This thesis deals with differences in the level of satisfaction with democracy between populists and non-populists in eleven Western European countries the past twenty years, with the common denominator that they all have experienced the electoral success of a populist radical-right party and a population increasingly expressing distrust and dissatisfaction with democracy. The thesis is based on a definition of populism in which it is regarded as a threat to democracy, and moreover, the thesis explores whether there are any significant differences in the level of satisfaction with democracy and whether these differences changes as time passes between these two voter groups.  The results of the analysis, which is carried out quantitively, strengthens the theoretical expectations, proving that there is a significant negative correlation between being populist and level of satisfaction with democracy, and that the effect becomes stronger as time passes. The results also align with the perception that societal changes such as modernization and globalization has contributed to the growth of new voter groups who express their dissatisfaction with democracy by opposing the establishment, thus turning to the political alternatives.

Populism is a phenomenon that impacts not only nation-states and their institutions but also the institutions of international-supranational organizations. This is the case of the European Union, where populist radical right parties (PRRPs) – the most predominant type of populism in Europe – reached the Parliament in 1984, consolidated in 2014, and have since then participated in the debates about the European legislation. Such participation has been mainly framed by the current functioning of the European Parliament (EP), which grants greater importance to alliances instead of individual Members of the Parliament, thereby, PRRPs cooperated among themselves in three groups: the European Conservatives and Reformists, the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, and the Europe of Nations and Freedom.  Particularly in migration, a key area of interest of these parties because of their nativist and authoritarian characteristics, these alliances have specific positions and therefore, have promoted different strategies aimed at increasing the powers of member states by diminishing European integration, strengthening the EU external borders, and preventing the arrival of new immigrants, especially the illegal ones. This was particularly reinforced in the 8th parliamentary period that lasted from 2014 to 2019, which also coincided with the 2015 refugee crisis. In this context, the EP adopted and implanted various legislation to cope with the crisis, including the European Border and Coast Guard, the European travel document for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals, the Entry/Exit System, the European Travel Information and Authorization System, and the reinforcement of the mandate of the EU-LISA agency.  In 30.905 words, this research aims at understanding whether PRRPs’ characteristics and positions have influenced the EU immigration legislation, measured by how successful have been the two common strategies they undertake to do so: influencing the voters’ attitudes and opinions and obstructing parliamentary proceedings. Data shows that these groups still have a minority in the Parliament, do not vote together as a bloc, some of them do not actively participate in parliamentary work, and therefore, have limited power to impact the legislation as they can only do it indirectly by shaping the behavior of their electoral force.

The political party Sweden democrats became Sweden’s third largest party in 2014 after entering the Swedish parliament back in 2010 for the first time. During this time discussions about the party background and ideology have increased both from other parties and in the society. The controversy surrounding the party can partly be traced back to its foundation and the period before the party entered the national parliament in 2010. Sweden democrats was founded in 1988 by the remains of two right wing extremist movements, today the party has distanced itself from Nazism and calls itself a social conservative party. According to studies Sweden democrat’s ideology is considered as right-wing radical populism. This difference of identification is a problem, because it creates questions why it exists. Are the Sweden democrats really a social conservative party or is the party rendering a false image, and why. In this essay I will use ideal types of the two ideologies social conservative and Right-wing radical populism to evaluate which ideal type can describe the ideology in the party materials of the Swedish democrats most adequate. Additionally this essay will compare the ideal types to see how different the two ideologies are. The analysis and conclusion shows that the two ideologies differs from each other, but they share a few aspects. The evaluation of Sweden democrats party material does show that the party shares the fundamental value of right-wing radical populism and contains attributes from that theory, including etno-nationalism and etno-pluralism. The essays conclusion is therefore that Sweden democrats appears to be a right-wing radical populist party. That creates a question for future research, why the party identify itself as a social conservative party.

This thesis aims to describe the use of gender symbols and gender equality ideas in contemporary nationalist parties in Sweden. Nationalism and national identity traditionally contain gendered ideas, symbols and identities, in which women are subordinate to men. Paradoxically, in Sweden, gender equality has become an intrinsic part of the national identity. Theories on gender and nationalism are applied and used in the quantitative and qualitative analysis in order to distinguish and describe the use of gender symbols and gender equality ideas in the two Swedish parties New Democracy and the Sweden Democrats. The findings show that the parties do rely on traditional nationalist gender roles, and that the Sweden Democrats emphasize these roles to a greater extent than New Democracy. The analysis also shows that both parties try to incorporate the Swedish gender equality into their ideologies but interpret the notion of gender equality in two different ways.

