我國公告土地現值係作為人民土地移轉時申報實際買賣價格之參考，且為主管機關審核土地移轉現值及徵收土地補償地價之依據。公告土地現值之數額即攸關人民財產權益之負擔與損失之填補，涉及土地所有權人之權益，因此，其查定除應公平、具合理性外，更應符合相關之法律規範。 惟本研究發現，在現行體制、架構下產生之公告土地現值，存在不少適法性之問題。從公告土地現值形成之依據而言，現行辦理公告土地現值之作業僅以地價調查估計規則作為操作準據，缺乏法律之明確授權，違反法律保留原則。除此之外，形成公告土地現值必須辦理之程序—劃設地價區段、估計區段地價、舉辦公開說明會、提請地價評議委員會評議、編製土地現值表公告等等，更有著地價區段之劃設未符合明確性原則、估計估計區段地價應有之規範未以自治條例訂之、未以法律直接規範或明確授權命令規定，直轄市或縣（市）提請地價評議委員會評議區段地價前應舉辦公開說明會、地價評議委員會無法落實法律制度設計所賦予之功能、現行各直轄市或縣（市）政府有意地將一般正常交易價格打折後，評定作為公告土地現值，已違反立法原意、不得逕以地價調查估計規則第二十三條規定將公告土地現值定為區段價制等問題。 再者，公共設施保留地之公告土地現值，依現行規定係由直轄市或縣（市）政府於每年編製土地現值表時，預先依平均地權條例施行細則第六十三條規定，計算其補償地價，以作為公告土地現值。惟現行預先以較高之補償地價作為其公告土地現值之作法，將有高估其公告地價之情事，也就造成公共設施保留地之土地所有權人於其土地利用權能受限制之情況下，反須多繳納地價稅，顯有不公。 另外，由於公告土地現值之形成涉及高度之專業判斷，且因規範密度不足，造成行政法院對於公告土地現值形成之司法審查密度，係採消極審查方式，僅能以公告土地現值之決定，是否提經地價評議委員會評議來作為其審查標準。惟現行地價評議委員會無法達到制度設計所賦予之功能，因此，此刻最重要之課題，即應強化法律對於公告土地現值形成程序面之規範密度，藉以保障人民財產權益。 由於我國已邁入民主法治國家，政府的行政行為除以國民權利、自由之保障為職志外，並以實現公益、公共性為目的，其實現之價值內涵更應避免行政單方地操縱及對人民有不平等之處遇，政府之行政行為即需有法治國原理之注意。本研究爰於終章試著建構我國現行公告土地現值制度應有之法規範。

原住民族長期生活於山村地區，有著特殊民族文化維繫個人或團體間長期的互動，惟日本時期沿襲迄今的保留地制度，無論是空間區位的選擇或增劃編地點的決定，原住民族毫無參與的餘地，導致無法妥善勘選區位適當的土地作為原住民保留地使用，進而使文化傳承、經濟生活所依賴的母土逐漸流失；近年來受國外原住民保留地經營管理成功案例的激勵及民族意識的興起下，原住民發起三次還我土地運動，而政府部門在增劃編的回應中，也認真的思索保留地興革的建議，遂在學者專家及原住民族菁英的討論過程，凝聚回復傳統產權共有舊制的共識。 　　憲法增修條文第十條第十二項對原住民族基本權的規範，含有「制度保障」之意涵，因此原住民族土地管理法規，是有提昇為法律位階之必要性，爰由內政部研定「原住民族土地開發管理條例」草案，刻正依法定程序送請立法院審議中。按該條例草案異於前之管理辦法者，在於增加了「原住民族保留區」的制度設計，新制在原住民族社會已有共識，惟尚缺乏個案研究的實證分析，因此難以辨別制度可能引發的後遺症，爰有本研究就桃源鄉進行個案分析驗證。 　　本研究以國外學者Elinor Ostrom在制度經濟學對共用資源共管機制的制度設計原則，來檢驗分析個案在保留區新制實施過程中，可能衍生的問題，以實地問卷訪談的方式進行調查；嗣經得知劃設原住民族保留區可以解決桃源鄉現存的保留地問題，而劃設地點以該鄉梅山村及寶山村最適宜，惟應建立一套劃設指標據以實施且應有相關配套措施，最後根據當地原住民的意見反應，證明集體決策理論觀點，適合運用在劃設原住民族保留區的決策過程。 　　此外，在後續研究的部分，本研究亦建議：桃源鄉小規模群體自主治理的資源利用方式，可否全面運用到保留區新制，有待與其他個案比較分析及探討，而欲達此政策目的，必須選定實驗區域，進行試驗及檢討，方得確保制度設計成為法律後，能夠彌補現行保留地措施肇致政府失靈與市場失靈的缺失。 / Taiwan indigenous people have lived in mountainous area for centuries. The interactions between their individuals and groups are regulated by specific cultures. However, the Reserved Land Institution began with Japan Colonist Era does not allow indigenous people to chose the place they live in by themselves. It made improper zoning. urthermore, it led to the land, which had supported their cultural and economic life lapsed gradually. In past twenty years, encouraged by the international indigenous movements and domestic ideology wakening, Taiwan indigenous people had held the Return My Land Demonstrations for three times. Government began to deliberate the reform of Indigenous Reserved Land Institution, and acquired conclusions after long-term discussion between government, scholars and indigenous elites. One of the conclusions is to revert to the traditional land tenure co-owning institution. 　　According to the Added Article of the Constitution (article 10, item 12) , this country has obligation to protect the basic rights of indigenous people with formal institutions. It means the Indigenous Reserved Land Developing and Managing Regulation needs to be promoted to a formal law. At this moment, The Legislative Yuan is deliberating the Indigenous Reserved Land Developing and Managing Law drafted by the Exclusive Yuan. A new designing named Reserved Area was made in it. This new designing was agreed by most of indigenous people. However, there is no empirical analysis to it and its side effect so far. Therefore, this research examined the Reserved Area Institution by case study in Taoyuan Township of Kaohsiung County. 　　