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In this report I argue that a popular account of the nature of ethical thought and talk -- non-cognitivism -- cannot make sense of our attempts to explain why some things are right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust. After introducing the process by which we attempt to explain these sorts of ethical features (a process I call ethical explanation), I consider how we might test whether non-cognitivism can account for this process. We can test whether non-cognitivism can account for ethical explanation, I argue, by testing whether non-cognitivism can account for the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences, the sentences we use to express explanatory thoughts in ethics. After considering how non-cognitivism might account for ethical explanatory sentences (and so the thoughts these sentences express), I develop a series of problem cases on which, I argue, no plausible non-cognitivist account of these meanings of these sentences is possible. Because non-cognitivism cannot account for the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences, I conclude, non-cognitivism cannot account for ethical explanation. / text

According to folk psychology, instrumental music regularly elicits emotions in listeners. Philosophers and psychologists such as Kivy, Konecni and Zangwill have questioned the existence of these musically elicited emotions, arguing that instrumental music elicits moods or aesthetic judgments rather than emotions. I defend the folk psychological position against these skeptics. The first chapter sets up the debate surrounding musically elicited emotions, while chapters two and three defend the thesis that instrumental music elicits emotions against the critics’ arguments. Chapter four outlines the implications of this defense for a variety of fields.

Orientador: Edwiges Maria Morato / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-17T22:46:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rajer_Franco_M.pdf: 2767921 bytes, checksum: cffae1a3ef01e9af9dbc211d984c1533 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Resumo: No campo da Afasiologia, ciência que estuda os déficits de linguagem decorrentes de lesão cerebral, encontramos uma série de "sintomas" linguísticos associados aos quadros de afasia, dentre os quais figura a anomia. A anomia é definida como dificuldade ou incapacidade de encontrar palavras durante a enunciação (MORATO, 2002, p.10). Este déficit tem sido objeto de estudo da Afasiologia, ciência esta que encontra subsídios teóricos no campo linguístico, isto é, a classificação e compreensão dos fenômenos afásicos são diretamente influenciadas pelas teorizações linguísticas, tal como vemos, por exemplo, em Jakobson [1954] (1981), no célebre artigo intitulado Dois aspectos da Linguagem e dois tipos de Afasia. Na literatura existente, o termo anomia integra as várias formas de classificação dos fenômenos afásicos e psíquicos. Contudo, lembramos que mesmo os indivíduos cujas faculdades linguísticas estariam preservadas podem, eventualmente, manifestar certa dificuldade de encontrar palavras; ou seja, este déficit pode integrar outras condições patológico-cerebrais. Por outro lado, o mesmo termo foi utilizado por Durkheim [1897] (1996) para descrever um estado social caótico, desordenado, no qual se afrouxa a coerção moral sobre os indivíduos, levando-os ao desregramento e à delinquência. No entanto, quando o sociólogo francês faz uso do termo em questão, ele tem em vista o radical grego "nomos" (lei moral, costume), no qual a "anomia" significa "ausência de leis Temos, assim, um único termo com dupla identidade semiológica: a primeira tem a forma de uma "patologia social" descrita por Durkheim nas obras Da Divisão do Trabalho Social (1893) e O Suicídio (1897); a segunda aponta um déficit linguístico e é objeto da Afasiologia. Neste trabalho pretendemos investigar a realidade semiológica polissêmica da anomia e suas implicações gerais para o entendimento de relações entre os processos de normatização social e os processos de nomeação/referenciação / Abstract: Considering the Aphasiology field, science study about the language capacity diminished by cerebral damage, it's possible to find a series of linguistic 'symptoms' associated with aphasia, within it the anomia. Anomia is defined as a difficult or incapacity in select words during the enunciation (MORATO, 2002, p.10). This deficit has been the object of Aphasiology studies, science that seeks theoretical support in the linguistic field, therefore a classification and comprehension of the aphasic phenomenon, which are directly influenced by the linguistic theorizing, as we can see, for example, in Jakobson [1954] (1981). In the existent literature, the term anomia appears diffuse with