In 2010, the populist radical right party the Sweden Democrats were voted into the Swedish parliament, which rattled the mainstream parties. The Sweden Democrats’ stance on migration policy was clear from the start, with their MPs promoting a radical decrease, if not a complete stop, to all immigration. This thesis aims to expand the existing research about populism in Sweden and contribute to the field of political science by analysing the general policy debates on migration policy held after the entry of the Sweden Democrats into parliament. The study examines the debates to get answers to several questions: What do politicians think is the main problem with migration policy over the years and how are the problems represented? Is it possible to find indications of populism during the debates and are there signs of the Sweden Democrats' discourse being normalized? Are there any discursive shifts made by the mainstream parties and is there a hegemonic discourse visible throughout the debates? The results show four dominating problem representations on the topic of migration over the years, with the problem representation of the Sweden Democrats gaining support from the Liberals and the Christian Democrats in the debate of 2018. Tendencies of normalization of the Sweden Democrats’ discourse are also detectable in the 2018 debate, as well as some discursive shifts by mainstream parties. A hegemonic discourse is visible during the 2010 and 2014 debates, but it has lost its hegemonic position during the 2018 debate.

Populist radical right (PRR) political parties have become important players in many European countries. These parties generally have a core ideology of ethnic nationalism supported by antiestablishment populism and sociocultural authoritarianism. PRR parties have managed to find electoral success in many European countries over the last few decades, usually at the expense of more established mainstream parties. The success of PRR parties is dependent on both voters and the parties themselves. In other words, parties must frame issues in a way that appeals to at least some voters while voters must have some reason for supporting these parties. This thesis looks at Denmark and Sweden, two countries with relatively similar cultures, political systems, and economies that have had different experiences with PRR parties. An analysis of socioeconomic factors highlights certain traits that makes voters more likely to vote for PRR parties, namely education and unemployment. Additionally, PRR party rhetoric likely appeals to socioeconomically disadvantaged voters by promising improved welfare and shifting the blame for their troubles to immigrants. In sum, this thesis suggests that PRR parties will continue to find electoral success as long as immigration maintains a high level of political salience, as PRR parties can use anti-immigration rhetoric to attract the socioeconomically disadvantaged. / Master of Arts / Populist radical right (PRR) political parties have become important players in many European countries. These parties generally have a core ideology of ethnic nationalism, a form of nationalism defined by ethnicity and focusing on a shared heritage. PRR parties also generally espouse antiestablishment populism by trying to appeal to the masses through critques of the government and established political parties. These parties also tend to embrace sociocultural authoritarianism, the desire for strict obedience to authority as it pertains to society and culture. This thesis looks at Denmark and Sweden, two countries with relatively similar cultures, political systems, and economies that have had different experiences with PRR parties. However, PRR parties have been electorally successful in both countries over the last decade. This thesis examines socioeconomic factors that may affect the likelihood of voters to vote for PRR parties, and determines that education and unemployment can play a large role in voter attitudes. Additionally, this thesis analyzes PRR party rhetoric and ascertains that these parties likely appeal to socioeconomically disadvantaged voters. In sum, this thesis suggests that PRR parties will continue to find electoral success as long as immigration remains an important political issue, as PRR parties can use anti-immigration rhetoric to attract the socioeconomically disadvantaged.

