Thesis advisor: Robert Murphy / In this paper, I explore the connection between governance and economic growth. Economic growth has been a phenomenon experienced by some countries, but totally lacking in others. This paper explores the role of governance on growth, utilizing the governance indicators developed by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators project. I develop a model that is a synthesis of the Solow Growth Model, as well as the growth models developed by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Kaufmann and Kraay (2002). My results conclude that governance is linked with economic growth through two channels: first, governance and economic growth are positively correlated with each other; and secondly, good governance positively affects trade and investment, which then is positively associated with the growth of GDP per capita. Thus, good governance should be of the utmost concern for countries attempting to achieve growth of GDP per capita. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics Honors Program. / Discipline: Economics.

The theme of this thesis is the current trade policy of India. India is not longer seen only as a cheap "call" center and low-cost outsourcing factory. More and more large Western companies have chosen India because of high added value and they begin to perceive it as an equal player with global ambitions. The thesis is divided into five chapters. The aim of the first chapter is to explain the concept of business policy. The second chapter deals with the basic macroeconomic indicators. The third chapter analyzes trade policy instruments used in India. The remaining chapters are devoted to foreign direct investment policy and innovation policy. You find enclosed and compiled a questionnaire which was sent to selected companies. These are companies that have experience with the Indian market.

The politics of trade after the Cold War has transformed United States foreign policy. In fact, given the surge of interest in free trade agreements (FTAs) and the far-reaching political and economic repercussions of globalization, this thesis argues that the post-Cold War period, reinforced by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, constitute a critical juncture in the history of U.S. international economic policy and trade diplomacy. The U.S. began to seek FTAs after 1989 as a way to maintain its strategic influence in international relations and counterbalance the formation of trading blocs such as the European Union (EU). Yet, despite its hegemony, the U.S. has succeeded in negotiating and implementing relatively few FTAs. Addressing this paradox, this dissertation seeks to answer two basic questions: First, why does the U.S. have relatively few FTAs compared to other economically powerful countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD)? Second, why has the U.S. taken longer to negotiate and conclude certain FTAs over others? These questions will be examined by analyzing the evolution of interest group coalitions and the persistent conflict surrounding FTAs and international trade in general since the end of the Cold War. To further this analysis, the dissertation will study the influence of interest groups, bureaucratic politics, and the role of institutions, as well as the interaction among state and civil society actors, on the politics of trade. The dissertation will focus on the immediate aftermath of the Cold War period, which set the tone for current U.S. trade policy, and will examine the negotiations leading to the agreements signed with Jordan, Singapore, and Chile.

This thesis consists of three essays in the fields of the political economy of international trade. Location Equilibrium with Endogenous Rent Seeking: This paper analyzes the location of manufacturing activities when regional policy is determined by endogenous rent seeking. Once lobbying for government transfers to regions is included in an economic geography framework with size asymmetries, the standard prediction that the larger region becomes the core when trade barriers are reduced no longer holds. The establishment of manufacturing production in the economically smaller region is increasing in the level of regional integration once trade becomes freer than a certain threshold value. When free trade prevails, the relocation of industry takes place up to the point where there are as many firms operating in the South as in the North. Furthermore, lobbying slows down the agglomeration process, whereas the home market magnification effect (Baldwin, 2000) becomes weaker. Endogenous Tariff Formation and the Political Economy of Trade Retaliation: This paper extends the notion of endogenous tariff formation under representative democracy by allowing for strategic interaction between governments. The model developed suggests that the ideological distribution in the electorate within a country affects the tariff setting behavior among its trading partners. The equilibrium tariffs in a country depend on the trade policy preferences of the ideologically neutral voters among such partners as well as on the distribution of their sector-specific factor ownership. Ideological shifts in the population which systematically alter the political power of different voter groups, or types of factor owners, in one country thus influence the tariff setting behavior in competing trading nations. On the Indeterminacy of Trade Policy under Different Electoral Rules: Current research has found ambiguous results with respect to the effects of the type of electoral regime on trade policy. The present paper proposes a solution to this indeterminacy. It is shown that the equilibrium level of trade protection can be relatively higher, as well as lower, under a majoritarian electoral rule compared to proportional representation. The framework developed in this paper thus includes as special cases earlier models reported in the literature. The equilibrium outcome is shown to depend on the number of voters in swing districts who own a factor specific to the exporting industry in relation to those who possess claims to the specific input employed by the import-competing sector. Using a cross section of countries, empirical evidence is consistent with this hypothesis.