a series of classifications forms about the aphasic and psychic phenomenon. Recalling that the same person, which the linguistic capacity would have been preserved can, eventually, demonstrate a difficult in find and select words, so, this deficit, can integrate other psychological-cerebral conditions. On the other hand, the same term was used by Durkheim [1987] (1996) to describe a chaotic social state, uncoordinated, which a loosened moral coercion upon the people, leading them to the absence of rules and to delinquency. However, when the French sociology uses the term, he have in mind, the greek radical "nomos" (moral law, costume), where 'anomia' has the meaning of 'without laws' or 'absence of laws'. Therefore, the only term with double semiological identity: the first has the form of a "social pathologic" describe by Durkheim in works as The Division of Labour in Society (1983) and Suicide (1897); the second point to a linguistic deficit and is the object of Aphasiology. This work intend to investigate the existent relation between the social normative process and the naming process / Mestrado / Linguistica / Mestre em Linguística

<p>There are various theories in the philosophy of mind/cognitive science of what kinds of knowledge, or information carrying mental states, constitute our mental concepts. Such knowledge is used in higher acts of cognition such as in categorization, induction, deduction, and analogical reasoning when we think or reason about the extension of the concept. While most concept theories have primarily focused on concrete concepts such as `chair,' `table,' and `dog,' I take such modern theories and apply them to abstract moral concepts such as `virtue,' `right action,' and `just.' I argue for a new overall pluralistic theory of moral concepts, combining several theories of concepts. This pluralistic view differs from, for example, Ayer's non-cognitivist theory that contends that our moral concepts are constituted by or just are emotions and desires. Finally, I draw further philosophical implications my conclusion may have for applied ethics, normative ethical theory, political philosophy and meta-ethics.</p> / Dissertation

The topic of the thesis are moral judgments which are articulated in language by claims or speech-acts like, for example, “One ought to keep one’s promises” or “It is good to respect the beauty of nature”. According to the philosophical literature on moral judgments, they have two distinctive features. They are objective and practical: They purport to be correct in an objective sense and they tend to motivate us to act in certain ways. In light of these two features, I discuss the two most prominent accounts in the philosophical literature on moral judgments: cognitivism and noncognitivism. Cognitivism takes moral judgments to be acts of theoretical knowledge with a special normative content. Noncognitivism takes moral judgments to be desire-like acts of the mind. In part I., I argue that cognitivism is not able to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality since it spoils the practical character of such judgments. In part II., I argue that noncognitivism is not able to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality because it makes the objectivity of moral claims mysterious. In part III. of the thesis, I then aim at developing an alternative to cognitivism and noncognitivism that overcomes their shortcomings but also saves their insights. I call this alternative account 'practical cognitivism'. The core claim of practical cognitivism is that moral judgments are acts of a sui generis power for practical knowledge or cognition. The bulk of part III. is about developing this claim and showing that it allows us to make sense of moral judgments as the unity of objectivity and practicality. I end the thesis by responding to some objections that might be raised against practical cognitivism.:1. Approaching my topic: moral judgments 1 1.1. The objectivity of moral judgments ................... 5 1.2. The practicality of moral judgments................... 9 1.3. The task, the problem .......................... 11 1.4. Outlook .................................. 16 I. Cognitivism 21 2. Introduction 21 3. Cognitivism: the basics 22 3.1. Ordinary descriptive beliefs ....................... 22 3.2. Moral beliefs................................ 28 3.3. Scanlon’s and Smith’s cognitivism.................... 31 4. Cognitivism and the objectivity of moral judgments 35 5. Cognitivism and the practicality of moral judgments 38 5.1. Attempt#1:Externalism ........................ 40 5.2. Attempt #2: The rationality-based account of practicality . . . . . . 44 5.3. Attempt#3: Volitionalism........................ 55 6. Conclusion 63 II. Noncognitivism 67 7. Introduction 67 8. Noncognitivism: the basics 69 8.1. Nondescriptivism ............................. 