“The Stable marriage problem (SMP) is basically the problem of finding a stable matchingbetween two sets of persons, the men and the women, where each person in every group has a listcontaining every person that belongs to other group ordered by preference. The first ones to discovera stable solution for the problem were D. Gale and G.S. Shapley. Today the problem and most of itsvariations have been studied by many researchers, and for most of them polynomial time algorithmsdo not exist. Lately genetic algorithms have been used to solve such problems and have oftenproduced better solutions than specialized polynomial algorithms. In this thesis we study and showthat the Stable marriage problem has a number of important real-world applications. It theexperimentation, we model the original problem and one of its variations and show the benefits ofusing genetic algorithms for solving the SMP.” / Program: Magisterutbildning i informatik

Pensar sobre a felicidade não é um exercício particularmente recente. Desde os gregos antigos, pensar sobre a felicidade e propor aquilo que ela significa faz parte da história dos Homens. Em meio a esse longo percurso, de mais de dois mil anos, o tema continua polêmico, sendo entendido de diferentes formas mesmo após ser investigado intensamente como objeto científico desde a segunda metade do século XX. Neste trabalho, a partir de três questões provocadoras (\"por que um mesmo objeto gera conceitos tão diferentes?\", \"por que os recentes achados científicos, com evidências de causalidades confiáveis, não têm sido capazes de aprofundar a compreensão do que é felicidade e não são indicadores de caminhos para se promover felicidade?\" e \"como a ciência poderia estudar a felicidade?\") traçou-se os objetivos a seguir: (1) apresentar definição abrangente de felicidade; (2) identificar inconsistências entre conceito, objetivos e fundamentos nas pesquisas atuais sobre a felicidade; (3) apresentar uma forma de a ciência investigar a felicidade de modo coerente e rigoroso. Para tal, analisaram-se diferentes proposições de felicidade na filosofia, na ciência (especialmente a Psicologia Positiva) e na política, buscando aquilo que há de comum em relação ao conceito. A partir de referencial construcionista social e do conceito de performatividade, chegou-se, ao entendimento de que felicidade \"aquilo que determinada pessoa entende ser, em dado momento, a melhor forma de se viver a partir de sua relação dialética com o mundo\". Entender a felicidade dessa maneira evidencia seu caráter líquido, em constante transformação. Mais promissor do que estudar seu aspecto estável, é estudá-la enquanto objeto em constante transformação. Quanto mais se tenta aprisioná-la e torná-la mensurável, mais complexidade lhe é acrescentada (ao invés de inteligibilidade). É por tal razão que a empreitada empirista da Psicologia Positiva, na medida em que fragmentou o conceito, não fertilizou a discussão sobre o tema. Ao invés disso, acrescentou novos sinônimos e correlatos, bem como exigiu abandonar importantes discussões e adotar termos vagos para definí-la. Ainda, é importante considerar o caráter performativo de se falar sobre a felicidade. Por ser um tema de interesse tão amplo, comunicações sobre a felicidade evidenciam capacidade de interferir no modo com que as pessoas vivem. Falar sobre a felicidade nunca será um simples falar. De modo geral, pode-se apontar para três oportunidades de pesquisa em relação ao tema: aprofundar as consequências de se utilizar o conceito e a rede de construção de credibilidade em torno dele; entender aquilo que faz o entendimento do conceito mudar e de que forma; utilizar o conceito como forma de acessar características individuais e sociais relevantes / Happiness is not a particularly recent subject. Since ancient Greece, the exercise of thinking about happiness and proposing what it means is part of human history. In the midst of this long journey, of more than two thousand years, the subject remains controversial. It is understood in different ways even after being intensively investigated as a scientific object since the second half of the twentieth century. This work derives from three provocative questions (\"why does the same object generate such different concepts?\", \"why recent scientific findings, with evidence of reliable causality, have not been able to deepen the understanding of happiness and are not indicators of ways to promote happiness?