Cette thèse porte sur les impacts réels et potentiels des partis de droite radicale (PDR) sur l'économie et évalue ces impacts - quantitativement et qualitativement - en considérant la politique économique et les performances économiques de 27 pays européens.Nous commençons par discuter les définitions de pdr (chapitre 1) et leur position sur les questions économiques (chapitre 2). Nous en déduisons une taxonomie des positions de ces partis sur les questions économiques et confirmons l'hétérogénéité entre les PDR sur ces questions. Le chapitre 3 résume la littérature sur les déterminants politiques de l'économie, dont nous tirons nos hypothèses. Le chapitre 4 teste ces hypothèses à l’aide d’économétrie sur des données de panel. Nous montrons que la présence de PDR semble avoir des effets sur l’économie mais différent en europe de l’est et de l’ouest. En europe de l'est, les scores électoraux des PDR, ainsi que leur inclusion dans une coalition au pouvoir sont significativement liés à l'augmentation des importations et de la diminution des exportations. En europe de l’ouest, leur inclusion dans une coalition au pouvoir est lié à l’accroissement de l'écart entre les taux de chômage de la main-d'oeuvre autochtone et étrangère.Afin de comprendre les mécanismes qui sous-tendent nos résultats, le chapitre 5 propose une contribution originale à l'approche néo-réaliste d'amable et palombarini (2005). Nous soutenons que la politique économique est le résultat de la régulation politique des conflits sociaux et illustrons notre point de vue avec l'étude de cas de la ligue du nord italienne. / This PhD Thesis discusses the actual and potential impacts of Radical Right Parties (RRPs) on the economy and assesses these impacts – quantitatively and qualitatively – by considering the economic policy and performances of 27 European countries.We start discussing the different definitions of RRPs (Chapter 1) and their position on economic issues (Chapter 2 We derive an original taxonomy of RRPs’ positions on economic matters confirming the heterogeneity between RRPs. In Chapter 3, we critically review the literature on the political determinants of the economy and identify three conceptualisations of the ‘political’ in neo-classical economics: opportunistic, partisan, and institutional models. Chapter 4 tests our main hypotheses by using a dynamic panel data model. Results show no significant and robust evidence in support of an impact on authoritarian (e.g. security) and populist (e.g. deficits) indicators. We find evidence in support of a nativist impact, different in Eastern and Western European countries. In Eastern Europe, RRPs’ electoral scores, as well as their inclusion in a ruling coalition, are a significant predictor of increased imports and decreased exports. In Western Europe, RRPs’ strength and presence in a ruling coalition are a significant predictor of increasing gap in unemployment rates between native and foreign workforce.In order to understand the mechanisms behind our results, Chapter 5 proposes an original contribution to Amable and Palombarini (2005)’s neo-realist approach. We argue that economic policy is the result of the political regulation of social conflict and illustrate our framework with the case study of the Italian Lega Nord.

Die Beiträge des vorliegenden Sammelbandes gehen auf die wissenschaftliche Fachtagung „Grenzen der Toleranz. Rechtsextremes Milieu und demokratische Gesellschaft in Brandenburg - Bilanz und Perspektiven" zurück, die im Mai 2009 in Potsdam stattfand. Auf der Tagung hielten verschiedene Wissenschaftler Vorträge, die ihrerseits durch Praktiker/innen mittels „Kommentaren aus der Praxis“ gespiegelt wurden. Die meisten Vorträge der Tagung finden sich in diesem Band nun in überarbeiteter, in der Regel erweiterter und aktualisierter Form wieder. In einem Fall wurde ein Text aufgenommen, der aus einem längeren „Kommentar aus der Praxis“ entstanden ist. Die Beiträge kreisen um das Problem des Rechtsextremismus, seinen Erscheinungsformen und Praktiken in Brandenburg und darüber hinaus, und beleuchten die staatlichen und zivilgesellschaftlichen Gegenmaßnahmen und –strategien. Dabei wird deutlich: Brandenburg hat zwar noch ein Rechtsextremismusproblem - aber auch vielfältige Strategien und Erfahrungen in der erfolgreichen Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Phänomen. / This volume combines contributions to a conference Grenzen der Toleranz. Rechtsextremes Milieu und demokratische Gesellschaft in Brandenburg – Bilanz und Perspektiven („The Limits of Tolerance. Far Right Milieus and Democratic Society in Brandenburg – Results and Perspectives“) held in Potsdam in May 2009. At this conference, several scholars held lectures and were commented by practitioners. The contributions to the book discuss different aspects of the far right movements and its praxis in Brandenburg and beyond, and they introduce and analyze the reactions and counter-activities of the state as well as the civil society. Thus, it becomes obvious: Right wing extremism is still a challenge for democratic society in Brandenburg, but this society has also developed multiple and effective strategies to react.

This thesis explores how economic performance, measured as real GDP-growth per capita, affects the vote share of parties which relies on radical ideological platforms. Using a fixed effect model with panel data, based on real electoral outcomes of 18 western European democracies, the result reveals an ambiguous reality. The overall conclusion implies that low growth rates benefit the electoral success of radical-right parties and holds for robustness checks. No solid evidence of the relationship is found on the radical-left side.The result further reveals that the individuals decision to vote radical is relative more affected by the ongoing business cycle trend between the elections rather than sudden changes close to the election day. The relationship also appears to be stronger among nations of southern Europe.

In 2018, the Sweden Democrats party has gained 17.5 per cent of the votes during the Swedish general elections. Consequently, with this success, they became the third largest party in the riksdag. However, the party’s rapid growth has created several questions in the political arena and the Swedish society about the party’s ideological affiliations and evolutions. The political scientists, Mudde (2010) and Widfeldt (2008) argue that in order to understand a party’s improvements, it is important to explore a party’s ideological evolution. Scholars have argued that Sweden Democrats have normalized their ideas and values; adopted liberal values in some policy areas in order to attract a large number of voters, succeed and survive in the political system. The aim of this study is to explore the party’s idea/ideology changes since its creation in 1988 until present 2019. Hence, the main purpose is to find out if the core ideologies of the Sweden Democrats - that is nativism, authoritarianism and populism- as expressed in their party programs respectively electoral manifestos, are characterized by continuity or by normalization, and adaptation to liberal values. Using Marie Demker’s (1993) concept of ideology, ideal types for radical right populism and liberalism have been constructed as analytical tool. The study shows that throughout the years, the party’s nativist world view and strategy have been changed and normalized, the authoritarian world view has mainly been constant but the strategy has had major changes; shifted to liberal values, and finally regarding populism; both world view and strategy are characterized by continuity.