69 8.2. Intrinsic practicality ........................... 71 8.3. The desire-like account of intrinsic practicality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 8.4. A standard of internal consistency.................... 79 8.5. Expressing vs. reporting ......................... 85 9. Noncognitivism and the practicality of moral judgments 88 10.Noncognitivism and the objectivity of moral judgments 90 10.1. Noncognitivism vs. speakersubjectivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 10.2. Attempt #1: Horgan and Timmons................... 96 10.3. Attempt #2: Blackburn ......................... 99 10.4. Attempt #3: Gibbard ..........................103 11. Conclusion 112 III. Practical Cognitivism 115 12. Introduction 115 12.1. Diagnosis .................................115 12.2. Practical cognitivism ...........................125 13. The generic concept of form 130 13.1. Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 13.2. Applying the generic concept of form to moral judgments . . . . . . . 136 14.The practical character of practical knowledge 138 15.The cognitive character of practical knowledge 145 15.1. Universal validity as a feature of theoretical knowledge . . . . . . . . 146 15.2. Universal validity as a feature of practical knowledge . . . . . . . . . 148 16. The self-conscious character of practical knowledge 153 17. Moral judgments as acts of practical knowledge 160 17.1. Self-conscious practicality ........................161 17.2. Self-conscious validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 1 7.3. Self-conscious practical validity .....................167 18. Excursus: Thompson’s (Neo)Aristotelian practical cognitivism 172 19.The objectivity and intrinsic practicality of moral judgments 179 19.1. The objectivity of moral judgments ...................180 19.2.The intrinsic practicality of moral judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 19.3. Shared willing, public reasons and practical knowledge of the good . . 191 20.Conclusion 196 21.Objections 198 21.1. Moral error and practical irrationality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200 21.2. The formalism objection .........................208 22. Acknowledgement 219 References 220

Abstract / Multinational corporations have played a significant role for e-learning systems’ penetration in Africa. This study sought to explore how e-learning systems are accepted and used by a multinational corporation in Africa. The multinational company focuses in building materials and construction. The qualitative research approach utilizing the exploratory and analytical case study design was employed in this study. The research participants comprised of managers who are employees of a multinational corporation, and they were purposively sampled from Middle East Africa region. Research instruments used were interviews guide and questionnaires on e-learning and its use by a multinational corporation operating in Africa. The results revealed that e-learning systems play a pivotal role in transforming education in Africa. The study also found that for a prosperous e-learning strategy in Africa, there is requisite for leadership transformation, team building, and easy access to information. In addition, there is also a need for commercial transformation, and understanding of company goals, induction of new members, and promotion of a learning culture, collaboration, and guidance. Finally, the study considered the various e-learning systems application challenges in Africa. These were found to range from the lack of technological awareness by learners, lack of time by the working class, poor connectivity, high setup costs, language barriers, as well as the lack of customised gadgets for e-learning. / School of Computing / M.Sc. (Computing)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-04T18:29:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Paulo Eduardo Benzoni.pdf: 990162 bytes, checksum: 2c656c2ab7fb5cf260410fddc0640b12 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02-13 / The stress field has been studied so much where data have demonstrated that in average, more than half of the population of big cities present stress. Stress comes from inner factors (vulnerabilities) and outer ones (environment demands), however, when it is worked on the treatment area itself, it has been observed that some individuals present a sort of persistent behavior which take them to be involved in stressful situations. It is regarded as Lipp nominated: Lives Themes. It is presented on this term a purpose of diagnosis and enlargement of the concept on Lives Themes, grounded on the cognitivebehavioral approach. It was also developed a theorist model of cognitive basis that could explain the problematic