The theoretical basis of this research is the institution designing principles of common pool resources self-governance, which addressed by Elinor Ostrom. Meanwhile, the investigation was processed by questionnaires. After the analysis, this research pointed that Indigenous Reserved Area Institution can solve the problems of Reserved land in Taoyuan Township now. The most proper locations of Indigenous Reserved Area are May-Shan and Pao-Shan villages. In farther step, it needs relative supporting measures and concrete area setting index. Beside, base on the responses of local residences, the research proved that Collective Action Theory is proper to be applied in the decision making process of setting the Indigenous Reserved Area. 　　In the end, the research suggested: the way people in Taoyuan Township governing their resource is not definitely proper to other indigenous groups. The precondition of implementing the new designing is to make more case tudies, compares and analysis. It is necessary to have small-scale experiments in advance. In the way, it can just correct the market failure and government failure caused by on going regulation when the new designing becomes a formal new law.

土地制度規範著對於土地的使用所引起的人與人之間相互認可的行為關係，對於制度起源的討論，往往認為制度具有降低成本、創造集體利益的功能，但由於制度主體的因素，制度則可能是國家對某一群體的剝削，例如日治時期將原住民土地收歸國有；由於制度安排的失當，很可能使得後續的發展陷入惡性的路徑依賴之中，例如民國五十五年的保留地私有化政策後原住民地權的快速流失。 　　一項近年的政府調查顯示，原住民保留地被非法使用、私下轉讓的情況日益嚴重，但同一時期的另一項研究卻又指出：原住民社會普遍傾向認為原住民保留地不得移轉給非原住民的限制不宜開放。從政治經濟的角度來說，保留地若朝向全面的私有化、開放原漢買賣，固然可以回應市場立即的需求，但交易過程中信息不完全、原住民經濟的弱勢等等外部效果卻不可能依靠市場機制加以解決，同時，可預見的原住民土地大量流失將和社會普遍認同的價值相違背；另一方面，保留地若朝向以國有化進行政府的干預，固然可以抑制自由買賣造成的原住民地權流失，但卻又和資源利用極佳化的市場邏輯相去甚遠而必須付出高額的成本，亦難以有效執行；從制度研究的眼光來看，現行的保留地制度正處於兩難下的制度失衡狀態。 　　在五年的反覆討論之後，內政部法規會於九十年一月十七號通過了「原住民族保留地開發管理條例草案」，該條例草案最大的特色是在所有權移轉限制下，增加了「原住民族保留區」的制度設計，在「原住民族保留區」中的土地所有權，得登記為原住民部落團體「共有」，土地的經營管理也將由部落團體來共同進行，這樣的政策所呈現是政府對於社會壓力和原住民土地困境的回應。然而，作為共有制實行的基礎，無論是在學理上或實證上，對於共有資源自主治理的探討都有尚待進一步充實的空間。 　　經過先期的調查和訪談，本研究選定新竹縣尖石鄉中三個公共資源自主治理的案例，並從制度經濟與集體選擇理論的架構，分析案例中人們如何建立自主性的組織，如何經由集體的選擇制定符合當地條件的公共資源治理規則，如何履行彼此的承諾並相互監督，以及如何避免陷入集體不理性的過度利用的悲劇，且對於案例中影響原住民部落採取資源共有和自主治理策略的因素加以探討。最後，評析內在制度的變遷及泰雅族傳統制度在現代的演化，以及公共資源自主管理在降低執行和監督成本、降低其外部效果、降低制度供給的成本等方面的制度優勢，並指出資源形式與共有範圍的關係、學習過程的重要、共有組織的作用是為共有制度有效運作的關鍵。 　　此外，在後續研究部份，本研究亦建議：理論上對於非以直接提取資源單位方式產生的利益分配問題、排他性技術的成本的雙重影響的探討；實證上對於集團移住後的原住民部落中共有組織的分析；政策上對共有組織「分級分類」原則的研議，皆值得作為後續進一步研究的課題。 / Institution about land rules the relationship, which is caused by land using and identified between people. According to the discussion of the beginning of institution, it can descend the cost of trade and make collective interesting. However, institutions can also be the means for a nation to exploit its people because of the subject of institution. The Nationalization of land, which is owned by aboriginal people in the time Japan governed Taiwan for instance. And, because of the improper arrangement of institution, the development may go in to a vicious path-dependence circle; the privatization policy in 1966 made the fast lapse of aboriginal land for example. 　　