Doctor Legum - LLD / The crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity are customary international law crimes. The African continent has experienced quite a number of cases involving these crimes, and the continent's ability and willingness to prosecute offenders’ remains in doubt. As a result, in the past decade or so, non-African states have sought to institute proceedings against African leaders accused of perpetrating international customary law crimes. These attempts have taken two distinct formats, the first being the use of Universal Jurisdiction {UJ), and the second being the attempts by the International Criminal Court {ICC) to indict and prosecute African leaders. The African Union {AU) has vehemently opposed both these attempts on the grounds that they are inspired by neo-colonial thinking that is aimed at stifling peace and reconciliation efforts on the continent.Proponents of UJ argue that this principle is fundamental to international justice and the global fight to end impunity for international crimes. UJ allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed outside its territory and for which the normal jurisdictional links of nationality and passive personality do not exist. Although the concept of UJ has been part of international law for quite some time, its relevance today has been questioned by national courts and international judicial bodies. Its recent usage by both Belgian and French courts, as well as by international tribunals, such as the ICC, has attracted sharp criticism from many African states. Given that African states constitute the biggest block of signatory states to the Rome Statute, their voice cannot be ignored. Their principal concern is that the ICC is unfairly targeting African leaders for prosecution. The negative sentiment is also evidenced by some African leaders' deliberate refusal to comply with ICC requests or to cooperate in cases where warrants of arrest have been issued against African leaders, such as in the case of the Sudanese President, Omar Al Bashir, and the present prosecution of the Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy, William Ruto. Given the aversion shown by African states to ICC prosecution of state leaders, and attempts by some non-African states to resort to UJ in order to try African leaders, the question is whether African states themselves have a solution to the problem of impunity on the continent? The answer might lie, partly, in the age old concept of UJ, where individual African states might be able to exercise jurisdiction over the international crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It might also lie in the ability and willingness of African states to strengthen the Continent’s own, regional institutions by setting up an African international criminal tribunal, or strengthening an existing one to deal with these issues. It therefore becomes important to assess what the African standpoint on UJ is, as against what the practical realities are. In other words, what continental or regional institutions exist to combat impunity for international crimes: what do states do in fact?

The United Nations General Assembly adopted on the 20PthP of November 1989 the Convention on the Rights of the Child responding to the atrocities committed against the child, the deaths of children from armed conflict, and children suffering from diseases and hunger. Moreover, the UNGA adopted on May 25PthP, 2000 two Optional Protocols to the CRC relating to the involvement of children in armed conflict and to the sale of children, the use of the child for pornography and prostitution. The CRC, almost ratified by all states, contains a comprehensive list of Human Rights relating to children which should be respected, promoted, protected and fulfilled. The CRC guarantees children’s individual human rights strengthening the role of parents. The UNCRC defines in article 1 that a child is every human being below the age of 18 unless, in a particular state, the age of majority is achieved earlier and emphasizes on four general principles the best interest of the child, non-discrimination, the rights to life, survival and development and the right to participate. Furthermore, especially for children in armed conflict, the CRC sets up measures which all states parties must implement in order to protect them and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) also sets up some measures to protect them in armed conflict according to International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. Nevertheless, during armed conflict, it is almost impossible to respect all obligations set in IHL and IHRL. During the last twelve years, the Democratic Republic of Congo was a battlefield in which it has been estimated that 2 million children have been killed, more than 6 million have been injured during this armed conflict. For instance, they have suffered sexual violence, grave psychological trauma, malnutrition and diseases. All the six grave violations against children set by the UN Security Council in its resolution 1612 (killing or maiming of children, recruitment or use of child soldiers, rape and other forms of sexual violence against children, abduction of children, attacks against schools or hospitals, denial of humanitarian access to children) were committed during this period in the DRC. Therefore, the DRC is responsible for the violation of children’s rights set in the various legal instruments protecting children in period of armed conflict. Despite the responsibility of the state, armed groups or individuals are also recognized as criminally responsible of the violation of the rights of children within the Congolese jurisdiction only if the material elements are committed intentionally and with knowledge, according to article 30 of the International Criminal Court. However, the reparation of these violations may foresee restitution, compensation for damage suffered in the past, assurance against future breach of international obligations and an approach that of remedial justice and prevention because children represent our societies and their protection represents a right and a human security issue. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

