以往供應鏈中的生產者，將產品販售給其下游的其他批發商．批發商再將產品販售給其下游的零售商或是大賣場等，最後消費者再向零售商和大賣場購買產品，由於資訊獲取或是購買管道便利性等等之限制．消費者在這樣的情況下，只能選擇向零售商和大賣場等通路成員購買商品。近年來，由於網際網路的普及和資訊傳遞管道的發達，銷售通路中的成員都開始利用傳統的通路和直接通路來販售產品時，通路衝突的現象也會伴隨著發生，在這樣的通路環境當中，每個通路成員不僅要致力於增加商品販賣的營收，也必須要維持其他通路成員和本身的合作利益關係。商品在傳統通路和間接通路販售的價格和流通的產品數量便成為了重要的決策問題。 本研究針對上述的通路環境下所造成的通路競爭問題，提出一個價格協調的模型，透過賽局理論的協調方法，決定通路成員於直接通路和間接通路的產品販售價格，以獲取本身利潤最佳化，避免因通路衝突所造成的損失。本研究提出一個以賽局理論為基礎之決策模型，透過考量相關運銷成本的角度，建立協調價格的決策方式，並利用最佳化方法來求得通路成員間的流通分配量，研究也以具有相同通路環境的農產品供應鏈為例，實際將數據帶入協調模型加以運作，求出各通路成員間的協調價格及流通分配量。最後透過通路成員的利潤分析，驗證協調模型的合理性。並的到以下的結論：1.在直接和間接通路並存的銷售環境中，透過限制條件的確立和競爭價格的決策，通路成員仍然可以尋求到一個均衡的價格，來避免因通路成員間的價格競爭所產生的利潤損失。2.就整體供應鏈合作價值而言，協調價格的機制能夠維持通路中每個通路成員的合作關係，降低價格競爭關係下，所造成的不必要損失。

我國油品市場從1987年開始，從下游加油站開始開放，並且在2000年9月開放國內油品市場，准許台塑石油產品在國內市場銷售，打開了油品市場的競爭；並且在2002年元月開放進口汽柴油，我國油品市場從獨占轉行到多頭寡占市場型態。開放至今，中油、台塑石油、以及國外油品商在台灣掀起了一場接著一場市占率戰爭，可惜的是，台灣埃索環球公司在不斷虧損與打不開通路困難下，於2003年退出台灣油品市場。 油品市場開放，雖然中油、台塑兩家廠商競爭的激烈，但是消費者卻樂於享受開放之後福利；但是仔細觀察國內油價，兩家廠商提供產品不僅相同，連油價也趨於一致，最令人詬病的，只要一家廠商漲價，另外一家一定會同幅度、同時間調漲，兩家廠商似乎已有默契，在油品市場興風作浪；這並不是當初開放市場原意，更不是消費者所樂見的。比起上游煉油商，加油站之間戰爭更引人注意，斗大降價廣告、多元化加油贈品，讓消費者更能節省自己成本。總合來說，油品市場開放是否達到預期效果，或是競爭本質已經從上游煉油商轉移到下游通路商，本文檢視國內油品市場並試圖找出解答。 比較國內油價佔國際油價比例、波動頻率、波動幅度之後，發現油品市場開放後都較開放前顯示競爭帶來的效果；並且透過實地採樣，調查台北市、鄰近台北縣鄉鎮市加油站，利用回歸方式求證，發現加油站折讓比例與區域競爭強弱、本身規模大小呈現正相關，與最近加油站距離、本身加油站所處區域熱鬧程度成反比，得到市場開放之後，加油站在競爭強度增強後，勢必透過更優惠價格吸引顧客群，增加本身利潤。 在市場開放之後，的確因為競爭開放造成影響，雖然油價並無不同，但整個油品市場競爭型態轉變成非價格競爭。