A recent investigation made by government shows that more and more aboriginal reserved-land was illegally sold and transferred in the black market. However, in the same time, another research appointed that most people in aboriginal society disagree the revocation of the limit that non-aboriginal cannot get the property of aboriginal reserved-land. In the view of political economics, if the property of aboriginal reserved-land was turn to entirely privatized, it can reply the immediate need market, but the external diseconomy such as incomplete information and the lower position of the aboriginal people can not be resolved by the market, and the following results that most of the aboriginal land property lapse will belie the general value identified by our society. On the other hand, if the property of aboriginal keeps on nationalized it can bate the lapse of the land property, but government has to pay high cost to belie the market logic hat resource should be optima used, and it will be difficult to administer. In the view of institutional study, the institution of aboriginal reserved-land is in a situation of inequilibrium. 　　After a long discussion lasted from more than five years, the Act Committee of Administer Department announced a proposed act for the development and administers of aboriginal reserved-land. The most particular part of this proposed act is the design of "aboriginal-reserved zone" and common land property. The total area of the aboriginal reserved zones was supposed to be 1.4 million acres, and the land property in the zones may belong to the whole settlement society. Such a policy is a positive reply to the social strait and the predicament of aboriginal society. However, being the base to exercise the common property institution, either the theoretical or the practical discussion of the "common pool resources self-governing" still needs to be completed. 　　A previous investigation and visiting, an Atayal county with three CPR self-governing cases was chosen in this approach. With a framework of institutional economics and collective act theory, this approach analyzed how people organized a self-governing organization, how a public choice was made to design the rules which are proper to local CPR situation, how people fulfill their obligation and supervise each other, how people avoid the tragic result o collective irrationality such as over using, furthermore, discuss the factor effect the CPR self-governing strategy .In the end, this approach discuss the change of internal institution and the evolution of Atayal tribes’ traditional institution in modern time, and the advantage of self-governing institution. Then, pointed out the relation between types of resources and areas of common property, the processes of learning, and the effects of organization are the key points to exercise the common property institution. 　　In addition, this approach suggested: in the theoretical aspect, the dispute caused by distribution of the interest that was not made by direct appropriation, the dual influence from the cost of exclusion technology. And, in the practical aspect, the principles to classify the self-governing organizations, can be the new problematic for further approach.