The equity side of the court of exchequer "is by far the most obscure of all the English jurisdictions," declared Plucknett. The purpose of this essay is to shed some light upon this court and to explore its jurisdiction, to introduce its staff, to discover its procedures, to explain its equity records, and perhaps to render Plucknett's statement obsolete. Institutional history has an unfortunate tendency to dryness and remoteness, which coupled with the author's literary short-comings portends a tedious undertaking for the reader of this work. However, a reminder of the immense importance- of institutional history for both the lawyer and the historian will, hopefully, overcome this initial discouragement. Substantive law is inextricably intermingled with the procedures of the court; the practicalities of the prosecution of a lawsuit can never be neglected. Of initial and fundamental importance is that for which the petitioner prays. In practical terms this was a remedy for a grievance or a complaint; in larger terms and in the context of this study, this was the prayer for equitable relief. This study demonstrates that equity was bigger than the chancery and that others besides the lord high chancellor had a hand in its development . It is true that the court of chancery was the most important court of equity, but the existence of an alternative high court of equity in the exchequer had a significant effect upon the development of equity and upon the chancery itself.

The scope of this thesis is regulation (EC)No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters. The provisions of Regulation is aiming the improvement and simplification of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements within the territory of the EU. According to the title of regulation this tesis is diveded in several parts explaining the key elements of developing the other maxime of the EU-free movement of judgements. First part includes the general fundamentals for determination of jurisdiction in cases with transborder element which is essential for aplication of this regulation as a part of legislation on international private law. Thanks to the nearly identical wording of Brussels I Regulation and Convention dealing with the same matter from the year 1968, all legal opinions of European Court of Justice related to that Convention can be invoked nowdays. Second part and third part turn to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements in order to ensure the situation when "the declaration that a judgement is enforceable should be issued virtually automatically after purely formal checks of the documents supplied, without there being any possibility for the court to raise of its own motion on any of the ground for non-enforcement provided by this Regulation". The last part contents future trend in this sphere which can be seen from application of other regulation (European enforcement order, European order for payment procedure)giving rise to rapid and simple mechanism in specific cases. Especially it treats of cancellation special exequator proceeding which should be undertaken to achieve that foreign judgement would be enforceable.

This thesis investigates the problem of commencement of insolvency proceedings, content of an insolvency petition, the effects of insolvency proceedings and the decission about insolvency petition. In connection with the filing of insolvency petition focuses on issues of international jurisdiction. The paper also analyzed the empirical data relating to insolvency proposals. The aim is examining whether the current legal system of commencement insolvency proceedings can be misuse and whether the legal framework of international jurisdiction can be misuse. There are also examine various possibilities of misuse legislation. Also, the thesis focuses on the possible regulatory considerations.

No description available.

La réflexion sur le tiers dans le contentieux international a pour origine le constat d’une présence accrue des tiers dans le cadre du règlement juridictionnel des différends internationaux, questionnant la vision traditionnelle du procès international comme étant « la chose des parties ». Le tiers est défini négativement, comme toute entité qui n’est ni l’organe juridictionnel, ni les parties à l’instance. Tout au long de l’étude, il est procédé à une identification plus précise de cette notion à géométrie variable : selon la juridiction considérée et le type de procédure examiné, le tiers est un Etat, une organisation internationale, une personne privée physique ou morale. Dans le cadre d’un corpus de juridictions varié, la place du tiers dans le contentieux international est étudiée, en examinant successivement les aspects relevant de sa protection et de sa participation dans le contentieux international. En filigrane, l’étude appréhende la contribution des tiers au maintien de la paix, dans le cadre du règlement pacifique juridictionnel des différends internationaux. / The reflection on third entities in international litigation comes from the finding of an increased presence of “thirds” in the jurisdictional settlement of international disputes, thus questioning the traditional vision of the international trial as being “the thing of the parties”. The “third” is defined negatively, as any entity that is neither the jurisdiction nor the parties to the proceedings. Throughout the study, a more precise identification of this notion is developed : depending on the jurisdiction in question and the type of procedure examined, third entities are either States, international organizations, private (physical or moral) persons. Within the framework of diverse jurisdictions, the study apprehends the place given to third entities in international litigation, examining successively their protection and their participation. In the background, the study looks at the contribution of third entities to peacekeeping, as part of the peaceful settlement of disputes.

