This thesis comprises of three chapters. The first essay is sole-authored and is titled `Creditor Control Rights and Managerial Risk Shifting.' The second essay is titled `Creditor Control Rights and Product Market Competition' and is joint work with Professor Matthew T. Billett and MiaoMiao Yu. The third essay is sole-authored and is titled `Merger Waves, Pseudo Market Timing, and Post-Merger Performance.' Chapter one examines agency conflicts around violations of bank loan covenants. Recent evidence shows that corporate policies change significantly following financial covenant violations. These changes are attributed to increased creditor influence over borrowing firms in ways that benefit both shareholders and debtholders. In this essay, I investigate whether shareholders engage in activities counter to creditors' interests following violations. I find that the expected negative relation between volatility and investment reverses for firms once they violate a covenant, consistent with risk-shifting behavior. This behavior is more pronounced in firms with high CEO portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility and firms with high CEO equity ownership. Moreover, I document a significant increase in firm risk in the year following the violation. Overall, these findings suggest that even in the presence of increased creditor control risk shifting still occurs. The prior conclusions that shareholder-debtholder incentives are congruent at violations do not appear to be the case. Chapter two documents that debt covenants have a profound impact on firms' product market behavior. By examining financial covenant violations from 1996 to 2007, we show that once firms violate a covenant, they experience a substantial decrease in their market share. We also show that firms exhibit poor long-term abnormal returns following covenant violations. In contrast, their rivals grow market share and exhibit significantly positive abnormal returns after their peer firm violates a covenant. Overall, these findings suggest that creditor influence over firms have dramatic effects on product market outcomes and rival firm behavior. Chapter three questions whether managers time the market when they make merger decisions. Merger and acquisition waves seem to correspond with market tides, cresting with bull markets. A contentious debate exists over whether this trend indicates managerial market timing ability. Pseudo market timing, introduced by Schultz (2003, Journal of Finance 58, 483-517), provides an alternative hypothesis to explain abnormal performance following events even when managers cannot time the market. I find that acquiring firms which use stocks as the method of payment exhibit negative long-run abnormal returns in event-time, but not in calendar time. Simulations reveal that even when ex ante expected abnormal returns are zero (i.e. managers have no market timing ability), median ex post performance for acquirers is significantly negative when event-time is used. These findings support pseudo market timing as an explanation for acquiring firm underperformance in the context of stock mergers.

Growing energy use and greenhouse gas emissions have implied an increased attention to the development of renewable energy sources. Bioenergy from forest biomass is expected to be one of the cornerstones in reaching renewable energy targets, especially in forest-rich countries such as Sweden. However, forest biomass is a limited resource, and an intensified use of bioenergy could affect roundwood and forest products’ markets in several ways. The overall purpose of this thesis is to analyze price formation and resource allocation of forest raw materials in the presence of increased bioenergy demand. The empirical focus is on the competition for wood fibres between bioenergy use and the traditional forest industries, as well as synergy effects between the various sectors using forest raw materials. The methodologic approach is partial equilibrium modeling (forest sector model), and the geographical focus is on Sweden. The thesis comprises three self-contained articles, which all address the above issues. The first paper presents an economic assessment of two different policies – both implying an increased demand for forest ecosystem services – and how these could affect the competition for forest raw materials. A forest sector trade model is updated to a new base year (2016), and used to analyze the consequences of increased bioenergy use in the heat and power (HP) sector as well as increased forest conservation in Sweden. These overall scenarios are assessed individually and in combination. The results show how various forest raw material-using sectors are affected in terms of price changes and responses in production. A particularly interesting market impact is that bioenergy promotion and forest conservation tend to have opposite effects on forest industry by-product prices. Moreover, combining the two policies mitigates the forest industry by-product price increase compared to the case where only the bioenergy-promoting policy is implemented. In other words, the HP sector is less negatively affected in terms of increased feedstock prices if bioenergy demand target are accompanied by increased forest conservation. This effect is due to increasing pulpwood prices, which reduces pulp, paper and board production, and in turn mitiges the competition for the associated by-products. Overall, the paper illustrates the great complexity of the forest raw material market, and the importance of considering demand and supply responses within and between sectors in energy and forest policy designs. The second article investigates the forest raw material market effects from introducing second-generation transport biofuel (exemplified by Bio-SNG) production in Sweden. Increases in Bio-SNG demand between 5 and 30 TWh are investigated. The simulation results illustrate increasing forest industry by-product (i.e., sawdust, wood chips and bark) prices, not least in the high-production scenarios (i.e. 20-30 TWh). This suggests that increases in second-generation biofuel productions lead to increased competition for the forest raw materials. The higher feedstock prices make the HP sector less profitable, but very meagre evidence of substitution of fossil fuels for by-products can be found. In this sector, there is instead an increased use of harvesting residues. Fiberboard and particleboard production ceases entirely due to increased input prices. There is also evidence of synergy (“by-product”) effects between the sawmill sector and the use of forest raw materials in the HP sector. Higher by-product prices spur sawmills to produce more sawnwood, something that in turn induces forest owners to increase harvest levels. Already in the 5 TWh Bio-SNG scenario, there is an increase in the harvest level, thus suggesting that the by-product effect kicks in from start. Biofuels and green chemicals are likely to play significant roles in achieving the transition towards a zero-carbon society. However, large-scale biorefineries are not yet cost-competitive with their fossil-fuel counterparts, and it is therefore important to identify biorefinery concepts with high economic performance in order to achieve widespread deployment in the future. For evaluations of early-stage biorefinery concepts, there is a need to consider not only the technical performance and the process costs, but also the performance of the full supply chain and the impact of its implementation in the feedstock and products markets. The third article presents – and argues for – a conceptual interdisciplinary framework that can form the basis for future evaluations of the full supply-chain performance of various novel biorefinery concepts. This framework considers the competition for biomass feedstocks across sectors, and assumes exogenous end-use product demand and various geographical and technical constraints. It can be used to evaluate the impacts of the introduction of various biorefinery concepts in the biomass markets in terms of feedstock allocations and prices. Policy evaluations, taking into account both engineering constraints and market mechanisms, should also be possible. Overall, the thesis illustrates the importance of considering the market effects when designing and evaluating forest policies and bioenergy policy targets. The forest industry sector and the bioenergy sector are closely interlinked and can both make or break one another depending on the policy design. The results indicate that for an increased demand of bioenergy, an industrial transformation is to be expected, as well as increased roundwood harvest.

