Sammanfattning Detta är en rättsdogmatisk utredning om Eskilstuna kommuns befogenhet att lämna ekonomiskt bidrag till Mälardalens högskola. Syftet är att utreda huruvida kommunallagen medger att en kommun lämnar ekonomiskt bidrag till en högskola med staten som huvudman. Sveriges kommuner har en viss självbestämmanderätt som är lagstadgad, dock sätter kommunallagen 2:1 gränser för vilka angelägenheter en kommun får engagera sig i. Paragrafen ställer krav på att det finns allmänintresse hos kommunmedborgarna för att kommunen ska kunna engagera sig i angelägenheten, att det finns en anknytning till kommunens område och medlemmar, samt att det är en angelägenhet som inte ankommer på någon annan att sköta. I uppsatsen visas Eskilstuna kommuns ekonomiska bidrag till Mälardalens högskola och dessa jämförs med gällande rättspraxis genom ekonomiska beräkningar. Den rättsliga regleringen av hur en kommunmedlem överklagar ett kommunalt beslut genom laglighetsprövning redovisas. Efter att rättsområdet gällande ekonomiska bidrag från kommuner till en statlig högskola granskats genom praxis kommer författaren fram till slutsatsen att det inte finns någon begränsning per se i kommunallagen att lämna ekonomiska bidrag till en högskola. Dock är rättsläget ytterst osäkert hur stora belopp som är befogade, då det i varje enskilt fall måste visas på kommunalt allmänintresse och allmännytta samt att det finns en lokal anknytning som står i proportion till bidragets storlek.

<p>As of 1 December 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon came into force. The Treaty brings along several changes for the physical structure of the EU. There are no changes aimed directly towards procurement, however the Treaty of Lisbon might prove to include changes of major impact. Article 3 (3) NEU includes a change to how the inner market shall be achieved. The Treaty text has gone from an inner market based on competition to include a “social economic market”, however there is no indication of what this means from a procurement perspective. The inner market and procurement had difficulties already before the entry of the Lisbon Treaty. There was arguments as regards to how fair a state could intervene trough public procurement to achieve positive social effects. The CJEU has persistently held that the inner market shall be built by the help of the inner market and competition. The Commission has during the last years started to express a different opinion than the CJEU with regards to low value procurements. The legislators has also shown a great interest for the SME’s and ensured more leeway for these companies to receive help form the member states. The ECJ has however made it difficult to support further than the actual startup phase of an SME. The European Parliament is critical to the Commissions work with regards to measures supporting the member states and ignoring the CJEU. The EU Parliament fears the consequences a more protectionist approach might have on the development of a free inner market and express concern for the legal uncertainty developed trough the lack of attention to the procurement market when introducing the “social market economy” with the Treaty of Lisbon.</p><p>The EU Parliament and the CJEU might have to adjust their opinion on competition within the inner market towards the Commissions opinion. The thesis does however conclude that an inclusion of the de minis principle in the test for equality of suppliers might be all that will be done to clarify this legal uncertainty.</p> / No formal opposition.

Thesis (M.A.)--Guo li zheng zhi da xue, 1976. / Cover title. Reproduced from typescript on double leaves. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 164-167).

Thesis (M.A.)--Guo li zheng zhi da xue, 1976. / Cover title. Reproduced from typescript on double leaves. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 164-167).

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Le licenciement disciplinaire du salarié protégé est une activité sous contrôle. Elle implique d’autres acteurs que les parties au contrat. Elle ne concerne pas que l’employeur et le salarié. Le licenciement doit être autorisé par une décision préalable de l’inspection du travail. Cet acte administratif est contestable devant les juridictions administratives. Le législateur s’immisce aussi dans le processus par son pouvoir d’amnistie. Le contrôle du licenciement disciplinaire du salarié protégé mobilise toutes les forces de l’Etat et concerne les pouvoirs exécutifs, législatifs et judiciaires. Ce dispositif exceptionnel répond au besoin de protection d’une certaine catégorie de salarié. Par son activité syndicale, le salarié protégé est plus exposé au licenciement. Il n’en reste pas moins que la protection dont il dispose actuellement est déséquilibrée, surtout en matière disciplinaire. La procédure de licenciement disciplinaire du salarié protégé entraine pertes d’efficiences et violations de droits élémentaires. Elle ignore le principe de responsabilité au sein de l’entreprise, par la tolérance de fautes qui auraient pu justifier un licenciement. L’immixtion étatique dans le licenciement disciplinaire du salarié protégé s’appuie sur des mécanismes perfectibles. Il importe d’identifier les défauts majeurs de cette procédure : complexité administrative, indulgence parfois excessive face à la faute, méconnaissance de garanties procédurales élémentaires. Passé ce diagnostic, certaines pistes d’amélioration pourront être suggérées. A l’heure où les pouvoirs publics désirent créer un environnement compétitif pour les entreprises, l’optimisation du contrôle du licenciement du salarié protégé est sans doute une préoccupation d’avenir. / Pas de résumé en anglais

