Esta dissertação reserva-se à analise do conceito de intradutibilidade presente na teoria da linguagem desenvolvida por John Locke, no Livro III, das palavras, de seu Ensaio sobre o entendimento humano, de 1690. Essa teoria visa rejeitar conceitos em voga no séc. XVII, especialmente o inatismo, advogando em favor do argumento de que o entendimento é adquirido por meio da experiência sensorial, sendo esta particular a cada indivíduo. Nesse sentido, a forma como as ideias são apreendidas na mente de cada indivíduo é também particular; a linguagem, portanto, é vista pelo autor como o instrumento responsável por socializar essas ideias particulares e permitir a comunicação. Entretanto, somada à crítica ao inatismo, Locke, no Livro III, questiona i. o emprego abusivo das palavras no contexto científico, ao elencar uma série de ações realizadas por debatedores para impressionar seu ouvinte muito mais do que transmitir um conhecimento e refletir sobre a Verdade e ii. a natureza imperfeita das palavras que compõem a linguagem especialmente devido ao seu comportamento arbitrário, ou seja, sua relação com as ideias que devem representar não é natural, mas imposta pelo homem. Ademais, Locke afirma, também como contraposição às discussões da época, haver duas essências: a nominal, acessível à nossa apreensão e delimitada pelas palavras, e a real, cuja totalidade é inapreensível pela experiência e, por extensão, pelas palavras. Assim, ao defender a intradutibilidade, argumenta em favor de um novo método de investigação filosófica, que leva em consideração a particularidade do falante, a arbitrariedade na relação entre as palavras e as ideias e a impossibilidade de 7 se acessar a realidade em sua totalidade. A afirmação da intradutibilidade não exclui a prática da tradução, reconhecida por John Locke no mesmo livro III, defende apenas o supracitado. Por isso, esta dissertação também apresenta uma tradução desse Livro III para uma demonstração prática da teoria predicada por esse autor e uma reflexão das escolhas realizadas no intuito de adequar-se aos argumentos levantados e analisados ao longo de toda a dissertação. / It is intended to analyse the concept of translatability in John Lockes theory of language, which is developed in the Book III, of words, of his Essay concerning human understanding, in 1690. He rejects the 17th century scholars and the inatism theory claiming that the knowledge is apprehended by sense experiences, which are particular to each one. Hence the ideas are also particular, the language, by that means, is the main instrument used by the humans to convey their thoughts and whose chief end is communication. Locke also rejects other two things: i. the abuse of words causing obscure discourses whose only purpose is to impress the hearer, not to present the truth and ii. the imperfection inherent to the nature of words, because its relation to the ideas is arbitrary and not based on any pattern in nature. Thus, Locke arguments that there are two types of essences: a nominal defined by words and a real, which is impossible to describe, because we have only access to reality through our senses. By defending intranslatability Locke is actually defending a new philosophical method which includes the fact that language is particular to each speaker, the arbitrary relation between words and ideas and the impossibility to comprehend thoroughly reality. However it does not excludes translation itself, recognized by Locke in the same Book III; translating it portrays his theory and proposes a debate concerning the choices made to better convey his view.

The main goal of this research is to analyze the concept of formation within John Locke's work. But this debate is inserted on the moral perspective defended by the philosopher in his work's set. On another hand, we realize that the formation intended by the author has in the gentleman, its main target. This discussion involves, besides the philosopher's educational texts, the theoretician contributions within the Essays on the Law of Nature, Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Two Treatises of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration. Although, we don't excuse the adoption of other manuscripts from his own and from the commentators we judge pertinent. Once we conclude it, we will reinforce the arguments shown, demonstrating the relevance of the philosopher's educational thought. At last, as a methodological procedure we adopt the reading, analysis and the interpretation of the selected texts. / O objetivo principal desta pesquisa é analisar o conceito de formação contido na obra educacional de John Locke. Mas este debate está inserido na perspectiva moral defendida pelo filósofo no conjunto de sua obra. Por outro lado, percebemos que a formação pretendida pelo autor tem no gentleman, o seu alvo central. Esta discussão envolve, além dos textos educacionais do filósofo, as contribuições teóricas contidas nos Ensaios sobre a lei de natureza, Ensaios sobre o entendimento humano, Dois tratados sobre o governo e as Cartas sobre a tolerância. Entretanto, não dispensamos a adoção de outros manuscritos do próprio e dos comentadores que julgamos pertinentes. Ao concluirmos, reforçaremos os argumentos apresentados, demonstrando a relevância do pensamento educacional do filósofo. Por fim, como procedimento metodológico adotamos a leitura, análise e interpretação dos textos selecionados.