of lives themes on chronic stress, such model purposes the individual once attracted by a discriminative stimulus, he activates a scheme which figures out the reality, stirring a sort of inappropriate behavior that takes him to get involved in a stressful situation once there is no appropriate audience of coping , it comes up stress and everything is explained by a belief. Nine participants were evaluated, all of them on chronic stress, where there were five from a physiotherapy clinic-school and others from a psychotherapy private office, all of them under physical and psychological illnesses. They were evaluated through a semi-structured interview, Inventory on Stress Symptoms for adults by Lipp, Inventory of Life and Questionnaires of Schemes by Young. It was made from the purposed theorist model, a model of conceptualization on the Lives Themes, from which all the cases were studied and evaluated. The group s analysis let us to identify the self-sacrifice schemes and inflexible standards as the strongest (hardest) ones and the failure scheme as the weakest one, what enabled to infer that people under chronic stress tend to turn to others, with top-high goals and do not accept failures. It was also observed the presence of factors of behavior and parenthood practices on the development of maladaptative initial schemes which seem to fit the retraced standards of stress, and furthermore, it was also identified the broken (inappropriate) learning of strategies of coping , which turns more difficult the individual under Lives Themes, get rid of this stressful situation, as well as the presence of a discriminative stimulus which stirs the retraced standards of behavior that takes the individual to stressful situations. Finally, it was confirmed the presence of dysfunctional belief that justifies for the individual his situation of being involved constantly in the same stressful situation. The results pointed for the maintenance of the initial hypothesis purposed on the Lives Themes, as well as corroborated for the theorist model purposed. / A ?rea de stress tem sido muito estudada, dados demonstram que em m?dia, mais da metade da popula??o das grandes cidades brasileiras apresentam stress. O stress adv?m de fatores internos (vulnerabilidades) e externos (demandas do ambiente), por?m, quando se trabalha na ?rea de tratamento do mesmo, observa-se que alguns indiv?duos apresentam um padr?o de comportamento persistente que os levam a se envolverem em situa??es estressoras, trata-se do que Lipp denominou de Temas de Vida. Apresenta-se neste trabalho uma proposta de diagn?stico e amplia??o do conceito de temas de vida fundamentada na abordagem cognitivo-comportamental. Desenvolveu-se um modelo te?rico de base cognitiva que pudesse explicar a problem?tica de temas de vida no stress cr?nico, tal modelo prop?e que o indiv?duo atra?do por um est?mulo discriminativo ativa um esquema que interpreta a realidade, acionando um padr?o de comportamento inadequado que o leva a envolver-se na situa??o estressora; n?o havendo repert?rio adequado de coping, surge stress e tudo ? explicado por uma cren?a. Foram avaliados nove participantes, todos com stress cr?nico, sendo cinco de uma cl?nica escola de fisioterapia e quatro de um consult?rio particular de psicoterapia, todos com comorbidades f?sicas e psicol?gicas comuns ao stress cr?nico. Os participantes foram avaliados por meio de entrevista semi-estruturada, Invent?rio de Sintomas de stress para Adultos de Lipp, Invent?rio de Qualidade de Vida e Question?rio de Esquemas de Young. Elaborou-se, a partir do modelo te?rico proposto, um modelo de conceitualiza??o de casos de temas de vida, a partir do qual todos os casos estudados foram avaliados. A analise do grupo permitiu identificar os esquemas de auto-sacrif?cio e padr?es inflex?veis como os mais fortes e o esquema de fracasso como mais fraco o que possibilitou inferir que as pessoas com stress cr?nico tendem a voltar-se aos outros, com metas muito altas e n?o admitem fracasso. Observou-se a presen?a de fatores de temperamento e de pr?ticas parentais no desenvolvimento de esquemas iniciais desadaptativos que parecem modular os padr?es recorrentes de stress observados, al?m disso, identificou-se a aprendizagem inadequada de estrat?gias de coping, que dificultam o indiv?duo com temas de vida sair da situa??o estressora, bem como a presen?a de um est?mulo discriminativo que aciona o padr?o recorrente de comportamento que leva o indiv?duo a situa??es estressoras. Finalmente, confirmou-se a presen?a de uma cren?a disfuncional que justifica para o indiv?duo a sua situa??o de envolver-se constantemente nas mesmas situa??es de stress. Os resultados apontaram para sustenta??o das hip?teses iniciais propostas na teoria de temas de vida, bem como corroboraram o modelo te?rico proposto.