從Brander and Spencer (1985)和Eaton and Grossman (1986)兩篇最早的策略性貿易文獻中可知，廠商的競爭型態對於政府的貿易政策有決定性的影響，數量競爭下政府於第一階段的最適策略為補貼，價格競爭則為課稅；但在目前策略性貿易的各種延伸模型中並未對競爭型態與策略性貿易政策之間的關係做討論，本文將競爭型態不一致的情況引入原始的策略性貿易模型，亦即一家廠商採取數量競爭，另家廠商採取價格競爭的情形，並與競爭型態一致的情況作比較，探討競爭型態與策略性貿易政策的關係，得到了以下主要結論：(1)政府的最適貿易政策乃看對手廠商採取的競爭型態而定，若對手廠商採取數量競爭，則無論本國廠商採取價格或是數量競爭，最適策略皆為出口補貼。若對手廠商採取價格競爭，則無論本國廠商採取價格或是數量競爭，最適策略皆為出口課稅；(2)若本國廠商採取數量競爭，外國廠商有多家且採取數量或是價格競爭，則看採取數量競爭的外國廠商還是價格競爭的外國廠商，在單位補貼下對本國廠商的邊際利潤有較大的影響力，若整體數量競爭廠商影響力較大則最適政策為出口補貼，若整體價格競爭廠商影響力較大則最適政策為出口課稅。

重商主義時期“獎勵出口重課進口”的對外貿政策，及產業革命後生產力的擴張，使世界範圍內的傾銷大規模形成；二十世紀七○年代以來，「傾銷」已普遍存在於國際貿易之中，而對於「反傾銷」立法和實踐亦進展迅速，從關稅暨貿易總協定成立以來，對於「反傾銷」的立法、修訂一直是談判內容的主要議題。 本文的目的在探討在產品不完全替代下，面對國外持續性傾銷時，若廠商分別從事Cournot數量及Bertrand價格競爭時，如何課徴反傾銷稅？結果發現若廠商進行數量競爭時則：當本國與外國傾銷品相互替代率相同及本國產品對國外傾銷品之替代率大於國外傾銷品對本國產品之替代率時，本國政府可在社會福利最大化下制定反傾銷稅率。若進行價格競爭時則：本國政府無法依社會福利最大之反傾銷稅率制定反傾銷稅率。 / The mercantilist emphasis on expanding exports while restricting imports, coupled with the expansion of productivity seen following the industrial revolution, led to the proliferation of dumping trade practices around the world. “Dumping” has been a formally-recognized and widespread phenomenon in global trade since the 1970s. Against this, national governments have also been quick to implement countervailing laws and legislation. Anti-dumping legislation has been at the fore of international trade discussions since the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was established. This paper addresses the issue of how countervailing duties may be most effectively assessed in situations where a national product that is not completely substitutable by import competitors suffers sustained competition from imports dumped on the market. To achieve this objective, our research examines the effects on competition that result from the manufacturer of the national product adopting, respectively, Cournot volume and Bertrand pricing strategies. The result shows that, when a volume strategy is adopted, home government imposition of countervailing duties will be able to maximize social benefit when either domestic and imported (dumped) products share a similar substitutability ratio or the substitutability ratio of the domestic product is greater than that of the imported competition. When a pricing strategy is adopted, the government is, conversely, not in a position to impose a countervailing duty that will maximize social benefit.

在邁向全球貿易自由化過渡時期中，不免對各國國內產業造成相當大的衝擊與短暫之調適問題。此際貿易規範准許其政府採取一定措施以為救濟，然在執行相關之貿易救濟措施前，產業損害之認定係不可或缺之程序。 有鑑於進口救濟制度（包括平衡稅反傾銷稅）的引進在我國乃屬創舉，現行之「貨品進口救濟案件處理辦法」條文，引用美國的作法對於產業損害之認定僅止於實質損害之有無及其與損害成因間的因果關係論斷；但當進口品對國內產業造成經濟衝擊時，必然會反應在國內同類產品的價格與數量上的變化，當下唯有賴量化的指標才能對損害存在與否作客觀的審議，以便能適時，適當的採行救濟措施。 所以本文對探討不公平貿易競爭中的傾銷行為，採用曾巨威教授（民 84）所設立之產業損害評估模型，利用現有或可計算之參數資料，計算出進口品對國內產業造成的損失。以更清楚瞭解到量化的指標在整體產業損害分析中的意義及關係。 藉由實證數據分析，本文除直接證實生產高密度聚乙烯、低密度聚乙烯及聚丙烯的產業受到損害確實起因於傾銷的價格競爭所造成，並具體衡量出產業損害的程度，這種評估模式的使用不但能避免目前以眾多因素的個別變化作綜合考量的缺失，更重要的是這種分析方法代表的經濟合理性與嚴謹性，而且得到和貿易調查委員會一致的結果。 此法雖係以不公平貿易行為為探討的對象，其中推理亦可延伸適用於一般非屬不公平貿易行為者對國內產業損害的評估。鑑於國內尚未有對損害程度具體評估之實證文獻，此為本文之主要特色。