Multi-market contact can either escalate or deescalate rivalry. Recent empirical work has revealed an inverted U-shaped relationship between multi-market contact and rivalry. These findings have lead many to suggest that mutual forbearance (MF), a switch from competition to cooperation across markets, is a natural outcome of increasing multi-market contact between two firms. Despite the relatively widespread acceptance of this suggestion, we do not have a theoretically grounded explanation for how this switch from rivalry to mutual forbearance occurs. This dissertation takes up this task. Theories of learning and trust are used as the grounding for the development of a theoretical model of the process by which multi-market rivals switch from competition to cooperation across markets. The model is tested using data from the U.S. Scheduled Passenger Airline Industry. Results support the general theoretical foundations of the model and provide new insights into the genesis of mutual forbearance.

<p>Earnings management could be motivated by either managerial opportunism or efficient contracting. To discriminate between these motivations, I use a measure of product market competition that analytical research predicts will discipline managers and better align their interests with those of shareholders. Thus, if earnings management reflects managerial opportunism, then an increase in competition will decrease earnings management; and if it reflects efficient contracting, then an increase in competition will increase earnings management. Consistent with earnings management indicating managerial opportunism, I show that an increase in competition decreases real earnings management in the form of overproduction to avoid reporting negative earnings or a negative change in earnings.</p> / Dissertation

This thesis investigates, at the country level, the relationship between innovation output or generation of new technology and input factors such as stock of knowledge, research effort and institutional factors such as competition and intellectual property rights. It is shown that variations in generation of new technology reflect differences in knowledge stock, research effort, product market competition and other institutional factors of OECD countries. The available stock of knowledge and the research effort was shown to have a linear and positive effect on technology generation. It was also shown that the degree of product market competition has a nonlinear effect on technology growth, thereby confirming on a country-level an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation. Generation of new knowledge was examined using a knowledge production function with annual and accumulated knowledge measured with a patent indicator based on a worldwide count of patent priority filings. A cross-sectional linear regression model was used with secondary data. Independent variables included were the main variables accumulated stock of patent priority filings, the number of FTE researchers in R&amp;D and the Product Market Regulation Index. Institutional bias was accounted for by including the independent variables Index of Patent Rights, administrative patenting fees and a Global Competitiveness Index. The Global Competitiveness index was found to have positive effect on patent productivity and the administrative patenting fees relationship was found to be negative. The results are consistent with theories and empirical findings. The results also highlight the importance of innovation policies that keep costs of patenting low and of adjusting the competition policy of a country to the type of economy in question.