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / Includes bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This dissertation analyses and investigates how virtual property functions inside virtual worlds. It also determines if, within that context, virtual property is similar to, or should be treated like real world property. The questions that are addressed include the following. What is the (real world) legal status of property in virtual worlds? Is it worthwhile to recognise and protect virtual property in real world law? Is it possible to recognise and protect virtual property in real world law, given the differences? Would recognition and protection of virtual property in real world law require or be restricted to instances where virtual property is or can be recognised as real rights? The dissertation finds that there is a definable concept of “virtual property” as it is encountered in virtual worlds and there is a great degree of similarity between the function of property in virtual and real world systems. There are also sufficient justifications (social, economic and normative) to recognise virtual property as property. Even though the function of property is similar in both systems, the similarities are undermined by the absence, complete or almost complete, of real rights in virtual worlds. This creates a problem since, in real world law, real rights enjoy stronger protection than weaker personal rights. The first reason for this absence of real rights stems from the unique (and mostly uncircumventable) nature of game-code that removes the necessity to make all rights in virtual worlds real rights. The second reason relates to the fact that most virtual world rights are completely derived from and regulated by contract. It is concluded that it is possible to recognise and protect virtual property by means of traditional private law property law (both Roman-Germanic and Anglo-American), constitutional property law, and criminal law. While criminal law will fill some gaps left by the absence of real rights, the rest that are left are contractual rights. In certain circumstances, these contractual rights may be strong enough and in other cases they may require support from special legislation that strengthens weak personal rights and makes them into stronger property-like rights. In constitutional cases, these rights derive support from constitutional property law. However, in other circumstances recognition and protection will probably require recognition of real rights. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie proefskrif analiseer en ondersoek hoe virtuele eiendom in virtuele wêrelde werk. Dit gee ʼn oorsig oor die vraag of virtuele eiendom, in daardie konteks, vergelykbaar is met eiendom in die regte wêreld en dieselfde erkenning moet ontvang. Die volgende vrae word gestel en beantwoord. Wat is die (regte wêreld-) status van eiendom in ʼn virtuele wêreld? Is dit die moeite werd om virtuele eiendom in die regte wêreld-regstelsels te erken en te beskerm? Is dit moontlik om virtuele eiendom in die regte wêreld te erken en beskerm, gegewe die verskille? Sal erkenning en beskerming van virtuele eiendom in die regte wêreld-regstelsels vereis dat, of beperk word tot gevalle waar virtuele eiendom geïdentifiseer of erken word as saaklike regte? Die navorsing toon aan dat daar ʼn bepaalde konsep van virtuele eiendom is soos wat dit in virtuele wêrelde gevind word. Daar is ook ʼn merkbare ooreenkoms tussen die eiendomstelsels in die virtuele en regte wêrelde. Hierdie proefskrif bevind dat daar genoegsame regverdigingsgronde is (sosiaal, ekonomies, sowel as normatief) om regte wêreld-eiendomserkenning aan virtuele eiendom te verskaf. Alhoewel die funksie van eiendom dieselfde is in beide stelsels, word die ooreenkomste tussen hulle ondermyn deur die (algehele of amper algehele) tekort aan saaklike regte in die virtuele wêreld. Dit veroorsaak probleme, aangesien saaklike regte in die regte wêreld aansienlik sterker beskerming geniet as swakker persoonlike regte. Die redes vir hierdie tekort aan saaklike regte in ʼn virtuele wêreld is tweeledig. Eerstens veroorsaak die unieke aard van rekenaar-kode ʼn tekort aan saaklike regte binne die virtuele wêreld, aangesien die kode die bestaan van saaklike regte in meeste gevalle onnodig maak. Tweedens word meeste van die regte wat verkry word en bestaan in virtuele wêrelde geskep en gereguleer deur middel van kontrak. Daar word ook bevind dat dit moontlik is om aan virtuele eiendom erkenning en beskerming te gee deur middel van tradisionele privaatregtelike eiendom (beide Romeins-Germaans en Anglo-Amerikaans), konstitusionele eiendom en die strafreg. Strafreg kan egter slegs sekere gapings vul wat deur die tekort aan saaklike regte veroorsaak word. Die oorblywende regte sal egter persoonlike regte wees. In sekere omstandighede is dit moontlik dat hierdie persoonlike regte sterk genoeg sal wees, maar in ander gevalle sal dit nodig wees dat hul ondersteun word deur middel van die proklamasie van spesiale wetgewing wat swak persoonlike regte in die virtuele eiendom versterk tot eiendoms-agtige regte. In ander gevalle geniet hierdie regte beskerming deur die konstitusionele reg. In ander omstandighede sal dit egter verg dat erkenning en beskerming moet plaasvind deur die erkenning van saaklike regte in virtuele eiendom. / South African Research Chair in Property Law (sponsored by the Departement of Science and Technology (DST) / National Research Foundation (NRF) / University of Maastricht‟s Faculty of Law / Ius Commune Research School

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