm profit. These findings add to a growing literature exploring the role of personal preferences in entrepreneurs’ strategic decisions, such as location choice and ownership structure. The third study examines the impact of media coverage on the location choices of foreign firms. Publicly available media information has largely been ignored by the location literature, perhaps because its impact on location choice is expected to be trivial. This study challenges this assumption: Using a new instrument for media coverage (a major anniversary of a city’s establishment date), I show that extensive foreign media coverage of a city increases the number of foreign entrants. Moreover, this effect is strongest for socially and geographically distant firms and entrepreneurs.

員工持股信託計劃（Employee Stock Ownership Plans，ESOPs）在美、日等國已行之多年，相關研究也相當多。反之，臺灣企業自實施員工持股信託計劃以來，少有專論持股信託之實證研究發表。本文即是想探討臺灣企業實施員工持股信託後對公司績效的影響。本文以在國內某家銀行承作持股信託二年以上的公司為樣本，探討企業實施員工持股信託計畫與公司績效的關連性，實證結果發現在企業實施員工持股信託計劃之後的前三年，其資產報酬率、淨利率及成長機會有明顯上升的趨勢，其中員工持股信託對公司有短期的激勵效果，但其效果會隨著時間遞減，再進一步加入控制變數之結果顯示，員工分紅持股信託對公司績效表現具有較正面的影響，對員工之激勵效果較佳。 / In the US and Japan, Employee Stock Ownership Plans（ESOPs）have been practiced for more than 30 years, and related empirical studies are also abundant . However, similar studies have seldom been conducted in Taiwan. The purpose of this paper to examine whether there is significant impact on corporate performance that adopted ESOPs in Taiwan. We choose firms which have adopted ESOPs for two years or longer in a specific bank as our sample. We find that certain measures of corporate performance such as ROA、PM、Tobin's Q, improve significantly within the first three years after the plans went into effect. In general, ESOPs have positive effects on firms in the short run. However, this positive effect decreases gradually. Our results suggest that firms adopting employee bonus trust have better performance in our sample.

The rapid growth of financial markets and the increasing diffusion of corporate ownership have placed tremendous emphasis on the effectiveness of corporate governance in resolving agency conflicts within the firm. This study investigates the corporate governance and firm performance/failure relation by implementing various econometric modelling methods to disaggregate causal relations and spurious correlations. Using a panel dataset of Australian firms, a comprehensive suite of corporate governance mechanisms are considered; including the ownership, remuneration, and board structures of the firm. Initial ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed-effects panel specifications report significant causal relations between various corporate governance measures and firm outcomes. However, the dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) results indicate that no causal relations exist when taking into account the effects of simultaneity, dynamic endogeneity, and unobservable heterogeneity. Moreover, these results remain robust when accounting for the firm??s propensity for fraud. The findings support the equilibrium theory of corporate governance and the firm, suggesting that a firm??s corporate governance structure is an endogenous characteristic determined by other firm factors; and that any observed relations between governance and firm outcomes are spurious in nature. Chapter 2 examines the corporate governance and firm performance relation. Using a comprehensive suite of corporate governance measures, this chapter finds no evidence of a causal relation between corporate governance and firm performance when accounting for the biases introduced by simultaneity, dynamic endogeneity, and unobservable heterogeneity. This result is consistent across all firm performance measures. Chapter 3 explores the corporate governance and likelihood of firm failure relation by implementing the Merton (1974) model of firm-valuation. Similarly, no significant causal relations between a firm??s corporate governance structure and its likelihood of failure are detected when accounting for the influence of endogeneity on the parameter estimates. Chapter 4 re-examines the corporate governance and firm performance/failure relation within the context of corporate fraud. Using KPMG and ASIC fraud databases, the corporate governance and firm outcome relations are estimated whilst accounting for the firms?? vulnerability to corporate fraud. This chapter finds no evidence of a causal relation between corporate governance and firm outcomes when conditioning on a firm??s propensity for fraud.

