<p> Understanding the role of the public school teacher and how that role has changed over recent history is critical to comprehending the nature of teaching and teachers in American schools. This 2-phase, hypothesis-generating study was undertaken to develop a deeper understanding of the role of the teacher and, in particular, the ways that role has remained stable or changed across the historical process. It explored how the role of the teacher is construed by current, experienced teachers through personal construct systems and through their shared enactments of a social construct system proposed as an extension to personal construct theory. Departing from the traditional disciplinary approaches that have characterized much of the previous research on this topic and which have been limited in scope and method by their associated paradigms, this study adopted an interdisciplinary, mixed methods approach that integrated the perspectives of several disciplines and professional fields. It employed the repertory grid technique (RGT) from personal construct theory to elicit personal constructs from 16 experienced teachers in intensive RGT interviews to identify shared constructs. Those shared constructs were then employed as an inferred social construct system in an anonymous online survey of experienced practicing teachers (<i>n</i> = 258) to identify the ways in which that social construct system is enacted in construing the role of the teacher across the historical process, envisioning the future role of the teacher, and perceiving the ideal role. Latent class analysis indicated heterogeneity in teachers' views regarding the role and substantial perceived change across recent history, suggesting a lack of role consensus. The study also compared the participants' views of the ideal role of the teacher with their expectations for the future. The findings have implications for future research and for educational theory, policy, and practice.</p><p> <i>Keywords:</i> education history, repertory grid technique, teacher role</p>

What are moral values and where do they come from? David Hume argued that moral values were the product of a range of passions, inherent to human nature, that aim at the common good of society. Recent developments in game theory, evolutionary biology, animal behaviour, psychology and neuroscience suggest that Hume was right to suppose that humans have such passions. This dissertation reviews these developments, and considers their implications for moral philosophy. I first explain what Darwinian adaptations are, and how they generate behaviour. I then explain that, contrary to the Hobbesian caricature of life in the state of nature, evolutionary theory leads us to expect that organisms will be social, cooperative and even altruistic under certain circumstances. I introduce four main types of cooperation: kin altruism, coordination to mutual advantage, reciprocity and conflict resolution and provide examples of "adaptations for cooperation" from nonhuman species. I then review the evidence for equivalent adaptations for cooperation in humans. Next, I show how this Humean-Darwinian account of the moral sentiments can be used to make sense of traditional positions in meta-ethics; how it provides a rich deductive framework in which to locate and make sense of a wide variety of apparently contradictory positions in traditional normative ethics; and how it clearly demarcates the problems of applied ethics. I defend this version of ethical naturalism against the charge that it commits "the naturalistic fallacy". I conclude that evolutionary theory provides the best account yet of the origins and status of moral values, and that moral philosophy should be thought of as a branch of natural history.

The study of perfection, progress and evolution is a central theme in the history of ideas. This thesis explores this theme seen and understood as part of a discourse in the new fields of anthropology, sociology and psychology in the nineteenth century. A particular focus is on the stance taken by philosophers, scientists and writers in the discussion of theories of human physical and mental evolution, as well as on their views concerning the nature of social progress and historical change. The wisdom and feasibility of improving the human species is discussed alongside an analysis of new methods of investigating and measuring physical and mental attributes of the human organism. The instruments used to assess the development of mind, body and society are described, and are viewed as part of an increased emphasis on the use of technology as an integral part of modern life, and as a means toward the ordered gathering of information in social-scientific practice. An international perspective is taken by observing the way in which ideas about the physical and mental development of humankind was discussed in light and consequence of English and European scientific exploration in the Southern Hemisphere. Further, an evaluation is made of the manner of the spread of new thought in the social sciences from the intellectual and cultural �centre� of England and Europe to the Anglo-European community located at the �periphery� in Australia in the late nineteenth century. In particular the educative role played by the non-professional enthusiast as a pivotal conduit for the dissemination of these ideas is highlighted and linked back to a significant tradition of amateur scholarship as a central phenomenon in the study of the history of ideas.