本研究是利用代理人基模型 (Agent-Based model) 結合遺傳規劃法(genetic programming) 在模組化經濟體系下價格動態對市占率之影響。現今企業多數以市占率作為公司在市場上表現的主要指標，如果擁有高市占率的廠商，可以確定在這產業中生存。以往的文獻顯示模組化經濟下高價格廠商在市場上的表現會優於低價格廠商，取決重要因素為品質，因為高價產品通常品質也較高，容易取得消費者喜愛。本研究想探討是否在這個體系下，消費者所考量的都是以品質高低來決定是否購買產品，是否會有過去以往的價格競爭情形，以及在價格動態體系，市場所呈現的風貌如何。本研究設計39組的加成率參數組，並依據兩間廠商的決策上製作成價格動態矩陣圖表。試圖以這些已知參數組與線性內插法所預測之市占率的參數組進行分析。此研究模擬中發現，在模組化經濟下，價格競爭並不一定會讓市占率趨向於某一點均衡，也可能會趨向於一條路徑上。而且不一定是高價位的廠商會有很大機會獲得市場，也沒有所謂的贏家擁有超高市占率的情況產生。 / This study is the use of agent-based model combined with genetic programming to explore the impact of the price dynamics for the market share in the modular economy. Nowadays, the majority of enterprises use market share as the key performance indicators in the market, if the enterprise has a high market share, it can be determined to survive in this industry. The previous literature shows that manufacturers of high prices on the market under the modular economy will be better than the low-price manufacturers, depending on the important factors for quality. Expensive products are usually higher quality, easily favorite by consumers. My study is to investigate whether consumers consider in this system are based on the level of quality to decide to buy the product or not, and whether there will be price competitive situation, as well as the outlook presented by the market price dynamics system. In this paper, we design 39 markup rate’s parameter set and making price dynamic matrix diagram in accordance with the decisions of two manufacturers. Trying to analyze these known parameter set and the parameter set of the market share predicted by the linear interpolation. The simulation of the study found that in the modular economy price competition does not necessarily make the market share tends to a equilibrium point, or it may also tend to be a equilibrium path. But not necessarily high-priced manufacturers get to the market, there is no so-called winners with higher market share.

