No description available.

No description available.

Univ., Diss.--Rostock, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references and index.

Thesis (LLM)-- Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Secession is one of the oldest and probably more controversial themes of public international law. The potential of a right to secede draws even more controversy amongst international law scholars and lawyers alike. This research merges classical international law perspectives on secession and the right to secede in particular, within a contemporary setting. Two research questions are answered: (i) Does a legitimate right to state secession exist under contemporary international law; if so, what are its normative characteristics? (ii) What is the position of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the realisation of a legitimate right to secede, considering its opinion in the Kosovo-case? The work follows a normative methodological approach in tackling and presenting the arguments towards and against the legitimacy of the right to secede. This allows for a clear interrogation of the norms constituting classic international law against the realities of an evolving pedagogy. Classical international law is traditionally statecentred, primarily due to the 1648 legacy of the Treaty (Peace) of Westphalia. However, contemporary international law has come to incorporate the roles of nonstate actors and even individuals. Consequently, the impact of secession extends beyond traditional international law norms like; territorial integrity and sovereignty, nationalism and uti possidetis. Moving forward, a critical inclusion within modern conceptualisation of secession needs to be considerations like, the right to selfdetermination and the promotion of human rights. The research departs with a clear comprehension of the status quo of a general theory of secession. The identification of a prescriptive general theory of secession remains rather elusive. However, cogent arguments are presented for the establishment of a right to secede with a sufficient legal foundation to support a general theory and find effective enforcement for the right. The arguments for the right to secede are rooted within a sound conceptual framework and historical context. In dealing with the normative characteristics of the right to secede, the historic reasoning of Shaw is utilised in order to establish a legal process for secession. This reasoning is applied in the presentation of the municipal manifestation of the right to secede, which traditionally is found in the constitutional entrenchments of the right. The relationship between the right to secede and selfdetermination is presented through a balancing of the components that constitute the right to self-determination. Following the Canadian Supreme Court’s contribution on the right to self-determination in the Quebec-case, the aspirations of peoples for selfdetermination needs to follow this dual view of self-determination as consisting of the right to internal and external self-determination. The contemporary position of the right to secede under international law is best illustrated in the ICJ treatment of secession in its Kosovo Opinion. The focus here is to present new insights into the impact of unilateralism and multilateralism in the interaction with secession. Ultimately, this research in its normative methodological approach presents the arguments both ancient and contemporary for the legitimate potential of a right to secede. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In die internationale reg, is sessessie (afskeiding) sekerlik een van die meer kontroversiële temas. Binne die geledere van akademici en praktisyns veroorsaak die moontlikheid van ‘n reg tot afskeiding selfs meer onenigheid. Met hierdie navorsing word die klassieke sienings hieroor in die internationale reg saamgesnoer binne ‘n meer hedendaagse uitleg. Twee navorsingsvrae word beantwoord: (i) Bestaan daar ‘n legitieme reg vir staatsafskeiding binne die hendendaagse internationale reg en indien wel wat is die normatiewe karaktereienskappe van so ‘n reg? (ii) Wat is die stand van die Internationale hof vir Geregtigheid (ICJ) aangaande die verwesinliking van ‘n legitieme reg op afskeiding in die lig van die hof se uitspraak in die Kosovo-Opinie. Die navorsing volg ‘n normatiewe metodologiese benadering om die argumente teen asook vir die legitieme reg op afskeiding te voer. Dit skep ruimte vir ‘n duidelike bevraagtekening van die klassieke internationale regsnorme teen die agtergrond van ‘n transformerende pedagogie. Die klassieke internationale reg is kenmerkend staatsgeorienteerd, grootendeels as gevolg van die nalatingskap van die 1648 Verdrag (Vrede) van Westphalia. Tog gee hedendaagse internasionale reg erkening aan die handelinge van nie-regeringsentiteite en selfs individue. Gevolglik, strek die impak van sessessie heel verder as tradisionele internasionale regsnorme soos; territoriale integriteit en soewereiniteit, nasionalisme en uti possidetis. 'n Kritiese blik op die moderne begrip van sessessie moet oorwegings soos die reg op selfbeskikking en die bevordering van menseregte in ag neem om vooriutgang te bewerkstellig. Die navorsing begin met 'n duidelike begrip van die status quo insake 'n algemene teorie van sessessie. Die identifisering van 'n voorskriftelike algemene teorie van afskeiding bly ongelukkig ontwykend. Tog word oortuigende argumente vir die vestiging van 'n reg om af te skei gevoer. Dit gaan gepaard met 'n voldoende regsgrondslag wat 'n algemene teorie ondersteun, asook die moontlikheid vir die doeltreffende uitvoering van die reg. Die argumente ter ondersteuning van die reg tot afskeiding word geïllustreer binne 'n verantwoordbare konseptuele raamwerk en historiese konteks. In die hantering van die normatiewe kenmerke van die reg word die klassieke redenasie van Shaw benut ten einde 'n regsproses vir afskeiding te vestig. Hierdie redenasie word toegepas by die handtering van voorbeelde oor plaaslike manifestasies van die reg to afskeiding. Hierdie plaaslike manifestasies word tradisioneel gevind binne state se grondwetlike erkennings van die reg. Die verhouding tussen die reg om af te skei en selfbeskikking word aangebied deur 'n balansering van die komponente waaruit die reg op selfbeskikking bestaan. Na aanleiding van die Kanadese Hooggeregshof se bydrae tot die reg om selfbeskikking in die Quebec-saak, is die aspirasies van volkere vir selfbeskikking gevestig in die reg om interne en eksterne selfbeskikking. Die kontemporêre posisie van die reg om af te skei ingevolge die internasionale reg word goed geïllustreer in die Wêreldhof se behandeling van afskeiding in die Kosovo-Opinie. Die fokus hier is die uitleg van nuwe insig oor die mag van unilateralisme en multilateralisme in die interaksies oor sessessie. Ten slotte bied hierdie navorsing in sy normatiewe metodologiese benadering die argumente, beide antiek en kontemporêre, vir die legitieme potensiaal van 'n reg om af te skei.