This thesis examines late Ottoman discourses on the soul and emotions as reflected by a large corpus of psychological literature under the umbrella of ilm-i ahval-i ruh (the science of the states of the soul, psychology) in relation to the rise of the rhetoric concerning the 'new man' - an imaginary 'Ottoman individual' educated in 'new schools' to be in complete harmony with Ottoman modernization. It posits that the 'new man' was subjected to a process of design as a producing unit whether in possession of a soul or not, while the conceptual framework of the 'individual' was being formulated. The secondary literature on Ottoman modernization has illustrated intellectual efforts for designing the 'new man' in relation to the formation of national identity. In doing so it has focused on the process of indoctrination and the dissemination of normative accounts. Drawing on that literature, this thesis intends to complicate the picture and look beyond the normative accounts. By approaching the debate between materialism and spiritualism as a psychological argument and revolving the story around the metaphors of 'man as machine' and 'man as animal', it aims to display the influence of the scientific and technological changes that shaped the material as well as the intellectual culture these authors experienced. In an attempt to go beyond what lies beneath the national and religious underpinnings of the imagined 'new man', this thesis maintains a tight focus on the psychological writings of four intellectuals - all of whom gave serious thought to the debate about the soul: Abdullah Cevdet, Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, Baha Tevfik, and Mustafa Şekip Tunç. By shifting the centre of focus of the rhetoric about the 'new man' from national or religious identity formation to the pressing concerns about economic and technological progress, it shows an Ottoman entanglement with science and technology and a deeper Ottoman inquiry into the conceptual framework of the individual. Accordingly it argues that the psychological literature on the soul and emotions bears testimony to the acute concern for how to integrate individuals into the frenzy of progressive discourses in the late Ottoman Empire. This concern constituted common ground among intellectuals from different backgrounds. Yet they held different understandings of the notion of progress and often gave different answers to deeper philosophical questions pertaining to the new man's soul, emotions, will, and relations with collective units. Such complexity demonstrates that multiple trajectories were possible before national identity formation took concrete forms in a much later context, and that transnational patterns of 'constructing the subjects' through psychological studies played an equally important role.

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O objetivo desta tese consiste em avaliar, sob um prisma fenomenológico, as concepções presentes na obra de Santo Agostinho referentes ao uso da reflexão como instrumento do conhecimento de si. Para isso, analisamos as obras As confissões (397d.C.) A trindade (416 d.C.) e fragmentos de outras obras em que ele aborda o tema da reflexão. Consideramos dois diferentes níveis em que as ideias se encontram presentes nas obras: nas descrições de estados subjetivos narrados em primeira pessoa por Agostinho nas Confissões e nas exposições feitas por Agostinho em outras de suas obras. Investigamos alguns temas que se mostraram de grande importância para se compreender o papel da reflexão em Agostinho. Em primeiro lugar, o espírito humano entendido como uma realidade íntima, um ser reflexivo e imaterial. Em segundo lugar, analisamos o papel do método reflexivo em suas investigações acerca da memória, da percepção e das inter-relações entre o corpo e a mente. Em terceiro lugar procuramos observar como Agostinho compreende a vida do espírito em suas inter-relações com o mundo e com Deus. Na segunda parte da tese, os temas foram retomados e abordados sob um prisma fenomenológico. Para isso procuramos expor e avaliar, no que tange aos temas abordados por Agostinho, o percurso metodológico traçado por Husserl em Ideias 1 (1913) e Ideias 2 (1952). Na terceira parte da tese, fizemos uma análise comparativa entre as concepções e os métodos adotados pelos dois autores. Observamos que, embora haja diferenças no modo de aplicar a reflexão, muitas das conclusões tiradas por Husserl já haviam sido antecipadas por Agostinho, embora, neste, com um menor nível de rigor. Merecem destaque os seguintes pontos abordados primeiramente por Agostinho e posteriormente desenvolvidos por Husserl: 1) a mente é uma realidade íntima e indubitável; 2) a essência da mente é sua reflexividade, sua capacidade de apreender-se a si mesma; 3) a atenção ou intentio voluntatis é um fator constituinte do ato de percepção e de qualquer ato do cogito; 4) o tempo é abordado por Agostinho não como realidade independente do espírito, mas sim como uma realidade vinculada ao espírito, de modo que o passado, o presente e o futuro são articulados com a memória, a atenção e a expectativa. Em suma, o objetivo das análises e comparações é contribuir para uma visão mais rica e complexa da história do método reflexivo e, ao mesmo tempo, defender sua legitimidade e seu valor cognitivo. A reflexão é instrumento intelectual capaz de fornecer não só conhecimentos seguros sobre a estrutura apodíctica da consciência e dos diferentes estratos da pessoa humana, como também é válida para que cada indivíduo possa conhecer a si mesmo em sua singularidade. E essa individualização é marcada por fatores psíquicos, corpóreos e pelo mundo espiritual do sujeito, isto é, pelo mundo da vida. / The objective of this thesis is to evaluate, under a phenomenological perspective, the concepts present in the work of St. Augustine regarding the use of reflection as a tool of self-knowledge. We study the works Confessions (397AD) The Trinity (416AD) and fragments of other works in which he addresses the topic of reflection. We consider two different levels at which ideas are in his works: the descriptions of subjective states narrated in first person by Augustine in the Confessions and the presentations made by Augustine in his other works. Some themes have proved of great importance for understanding the role of reflection in the Augustine\'s works. Firstly, we analyze how Augustine develops the concept of mind understood as an inner reality, self-consciousness, characterized as immaterial substance. Secondly, we examined the role of the reflective method in his researches on memory, on perception and on the strata of the human person. Thirdly we analyzed how Augustine understands the life of the spirit in their interrelations with the world and with God. In the second part of the thesis, the issues addressed in the first part were reexamined under a phenomenological perspective, according to the methodological approach outlined by Husserl in Ideas 1 (1913) and Ideas 2 (1952). In the third part of the thesis, we made a comparative analysis of concepts and methods adopted by the two authors. We observe that although there are differences in the way of applying the reflection, many of the conclusions drawn by Husserl had already been anticipated by Augustine, albeit with a lower level of rigor. In particular the following points addressed first by Augustine and later developed by Husserl: 1) the mind is an intimate and undeniable reality. 2) The essence of mind is its reflexivity, its ability to know herself directly. 3) attention or intentio voluntatis is a constituent factor of the act of perception 4) the time is approached by Augustine not as a reality independent of mind, but as a reality linked to the spirit, so that the past, present and future are articulated with memory, attention and expectation. In short, the purpose of analysis and comparisons is to contribute to a richer and complex history of the reflective method and at the same time maintaining its legitimacy and its cognitive value. Reflection is an intellectual instrument able to provide apodictic knowledge of the structure of consciousness, about the different strata of the human person, and helps individuals to know himself in his uniqueness. And that individualization is marked by psychological factors, by corporal\'s factors and by his world of life.