\" and \"how could science study happiness?\"), outlining the following objectives: (1) introduce a broad and comprehensive definition of happiness; (2) identify inconsistencies between concept, goals and foundations in current research on happiness; (3) present a way for science to investigate happiness in a coherent and rigorous way. To accomplish these three objectives, different propositions of happiness were analyzed in philosophy, in science (especially Positive Psychology) and in governmental practice, seeking what is common in relation to the concept. From a social constructionism referential and using the concept of performativity, it came to the understanding that happiness \"is what a particular person understands to be, at a given moment, the best way to live from their dialetic relationship with the world.\" Understanding happiness in this particular way reveals its liquid character, implying it is in constant transformation. More promising than studying its stable aspect is to study it as an object in constant transformation. The more you try to imprison it and make it measurable, the more complexity you add (rather than intelligibility). It is for this reason that the empiricist enterprise of Positive Psychology did not fertilize the discussion on the subject. Instead, it added new synonyms and correlates, as well as required abandoning important discussions and adopted vague terms to define it. Still, it is important to consider the performative character of happiness. Because it is a subject of such wide interest, talking about happiness shows an ability to interfere with the way people live. Talking about happiness will never be a simple speech. In general, it is possible to point to three research opportunities in relation to the subject: to deepen the consequences of using the concept and the network of credibility building around it; understand what makes the understanding of happiness to change and in what ways; use the concept as a way to access relevant individual and social characteristics

A Ética de Espinosa é uma ontologia do necessário, da qual se pode deduzir uma ontologia da alegria. Por isso mesmo, na experiência humana dos afetos, o processo liberador que leva à felicidade é determinado pela experiência da alegria. Tudo começa no campo mesmo das alegrias passivas, campo no qual a tristeza também marca a sua presença. Presença negativa, de um lado, na medida em que implica diminuição de nossa capacidade de agir e pensar; de outro lado, presença positiva, enquanto experiência docente: a tristeza, não por si mesma, mas por sua relação específica com a alegria, ensina o corpo e a mente a lidar melhor com as alegrias a que somos desde sempre determinados a buscar, nas suas mais diversas formas. Da contrariedade afetiva envolvida na experiência das alegrias e tristezas pode nascer um desejo de verdadeira felicidade. Mas o processo liberador é marcado igualmente pela presença de um certo tipo de alegria: a hilaritas, um contentamento muito particular, uma alegria equilibrada que concorda por excelência com a razão, cujo trabalho abre diante de nós as trilhas que levam à felicidade. A razão, porém, só pode realizá-lo enquanto afeto de alegria ela mesma. Neste caso, inicia-se o percurso liberador. / The Ethics of Spinoza\'s ontology of the necessary, from which to infer an ontology of joy. Therefore, in the experience of human emotions, the liberator process that leads to happiness is determined by the experience of joy. It starts in the field same of passives joys, field in which the sadness also mark their presence. Negative presence, a hand, as it involves reduction of our capacity to act and think, on the other hand, positive presence, while teaching experience: a sadness, not for itself but for its specific relationship with the joy, teaches body and mind to cope better with the joys that we are always determined to seek, in its various forms. The contrariety involved in the affective experience of joys and sadness can lead to a desire for true happiness. But the liberator process is also marked by the presence of a certain kind of joy: the hilaritas, a very special joy, a joy balanced that agrees with reason par excellence, whose work opens before us the trails that lead to happiness. The reason, however, can only accomplish it as affection of joy itself. In this case, will begin the liberator route.