Esta dissertação reserva-se à analise do conceito de intradutibilidade presente na teoria da linguagem desenvolvida por John Locke, no Livro III, das palavras, de seu Ensaio sobre o entendimento humano, de 1690. Essa teoria visa rejeitar conceitos em voga no séc. XVII, especialmente o inatismo, advogando em favor do argumento de que o entendimento é adquirido por meio da experiência sensorial, sendo esta particular a cada indivíduo. Nesse sentido, a forma como as ideias são apreendidas na mente de cada indivíduo é também particular; a linguagem, portanto, é vista pelo autor como o instrumento responsável por socializar essas ideias particulares e permitir a comunicação. Entretanto, somada à crítica ao inatismo, Locke, no Livro III, questiona i. o emprego abusivo das palavras no contexto científico, ao elencar uma série de ações realizadas por debatedores para impressionar seu ouvinte muito mais do que transmitir um conhecimento e refletir sobre a Verdade e ii. a natureza imperfeita das palavras que compõem a linguagem especialmente devido ao seu comportamento arbitrário, ou seja, sua relação com as ideias que devem representar não é natural, mas imposta pelo homem. Ademais, Locke afirma, também como contraposição às discussões da época, haver duas essências: a nominal, acessível à nossa apreensão e delimitada pelas palavras, e a real, cuja totalidade é inapreensível pela experiência e, por extensão, pelas palavras. Assim, ao defender a intradutibilidade, argumenta em favor de um novo método de investigação filosófica, que leva em consideração a particularidade do falante, a arbitrariedade na relação entre as palavras e as ideias e a impossibilidade de 7 se acessar a realidade em sua totalidade. A afirmação da intradutibilidade não exclui a prática da tradução, reconhecida por John Locke no mesmo livro III, defende apenas o supracitado. Por isso, esta dissertação também apresenta uma tradução desse Livro III para uma demonstração prática da teoria predicada por esse autor e uma reflexão das escolhas realizadas no intuito de adequar-se aos argumentos levantados e analisados ao longo de toda a dissertação. / It is intended to analyse the concept of translatability in John Lockes theory of language, which is developed in the Book III, of words, of his Essay concerning human understanding, in 1690. He rejects the 17th century scholars and the inatism theory claiming that the knowledge is apprehended by sense experiences, which are particular to each one. Hence the ideas are also particular, the language, by that means, is the main instrument used by the humans to convey their thoughts and whose chief end is communication. Locke also rejects other two things: i. the abuse of words causing obscure discourses whose only purpose is to impress the hearer, not to present the truth and ii. the imperfection inherent to the nature of words, because its relation to the ideas is arbitrary and not based on any pattern in nature. Thus, Locke arguments that there are two types of essences: a nominal defined by words and a real, which is impossible to describe, because we have only access to reality through our senses. By defending intranslatability Locke is actually defending a new philosophical method which includes the fact that language is particular to each speaker, the arbitrary relation between words and ideas and the impossibility to comprehend thoroughly reality. However it does not excludes translation itself, recognized by Locke in the same Book III; translating it portrays his theory and proposes a debate concerning the choices made to better convey his view.

When observing the values which repeatedly appear in early American literature, we encounter ideas such as liberty, freedom, or the importance of the individual, but while property and ownership are often also core ideas and motivations for many Americans, their appearance is much more limited and excluded from certain contexts. However, property was always a key issue and economic profitability was always considered as foremost both on political and individual level. This can be seen all throughout American history since its beginning until the present, yet there is the curious trend of downplaying the importance of property in politically oriented text. While no one questioned its value in the past, Americans outwardly replaced property with liberty. Nevertheless, its importance cannot be hidden so easily and through careful examination it is shown as being understood as a pre-requisite of freedom and security, even as it is never the central focus of any major early American political text. This thesis explores the concept of property in the context of early American political writing in the area between eighteenth and nineteenth century; drawing from texts such as the Declaration of Independence, The Federalist, The Anti-Federalist Papers, Common Sense and other contemporary political pamphlets...

Thesis advisor: Richard Cobb-Stevens / The right of revolution in the social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke is a curious topic. This paper discusses the differences and similarities between the two philosophers’ discussions of this topic. It is argued that Hobbes and Locke differ most drastically on the notion of who the sovereign is. While Hobbes prefers to establish the sovereign as a demigod, Locke understands the sovereign as a mortal, and thus fallible, man. It is because of this distinction that Hobbes and Locke disagree on the notion of the right of revolution. Furthermore, the American Founding Fathers, including James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, inherited Locke’s perspective on this matter when arguing for the independence of the colonies. Finally, it is the conclusion of this paper that this notion of the right of revolution continues today, when observing the numerous political revolutions around the world. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Philosophy.

The aim of this dissertation is to shed light on an oft-overlooked aspect of Hobbes’ and Locke’s educational theories. Specifically, this dissertation examines the role of mothers in Hobbes’ Locke’s, and Wollstonecraft’s political theories and defends the claim that mothers have an overlooked, important role to play in civic society insofar as they contribute to educating children to become good members of civic society. To date, scholars working on Hobbes and Locke have largely focused on only one type of education and its relationship to civic society. Specifically, they have focused on civic education. Civic education refers to formal programs, such as day school or university curricula aimed at molding individuals into citizens or subjects, capable of sustaining a thriving commonwealth. However, when scholars focus on civic education, they miss part of the story surrounding how Hobbesian and Lockean education is implemented because not all of their educational program can be contained in formal schooling. In the Chapters 1 and 2 of the dissertation, I show that mothers play a role in educating future subjects and citizens in Hobbes’ and Locke’s theories by means of what I call civic socialization. Civic socialization refers to the informal processes by which children are educated to become good subjects and citizens who contribute to the wellbeing and stability of the commonwealth. In Chapter 3, I consider whether mothers’ role in civic socialization is compatible with early modern, liberal theories. Insofar as Hobbes and Locke are early modern, liberal thinkers, they maintain that men and women are naturally equal. However, mothers’ role in civic socialization often results in their subordination to fathers. Mary Wollstonecraft, although a figure in modern philosophy, is useful for showing this tension. In her theory, even when mothers are highly educated, their role in civic socialization often means that mothers must use their education for the benefit of their children and not for themselves. / 2020-11-27T00:00:00Z