My thesis develops three models of political economy, examining different factors that affect equilibrium in political markets. The first paper develops a model based on that of Moutos (2001) whereby a government must choose between a tariff and an income tax in order to raise revenue to finance redistribution from rich to poor. I use a simple median voter model of political economy to show that an income tax may be preferred if it can raise more money than the tariff. This result links well with the empirical observation that more liberal trade regimes are often associated with larger government sizes. The second paper explores the idea of interactions between different parts of a political party’s platform and the benefit that different groups can receive from those policies. I show that even when parties have no predisposition towards any particular policy their policy announcements may differ due to the difference in demand for policy favours from special interests. I also discuss how this difference in demand can affect the relative success of interests groups and of the political parties themselves, and apply these results to a simple model of trade policy to show that left-wing parties proposing higher income tax rates may attract support from groups who support trade protection in developed countries. My third paper provides an extension to the well known model of special interest politics by Grossman and Helpman (1996). I introduce costly informative spending that special interests can use to convert uninformed voters into informed ones. This is advantageous to special interests when those being informed are of a similar political persuasion to the interest group members, thus skewing equilibrium policies towards the group’s objectives.

The main goal of the following paper is to compare the trade policies of Brazil and the Russian Federation, analysing their insertion in global value chains. Briefly, it is argued that both countries follow a three-track strategy in international trade. Brazil focuses its efforts on the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels, especially with developing and emerging countries. Russia also focuses on the multilateral and regional levels, but the third pillar of its strategy is a "Look East", towards the more dynamic markets of today's global economy.

為何台灣居於部份農業貿易政策保護之位置? 本研究之目的係為了能解釋此原因。此可以被台灣歷史之理論上所施行的肉類貿易之例子所解釋。此農業貿易保護政策可被定義為選擇性之貿易保護。 / Why does Taiwan have in place a partially protectionist agricultural trade policy？ The goal of the research is to find a causal explanation to this question by looking at the case of meat trade. It can be explained under the premises of historical institutionalism theory. Its agricultural trade policy can be defined as selectively protectionist.

The PhD dissertation studies the construction of trade protection in the United States and the European Union. It focuses in particular on measures of contingent protection, comprising anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties and safeguards. The dissertation adopts a constructivist approach based on narrative analysis: broadening the conventional scope of political economy research on trade, the analysis combines the study of narratives with the concept of ‘discourse coalition’. The period under investigation spans over the period 2010-2014, covering the Obama Administration and the mandate of European Commissioner for trade Karel De Gucht. Adopting a comparative approach of the US and EU trade policy, the dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the US administration’s and the European Commission’s discourses on trade protection, and includes an analysis of a large array of other actors’ alternative, or competing constructions of contingent protection. The dissertation demonstrates that a specific type of unilateral enforcement plays an underestimated role in the construction of contingent protection. It also emphasizes that policy actors consider contingent protection as necessary to convince people that the trading system is fair; the research proposes the concept of ‘discursive embedded liberalism’ to account for this specific construction of trade protection. The research underlines elements of continuity and change, showing that many elements of the current crisis within the international trade regime were already in the making in the period under investigation. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Theses deals with agricultural policy of New Zealand in comparsion with the EU Common Agricultural Policy. Subject of examination is their impact on foreign trade in agricultural goods as well as impact on the farmers themselves. On the basis of the analysis of agricultural policies in New Zealand and the European Union is subsequently conducted an evaluation of both policies. The approaches in both territories are then comprehensively compared. In concclusion is outlined the possible future development.

This dissertation explores the impact of international trade on the geographic location of manufacturing activities and on regional productivity growth patterns within countries. This study develops models of trade with monopolistic competition in the context of a two-region country. It also provides empirical estimates of the e ect of tari policy on the distribution of industrial activities and on productivity growth di erentials across Colombia's regions. The rst essay investigates the consequences of trade liberalization for the distribution of manufacturing activities between large and small cities. It presents an extension of the Melitz (2003) model of trade with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous rms where producers' location and export market participation decisions depend on their productivity. As a country's exposure to trade shifts, rms and output are reallocated between large and small urban areas. Data from Colombia's manufacturing sector lend support to theoretical predictions concerning tari reduction's impact on the repartition of industrial activities between metro- and nonmetropolitan areas in this country. The second essay extends the New Economic Geography, Footloose-Capital model to examine the e ect of commercial policy on the distribution of industrial activities between regions within a country. This study aims at distinguishing theoretical cases with regard to the nature of the trade policy change or to the source of asymmetry between regions. It shows that trade liberalization can have adverse consequences for the manufacturing sector of a small or isolated region under bilateral liberalization, but a positive impact under unilateral trade liberalization. The third essay adapts the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model of trade with monopolistic competition, heterogeneous rms, and variable mark-ups to analyze the relationship between trade openness, regional market size, and regional aggregate industry performance. It demonstrates that the impact of trade liberalization on aggregate industry productivity growth varies across regions as a function of regional market size and proximity to foreign markets. A larger region experiences a greater increase in aggregate productivity through intra-industry reallocation of market shares. Similarly, a region with better access to international markets enjoys a higher productivity growth from tari reduction. Empirical evidence is obtained from the Colombian manufacturing sector.