Les principes de la commande publique souffrent d’une imprécision juridique dans la mesure où, aspirant à des finalités communes au moyen d’instruments juridiques identiques, aucun des objectifs généraux qu’ils poursuivent ensemble ne peut être spécifiquement rattaché à l’un d’eux. Afin de pallier cette insuffisance du droit positif, une nouvelle clé de lecture des principes doit être découverte. Une analyse détaillée du droit positif dévoile que le temps constitue le pivot d’une lisibilité certaine des fonctions des principes. Structurant le droit de la commande publique, cet élément permet d’identifier différents temps poursuivant des objectifs spécifiques, dont la concordance avec les principes permet de délimiter les finalités caractéristiques à chacun. À partir de cette application temporelle des principes, il est possible de définir leurs fonctions propres, en ce sens que chacune des règles spécifiques du droit de la commande publique peut être rattachée àl’un d’entre eux. Une confrontation de cette conceptualisation temporelle au droit positif dévoile que de cette définition des fonctions propres, découlent des implications positives sur le droit de la commande publique. D’une part, certaines zones d’ombres latentes de cette branche du droit sont clarifiées. D’autre part, l’office du juge des contentieux précontractuel et contractuel est précisé. Une lecture singulière des fonctions des principes permet ainsi de pallier en partie la complexité patente du droit de la commande publique. / The principles of the Public Commission suffer a legal indistinctness, inasmuch as, aspiring to common purposes by means of identical legal instruments, none of the general objectives that they pursue together cannot be specifically connected to one of them. To mitigate this insufficiency of the substantive law, a new key to the interpretation of principles must be discovered. A detailed analysis of the substantive law reveals that the time constitutes the pivot of a certain legibility of the fonctions of the principles. Structuring Public Commissions Law, this element allows to identify different time pursuing specific objectives, of which the concordance with the principles allows to delimit the characteristic purposes of each.From this temporal application of the principles, it is possible to define their own fonctions, in this sense that each of the rules specific of Public Commissions Law can be connected to one of them. A confrontation of this temporal conceptualisation reveals that of this definition of appropriate functions, ensue positives implications of the Public Commission Law. On one hand, some latent grey areas of this branch of the law are clarified. On the other hand, the office of the judge of pre-contractual and contractual disputes is specified. A singular reading of the fonctions of the principles allows thereby to mitigate partially to the obvious complexity of the Public Commission Law.

No / April 2008 saw the introduction of a new Public Law Outline (PLO) that aims to improve judicial case management of Public Law Children Act cases. The PLO is a response to concerns about the rising number of care proceedings, associated costs, and the difficulties of achieving case resolution given this volume. Based on an ethos that care proceedings should be avoided wherever possible, the new approach to case management, which places significant emphasis on pre-proceedings work and the effective engagement of parents, can be seen to reinforce the ‘no order principle’ enshrined in the Children Act (CA) 1989. Focusing specifically on relationships between parents and professionals, this paper provides a critical discussion of the potential of the PLO to further promote consensual practices with parents. Discussion traces the introduction of the concept of partnership within the CA 1989, provides a review of the evidence to-date of effective partnership working, before considering the prospects for the PLO with respect to parental engagement. A number of key contextual obstacles are highlighted that will inevitably undermine the aspirations of the new outline, and a more general observation is drawn about the limits of procedure in effecting change in complex social issues.