x, 94 p. : ill. (some col.) / This paper examines how competition faced by firms affects asset risk and expected returns. Contrary to Hou and Robinson's (2006) findings, I find that cross-industry variation in competition, as measured by the concentration ratio, is not a robust determinant of unconditional expected stock returns. In contrast, within-industry competition, as measured by relative price markup, is positively related to expected stock returns. Moreover, this relation is not captured by commonly used models of expected returns. When using the Markov regime-switching model advocated by Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000), I test and find support for Aguerrevere's (2009) recent model of competition find risk dynamics. In particular, systematic risk is greater in more competitive industries during bad times and greater in more concentrated industries during good times. In addition, real investment by firms facing greater competition leads real investment by firms facing less competition, supporting Aguerrevere's notion that less competition results in higher growth options and hence higher risk in good times. / Committee in charge: Dr. Roberto Gutierrez, Chair; Dr. Roberto Gutierrez, Advisor; Dr. Diane Del Guercio, Inside Member; Dr. John Chalmers， Inside Member； Dr. Bruce Blonigen， Outside Member

Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-23T13:42:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo Furieri Batianello.pdf: 1553909 bytes, checksum: 307230d5431d6833c34cb63af8c84ab9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-09-11 / FAPES / This dissertation analyzes the quality of accounting information (QAI) on the interaction between corporate governance and competition, aiming to tackle questions that have not been addressed by the literature available so far, especially when it comes to comparing the four possible environments resulting of the combination between different competition and governance environments. When it comes to the relationship between competition and governance, studies such as Karuna s (2010) point out to the existence of a cause/effect relationship between the intensity of the competition and stronger governance. When discussing accounting and competition, Dhaliwal et al. (2008) evidenced a positive relation between the amount of competition and the conditional conservatism, which is considered one of the main priorities of accounting information. Thus, in what concerns the relationship between governance and accounting, findings made by Bushman et al (2000) confirm that accountancy has an influence on corporate governance. Ball et al (2000) are contrary to that opinion, claiming that it is corporate governance that impacts on accountancy, which means that the governance mechanisms present at a certain environment would play a fundamental role in the quality of accounting information. The product market competition was calculated using the Herfindahl Index and the identification of firms with strong or weak governance was based on BM&FBovespa listings, where firms listed in New Market or Level 2 were considered with strong governance, and the others were considered with weak governance. The data used was collected between 2000 and 2011, from the firms listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange. The type of statistical analysis used to process data was the multiple regression with unbalanced panel data. In general, the results point to the same direction as previous ones, showing that both the presence of a strong governance and a highly competitive environment can enhance the accounting numbers in order to make them more qualitative. Interestingly, results suggest that in environments classified as uncompetitive and weak governance mechanisms, the quality of accounting information disclosed was relatively high, according to two of the three properties of the quality of accounting information analyzed / Esta dissertação analisa a qualidade da informação contábil (QIC) na interação entre a governança corporativa e a competição, visando responder lacunas ainda não preenchidas pela literatura, principalmente na comparação entre os quatro ambientes resultantes da interação entre competição e governança das firmas. No que tange relação competição/governança, estudos como o de Karuna (2010), por exemplo, apontaram existir uma relação entre a intensidade da competição e uma governança mais forte. Em relação à contabilidade/competição, Dhaliwal et al. (2008), descobriram haver associação positiva entre a intensidade da competição e o conservadorismo condicional, que é considerada uma das propriedades da informação contábil. Por conseguinte, no que diz respeito à relação governança/contabilidade, achados de Bushman et al. (2000), por exemplo, confirmam que a contabilidade influencia a governança corporativa. Ball et al. (2000) contradizem-nos afirmando que a governança corporativa impacta a contabilidade, ou seja, os mecanismos de governança presentes em um ambiente teriam papel fundamental na qualidade da informação contábil. A competição do mercado de produtos foi calculada mediante o Índice de Herfindahl. A divisão entre firmas com mecanismos de governança fortes e fracos foi feita com base na listagem da BM&FBovespa, onde considerou-se empresas listadas nos níveis Novo Mercado e Nível 2 como empresas com governança forte, e o restante como empresas com governança fraca. Foram utilizados dados entre os anos de 2000 e 2011, das firmas listadas da Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo. A técnica de análise estatística utilizada foi a regressão múltipla com dados em painel desbalanceado. Os resultados, no geral, corroboraram com estudos anteriores, de que tanto a presença de uma governança forte quanto um ambiente altamente competitivo podem incrementar os números contábeis de forma a torná-los mais qualitativos. Curiosamente, os resultados sugeriram que em ambientes classificados como não competitivos e com mecanismos de governança fracos, a qualidade da informação contábil divulgada mostrou-se relativamente alta, segundo duas das três propriedades da qualidade da informação contábil analisadas