L’ambition de cette thèse est de proposer la mise en place d’un nouveaurèglement européen dont l’objectif est de donner aux juges des Etats membres lesmoyens pour protéger leur compétence juridictionnelle contre les revendications decompétence des juges des Etats tiers lorsque l’intérêt étatique le justifie. Il s’agit deleur octroyer des pouvoirs supplémentaires lorsqu’ils n’agissent pas dans le cadre del’espace judiciaire européen.Dans ses relations avec les Etats tiers, le juge européen devrait ainsi pouvoirprononcer des injonctions anti-suit pour protéger sa compétence, au soutien desclauses juridictionnelles mais aussi toutes les fois où les liens qu’il entretient avec lelitige sont d’une particulière densité, traduisant d’un intérêt public à trancher le litige.L’espace judiciaire européen devrait également concevoir un système de circulationunifiée des décisions émanant des juridictions des Etats tiers afin de faire coïnciderespace judiciaire commun et espace économique commun au stade de l’exécutiondes décisions. L’objectif ici est d’accroître l’influence économique des juridictionsde l’Union européenne. / This thesis proposes a new European regulation providing judges from theEuropean union with tools to protect their international jurisdiction – when publicinterests is involved – against attempts from Parties to avoid the European forum. Theaim of this proposal is to give European judges more prerogatives when they are notacting under the frame of the European Judicial area.When there is a conflict of jurisdictions with a non-European state, the European judgeshould be allowed to issue an anti-suit injunction when a strong link between the forumand the dispute exists (which induces the State’s interest to have the dispute ruled by itsjurisdictions). This should also be allowed so as to support jurisdiction clauses.Finally, the European union should provide a unique system regarding the recognitionand enforcement of decisions issued by non-European jurisdictions. The aim of thissystem would be to increase the economical influence of European jurisdictions.

No abstract / Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2019. / Public Law / LLM / Unrestricted

Official Development Assistance (ODA) or international development aid (defined as the transfer of official financing to promote the development and welfare of developing countries), is a highly influential and politically sensitive area of international relations. Though it is not governed by any international legal agreement, it displays remarkable cohesion across the major Northern donors in its modalities of governance, the coherence in its normative aims and in its institutional reform agenda. In order to understand why, this project focuses on the central, if overlooked, role of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as the key institutional locus of the international governance of ODA by donors. This project examines the legal nature of the international governance of ODA, tracing and critically analysing the link between the governance of ODA and governance by ODA. It demonstrates how the legal form of the international governance of ODA is central to the reach and effectiveness of the legal and institutional reform agenda promoted via ODA at national and international levels, and to contouring the legal and political subjectivities of donors and aid-recipient states in ways that escape formal legal and democratic recognition. Finding that mainstream legal analytical methods fail to fully capture the legal-juridical quality of the international governance framework of ODA, and the particular role of law therein, I develop a new analytical lens based on the concepts of ‘jurisdiction’ (as juris dictio) and the ‘signature.’ This lens reveals how ODA creates a distinct jurisdiction with its own internal legal logic, where donor and aid-recipient subjectivities and relations of authority are continually constructed and maintained by international governance instruments and practices developed during colonial and imperial governance eras under the League of Nations and Marshall Plan institutions. I demonstrate how this jurisdictional space is augmented by key legal, policy, bureaucratic and technocratic instruments of governance by the OECD and DAC, through patterns of juridification and reiteration.