Thesis (LLD )--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Acquisitive prescription (“prescription”), an original method of acquisition of ownership, is regulated by two prescription acts. Prescription is mostly regarded as an unproblematic area of South African property law, since its requirements are reasonably clear and legally certain. However, the unproblematic nature of this legal rule was recently brought into question by the English Pye case. This case concerned an owner in England who lost valuable land through adverse possession. After the domestic courts confirmed that the owner had lost ownership through adverse possession, the Fourth Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg found that this legal institution constituted an uncompensated expropriation, which is in conflict with Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. This judgment may have repercussions for the constitutionality of prescription in South African law, despite the fact that the Grand Chamber – on appeal – found that adverse possession actually constitutes a mere (constitutional) deprivation of property. Therefore, it was necessary to investigate whether prescription is in line with section 25 of the Constitution. To answer this question, the dissertation investigates the historical roots of prescription in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, together with its modern requirements in South African law. The focus then shifts to how prescription operates in certain foreign systems, namely England, the Netherlands, France and Germany. This comparative perspective illustrates that the requirements for prescription are stricter in jurisdictions with a positive registration system. Furthermore, the civil law countries require possessors to possess property with the more strenuous animus domini, as opposed to English law that merely requires possession animo possidendi. The justifications for prescription are subsequently analysed in terms of the Lockean labour theory, Radin’s personality theory and law and economics theory. These theories indicate that sufficient moral and economic reasons exist for retaining prescription in countries with a negative registration system. These conclusions are finally used to determine whether prescription is in line with the property clause. The FNB methodology indicates that prescription constitutes a non-arbitrary deprivation of property. If one adheres to the FNB methodology it is equally unlikely that prescription could amount to an uncompensated expropriation or even to constructive expropriation. I conclude that prescription is in line with the South African property clause, which is analogous to the decision of the Grand Chamber in Pye. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Verkrygende verjaring (“verjaring”), ‘n oorspronklike wyse van verkryging van eiendomsreg, word gereguleer deur twee verjaringswette. Verjaring word grotendeels beskou as ‘n onproblematiese aspek van die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg, aangesien die vereistes daarvan taamlik duidelik en regseker is. Nietemin is die onproblematiese aard van hierdie regsinstelling onlangs deur die Engelse Pye-saak in twyfel getrek. Hierdie saak handel oor ‘n eienaar wat waardevolle grond in Engeland deur adverse possession verloor het. Nadat die plaaslike howe die verlies van eiendomsreg deur adverse possession bevestig het, het die Vierde Kamer van die Europese Hof van Menseregte in Straatsburg bevind dat hierdie regsreël neerkom op ‘n ongekompenseerde onteiening, wat inbreuk maak op Artikel 1 van die Eerste Protokol tot die Europese Verdrag van die Reg van die Mens 1950. Hierdie uitspraak kan implikasies inhou vir die grondwetlikheid van verjaring in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, ten spyte van die Groot Kamer se bevinding – op appèl – dat adverse possession eintlik neerkom op ‘n grondwetlik geldige ontneming van eiendom. Derhalwe was dit nodig om te bepaal of verjaring bestaanbaar is met artikel 25 van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet. Vir hierdie doel word die geskiedkundige wortels van verjaring in die Romeinse en Romeins- Hollandse reg, tesame met die moderne vereistes daarvan in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, ondersoek. Daar word ook gekyk na hoe hierdie regsreël in buitelandse regstelsels, naamlik Engeland, Nederland, Frankryk en Duitsland, funksioneer. Hierdie regsvergelykende studie toon dat verjaring strenger vereistes het in regstelsels met ‘n positiewe registrasiestelsel. Verder vereis die sivielregtelike lande dat ‘n besitter die grond animo domini moet besit, wat strenger is as die Engelsregtelike animus possidendi-vereiste. Die regverdigingsgronde van verjaring word vervolgens geëvalueer ingevolge die Lockeaanse arbeidsteorie, Radin se persoonlikheidsteorie en law and economics-teorie. Hierdie teorieë illustreer dat daar genoegsame morele en ekonomiese regverdigings vir die bestaan van verjaring is in lande met ‘n negatiewe regstrasiestelsel. Hierdie bevindings word ten slotte gebruik om te bepaal of verjaring bestaanbaar is met die eiendomsklousule. Die FNB-metodologie toon dat verjaring neerkom op ‘n geldige, nie-arbitrêre ontneming volgens artikel 25(1). Indien ‘n mens die FNB-metodologie volg is dit eweneens onwaarskynlik dat verjaring op ‘n ongekompenseerde onteiening – of selfs op konstruktiewe onteiening – neerkom. Gevolglik strook verjaring wel met die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsklousule, welke uitkoms soortgelyk is aan dié van die Groot Kamer in die Pye-saak.