This thesis presents three essays, with the first two focusing on the insider role of M&A advisors and the effectiveness of insider trading rule, while the third essay looks into the effects of product market competition on corporate cash holdings. The main hypothesis of the first and second essay is that the advisory banks that are privy to non-public deal information might have high motivation to exploit this privileged information by taking a position in a takeover target ahead of a deal and realise an excess return upon deal announcement. This motivation for and act of “insider trading” might be attenuated by the insider trading rules Rule10b5-1 and Rule10b5-2, which were released in 2000.The first essay examines the presence of acquiror advisors’ holdings in targets and their trading strategy on such holdings before deal announcement. Using an aggregate level of stake-holding in the target firm by a financial conglomerate/brands with which the advisor to the acquiror is affiliated, we find that advisory brands start to take and accumulate holdings in targets at least seven quarters before deal announcement through to announcement quarter. The stake-holding is significantly larger than that of a non-advisory brand group that is defined. We argue that these results imply the direct link between advisory holdings, advisor identity and the strong intentions of trading on private deal information. However, this tendency is markedly attenuated in the post-rule period after 2000. This change in advisory brand trading strategy on target stocks ahead of a deal with the passage of rules suggests a positive deterrence effect of the insider trading rule. In the second essay, we investigate the profitability of this trading strategy by advisory brands to acquirors taking stake in targets ahead of a deal. Results suggest that both the level and the build-up (increase) of an advisory stake between the last two quarters immediately preceding deal announcement are positively related to the target return. These results are consistent with the view that advisory brands trade on their privileged deal information by taking and increasing holdings in targets ahead of deals to profit from the increase in target share price. In our sub-period analysis, results suggest that all the coefficients become much smaller and insignificant for the post-rule period after 2000. This again indicates a strongly positive deterrent effect of regulation, which further confirms the conclusion of the first essay. The third essay is related to both the static and dynamic effect of product market competition on firm cash holdings. We find that the intensity of product market competition measured by product similarity from Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2011) has a significant positive effect on firm cash holdings, after controlling for other measures including the Industry Herfindahl Index and industry fluidity. This suggests that firms in a more competitive industry reserve more cash as their war chest or preemptive tool against competitors. Further, Vector Autoregression (VAR) and analyses of shock show that when there is a sudden increase in product similarity/competition level (shock), firms use cash to fight off competition, leading to a decrease in cash holdings.

In my dissertation, I examine factors associated with firms’ submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification and test if shareholder ratification of auditor selection is associated with the extent of price competition in the audit market (as measured by audit fees) and audit quality (as measured by clients’ earnings management). The dissertation is motivated from the recent recommendation of the U.S. Treasury’s Advisory Committee on Auditing Profession (ACAP) regarding the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification votes. The ACAP suggests that this practice may improve the competition in the audit market; yet, there is no empirical evidence supporting the ACAP’s recommendation. My dissertation attempts to fill the gap in the literature on an issue of current interest to the auditing profession. I find that firm size, CEO-Chair duality, insider ownership and institutional ownership are associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. However, I do not find an association between audit committee variables and the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The second essay investigates the association between auditor ratification and audit fees. Audit fees are higher in firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification. The finding is not consistent with the increased price competition predicted by the ACAP. The third essay of my dissertation examine whether the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification is associated with earnings management. I find that firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification are more likely to have lower level of earnings management. Overall, the results suggest that the same factors that are associated with higher quality monitoring also may be associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The results call into question the one-size-fits-all approach recommended by the ACAP.

I analyze the effects of bank mergers and competitive market structure after the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act. The first chapter studies the incentives to decide mergers and the effects of market competition. Nationwide branching from deregulation and the resulting bank consolidation have brought more a competitive market environment. In particular, branch networks play an important role in bank merger analysis. Using commercial banks' branch-level location data in Texas from 1994 to 2005, I estimate a two-sided matching model of merging and target banks with transferable utility. To study post-match values, I apply the maximum score estimator developed by Fox (2010). I find the positive assortative matching of bank sizes and I confirm that a bank prefers matching with target banks that have geographically overlapping markets. Moreover, I extend the standard matching model to incorporate externalities of market competition and the merger activities of rivals. Competitive rivals lessen the effects of mergers but mergers that increase market power have positive externalities on unmatched banks. The second chapter develops a structural model of demand and supply for retail banking to predict post-merger price. Ownership consolidation can affect not only price but also product characteristics. Once demand parameters and price elasticities are estimated, the adjustments in banking characteristics following mergers are considered in order to estimate marginal costs. I apply Peters’ (2006) simulation methods to account for the discrepancy between simulated merger changes and actual changes. The third chapter builds on an entry model of Berry and Waldfogel (1999) to quantify market competition. Significant consolidation waves after the Riegle-Neal Act brought a decrease in the number of banking institutions, while the relaxation of branching regulations almost doubled the number of bank branches and fortified market competition. When a new branch with high quality enters, I analyze the effects of market deposit expansion, business stealing from rival incumbent banks and cannibalization from other branches operated by the same bank. I find evidence that business stealing effects dominate cannibalization effects as market size increases. However, the impact of competition is localized and cannibalization effects are rather reversed at remote distances.