Thesis (M.A.)--Miami University, Dept. of Political Science, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 49-51).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2005. / Mary Stuckey, committee chair; Carol Winkler, M. Lane Bruner, David Cheshier, James Darsey, Daniel Franklin, committee members. Electronic text (316 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed July 16, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 301-316).

Univ., Diss. u.d.T.: Günzel, Angelika: Grundstrukturen des Verhältnisses von Staat und Religion in Israel unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtsstellung der Religionsgemeinschaften--Trier, 2004. / Literaturverz. S. [279] - 292.

[pt] Nos últimos anos, o fenômeno religioso voltou a ter presença pública no Uruguai, apesar do processo de inspiração jacobina de separação entre religião e Estado que se deu a partir do final do século XIX e teve seu ápice nas primeiras décadas do século XX. A sociedade menos religiosa da América Latina (que apresenta índices similares a alguns países europeus) e que viveu um forte processo de secularização que deslocou a religião majoritariamente para o âmbito da vida privada está mudando. Ou ao menos, está passando por uma revisão daquele que é tido como seu caráter distintivo: a laicidade de seu povo e de suas instituições estatais. Defendendo uma incidência maior na esfera pública e na política institucional, líderes evangélicos ligados a diversas organizações religiosas afirmam ser necessário defender valores que não estão sendo representados pelos atuais legisladores e tampouco pelo Estado nacional. Animada a participar da política parlamentar em reação à chamada agenda de direitos – é dizer, a regulamentação do aborto, do consumo de maconha, e também do casamento entre pessoas do mesmo sexo – parte da liderança evangélica uruguaia realizou uma substancial mudança de paradigma ao decidir influenciar a política a partir de sua compreensão cristã de mundo e ao abandonar a perspectiva laica que restringia ao âmbito privado a atuação religiosa. Como em outras partes, o discurso desses atores religiosos defende o retorno à esfera privada de temas que hoje, inclusive no Uruguai, são compreendidos como direitos e debatidos a partir de uma moralidade laica. Chama atenção o desenrolar desse processo em um país que realizou, de modo precoce e radical, a transferência para o Estado e a universalização de funções antes concernentes às famílias e aos grupos religiosos. Esta tese, fruto de pesquisa empírica realizada no Uruguai entre novembro de 2018 e abril de 2019, apresenta as percepções dessa nova liderança evangélica acerca das relações entre religião, moralidade e Estado e propõe uma reflexão sobre os dilemas que sua prática política suscita naquela que é considerada a democracia mais estável da América Latina. A partir da análise desse caso particular (marcado pela racionalização moderna do espaço da política e da assistência social), esse trabalho procura refletir sobre a demanda contemporânea de alargamento da experiência política moderna e a consequente revisão do conceito de laicidade. Essas mudanças, por centrais para o estabelecimento de um pacto de convivência social, dizem respeito a todas as democracias, especialmente às latino-americanas tão marcadas pelo fenômeno religioso. / [en] In recent years, the religious phenomenon has returned to the public sphere in Uruguay, despite the Jacobin-inspired process of separation between religion and Modern State that took place from the end of the 19th century and had its peak in the first decades of the 20th century. The least religious society in Latin America (which has similar rates to some European countries), and which has undergone a radical process of secularization that has shifted religion mostly to the sphere of private life, is changing. Or at least, it is undergoing a review of what is considered to be its distinctive character: the secularity of its people and its state institutions. Defending a greater religious incidence in the public sphere and in institutional politics, evangelical leaders linked to various religious organizations say that it is necessary to stand up for values that are not being represented by current legislators or by the national State. Animated to participate in parliamentary policy in reaction to the so-called rights agenda - that is, the regulation of abortion, marijuana use, as well as same-sex marriage - part of the Uruguayan evangelical leadership made a substantial paradigm shift in deciding to influence politics from its Christian worldview and by abandoning the secular perspective that restricted religious activity to the private sphere. As in other parts, the discourse of these religious actors defends the return to privacy of themes that today, including in Uruguay, are understood as rights and debated based on secular morality. It is noteworthy that the development of this process occurred in a country that carried out, early and radically, the transference to the State and the universalization of functions previously concerning families and religious groups. This thesis, the result of empirical research carried out in Uruguay between November 2018 and April 2019, presents the perceptions of this new evangelical leadership regarding the relations between religion, morality, and the State and proposes a reflection on the dilemmas that its political practice raises in that which is considered the most stable democracy in Latin America. Based on the analysis of this particular case (marked by the modern rationalization of the space of politics and social assistance), this work seeks to reflect on the contemporary demand for extending the modern political experience and the consequent revision of the concept of secularity. These changes, which are central to the establishment of a social coexistence pact, concern all democracies, especially Latin American ones marked by the religious phenomenon.