This diploma thesis examines the suitability of generalization of the populist radical right parties (PRRP). In recent years, these parties have succeeded on the political scene of many European countries. Using the example of "new" Svoboda a přímá demokracie (SPD) political party and the established Danish People's Party (DF) it shows the differences in the party pre-election rhetoric and program, which are brought about by parties' age as well as by different historical developments in the respective countries. The historical context has affected contemporary political environment and, therefore, there are reasonable doubts about the generalization of the PRRPs. This is especially the case of post-communist countries, which, after years of oppression, had to go through a process of transformation that involved not only economic issues. This thesis is based on the Lipset's and Rokkan's cleavages theory, while it tries to confirm its existence in the given states, namely the economical, the religious, the center - periphery and the urban - rural cleavage. The inclusion of six tested factors in the analysis helps to do this. The multiple linear regression analysis tested which factors (the factors are socio-cultural, socio-economic, and demographic factors) have a statistically significant...

Do Populist Radical Right Parties have an impact on the attitudes of other parties? Despite drawing much attention from the general public as well as academics, there is no clear answer to this conundrum. In this paper I examine how mainstream political parties change their positions in parliamentary debates on immigration and refugees after Populist Radical Right Parties enter parliament. In order to do this, I use theoretical concepts such as discourse coalitions and storylines in combination with network methodology to map out how parties in the Swedish parliament relate to one another through their attitudes towards key themes in the debate on immigration and refugees. This paper focuses on the relations between parties through language by applying Discourse Network Analysis on parliamentary debates. Thus, it contributes with a new relational aspect and methodological tool on a relatively underutilised material. The findings indicate that there is a change in other parties’ attitudes towards immigration and refugees, with two mainstream right parties moving closer to the Populist Radical Right Party. However, the datatype does not support causal language and the findings are limited due to small amounts of data.

The rise of right-wing populism has been identified as a major threat to multilateralism, and its negative consequences for climate policy have already materialised. However, its impacts on environmental policy have been less studied, especially so regarding policy outcomes. In this paper, I strive to narrow this research gap by investigating the impacts of right-wing populism on environmental protection expenditure. I employ a panel regression analysis to examine populist government participation in all European Union member states, and I also separate countries that have experienced a right-wing populist government to explore differences across the party family. The results show no profound effects, which is anticipated. Environmental concerns are more easily conveyed within the right-wing populist logic than climate change mitigation measures, and many European PRRPs express pro-environmental policy stances - they are so-called green patriotists. Based on previous studies, I expand on this concept. Finally, the results indicate green patriotism might be influential for policy outcomes, which is another contribution of this paper to the research field.

Literature on climate policy of political parties’ points to an emerging congruence between populist radical right parties and scepticism toward climate change and climate policy. This thesis explores this nexus via a case study of the Sweden Democrats (SD) climate policy over a period of twelve years (2010-2022). It examines if the Sweden Democrats have expressed variations of climate scepticism and whether this has varied over time. Idea analysis and a taxonomy of three categories of climate scepticism are used for analysing official policy material of the Sweden Democrats. This thesis finds that the Sweden Democrats have outcomes on all three categories of climate scepticism: evidence (i.e., whether human caused climate change is happening), process (related to bureaucratic and scientific processes, e.g., scepticism against dominant research paradigms and bureaucratic decision making), and response scepticism (related to policy choices dealing with climate change). Over time there has been a gradual migration of scepticism from evidence and process related scepticism toward more policy-oriented forms of scepticism that concerns type of policy and attitudinal responses to climate change. Sweden Democrats climate scepticism is primarily anchored in arguments related to desired levels of national response and issues of trade/offs, with climate scepticism frequently constructed through frameworks of the potential harm that climate mitigation may do to national sovereignty, national economy, and industries. Another finding is that the Sweden Democrats overall have a lower salience and prioritization of climate issues compared to other parties represented in parliament whose climate policy they criticize, presenting their climate policy as alternative to these parties. This thesis concludes that the Sweden Democrats climate scepticism is closer to an unconvinced stance toward climate change rather than strictly denialistic, with evidentiary sceptic arguments over time becoming less frequent and decreasing in the degree of scepticism.