Since the 1990s the support for the populist radical right parties has steadily increased. This essay investigates if there is a common policy preference among this party-family that makes them successful, irrespective of each party’s national belonging. This is achieved by utilising a time-series cross-sectional data from the Comparative Manifesto Project. These data range between 1990-2018 and includes 13 different West-European countries. Five different hypotheses containing different policy preferences are tested through multiple regression analysis. The essay concludes that the previously commonly accepted winning formula containing a positive view on welfare, emphasis on authoritarian values and nativism does not hold up. Furthermore, the essay concludes that national context has a decisive role of which policy preference is successful. The common successful policy preference among the populist radical right is their promotion of authoritarian values together with an emphasis on eliminating political corruption and clientelist behaviour (populism). This is explained by societal value changes with major clashing groups in the society, making the authoritarian values a successful policy preference irrespective of national context.

À partir de campagnes d’entretiens réalisés auprès d’acteurs publics répondant à la droite radicale en Allemagne et en France, je propose d’expliquer comment les acteurs publics de ces deux Etats participent à la régulation de l’expression du radicalisme de droite. J’ai choisi pour ce faire d’explorer deux pays voisins ayant cadré différemment la place de la lutte contre le radicalisme de droite : les acteurs politiques et administratifs allemands ont construit une politique publique luttant contre le radicalisme politique, ce qui n’est pas le cas de la France où le traitement de la droite radicale se fait avant tout au sein de l’arène politique. L’approche comparée souligne que la gouvernance de la droite radicale par les services de l’Etat fait l’objet d’une construction constante reposant sur une diversité d’acteurs ayant leurs propres cadres de références basés sur des jugements normatifs, des intérêts et expériences institutionnelles. Ce sont les constellations d’acteurs avec différents cadres de référence et la nature de leurs interactions qui permettent d’expliquer les conditions de l’utilisation des instruments de politique publique répondant au radicalisme de droite. Les différences dans la gestion du radicalisme de droite en Allemagne et en France illustrent les rapports que ces sociétés libérales et démocratiques entretiennent avec la politique. / Based on research fieldwork conducted in France and Germany with semi-directed interviews split between different institutional actors responding to right-wing radicalism, this study seeks to explain how public actors have taken part in the regulation of the expression of right-wing radicalism. I thereby chose to compare neighbouring countries, which have framed the struggle against right-wing radicalism differently: German political and state actors have constructed a public policy responding to political radicalism, whereas it has hardly been the case in France where the radical right is primarily handled in the political arena. The comparative approach outlines that the governance of the radical right by state authorities is the object of a continuous political construction undertaken by a variety of actors with distinctive policy frames. These are based on normative judgements, personal interests, and institutional experiences. The constellations of actors with different policy frames and their interactions during the decision-making process enable to explain the modalities of the use of policy instruments that are used to respond to right-wing radicalism. Differences in the handling of right-wing radicalism in France and Germany illustrate the relationships that these liberal and democratic societies have had with politics.

[pt] Este estudo investiga as relações, as disputas e os debates no Reino Unido entre partidos de esquerda (Labour), direita (Tories) e extrema-direita (UKIP) durante o referendo do Brexit, entre dezembro de 2015 e julho de 2016. Com base na leitura de jornais, artigos na internet, discursos, programas partidários e leis britânicas, o trabalho destacou a centralidade dos temas da imigração e da construção das identidades nacionais no referendo. O estudo desenvolve dois argumentos principais. O primeiro argumento afirma que os partidos britânicos não atuaram de modo isolado ou autônomo, mas constituíram e responderam a um sistema geral da ação política. Isso implica ver a atuação da extrema-direita como parte dos atores políticos partidários que se influenciaram de forma mútua e permanente. O segundo argumento defende que a votação marcou a estruturação dos espaços políticos no Reino Unido por meio de duas lógicas contraditórias: complexificação e simplificação. Por um lado, o Brexit representou um excedente de significação, levando as disputas a lugares cada vez mais improváveis. Por outro lado, o boletim de votação do dia 23 de junho de 2016 comportava somente duas opções: Leave ou Remain, isto é, deixar a União Europeia ou permanecer na mesma instituição. Nesse sentido, o referendo anunciou uma promessa difícil, de modo que as discussões transbordaram a própria moldura da votação. Por meio de um jogo entre excesso e falta, completude e incompletude, significação e contradição, o evento funcionou como um espaço privilegiado para as disputas políticas por hegemonia na construção da coletividade nacional britânica. / [en] This study investigates the relations, disputes and debates in the United Kingdom between left-wing (Labour), right-wing (Tories) and radical right (UKIP) parties during the Brexit referendum, between December 2015 and July 2016. Based on the reading of newspapers, articles on the internet, speeches, party manifestos and British laws, the work highlighted the centrality of the themes of immigration and the construction of national identities in the referendum. The study builds two main arguments. The first argument states that British parties did not act in isolation or autonomously, but constituted and responded to a general system of political action. This implies seeing the performance of the radical right as part of the party political actors who influenced each other mutually and permanently. The second argument argues that the voting marked the structuring of political spaces in the United Kingdom through two contradictory logics: complexification and simplification. On one hand, Brexit represented an excess of meaning, leading disputes to increasingly unlikely places. On the other hand, the ballot paper on June 23rd 2016 carried only two options: Leave or Remain, that is, leave or stay in the European Union. In this sense, the referendum announced a difficult promise, so that the discussions overflowed the very frame of the vote. Through a game between excess and lack, completeness and incompleteness, meaning and contradiction, the event functioned as a privileged space for political disputes for hegemony in building British national collectivity.