Cognitivismo Avaliativo Descritivista é a tese segundo a qual atribuições de valor pretendem descrever aspectos da realidade. Segundo essa tese, ser valioso não é senão instanciar certa propriedade ou participar de certa relação. O esforço de reflexão e discussão avaliativa é concebido como um esforço para ajustar nossas convicções avaliativas à realidade, e quando este esforço é bem-sucedido obtermos conhecimento avaliativo. Atribuições de valor se distinguem de outras proposições descritivas apenas em razão do caráter peculiar dos aspectos da realidade dos quais se ocupa. O objetivo da presente dissertação é objetar a este tese. Cabe ao defensor do Cognitivismo Descritivista delimitar a região da realidade da qual tratam atribuições de valor. É por referência a ela que o cognitivista deve explicar os traços distintivos do juízo de valor. Há duas alternativas disponíveis: ou juízos de valor dizem respeito a um reino de fatos que transcendem a realidade natural ou dizem respeito a fatos naturais. No primeiro capítulo argumento que o Cognitivismo em sua forma Não-Naturalista não pode dar conta da covariação do valor. A covariação consiste no fato de diferenças em valor sempre são acompanhadas de diferenças não-avaliativas. Esta é uma restrição à qual nossas atribuições de valor se conformam, mas não podemos dar sentido a ela se assumimos a verdade do Cognitivismo Não-Naturalista. O Cognitivismo Descritivista deve, portanto, assumir uma forma Naturalista. No segundo capítulo argumento a única razão para preferir o Cognitivismo Naturalista a caracterizações alternativas do juízo de valor consiste no fato de que essa tese promete dar conta da objetividade de atribuições de valor segundo certa concepção de objetividade Segundo esta concepção só são objetivos aqueles aspectos da realidade acessíveis em abstração de qualquer perspectiva particular, incluída aí a perspectiva caracterizada pela propensão a certas respostas comportamentais e afetivas que adquirimos ao longo de nossa educação moral. Argumento que esta concepção de objetividade não se sustenta e que, portanto, não temos nenhuma razão para adotar o Cognitivismo Naturalista. No terceiro capítulo argumento que, mesmo que tivéssemos alguma razão para supor que atribuições de valor consistem na descrição de aspectos naturais da realidade, esta caracterização do juízo de valor também falha em dar conta de um traço distintivo de tais juízos, qual seja, a restrição à terceirização de juízos de valor. A restrição à terceirização consiste no fato de que o parecer de pretensos especialistas em valor não pode fornecer razão para aceitar certo juízo de valor. Usualmente o parecer de especialistas pode fornecer razão para adotar juízos descritivos, e se assumimos que atribuições de valor descrevem aspectos naturais da realidade não podemos dar conta dessa restrição. Concluo que devemos recusar o Cognitivismo Descritivista. / Descriptive Evaluative Cognitivism is the thesis according to which ascriptions of value aim at describing features of reality. According to this thesis, to be valuable is just to instantiate some property or to take part in some relation. The effort of evaluative reflection and discussion is conceived as an effort to adjust our evaluative convictions to reality, and if we succeed in this effort we obtain evaluative knowledge. Ascriptions of value distinguish themselves from other descriptive propositions in virtue of the peculiar character of the features of reality they aim to describe. The goal of this dissertation is to present an objection to this thesis. The defender of Descriptive Cognitivism must specify the domain of reality ascriptions of value are about. It is by reference to it that the cognitivist must explain the distinctive traits of value judgments. There are two available options: either value judgments are about a domain of facts that transcends natural reality, or they are about natural facts. In the first chapter I argue that Cognitivism in its Non-naturalistic form cannot account for the covariation of value. Covariation consists in the fact that differences in value are always accompanied by non-evaluative differences. Our ascriptions of value comply with this constraint, but we cannot make sense of it if we assume that Non-naturalist Cognitivism is correct. Descriptive Cognitivism must, therefore, adopt a Naturalistic form. In the second chapter I argue that the only reason to prefer Naturalist Cognitivism to alternative characterizations of value judgments is the fact that it can account for the objectivity of value ascriptions according to a