In my dissertation Happiness and Superlative Value in the Eudemian Ethics, I analyze dimensions of the Eudemian Ethics (EE) that, as I see it, make the EE a distinctive contribution to ethics. The EE discusses a superlative excellence called kalokagathia, the virtue of being-beautiful-and-good, which does not figure in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE). The agent who possesses kalokagathia is the best agent of Aristotle’s EE. Scholars tend to hold that the practically wise person, the phronimos, or the theoretically wise person, the sophos, are the best agents of the NE. If my reading of the EE is right, then the EE and the NE conceive differently of the best agent. This is salient in both treatises’ construals of the unity of the virtues. In the NE, the unity of the virtues includes the character virtues and phronêsis. In the EE, it additionally includes the virtues of theoretical thinking, or so I argue. The EE starts with what I call the Superlative Thesis (ST): happiness is what is best, most beautiful, and most pleasant of all. I take this beginning to be programmatic. Aristotle aims to show how these three kinds of value combine in the best human life, rather than coming apart. The Pleasure Thesis (PT) is the most contested aspect of ST: happiness is the most pleasant thing of all. On my reading, Aristotle fully embraces PT. In laying out his proposal for the best human life, the Aristotle of the EE develops a distinctive kind of naturalism, which I call Natural Goods Naturalism. I reconstruct this position in two steps: by interpreting the EE’s function argument; and by exploring the notion of natural goods, which is central to the EE, but does not figure in the NE. In sum, my dissertation argues that the EE contains a distinctive and under-appreciated option within ancient ethics, and that it contains ideas that are relevant to today’s virtue ethics and ethical naturalism.

A tese procura sustentar que Adam Smith atenua seu posicionamento crítico com relação à busca por acumulação de riquezas nas sociedades comerciais entre a Teoria dos Sentimentos Morais e A Riqueza das Nações. Tal mudança se associa a um novo personagem das relações econômicas que surge na última dessas obras: o acumulador de capital. A diferença entre a busca pela fortuna e a acumulação de capital, segundo defendemos, se associa a uma diferença conceitual entre riqueza e capital, diferença essa que se deveria, conforme nossa concepção, à influência do pensamento fisiocrático, e particularmente do Quadro Econômico de Quesnay, sobre a ideia smithiana de progresso da opulência, e mesmo, talvez, sobre sua visão geral da sociedade. Sustentamos, finalmente e esse é nosso ponto principal , que Adam Smith procurou conciliar tal mudança com o que havia escrito em sua primeira obra. Essa tentativa se patenteia por aspectos sutis, porém relevantes, das modificações que o filósofo introduziu no texto da Teoria dos Sentimentos Morais em sua última revisão, de 1790. / The thesis sustains that Adam Smith attenuates his critical position with regard to the search for wealth accumulation in commercial societies between the Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations. Such a change is associated with a new \"character\" of economic relations that emerges in the last of these works: the accumulator of capital. The difference between the search for fortune and the accumulation of capital, we argue, is associated with a conceptual difference between wealth and capital, which is owed, according to our conception, to the physiocrat\'s influence over the Smithian idea of \"progress of opulence,\" and perhaps even over his general view of society. Finally, we argue - and this is our main point - that Adam Smith sought to reconcile this change with what he had written in his first work. This attempt was evidenced by subtle but relevant aspects of the modifications that the philosopher introduced in the text of the Theory of Moral Sentiments in his last revision of 1790.