In recent studies of Scandinavian Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties, a convergence of their socioeconomic and sociocultural politics have been emphasized. This evidence points towards them having tempered their more radical agenda as they have moved towards the mainstream. But the description of the Sweden Democrats, the Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party as a homogenous entity doesn’t fit their own perception. Across different channels, like printed media and debates, the Scandinavian parties have made clear statements about how they should not be equated with one another. Through comparative method this study wants to shed light on the Scandinavian PRR-parties dividing and uniting ideological features to discuss if they should be described as homogenous - or can we find divergence? Drawing on Cas Muddes theory of populism as a thin ideology, together with Benedict Anderson's theory of nationalism as an ‘imagined community’, this study demonstrates how we can cover the full range of ideas that PRR-parties represent, and thereby present a more nuanced description of them.

La prise en compte du cadrage fait par les influenceurs de la droite radicale et du contenu de leur discours reste peu explorée. Ces contenus sont particulièrement préoccupants lorsqu’ils sont produits par des « influenceurs » qui auraient non seulement un pouvoir social sur leurs nombreux adeptes engagés, mais qui susciteraient aussi une opposition souvent virulente envers les autorités. Certains affirment que la recherche a manqué d’études empiriques systématiques sur le sujet et l’étude de la variation de cadre serait une piste intéressante pour de futures recherches (Benford 1997). Il y a donc un besoin pressant de développer une compréhension rigoureuse de la façon dont des crises mondiales peuvent changer la façon dont certains influenceurs de la droite radicale cadrent leurs discours. En utilisant des données originales sur cinq influenceurs de la droite radicale au Québec sur la plateforme Twitter de janvier 2020 à avril 2022, nous relevons d’abord les sujets prédominants dans le discours des influenceurs de la droite radicale. Grâce à une analyse thématique par LDA, nous confirmons que sept sujets dominent le discours des influenceurs de la droite radicale durant la pandémie de COVID-19, soit les élites, la gestion de crise, les médias, la fausse pandémie, la conspiration, le gouvernement et la liberté. Deuxièmement, nous montrons que la crise sanitaire de COVID-19 a poussé les influenceurs de la droite radicale à changer leur discours et à adopter trois « cadres de crise » qui présentent la COVID-19 comme directement liée aux concepts de gouvernance, de conspiration et de liberté. / The framing done by radical right influencers and the content of their discourse remain underexplored. Such content is of serious concern when it is produced by "influencers" who would not only have social power over their many committed followers, but also would generate often virulent opposition to the authorities. Some argue that research has lacked systematic empirical studies on the topic and the study of frame variation would be an interesting avenue for future research (Benford 1997). There is thus a pressing need to develop a rigorous understanding of how global crises can change the way some radical right-wing influencers frame their discourse. Using original data about five radical right influencers in Quebec on the Twitter platform from January 2020 to April 2022, we first identify the predominant topics in radical right influencers' discourse. Through a thematic analysis by LDA, we confirm that six topics dominate the discourse of radical right influencers during the pandemic of COVID-19: elites, crisis management, media, fake pandemic, conspiracy, and freedom. Second, we show that the COVID-19 health crisis pushed radical right influencers to change their discourse and adopt three "crisis frames" that present COVID-19 as directly related to the concepts of conspiracy, governance, and freedom.

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