Thesis (LLD (Public Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The guarantee of a fair trial is fundamental to the criminal process of every modern society. Like all civilised nations, Botswana’s legal order provides for the protection of accused persons through the guarantee of a fair trial. But equality of arms, a central feature of medieval trial by combat, seems to have disappeared from modern criminal procedural systems. The question arises, therefore, whether criminal justice systems sufficiently cater for the fair trial of accused persons. This thesis will argue that the present legal and institutional framework for the protection of fair trial rights in Botswana falls short of guaranteeing procedural equality and that this severely compromises fairness. The institutional framework does not support equality of arms and therefore leaves procedural rights in a basic state of application. The thesis, therefore, seeks to analyse the protection of fair trial rights in Botswana in light of the principle of equality of arms. The thesis explores the origins and theoretical foundations of the principle. It recognises that the present application of the principle occurs by implicit countenance. The absence of any constitutional recognition of the principle leaves procedural rights in a basic state of application. The thesis discusses the practical implications of an express recognition and constitutional application of the principle in the adversarial system. Equality of arms should be central in the criminal process and no party should have an unfair advantage over the other. The thesis recognises that the prosecution is in a position of advantage in that it has the support of the state. This advantage manifests itself in the form of vast resources regarding expertise, investigatory powers and legislative powers. Disparities in resources, the ability to investigate and access to witnesses create an inequality of arms between the state and the accused. This can only be balanced and countered by empowering the accused with constitutional and procedural rights that specifically protect the accused in the face of the might of the state. These procedural rights include the presumption of innocence, the right to legal representation and the right to disclosure. It is argued, however, that though accused-based rights and constitutional rules of procedure generally protect the accused and ensure that the process is fair, they mainly remain theoretical declarations if they are not applied in line with equality of arms. In other words, the meaningful enjoyment of these rights by the accused, demands the strengthening of resources and legislative and institutional governance. Fairness in criminal trials is epitomised in the balance between the overwhelming resources of the state and the constitutional protection of the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional protection afforded to the accused is compromised. The first part engages the reader with the development of accused-based rights and introduces the constitutionalisation of procedural rights in Botswana. It discusses the scope and application of the principle of equality of arms, develops its relevance to the adversarial system and justifies an application of the principle in Botswana domestic law. It makes a comparison between the adversarial and inquisitorial models while recognising the growing tendency towards convergence. It highlights the adversarial system as interest-based, and recognises the indispensability of the principle of equality of arms to such a system. While recognising that inquisitorial procedures often offend equality of arms, the role of the inquisitorial system in ensuring equality of arms is also recognised. It measures and analyses the normative value, application and recognition of equality of arms in Botswana’s legal system, arguing for express recognition and a conceptual application of the principle by the courts. It is reasoned that express recognition of the principle will result in fuller protection and better realisation of accused-based rights. Exploring the adversarial-inquisitorial dichotomy, it recognises the need for convergence, but emphasises the principle of equality of arms and the right to adversarial proceedings as the foundation for fair trials. The second part analyses the investigation process and generally bemoans the great inequalities at this stage of the criminal process. It discusses procedural and evidential rules that serve to minimise the imbalances and the role that exclusionary rules play in ensuring fair trials and reliable verdicts. The third part identifies specific trial rights which are relevant to the principle of equality of arms. Central to the discussion are the right to legal representation and the presumption of innocence which are discussed in chapters 7 and 8 respectively. These two important rights are central to the protection of the accused but unfortunately are the most compromised due to lack of resources and legislative intervention. Chapter 9 deals with other rights that are relevant to the principle as well as the ability of the accused to present his case and effectively defend himself. It emphasises the need for the courts to engage in the trial, thereby enabling the unrepresented accused. The fourth part contains final conclusions which argue that the principle of equality of arms forms the basis for the full realisation of individual procedural rights and advocates for the recognition of the principle in the Botswana legal order. It is concluded that the constitutional enshrinement of fair trial rights and their basic application by the courts, without actual measures to ensure their realisation, are insufficient. Suggestions include legislative and institutional reforms, as well as a constitutional recognition of the principle of equality of arms. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die waarborg van ‘n billike verhoor is fundamenteel tot die strafprosesregstelsel van elke beskaafde gemeenskap. Soos in ander beskaafde lande, word die beskuldige in Botswana ook beskerm deur die reg op ‘n billike verhoor. In die Middeleeue was gelykheid van wapens (“equality of arms”) die sentrale kenmerk van die tweegeveg as geskilberegtigingsmetode. Dit blyk egter dat hierdie sentrale kenmerk afwesig is in moderne strafprosesregstelsels is. Die vraag ontstaan of hierdie toedrag van sake ‘n beskuldige se reg op ‘n billike verhoor op risiko plaas. In hierdie tesis word betoog dat die posisie in Botswana van so ‘n aard is dat “ongelyke bewapening” veroorsaak dat die reg op ‘n billike verhoor belemmer word. Die plaaslike institusionele bedeling onderskraag nie die beskerming van gelykheid van wapens nie en veroorsaak derhalwe dat prosessuele regte in “a basic state of application” is, met ander woorde, op ‘n eenvoudige en meganiese toepassingvlak is. Met die norm van gelyke bewapening as vertrekpunt, ondersoek hierdie tesis die beskerming van die reg op ‘n billike verhoor in Botswana. ‘n Ondersoek word geloods na die oorsprong en toereriese basis van die beginsel van gelyke bewapening. Die afwesigheid van uitdrukklike grondwetlike erkenning van die beginsel, word vergelyk met die praktiese implikasies en uitdruklike grondwetlike erkenning en toepassing in ‘n adversatiewe stelsel. Gelykheid van wapens behoort sentraal tot die strafproses te wees en geen party behoor ‘n onbillike voordeel bo die ander te geniet nie. In hierdie tesis word erken dat die vervolging bloot vanweë die feit dat dit deur die staatsmasjienerie ondersteun word, wesenlik bevoordeel word bo die individu as aangeklaagde. Dit gaan hier om toegang tot hulpbronne soos deskundigheid, asook die rol wat misdaadondersoekmagte en ander wetgewing speel. Ongelykhede byvoorbeeld in hulpbronne, in die vermoë om misdaad te ondersoek en in die toegang tot getuies, dra alles daartoe by dat ‘n wanbalans tussen die staat en die individu ontstaan. Die verlening van prosessuele regte aan die beskuldigde is ‘n metode om die balans te probeer herstel. Voorbeelde van sulke regte is die reg om onskuldig vermoed te wees, die reg op ‘n regsverteenwoordiger en die reg op insae in verklarings. In hierdie tesis word egter betoog dat alhoewel hierdie regte en ander grondwetlike strafprosedures die beskuldigde kan beskerm en die billikheid van die proses kan bevorder, dit absoluut noodsaaklik is dat voormelde regte en prosedures in lyn met die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens geïnterpreteer en toegepas moet word. Betekenisvolle afdwinging en toepassing van ‘n beskuldigde se regte verg versterking van bronne en die institusionele bedeling. Billikheid in die strafverhoor word gekenmerk aan die graad van balans wat bereik kan word tussen die oorvloedige hulpbronne van die staat teenoor die grondwetlike beskerming van die beskuldigde. In die afwesigheid van ‘n balans, word die beskuldigde benadeel. Die eerste gedeelte van hierdie tesis behandel die ontwikkeling van die beskuldigde se regte en bevat ‘n inleiding tot die konstitusionalisering van prossuele regte in Botswana. In Deel Een word die omvang en toepassing van die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens bespreek en word die relevantheid van hierdie beginsel in die adversatiewe proses identifiseer, veral wat Botswana betref. Die adversatiewe en inkwisitoriese modelle word vergelyk en bespreek met erkenning aan die moderne neiging dat die twee modelle besig is om in een te vloei – die sogenaamde verskynsel van “convergence”. Daar word aangetoon dat gelykheid van wapens die adversatiewe model onderlê. Hierteenoor is dit so dat die inkwisitoriese model ook erkenning aan gelykheid van wapens verleen. Daar word betoog dat gelykheid van wapens ‘n normatiewe waarde het en uitdruklik in Botswana deur die howe erken moet word. Uitdruklike erkenning sal tot groter beskerming en realisering van ‘n beskuldigde se regte lei. In Deel Een word ook tot die slotsom geraak dat alhoewel daar ‘n behoefte aan “convergence” is, dit onvermydelik tog ook so is dat gelykheid van wapens en die reg op ‘n adversatiewe proses die grondslag van ‘n billike verhoor vorm. In Deel Twee word die misdaadondersoekproses ontleed en word die grootskaalse ongelykhede wat hier onstaan en bestaan, bespreek. Daar word gelet op prosesregtelike en bewysregtelike reëls wat hierdie ongelykhede kan minimaliseer. Die rol van uitsluitingsreëls ter bevordering van ‘n billike verhoor en ‘n betroubare bevinding, word ook aangespreek. Deel Drie identifiseer spesifieke verhoorregte wat in ‘n besondere direkte verband met die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens staan. Hier is veral twee regte van besondere belang: die reg op ‘n regsverteenwoordiger (hoofstuk 7) en die reg om onskukdig vermoed te wees (hoofstuk 8). Ongelukkig is dit so dat hierdie twee regte erg ondermyn word. Die reg op resverteenwoordiging word ingekort deur ‘n gebrek aan finansiële bronne terwyl die vermoede van onskuld deur wetgewing ondergrawe word. In hoofstuk 9 word ander relevante regte bespreek en word die noodsaak van ‘n aktiewe hof in die geval van ‘n onverteenwoordigde beskuldigde bepleit Deel Vier bevat finale gevolgtrekkings. Daar word betoog dat die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens die basis vorm in die volle relisering van individuele regte en, verder, dat hierdie beginsel ten volle in die regstelsel van Botswana erken behoort te word. Blote grondwetlike verskansing van die grondwetlike reg op ‘n billike verhoor en ‘n blote basiese interpretasie daarvan deur die howe, is onvoldoende wanneer daar geen maatreels is om die haalbare realisering af te dwing nie. Wetgewende en institusionele hervorming is nodig, asook ‘n grondwetlike erkenning van die beginsel van gelykheid van wapens. / Research funds made available by Prof. S. E. van der Merwe