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo abordar a forma como se constelaram as angústias de influência para que Winnicott se tornasse o autor que conhecemos em resumo, como se passou a autorização de Winnicott. Suponho que a obra escrita de um autor é a ponta visível de um processo que denominei autorização; a ideia é que todo autor lida, em alguma medida, com angústias associadas à significação que o escrever e/ou o ser-autor assumem para ele. Essa autorização conflui, do ponto de vista assumido aqui, com um reconhecimento e uma afirmação de si perante os pares e as figuras de autoridade que retomam, na chave do grupo de destino da escrita do autor, as questões que a criança tem na fase edípica; tal leitura remonta em muito ao tema da angústia de influência, trabalhada por Harold Bloom, e ao testemunho que Ronald Britton oferece da mesma problemática em relação ao meio psicanalítico. No caso singular de Winnicott, considero o processo de autorização como estando muito relacionado à busca por autenticidade; esta, por sua vez, é entendida como associada ao próprio reconhecimento da existência e da legitimação das formas singulares de afirmação do autor. À sua maneira, Winnicott parece colocar em novos termos a questão em torno da autoridade, na medida em que subverte a problemática da submissão a uma lei maior que funcionaria como tabu a questão passaria por criar uma via própria, singular, por equacionar os imperativos estabelecidos, mas, nesse mesmo gesto de reconhecimento, ele incute uma inovação. A formulação final a que chego, tendo em vista esses aspectos, é que a liberdade de leitura ou a incorporação criativa da tradição ocupam em Winnicott o lugar que a infelicidade cotidiana ou a aceitação da castração assumem em Harold Bloom; na autorização winnicottiana, a liberdade e a idiossincrasia parecem ocupar o lugar que, na triangulação edípica, compete ao pai formulação certamente paradoxal, mas que busca fazer justiça ao pensamento do autor / This work aims to discuss how influence anxieties constellate in the manner through which Winnicott became the author we know, and how we know him (or it) in brief, how Winnicott authorization proceeded. We believe the written oeuvre of an author is the distinguishable tip of the process we named authorization; we understand an author deals, somehow, which anxieties connected to the signification what writing and/or being an author assume to him. This authorization surmounts the process of recognition and self-standing among peers and authority figures, and bring forth in the process of writing for an audience the issues the child undertakes through its oedipical phase; this understanding owes much to the discussions on the anxiety of influence, established around Harold Bloom\'s publications, and to the testimony granted by Ronald Britton about the same topic in regard to his own experience in the psychoanalytical field. In Winnicott\'s case we alleged the authorization process is profoundly related to his search for authenticity, and authenticity, in its turn, has been associated with the recognition of existence and of singular means of existence. In his terms Winnicott seems to have subverted the problematic around the submission to a higher law established as a taboo the problem would be subverted into being that of the search and creation of a particular and singular path equating the manners involved; in that very constitution of the problem the subversion of the classical portrayal of the authorization amidst established and unquestionable authorities, a paradoxical revolution insinuates itself. We claim lastly that in Winnicott\'s work the freedom of thought and the creative incorporation of tradition occupy the place that formerly the everyday misery and the acceptance of castration assumed, e.g. in Harold Bloom\'s work. In Winnicott\'s authorization process freedom and idiosyncrasy occupy the place that, in the classical oedipical triangulation, the father occupies formulation undoubtedly paradoxical, but apparently appropriate to the author\'s theory

Edith Stein (1891-1942) foi uma proeminente discípula de Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), fundador da corrente teórico-metodológica da Fenomenologia. Seguindo de maneira fiel ao mestre, contudo fornecendo contribuições autênticas à escola fenomenológica, Stein ocupouse principalmente da temática da estrutura da pessoa humana e da fundamentação daquelas ciências que possuem o homem como objeto de estudo. Dentre estas ciências, destaca-se a Psicologia Científica. Nesse sentido, o objetivo desta pesquisa foi realizar uma análise acerca da fundamentação filosófica e antropológica que a fenomenologia de Edith Stein pode apresentar para a Psicologia Científica, no que tange à problemática da definição do objeto e método desta ciência. Dentro da perspectiva da Historiografia da Psicologia Científica, utilizamos como fonte primária a obra Introdução à Filosofia de Stein. Nesta obra, uma das principais questões colocadas pela autora é compreender o