John Locke claims both that ‘person' is a forensic term and that personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness. The aim of my dissertation is to explain and critically assess how Locke links his moral and legal account of personhood to his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of consciousness. My interpretation of Locke's account of persons and personal identity is embedded in Locke's sortal-dependent account of identity. Locke's sortal-dependent account of identity provides an important theoretical framework for my interpretation: It makes clear that Locke's account of personhood is to be considered separately from his account of personal identity. My approach gives full credit to Locke's claim that ‘person' is a forensic term, because I argue that persons, according to Locke, belong to a moral and legal kind of being: they are subjects of accountability. On this basis I argue that two components explain why Locke argues that personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness: firstly, his particular moral and legal conception of a person, and, secondly, his particular understanding of the conditions of just accountability and just reward and punishment. Given one accepts Locke's conception of a person and his understanding of the conditions of just accountability, it will be easy to see why Locke regards sameness of consciousness to be necessary for personal identity, but the more challenging question is whether sameness of consciousness is also sufficient. I critically assess this question by considering Locke's account of persons and personal identity within Locke's epistemological, metaphysical and religious views. I will argue that, at least from the divine perspective, the underlying ontological constitution has to be taken into consideration and that it is a verbal question whether Locke's term ‘consciousness' refers not only to phenomenologically given consciousness, but also to the underlying ontological constitution.

In the broadest sense, the three essays that form this dissertation address certain normative features in John Locke’s philosophy. “On Revolution: Arendt, Locke, and Republican Revisionism” deals with Hannah Arendt’s early republican revisionism that removes Locke’s influence from the American revolutionary period. Her (mistaken) belief is that Locke’s political philosophy encourages social disengagement and political apathy. In “One Body of People: Locke on Amerindians, Protestant Evangelism, and the Colonization of North America” I take seriously Locke’s religious devotion and reassess his colonial philosophy through an “evangelical” lens. It turns out his colonial thought was not motivated by “punishment” but by a perceived collective good. In “Friends in the State of Nature: John Locke and the Formation of Security Communities,” I explore the routinely overlooked fact that Locke characterizes humans as highly sociable and prone to friendship. To be sure, friendship and trust not only exist in the state of nature, they are what precipitate the contractual movement into civil society. This is particularly relevant given the fact that the realist tradition within International Relations almost reflexively characterizes the relationship between states as one of ruthless self ­interest. The way Locke speaks about the formation of political communities is highly reminiscent of “security communities,” a term popularized by Karl Deustch in the late 1950s, which describes groups of people who have integrated to such an extent that conflict can be managed in nonviolent ways. Locke characterizes the international community both in terms of moral communities (where different regions of the world share different values), and also in terms of economic communities of varying degrees of interdependence.

Toleration is a core liberal ideal, but it is not an ideal without limits. To tolerate the intolerant would be to violate the principles and purposes underlying liberal societies. This important exception to the liberal ideal of toleration is dangerous, however, in that we may make it too exclusionary in practice. That is, we may mistakenly apply it to peaceful, beneficial members of our communities as well as to the truly intolerant. In particular, some contemporary liberals see religion either as inherently intolerant and dangerous or as violating standards of public discourse that they feel are necessary to uphold liberalism's core ideals, including toleration. This work argues that we risk violating the liberal ideal of toleration in a hasty over-generalization about religious belief. Through an examination of the arguments of Roger Williams and John Locke, this work argues that religious belief can be compatible with toleration, and that the practice and popular value of liberal toleration has at least in part a religious origin. These authors, and believers like them, defended toleration, partially as a result of their own experiences of intolerance, but also because they saw toleration as a theological necessity. Thus, this work shows that we have misunderstood the relationship between religion and toleration. While some forms of religious belief may incite intolerance and violence, others provide a firm foundation for toleration. We must show care in distinguishing the two to avoid violating the fundamental liberal ideal of toleration. Moreover, it is important that we do so to foster civil comity and cooperation, as well as to sustain the other benefits that religious groups provide to liberal, democratic societies.

El enunciado sintético de la tesis puede expresarse así: Pese a las diversas posiciones encontradas, Locke mantendría un puesto de avanzada dentro de la corriente liberal, aunque por ciertos motivos -especialmente histórico-sociales- cabe advertir en su doctrina política un liberalismo "sui generis", con perfiles aristocráticos y colonialistas.