The purpose of this research was to determine if a relationship exists between McGregor’s Leadership Theory and subjective states of well-being among higher educational leaders in state and community colleges in Florida. The underlying supposition was that the preference for what Douglas McGregor called Theory X or Theory Y assumptions, indicate intrinsic assumptions about human nature and are linked to subjective happiness. Quantitative data were collected through electronic administration of two surveys and demographic questions to higher educational leaders at 28 state and community colleges in the State of Florida. These instruments measured levels of well-being through the PERMA-Profiler instrument and preferences for Theory X or Theory Y using the Theory X and Theory Y Managerial Assumptions Inventory. Multiple correlation and regression analyses were used to address the research questions. This study detected no relationship between well-being and happiness in this sample. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2017. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-23T14:09:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniel do Valle Pretti texto completo.pdf: 6365107 bytes, checksum: b36aa3d4a5b3f6985a25066df5cad404 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-03-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / In this dissertation we aim to present different ways of understanding men using the relationship between being and movement in the thought of Aristotle. According to the philosopher, nature is the proper scope to investigate beings that can change.Therefore, first of all we will analyze the importance of men in the formulation of the definition of movement. With that purpose in mind, we will contrast art and nature.Consequently, we will be able to investigate the Aristotelian understanding about the best possible realization for men s life, or rather, happiness. We sustain that the notion of happiness is onto-cosmologically grounded on the close relationship between the notion of movement and the first principle that opens the Nicomachean Ethics. At last, we will analyze what it means to guide itself by reason, since we have in view the search for self-fulfillment. In other words, we will investigate how men form a moral virtue by and for a reality in change. / Apresentaremos nesta dissertação algumas maneiras de compreender o homem por meio da relação entre ser e movimento no pensamento de Aristóteles. Para o filósofo, a natureza é o âmbito próprio para se pensar os entes passíveis de mudança. Assim, analisaremos, em primeiro lugar, a importância do humano na formulação da definição de movimento. Para tanto, utilizaremos do contraste entre arte e natureza. Em seguida, estaremos aptos para investigar a compreensão aristotélica sobre a melhor realização possível para uma vida humana, a saber, a felicidade. Veremos como a noção de felicidade está onto-cosmologicamente fundamentada pela imbricação entre a noção de movimento e pelo princípio primeiro que abre a Ética Nicomaquéia. Por fim, analisaremos o que significa orientar-se pela razão, tendo em vista a busca pela plena realização de si. Ou seja, investigaremos como o homem forma uma virtude moral a partir e para a lida com a realidade em mudança.

Submitted by DANILO NOBRE DOS SANTOS (danilo_nobre@hotmail.com) on 2017-02-13T21:07:05Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação -Danilo Nobre dos Santos.pdf: 638138 bytes, checksum: b5bc84195a88966b7126b8fe54599911 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by LUIZA DE MENEZES ROMANETTO (luizamenezes@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2017-02-15T18:49:31Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 santos_dn_me_mar.pdf: 638138 bytes, checksum: b5bc84195a88966b7126b8fe54599911 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-02-15T18:49:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 santos_dn_me_mar.pdf: 638138 bytes, checksum: b5bc84195a88966b7126b8fe54599911 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-09-29 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Santo Agostinho apresenta a posse de Deus como o porto da felicidade. Deste modo, veremos que com o diálogo De Beata Vita, o autor oferece uma resposta para tal questionamento, a partir de uma noção de felicidade que consiste no perfeito conhecimento de Deus. Assim, abordaremos a referida questão com a finalidade de tornar mais evidente a concepção agostiniana de felicidade e realização humana. / Saint Augustine has the possession of God as the happiness of the harbor. Thus, we seethat with the De Vita Beata dialogue, the author offers na answer to this question, from a sense of happiness consists in the perfect knowledge of God. Thus, we will address that question in order to make it clear the Augustinian conception of happiness and human fulfillment.

This thesis examines the doctrine of happiness within the Jonathan Edwards corpus and seeks to understand its function and significance as it relates to Edwards's broader theological project. A close examination of both the internal development and the Early Modern intellectual context of Edwards's thought reveals that spiritual happiness is of central importance to Edwards's 'end of creation' project. Scholars commonly assume that the burden of Edwards's teleological writings is a theocentric defense and promotion of the glory of God in the face of an increasingly anthropocentric Enlightenment. However, this study demonstrates that, notwithstanding Edwards's adherence to the Reformed tradition's high view of God's glory, the early and enduring concern of Edwards's teleological project is the proof and defense of spiritual happiness as ultimate telos from a Reformed perspective. Edwards's purpose to defend the teleological status of happiness is primarily exposed by the development of Edwards's teleology in his Miscellanies notebook and related theological treatises such as Discourse on the Trinity and End of Creation, especially as Edwards engages rival teleological visions that tend to subordinate happiness. While Edwards's teleological conviction regarding happiness is inspired by his own Puritan and Reformed heritage and his early profound religious experience, he subsequently pursues the proof and defense of his Reformed teleology of happiness in response to the increasing tendency of Reformed and non-Calvinist Enlightenment thinkers to subordinate the teleological status of happiness. During the Early Modern period, Reformed theologians frequently subordinate happiness relative to godliness, and especially the glory of God, and Enlightenment thinkers increasingly make practical virtue and usefulness toward the common good the ultimate telos of human existence at the expense of spiritual happiness, which intellectual trends Edwards engages for the sake of defending his Reformed teleology of happiness. The first stage of the development of Edwards's teleology of happiness is marked by his conversion and subsequent profound experiences of spiritual happiness, and by his efforts that follow during the early 1720s to prove happiness as ultimate telos, primarily on the basis of Edwards's doctrine of divine goodness. During the second stage of development, Edwards works to defend happiness as ultimate telos from a comprehensively biblical and Reformed perspective. Edwards spends the rest of his career developing his doctrines of God and the Trinity, the work of redemption, and the glory of God primarily for the sake of defending his Reformed teleology of happiness, which I suggest, significantly influences and shapes Edwards's theology.