que é a natureza e a subjetividade e como é possível conhecê-las. Ao discuti-la, Stein propõe uma nova concepção de subjetividade, ancorado no conceito de pessoa humana, que contempla a própria corporeidade e a constituição tripartida, porém essencialmente unitária, da pessoa. A alma constitui o princípio vital, sinal de uma interioridade formada pela estrutura psíquica que, por sua vez, possui qualidades sensíveis e espirituais. É possível apreender e conhecer a vida anímica de uma pessoa por meio da expressividade de seu corpo, através das vivências intencionais da percepção externa, percepção interna e empatia que devem, portanto, ser consideradas na metodologia das ciências que pretendem o conhecimento de pessoas humanas. Pudemos concluir que a obra analisada pode ser inserida no núcleo das discussões ainda presentes na Psicologia, podendo lançar luzes, em questões referentes à origem do conhecimento; à natureza da pessoa, suas semelhanças e diferenças em relação aos outros animais; a evidenciação da estrutura espiritual humana, contemplando a questão da liberdade e da volição, assim como sua relação com os aspectos psíquicos (cognitivos e afetivos) e sensíveis; a unidade essencial psicofísica e espiritual da pessoa; a constituição da personalidade; o conhecimento de outras pessoas e de si mesmo; e a ação do homem no mundo. Além disso, as análises de Stein presentes nesta obra nos fornecem esclarecimentos epistemológicos referentes às ciências da subjetividade, as possibilidades de interdisciplinaridade e a observação à autonomia de cada área. / Edith Stein (1891-1942) was a prominent disciple of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), founder of the theoretical-methodological proposal of Phenomenology. Following faithfully to the master, yet providing authentic contributions to phenomenological school, Stein mainly dealt with the issue of the structure of the human person and the foundation of those sciences who hold the man as the object of study. Among these sciences, we can lay emphasis on Scientific Psychology. Thereby, the objective of this research was to conduct an analysis about the philosophical and anthropological foundation that Edith Stein\'s phenomenology may offer to Scientific Psychology, regarding the problem of defining the object and method of this science. From the perspective of Historiography of Scientific Psychology, we used as primary source Stein\'s work Introduction to Philosophy. In this work, one of the main issues raised by the author is to understand what nature and subjectivity are and how we can get to the knowledge of them. Discussing it, Stein proposes a new conception of subjectivity, anchored in the concept of the human person, which includes our own corporeality and the essential tripartite yet united constitution of the human being. The soul is the vital principle; indication of an interiority formed by a psychic structure that, in turn, has sensible and spiritual qualities. It is possible to learn about a person\'s soul\'s life through the expressiveness of her body, through intentional acts of external perception, inner perception and empathy that should therefore be considered in the methodology of the sciences who claim the knowledge of human being. We concluded that Stein\'s work can be inserted into the core of the discussions still present in Psychology and may shed light on questions concerning the origin of knowledge; the nature of the person; their similarities and differences from other animals; the disclosure of the human spiritual structure, contemplating the subject of freedom and volition, as well as its relationship with the psychic (cognitive and affective) and sensitive aspects; the essential unity of psychophysical and spiritual structure; the constitution of personality; the knowledge of others and of oneself; and the action of man in the world. Furthermore, Stein\'s analyzes provide epistemological clarification regarding the sciences of subjectivity, as well as the possibilities of interdisciplinarity and the autonomy of each observation area.

As idéias psicológicas foram introduzidas no estado do Rio Grande do Sul com a criação das primeiras instituições de ensino superior no final do século XIX. Entre elas se destacam a Faculdade de Medicina (1898) e a Faculdade de Direito (1900). Esta tese teve como objetivos principais descrever as idéias psicológicas presentes nestas duas faculdades, e investigar a relação da ciência psicológica com os demais campos de conhecimento. Foram pesquisados os acervos das bibliotecas das respectivas faculdades, bem como os arquivos históricos do estado e da cidade de Porto Alegre. Os livros e teses encontrados foram catalogados e listados quanto a sua procedência, data de publicação e área temática principal. A pesquisa nos arquivos históricos auxiliou na descrição do contexto sócio-cultural no qual estas faculdades se desenvolveram através do exame da legislação e dos jornais da época. Todos os documentos foram analisados com base nas abordagens da História das Idéias