Concentrated corporate ownership prevails in most countries, so the relationship between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders is an important principle-agent problem. Tunnelling, the transfer of assets and profit for the benefit of controlling owners, is the most important way of expropriating small shareholders. While tunnelling is rampant in emerging economies and even some developed countries, related research lacks convincing evidence. On the other hand, large shareholders sometimes use private funds to prop up firms in financial distress. Although there is plenty of anecdotal and indirect evidence on propping, it lacks direct large-sample examination. This study presents a pooled cross-sectional analysis of 4373 publicly listed companies in China between 2001 and 2004. The analysis not only examines the effects of various variables on the exploitation of related party transactions by controlling owners for tunnelling and propping, and also investigates the effects of tunnelling and propping on firm performance and valuation. The study reveals that the presence of controlling shareholders and higher control rights lead to higher levels of tunnelling. Conversely the existence of other large shareholders reduces the magnitude of tunnelling. In addition, the study shows that pyramidal-controlled firms and firms owned by the State display more incidences of tunnelling. When firms have better investment opportunity, however, their controlling shareholders tend to divert fewer funds for their private gains. It is also found that controlling shareholders offer funds to financially stricken firms under their control. This is the first study that finds direct evidence on the occurrence of propping although not all badly-performing firms are propped up. / While tunnelling negatively affects operating performance and firm valuation, propping has a positive effect on firm valuation. The occurrence and magnitude of tunnelling is greater than that of propping. Propping only occurs to partial firms in financial distress, yet there is no improvement in those firms’ performance. As propping from new controlling owners is more a way of back-door listing, they tend to engage in tunnelling when their control is secure. In short, when legal protection of minority shareholders is weak, controlling owners tend to tunnel for private benefit. Hence policymakers and regulators must recognise that to eliminate widespread expropriation, the establishment of strong corporate governance in well-functioning institutions and strong legal enforcement is important. Lower levels of tunnelling in years 2003 and 2004 justify the positive effect of stringent regulation. Yet, more needs to be undertaken beyond the legal and regulatory level such as an allowance for diversified corporate ownership and the transformation of non-floatable shares to be floated on the exchange to align interests of large and minority shareholders.

The rapid growth of financial markets and the increasing diffusion of corporate ownership have placed tremendous emphasis on the effectiveness of corporate governance in resolving agency conflicts within the firm. This study investigates the corporate governance and firm performance/failure relation by implementing various econometric modelling methods to disaggregate causal relations and spurious correlations. Using a panel dataset of Australian firms, a comprehensive suite of corporate governance mechanisms are considered; including the ownership, remuneration, and board structures of the firm. Initial ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed-effects panel specifications report significant causal relations between various corporate governance measures and firm outcomes. However, the dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) results indicate that no causal relations exist when taking into account the effects of simultaneity, dynamic endogeneity, and unobservable heterogeneity. Moreover, these results remain robust when accounting for the firm??s propensity for fraud. The findings support the equilibrium theory of corporate governance and the firm, suggesting that a firm??s corporate governance structure is an endogenous characteristic determined by other firm factors; and that any observed relations between governance and firm outcomes are spurious in nature. Chapter 2 examines the corporate governance and firm performance relation. Using a comprehensive suite of corporate governance measures, this chapter finds no evidence of a causal relation between corporate governance and firm performance when accounting for the biases introduced by simultaneity, dynamic endogeneity, and unobservable heterogeneity. This result is consistent across all firm performance measures. Chapter 3 explores the corporate governance and likelihood of firm failure relation by implementing the Merton (1974) model of firm-valuation. Similarly, no significant causal relations between a firm??s corporate governance structure and its likelihood of failure are detected when accounting for the influence of endogeneity on the parameter estimates. Chapter 4 re-examines the corporate governance and firm performance/failure relation within the context of corporate fraud. Using KPMG and ASIC fraud databases, the corporate governance and firm outcome relations are estimated whilst accounting for the firms?? vulnerability to corporate fraud. This chapter finds no evidence of a causal relation between corporate governance and firm outcomes when conditioning on a firm??s propensity for fraud.