certain conception of objectivity According to this conception, only those features of reality accessible in abstraction from any particular perspective, including the perspective characterized by the propensity to certain behavioral and affective responses that we acquire during our moral education, are objective. I argue that this conception of objectivity does not hold and that, therefore, we have no reason to accept Naturalist Cognitivism. In the third chapter I argue that even if we had some reason to suppose that ascriptions of value consist in the description of natural aspects of reality, this characterization of value judgments also fails to account for a distinctive feature of such judgments - the restriction on the outsourcing of value judgments. The restriction on outsourcing consists in the fact that the opinion of would-be value experts cannot provide a reason to accept a certain value judgment. Usually the expert opinion can provide a reason to accept descriptive judgments, and if we assume that ascriptions of value describe natural features of reality, then we cannot account for this restriction. I conclude that we must reject Descriptive Cognitivism.

This thesis addresses a methodological impasse within film studies which is of ongoing concern because of the way that it demonstrates the discipline’s conflicting approaches to ideology. This impasse arises because proponents of poststructuralism and cognitivism utilise methodologies which not only make internally consistent interpretations of films, but are also able to discount the theoretical criticisms of the rival paradigm. Attempts to debate and transcend these divisions have been unsuccessful. This thesis contributes to this gap in knowledge by arguing that both academic theories (such as poststructuralism and cognitivism) and filmmaking practice are influenced by the same historically contingent socio-cultural determinants. Academic claims about film’s effects can then be conceptualised as aggregates of thought which are analogous to the dramatic manipulations that filmmakers unconsciously work into their films, with both forms of cultural activity (academic theorising and filmmaking practice) influenced by the same diachronic socio-cultural contexts. The term that I use for these specific forms of filmmaking practice is writing formations. A filmic writing formation is a form of filmmaking practice influenced by the same cultural ideas which also inform academic hermeneutics. The thesis does not undertake a conventional extended literature review as a means to identify the gap in the literature. This is because contested theoretical discourses are part of the thesis’ subject matter. I analyse academic literature in the same way that I analyse film, conceptualising both 3 activities as being determined by the same specific historical and socio-cultural contexts. The thesis analyses Shakespearean films because they offer multiple diachronic texts which are foregrounded as interpretations, and in which different approaches to filmmaking can be clearly compared and contrasted across time. They clarify the complex and often unconscious relationships between academic theorising and filmic writing formations by facilitating an investigation of how the historic development of academic discourse relates to the historic development of filmmaking practice. The corpus of texts for analysis has been confined to Anglo-American realist film adaptations, and European and American debates about, and criticism of, realist film from the advent of poststructuralism in the late 1960s to the present day. The thesis is structured as an investigation into the current theoretical impasse and the unsatisfactory attempts to transcend it, the articulation of a new methodology relating to filmic writing formations, the elaboration of how different filmic writing formations operate within realist film adaptation, and a close case study of the unfolding historical processes whereby academic theory and filmmaking practice relate to the same socio-cultural determinants using four adaptations of Hamlet from different time periods. It concludes by explaining how filmmakers exploit and manipulate forms of filmic grammar which correspond to academic theories about those forms of filmic grammar, with both activities influenced by the same underlying diachronic culture. The thesis argues, then, that academic poststructuralism and cognitivism can be 4 conceptualised as explanations for different but contiguous aspects of filmmaking practice, rather than as mutually exclusive claims about film’s effects.