Psicológicas e da História das Ciências. Identificaram-se seis categorias utilizadas na análise dos dados, a saber, “Idéias psicológicas e concepções de higiene no contexto sul-rio-grandense”, “Concepções de adoecimento mental e a constituição da Psiquiatria no Rio Grande do Sul”, “Criminologia, identidade e o estabelecimento de normas na sociedade sul-rio-grandense”, “Saúde pública e cuidados com a infância: Primeiras experiências em higiene escolar”; “Estratégias de diagnóstico e de tratamento das doenças mentais nas perspectivas da Psiquiatria e Neurologia sul-rio-grandense” e “A relação do homem com o ambiente: Primeiras experiências da aplicação da teoria psicossomática na Medicina do Rio Grande do Sul”. Os resultados foram analisados em suas similaridades e especificidades com outras investigações a respeito da História das Idéias Psicológicas no Brasil e compõem um levantamento das idéias psicológicas no Rio Grande do Sul entre 1890 e 1950. / The psychological ideas were introduced in Rio Grande do Sul with the foundation of the Medicine School (1898) and the Law School (1900). This thesis aimed to describe the psychological ideas in these two schools and to establish the relationship between psychology and others realms of knowledge in the Rio Grande do Sul. The libraries of Medicine School and Law School, the historical archives of Porto Alegre and Rio Grande do Sul were investigated. The books and the thesis founded were enlisted by their origin, time of publication and thematic areas. The research at the historical archives helped to describe the socio-cultural framework where the schools were developed trough the analysis of legislation and newspapers. All documents were analyzed by History of Psychological Ideas and History of Science theories. Six categories were identified: “Psychological ideas and hygiene conceptions in Rio Grande do Sul”, “Mental health conceptions and Psychiatry in the Rio Grande do Sul”, “Criminology, identity and behavior at sul-rio-grandense society”, “Public health and childhood care: First experiences in school hygiene”, “Diagnosis strategies and mental health treatment on Neurology and Psychiatry perspectives”, “The relationship between man and environment: First experiences in the application of psychosomatic theory in Rio Grande do Sul”. The results were a panorama of psychological ideas in Rio Grande do Sul between 1890 and 1950.

Esta pesquisa busca traçar as rotas pelas quais deu-se a incorporação de categorias psicológicas na construção histórica da infância criminalizada no caso brasileiro. Ao reconstruir este percurso, defende-se a tese de que a emergência de determinados saberes psicológicos no Brasil foi estruturante nessa construção no período analisado, que compreende a Primeira República. Sob essa premissa, é analisado o lugar de categorias psicológicas na constelação que demarcou o discurso sobre a infância criminalizada, pretendendo-se assim apontar marcas da sedimentação de tais categorias. Para tanto, foi necessário investigar como o controle social de numerosas crianças gerou uma norma própria ao grupo classificado como objeto de ciência. A pesquisa indicou que o objeto “infância criminalizada" não é unívoco ao ser delineado nas sentenças jurídicas, nas medidas policiais, no diagnóstico psiquiátrico ou nos projetos pedagógicos. Procurou-se descrever a dispersão desses objetos durante a Primeira República, apreender os interstícios que os distinguem e apontar o jogo múltiplo de categorias psicológicas nessa dispersão. Nesse rumo, procurou-se também enfatizar em que medida o discurso psicológico foi permeável a opções filosóficas ou morais, e atravessado radicalmente pela prática política. / This research traces the routes through which psychological categories were incorporated into the historical construction of criminalized childhood, in Brazil. In this reconstruction, it is supported that the emergence of certain psychological knowledge in Brazil has served as a frame for the mentioned building in the First Republic. It is analyzed the role of psychological categories in the constellation that has circumscribed the discourse on criminalized childhood. We intended, in this way, to delineate the marks of sedimentation of such categories. In order to achieve that goal, it was necessary to investigate how the social control of numerous children, covering the same age ranges, originated a proper rule to the group classified as a scientific object. The research indicated that the meaning of the “criminalized childhood" object is not the same when outlined in legal sentences, police measures, psychiatric diagnosis or pedagogical projects. It was necessary to describe the scattering of such objects during the First Republic, to grasp with the interstices that distinguish them and to point out the multiple game of psychological categories in that scattering. Following this thread, we also try to stress in which way psychological discourse was exposed to philosophical or moral options and radically crossed by political practice.