Les relations entre l’Etat et la religion sont déterminantes dans l’histoire de chaque pays. Au Kazakhstan, le statut de l’islam a varié au gré du régime sur place. Implanté en plusieurs vagues, commençant par la conquête arabe du sud du pays, puis officialisé par les Qarakhanides, la Horde d’Or sous le khan Özbek et les khans kazakhs, l’islam a trouvé une certaine régulation à partir du XVIIIème siècle avec la colonisation russe. L’Empire russe, intéressé par le fait de gagner les musulmans à sa cause, favorise leur religion en créant l’Assemblée spirituelle à Orenbourg. L’impératrice Catherine II envoie des mollahs tatars dans la steppe kazakhe et construit de nombreuses mosquées pour mieux contrôler les Kazakhs. Mais le renforcement de l’islam donne des résultats inverses à ceux escomptés et l’empire durcit sa position envers le dernier, il limite le nombre de mollahs et de mosquées par région. Avec l’arrivée des soviétiques au pouvoir, tout semble changer. Mais provisoirement seulement ; les premières « déclarations démocratiques » n’aboutissent qu’à se retourner contre toutes les religions par une série de répressions à la fin des années 1920, et l’idéologie communiste espère mettre fin à l’islam. Pourtant les Directions spirituelles musulmanes avaient été rétablies durant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale par Staline qui avait voulu utiliser le potentiel religieux pour servir ses buts. Elles ont fonctionné jusqu’à l’effondrement de l’URSS en reflétant les décisions du parti. L’indépendance du Kazakhstan a donné une chance aux croyants de rétablir la religion, mais en même temps elle a contribué à l’apparition de mouvances radicales. Depuis les années 2000 le gouvernement revoit sa politique en matière religieuse, en effectuant de nouveau des restrictions. L’histoire recommence-t-elle ? / Relations between the state and religion are determining in the history of every country. At Kazakhstan the status of Islam has largely depended on the ruling regime. Islam was brought to Kazakhstan in several waves, starting from the conquest of the country’s south by Arabs. It was legalized by Qarakhanides, the Golden Horde under Khan Özbek and Kazakh clans and was further regularized with Russian colonization starting from XVIII century. Russian Empire, interested in attracting Muslims, has favored their religion by creating a Spiritual assembly at Orenburg. Empress Catherine II (The Great) had sent Tatar mullahs to the Kazakh steppes to establish Moslem institutions (mosques, religious schools, etc). This was aimed at gaining control over the Kazakh population. But reinforcement of Islam has led to rather opposite result and, as a consequence, Empire hardened towards Islam - the numbers of mosques and mullahs were reduced. It seemed to change upon arrival of the Soviets to the region, but only for a limited time, followed by anti-religious declarations of the Soviet Government and repressions at the end of 1920s, aiming to exterminate the influence of Islam once and forever. However during Second World War, under Stalin, Muslin spiritual institutions were once more re-established. They continued to function during the post-war era and collapse of USSR, being in the total support for the latter. Independence of Kazakhstan has provided an opportunity for the citizens to freely express their beliefs, and at the same time it led to the emerging of certain radical movements. From the years of 2000 the Kazakh government revises once again its policy on religion towards restriction. The history repeats itself?

Självmord är ett fenomen som funnits så länge vi kan minnas. Självmord och sekularism är ett någorlunda nyare fenomen men diskuterades först av sociologen Emilé Durkheim i hans verk Självmordet (1897/1983). Syftet med denna rapport är att undersöka just sambandet mellan sekularism och självmord, men även andra faktorer som kan spela in på självmordsfrekvensen i dagens moderna samhälle, baserat på de faktorer Durkheim påvisat i sitt verk. Frågeställningarna som rapporten grundas på är 1) Finns det ett klart samband mellan den sekulära befolkningen i ett land och högre självmordsfrekvens inom ny forskning? Och 2) Vilka faktorer, åsido sekularism, spelar in på självmordsfrekvensen i sekulära länder enligt ny forskning? Metoden som används är en kvalitativ innehållsanalys där specifika termer och ord söktes upp i ny forskning. Dessa termer är baserade på de orsaksfaktorer som Durkheim nämnt i sitt verk. Resultaten presenterades genom ett kodschema och visade bland annat att det finns ett samband mellan sekularism och högre självmord, som Durkheim påstått. Det verkar främst vara den religiösa gemenskapen som fungerar som ett skyddsnät för individen och desto mer religiös en gemenskap är desto lägre självmordsfrekvens verkar framkomma. Faktorer, åsido sekularism,  som påvisade högst självmordsfrekvens var bland annat kön (män) , ålder (50+) och socioekonomiska faktorer (specifikt arbetslöshet). / Suicide is a phenomenon that has been around for as long as we can remember. Suicide and secularism are a somewhat newer phenomena but were first discussed by the sociologist Emilé Durkheim in his book Suicide (1897/1983). The purpose of this report is to examine the connection between secularism and suicide, but also other factors that may affect the suicide rate in today's modern society, based on the factors Durkheim previously identified in his book. The questions at issue on which the report is based on are 1) Is there a clear link between the secular population in a country and higher suicide rates shown in new research? And 2) According to new research, what factors, apart from secularism, affect the suicide rate in secular countries? The method used is a qualitative content analysis where specific terms and words were sought in new research. These terms are based on the factors of cause which Durkheim previously mentioned in his book. The results were presented through a ‘code scheme’ and showcased that there is a connection between secularism and higher suicide rates, as Durkheim claimed. It seems to be primarily the religious community that acts as a safety net for the individual and the more religious a community is, the lower the suicide rate appears. Factors, apart from secularism, which were linked to higher suicide rates included gender (male), age (50+) and socio-economic factors (specifically unemployment).