Submitted by Jorge Silva (jorgelmsilva@ufrrj.br) on 2018-03-14T17:50:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2017 - Everton de Jesus Silva.pdf: 1131282 bytes, checksum: e3ce430e9429df1849896da190eb904a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-03-14T17:50:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2017 - Everton de Jesus Silva.pdf: 1131282 bytes, checksum: e3ce430e9429df1849896da190eb904a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-06-23 / The aim of this dissertation is to investigate eudaimony from the work Nicomachean Ethics, searching to investigate what would have led Aristotle to identify the greatest good attainable by man with happiness. We try to demonstrate that happiness represents, for Aristotle, a self-sufficient good, sought by itself and not by any other thing. It is a dominant good, that is, the good for excellence, not the openness to the covering of other goods. Otherwise, the search for a happy life would be endless and never fully realized. We also find that happiness shouldn?t be understood as permanently secured possession, because even a considered happy man to be happy will have no guarantee that he will have his happiness permanently secured, because eudaimony should be understood as an activity that requires an active life. In Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle presents two types of eudaimony, one that occurs in the contemplative plane and the other one that is realized through the ethical virtues. Happiness on the contemplative plane is considered the most perfect and the most self-sufficient, allowing man to realize that which is most divine in himself, which is reason, whereas happiness provided by the ethical virtues can only enable man human happiness, hence the Aristotelian assertion that it is a kind of secondary happiness. / O objetivo desta disserta??o ? fazer uma investiga??o sobre a eudaimonia a partir da obra ?tica a Nic?maco, procurando investigar o que teria levado Arist?teles a identificar o maior bem ating?vel pelo homem com a felicidade. Procuramos demonstrar que a felicidade representa, para Arist?teles, um bem autossuficiente, buscado por si mesmo e n?o em fun??o de outra coisa. Ela ? um bem dominante, isto ?, o bem por excel?ncia e n?o a abertura para o abarcamento de outros bens. De outro modo, a busca por uma vida feliz seria algo intermin?vel e jamais se daria plenamente. Verificamos ainda que a felicidade n?o deve ser entendida como uma posse permanentemente assegurada, isso porque mesmo um homem considerado feliz n?o possuir? nenhuma garantia de que ter? sua felicidade segura de maneira permanente, porque a eudaimonia dever? ser compreendida como uma atividade que requer uma vida ativa. No livro X da ?tica a Nic?maco, Arist?teles apresenta dois tipos de eudaimonia, uma que se d? no plano contemplativo e a outra que se realiza atrav?s das virtudes ?ticas. A felicidade que se d? no plano contemplativo ? considerada a mais perfeita e a mais autossuficiente, permitindo ao homem realizar o que existe de mais divino em si, que ? a raz?o, enquanto que a felicidade proporcionada pelas virtudes ?ticas s? pode possibilitar ao homem uma felicidade tipicamente humana, da? a afirma??o aristot?lica de ser ela um tipo de felicidade secund?ria.