Thesis (LLM)-- Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study was to determine whether an individual can and/or should be allowed to consent to objectifying treatment. This necessitated the determination of the meaning of dignity, the meaning of freedom and the relationship between dignity and freedom. It was found that both the right not to be objectified and the right to consent to objectification could be found within human dignity. This is due to the broad definition of dignity in terms of which dignity has two, sometimes contradicting, components. One component safeguards autonomy and the right to choose, which supports consent to objectification, whereas the other promotes individual self-worth by prohibiting objectifying treatment. By investigating the meaning of freedom it was found that freedom as a constitutional value, and possibly also a free-standing constitutional right, could incorporate the right to consent to objectifying treatment. Three possible solutions to this tension between human dignity and freedom were identified and critically analysed. The first was that an individual cannot and should not be allowed to consent to objectification. This solution is primarily based on the notion that dignity is supreme to freedom and that freedom should yield to communitarian dignity. Furthermore, it is contended that consent to objectification is often invalid due to economic coercion and undue influence. The second possible solution was that, although an individual might not be able to validly consent to objectifying treatment, such consent should still be allowed under certain circumstances. The example of invalid consent due to economic coercion introduced in the previous solution was examined in relation to prostitution. The contention regarding this approach is that, since our government is unable to fulfil the socio-economic needs of those who consent due to economic coercion, such consent should be allowed and strictly regulated. The third possible approach was that circumstances do exist in which individuals can give valid consent to objectification and that in these circumstances they should be allowed to do so. In this solution the grounds of the first approach is criticised by contending, for example, that dignity is not supreme to freedom, that a plural society should allow these type of choices and that consent to objectification is already allowed in some instances. The results of this study were that, although there are situations in which genuine consent is not possible, it can be given under certain circumstances. An individual who cannot give genuine consent to objectification should not be allowed to do so, unless transitional measures dictate otherwise. However, an individual who is capable of giving valid consent to objectification should be allowed to do so. Finally, regardless of whether such consent is genuine or not, strict regulation thereof is required. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie studie was om vas te stel of 'n individu kan toestem en/of toegelaat behoort te word om toe te stem tot objektiverende behandeling. Dit genoodsaak dat die betekenis van menswaardigheid en vryheid, asook verhouding tussen hierdie twee begrippe vasgestel word. Daar is bevind dat beide die reg om nie te geobjektifeer te word nie en die reg om toe te stem tot objektivering gevind kan word binne die begrip van menswaardigheid. Hierdie is te danke aan die breë definisie van menswaardigheid in terme waarvan menswaardigheid uit twee, soms weersprekende, komponente bestaan. Een komponent beskerm outonomie en die reg om te kies, wat toestemming tot objektivering ondersteun, terwyl die ander komponent individuele waarde bevorder deurdat dit objektiverende behandeling verbied. Tydens die ondersoek aangaande die betekenis van vryheid is bevind dat vryheid as 'n grondwetlike waarde, en moontlik ook 'n vrystaande grondwetlike reg, die reg om toe te stem tot objektiverende behandeling kan inkorporeer. Drie moontlike oplossings vir hierdie spanning tussen menswaardigheid en vryheid is geïdentifiseer en krities ontleed. Die eerste is dat 'n individu nie kan toestem en ook nie toegelaat behoort te word om toe te stem tot objektivering nie. Hierdie oplossing is hoofsaaklik gebaseer op die veronderstelling dat vryheid onderworpe is aan menswaardigheid en dat individuele vryheid moet toegee tot die menswaardigheid van die gemeenskap. Verder word dit beweer dat toestemming tot objektivering dikwels ongeldig is as gevolg van die ekonomiese dwang en onbehoorlike beïnvloeding. Die tweede moontlike oplossing was dat, alhoewel 'n individu nie noodwendig instaat is om geldige toestemming tot objektiverende behandeling te verskaf nie, sodanige toestemming onder sekere omstandighede steeds toegelaat behoort te word. Die voorbeeld van ongeldig toestemming as gevolg van ekonomiese dwang wat in die vorige oplossing bekendgestel is, is ondersoek aan die hand van prostitusie. Die bewering ingevolge hierdie benadering is dat, aangesien ons regering is nie in staat is om die sosio-ekonomiese behoeftes van diegene wat toestem tot objektivering as gevolg van ekonomiese dwang te vervul nie, sodanige toestemming toegelaat en streng gereguleer behoort te word. Die derde moontlike benadering is dat daar wel omstandighede bestaan waar individue geldige toestemming kan gee tot objektivering en dat hulle in hierdie omstandighede toegelaat behoort te word om dit te gee. In terme van hierdie oplossing word die gronde waarop die eerste benadering gebaseer is gekritiseer, deur byvoorbeeld te argumenteer dat menswaardigheid nie verhewe is bo vryheid nie, dat in ons huidige diverse samelewing sulke soort keuses aanvaar behoort te word en dat toestemming tot objektivering reeds in sommige geval toegelaat word. Die resultate van hierdie studie was dat, alhoewel daar omstandighede bestaan waaronder geldige toestemming nie moontlik is nie, dit wel onder sekere omstandighede gegee kan word. 'n Individu wat nie daartoe instaat is om geldige toestemming tot objektivering te gee nie, behoort nie toegelaat word om dit te doen nie, tensy oorgangsmaatreëls anders bepaal. Waar 'n individu egter in staat is om geldige toestemming tot die objektivering te gee, behoort dit toegelaat word. Ten slotte is streng regulering van toestemming tot objektiverende behandeling nodig ongeag of sodanige toestemming geldig is of nie.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / Includes bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The existential crisis of the international regime of criminal law is arguably a thing of the past. This is confirmed through a growing body of positive law and the existence of various international criminal courts, notably the permanent International Criminal Court which has been in operation since 2002. Moreover, it is significant that international criminal law (“ICL”) is developing towards increased domestic enforcement, in particular as a result of the complementarity regime envisioned by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. States have generally been receptive and cooperative towards international criminal norms as well as the structures of international criminal justice. As a result international criminal laws are increasingly being transformed into national law and enforced by states on the domestic level. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the abovementioned developments, the characteristics of ICL and certain key concepts. In lieu of the upward trajectory of ICL’s development, the thesis aims to determine whether ICL exerts an influence which holds ‘transformative value’. Chapter 3 unpacks this concept by delineating the different meanings afforded to transformation and identifying the reticent characteristics of transformative change, especially the underlying importance of values during processes of transformation. Transformative value is conceptualised broadly as the product and potential of the type of change that holds some utility for the civitas maxima (or the community of mankind). In Part II, ICL’s transformative value is investigated from a historical and global perspective with emphasis on the purposes, values and politics of international criminal justice. Chapter 4 focuses on the Nuremberg IMT and the trial of Adolf Eichmann. It is submitted that these trials produced a paradigm shift that represents the transformative foundation of modern ICL. Chapter 5 investigates the purposes and aspirations of modern ICL with reference to its underlying assumptions as well as its objectives, the latter which may be found in positive law and the jurisprudence of international criminal courts. The research suggests that ICL is disposed towards objectives which are unique in comparison to those of domestic criminal law. While it cannot be denied that punishment under ICL is predominantly a backward-looking exercise in the tradition of domestic criminal law retributivism, ICL is somewhat removed from this paradigm due to its purpose- and value-driven nature. ICL is also expressive, normative and forward-looking in various respects. Individual criminal liability is however not universally accepted as an appropriate response to collective violence. This is partly a result of ICL’s endemic political dependency. Chapter 6 addresses the impact of politics on ICL’s transformative value. ICL is closely associated with liberal-legalist ideals which essentially promote the interests of individuals. Although it constitutes an important element of ICL’s transformative value, this political influence exposes ICL to criticism and may exert a disruptive influence on its transformative mandate. In this latter respect it is noted that ICL remains somewhat controversial and subject to the general limitations of the decentralised and state-dominated international legal system. In Part III, ICL’s transformative value is investigated using South Africa as a case study, with particular reference to its transitional- and post-transitional periods. Chapter 7 provides a domestic perspective of ICL’s transformative value by investigating the interactions of ICL and the South African legal system, particularly the value of the transformation of ICL into national law. In this regard the impact of Constitutional provisions and national legislation pertaining to ICL are considered, as well as a number of cases related to matters of international criminal justice. It is argued that international criminal norms may promote human values over state authority and political interests in the domestic context. Domestic courts may serve as ‘engine rooms’ for transformative change through more effective enforcement of those international criminal norms that have been ‘transformed’ into national law through implementation legislation. The permeation of international criminal norms into the domestic sphere represents a foray of universal values into an area traditionally dominated by sovereign might and holds potential for promoting the interests of individuals as well as for the institutionalisation of human rights. Yet, as illustrated by the current rift between the ICC and the African Union, international and regional political affiliations may influence the ability of a state to meet its obligations towards international criminal justice. In Part IV (Chapter 8), it is submitted that ICL is historically and ontologically aimed at change that is both backward-looking (repressive) and forward-looking (normative) as well as beneficial in a communitarian sense. ICL’s transformative value derives from the value-and purpose-driven nature of international criminal norms, the political nature of international criminal justice and also from the interaction between international law and domestic legal systems. ICL may be viewed as an authoritative expression of the norms and values of the international community. As such, ICL and its institutions may be viewed not only as a means of punishing the perpetrators of international crime, but also as part of the spearhead towards a desired alternative to the historical and present reality characterised by injustices which have gone unabated under the system of traditional Westphalian sovereignty. As egregious forms of the aforementioned injustices, macro criminality and impunity undermine the protection of internationally recognised individual rights. ICL seeks to remedy this through impacting on those individuals that have not yet acceded to the emergent universal consciousness of the majority in the international community. It is further argued that ICL’s transformative impact is not confined to the “hard” impact of the application of substantive ICL in international and domestic courts. The international criminal justice system as a whole also produces a normative impact through a purpose-driven association with international values and certain political preferences. This thesis offers a new way of thinking about the value, potential and limitations of the ICL regime, as well as the role of politics in international criminal justice. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die eksistensiële krisis van die internasionale strafregbestel is stellig iets van die verlede. Dít word bevestig deur die toenemende hoeveelheid positieweregsmateriaal en die bestaan van verskeie internasionale strafhowe, in die besonder die permanente Internasionale Strafhof wat sedert 2002 in werking is. Daarbenewens is dit beduidend dat internasionale strafreg (hierna ‘ISR’) na binnelandse toepassing begin verskuif, bepaald as gevolg van die komplementariteitsregime wat die Rome Statuut van die Internasionale Strafhof beoog. State is oor die algemeen ontvanklik vir, en tegemoetkomend jeens, internasionale strafnorme sowel as die strukture van internasionale strafregspleging. Gevolglik word internasionale strafwette al hoe meer tot in nasionale wette getransformeer en binnelands deur state toegepas. Hoofstuk 2 bied ’n oorsig van bogenoemde ontwikkelings, die kenmerke van ISR en bepaalde kernbegrippe. In die lig van die opwaartse ontwikkelingstrajek van ISR, het dié tesis ten doel om te bepaal of die invloed wat ISR uitoefen, oor ‘transformasiewaarde’ beskik. Hoofstuk 3 ondersoek hierdie begrip deur die verskillende betekenisse van transformasie uiteen te sit en die versweë kenmerke van transformerende verandering, veral die onderliggende belang van waardes in die transformasieproses, te bepaal. Transformasiewaarde word in die breë verstaan as die produk en potensiaal van die soort verandering wat een of ander nut het vir die civitas maxima (of die gemeenskap van die mensdom). In deel II word die transformasiewaarde van ISR uit ’n historiese en internasionale hoek ondersoek, met die klem op die doel, waardes en politiek van internasionale strafregspleging. Hoofstuk 4 konsentreer op die Neurenberg- internasionale militêre tribunaal en die verhoor van Adolf Eichmann. Daar word aangevoer dat hierdie verhore ’n paradigmaverskuiwing teweeggebring het wat die transformerende grondslag van moderne ISR gelê het. Hoofstuk 5 verken die doelwitte en aspirasies van moderne ISR aan die hand van die onderliggende aannames en oogmerke daarvan. Laasgenoemde is te vinde in die positiewe reg en regsleer van internasionale strafhowe. Die navorsing doen aan die hand dat die oogmerke van ISR uniek is in vergelyking met dié van binnelandse strafreg. Hoewel straf ingevolge ISR onteenseglik ’n hoofsaaklik terugblikkende oefening in die vergeldingstradisie van nasionale strafreg is, is ISR tog ietwat verwyderd van hierdie paradigma vanweë die doel- en waardegedrewe aard daarvan. ISR is in baie opsigte ook ekspressief, normatief en toekomsgerig. Individuele strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid word egter nie allerweë as ’n toepaslike reaksie op kollektiewe geweld aanvaar nie. Dít is deels ’n gevolg van die endemiese politieke afhanklikheid van ISR. Hoofstuk 6 handel derhalwe oor die impak van politiek op die transformasiewaarde van ISR. ISR hou ten nouste verband met liberaal-legalistiese ideale wat in wese individue se belange bevorder. Hoewel dit ’n belangrike element van die ISR-transformasiewaarde uitmaak, stel hierdie politieke invloed ISR ook bloot aan kritiek, en kan dit ’n ontwrigtende uitwerking op die transformasiemandaat daarvan hê. In dié verband word daarop gelet dat ISR ietwat omstrede bly, sowel as onderworpe aan die algemene beperkinge van die gedesentraliseerde en staatsoorheerste internasionale regstelsel. In deel III word die transformasiewaarde van ISR aan die hand van Suid-Afrika as gevallestudie ondersoek, met bepaalde verwysing na die oorgangs- en na-oorgangstydperke van die land. Hoofstuk 7 bied ’n binnelandse beskouing van die transformasiewaarde van ISR deur ondersoek in te stel na die wisselwerking tussen ISR en die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel, veral die waarde van die transformasie van ISR tot in die nasionale reg. In hierdie verband word daar besin oor die impak van grondwetlike bepalings en nasionale wetgewing met betrekking tot ISR, sowel as ’n aantal hofsake in verband met aangeleenthede van internasionale strafregspleging. Daar word aangevoer dat internasionale strafnorme in binnelandse verband straks mensewaardes bo staatsgesag en politieke belange bevorder. Binnelandse howe dien moontlik as ‘enjinkamers’ vir transformerende verandering, deur daardie internasionale strafnorme wat deur inwerkingstellingswetgewing tot in die nasionale reg ‘getransformeer’ is, doeltreffender toe te pas. Die deurdringing van internasionale strafnorme tot in die binnelandse sfeer stel ’n verskeidenheid universele waardes bekend op ’n gebied wat tradisioneel deur soewereine mag oorheers is, en hou potensiaal in vir die bevordering van individuele belange sowel as vir die institusionalisering van menseregte. Soos die huidige skeuring tussen die Internasionale Strafhof en die Afrika-unie egter toon, kan internasionale en streek- politieke bande ’n invloed hê op ’n staat se vermoë om sy verpligtinge teenoor internasionale strafregspleging na te kom. In deel IV (hoofstuk 8) word aangevoer dat ISR histories en ontologies afgestem is op terugblikkende (onderdrukkende) én toekomsgerigte (normatiewe) verandering, sowel as verandering wat een of ander gemeenskapsvoordeel inhou. Die transformasiewaarde van ISR spruit uit die waarde- en doelgedrewe aard van internasionale strafnorme, die politieke aard van internasionale strafregspleging, sowel as die wisselwerking tussen internasionale reg en binnelandse regstelsels. ISR kan as ’n gesaghebbende openbaring van die internasionale gemeenskap se norme en waardes beskou word. As sodanig, is ISR en die instellings daarvan nie net ’n middel om die plegers van internasionale misdaad te straf nie, maar ook deel van die strewe na ’n wenslike alternatief vir die historiese én huidige realiteit, wat gekenmerk word deur onregte wat ongebreideld onder die stelsel van tradisionele Wesfaalse soewereiniteit voortduur. Makrokriminaliteit en strafloosheid, synde uiterste vorme van voormelde onregte, ondermyn die beskerming van internasionaal erkende individuele regte. ISR beoog om dít reg te stel deur ’n invloed uit te oefen op daardie individue wat nóg nie die ontluikende universele bewustheid van die meerderheid in die internasionale gemeenskap openbaar nie. Daar word voorts betoog dat die transformerende impak van ISR nie tot die ‘harde’ impak van die toepassing van substantiewe ISR in internasionale en binnelandse howe beperk is nie. Die stelsel van internasionale strafregspleging in die geheel het ook ’n normatiewe impak deur middel van ’n doelgedrewe verbondenheid aan internasionale waardes en bepaalde politieke voorkeure. Hierdie tesis bied ’n nuwe denkwyse oor die waarde, potensiaal en beperkings van die ISR-bestel, sowel as die rol van politiek in internasionale strafregspleging. / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin for financial support / Stellenbosch University for financial support