在全球一片經濟不景氣的環境下，IMS 仍預測2009年全球藥品市場將會成長4.5-5.5％達到8200億美金，這顯示醫藥產業是一個值得投入的領域，台灣政府亦透過政策大力扶植醫藥產業發展，但是醫藥產業知識密集度高，投資金額高，開發時程長，失敗風險也高，台灣醫藥企業要如何擬定經營管理策略，將是影響成敗的重要因素。本文的目的是提出適合台灣藥廠的經營管理策略。 目前國際醫藥產業概況為，受到藥品安全事件影響，FDA對新藥審查越趨嚴格，加上研發新藥的投資成本越來越高，在得到明星新藥的速度追不上失去暢銷藥速度的壓力下，國際藥廠開始削減成本，將部分研發工作分工委外，進行企業聯盟與購併，以充實專利技術與產品版圖；由於眾多專利暢銷藥喪失專利，與政府鼓勵使用低價藥，學名藥市場備受看好。台灣醫藥產業多屬中小型企業，資金與研發能量不足，因此發展學名藥是第一項建議的策略。舊藥新用可以降低研發失敗風險與成本，是第二項建議的策略。技術移轉與授權是第三項策略，由外引進技術可以解決研發能力不足的問題，對外授權技術可以解決資金不足以撐完研發全程的問題，順應國際藥廠分工委外的趨勢，在醫藥產業生態鏈中合適的點進場與出場，能避免資金不足，減輕研發失敗的負荷。 學名藥廠如果能夠提早學名藥上市的時間就能增加獲利，熟悉簡易新藥申請程序、專利延長與資料專屬權保護規定對於學名藥上市時程的規劃有很大的幫助。美國最高法院對Merck v. Integra 的判決擴張藥物研發實驗實施免責權，鼓勵使用他人具專利的化合物進行與藥物審查相關的臨床前期試驗，有利於開發既有藥品的新用途，台灣的專利法相關規定亦在研討修法，希望結果對台灣藥廠採取舊藥新用的策略有所幫助。依據公司專長，研發能力強的公司可以將臨床前期獲得的專利技術授權給國際藥廠，而擅長臨床試驗的公司可以由外授權引進專利候選藥物在台灣進行臨床試驗，之後再對外授權，政府亦頒訂生技新藥產業發展條例，幫助企業應用技術移轉與授權找到生存的利基點。熟悉並活用法律知識是發展醫藥產業必備的工具。 / Even though people are worried about global economy recession, IMS still optimistically predicts that global pharmaceutical market will have 4.5 – 5.5 Percent growth in 2009, exceeding $820 billion. It means that pharmaceutical industry is a field worth investigating. The Taiwan government also provides fully support for pharmaceutical industry development through laws and regulations. However pharmaceutical industry is characterized for requiring high technology, lots of money, long developing time, and high risk of failure. The strategies pharmaceutical companies token will influence their fate to success or failure. The goal of this thesis is to propose suitable management strategies for Taiwan pharmaceutical industry. After several drug safety related incidents in recent years, FDA becomes more conservative and blocks new drug approval. More over, it takes more money to investigate a new drug, and the speed of getting new drugs can not catch up the speed of losing patent of blockbuster drugs. Under such huge pressure, international pharmaceutical companies adopt strategies as outsourcing part of drug developing work to achieve cost down. They also conduct strategic alliances and mergers, which can enrich their patents and products portfolio. Generic drug has great market potential because of several blockbuster drugs losing patents and government favoring cheap drugs. Pharmaceutical companies in Taiwan are all small and medium size enterprises. Their research capacity and capital are insufficient. So the first recommended strategy is developing generic drugs. The second strategy is drug repurposing which can minimize the risk of failure. The third strategy is technology transfer and licensing. Complying with the trend of outsourcing, Taiwan companies can adopt technology transfer and licensing strategy and determine proper points to enter and out of the chain of drug development. Licensing-in can resolve the problem of insufficient research capacity. License-out can prevent shortage of money. If a generic drug company can advance the timing to launch generic drug, it can earn more money. Thus well study of Abbreviated New Drug Applications, patent term expansion and data exclusivity can help plan market schedule. The Supreme Court decision in Merck v. Integra expands the protection of Safe Harbor which exempted from infringement all uses of patented compounds "reasonably related" to the process of developing information for submission under any federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of drugs. Using patented compound in pre-clinical trials is exempted and it encourages drug developer to use patented compound owned by other companies to explore new usage. The patent ruling law experiment exemption in Taiwan needs further discussion and amended. Hope the result of amendment can help drug repurposing strategy in Taiwan. Research oriented company can license out patented result to big pharmaceutical companies, while companies good in clinical trial study can license in patented drug candidate and do clinical trial in Taiwan. Taiwan Government also set rules to encourage pharmaceutical companies to adopt technology transfer and licensing. Having well knowledge relating to drug approval and patent law is a must to run a successful pharmaceutical company.

本研究從產業經濟學的「結構-行為-績效」架構與寡占理論中汲取對競爭行為的認知。將研究焦點鎖定在報紙產品市場最普遍也最主要的三種競爭行為：內容競爭、價格競爭與促銷競爭三者進行研究。研究對象則是以台灣報業市場中九家主要報紙，分屬三種不同屬性：綜合性報紙（中國時報、聯合報、自由時報、中央日報、台灣日報）、經濟專業性報紙（經濟日報、工商時報）、大眾娛樂性報紙（民生報、大成報），除此之外內容上相同屬性的報紙，彼此之間還有特性上的差異，以利研究不同屬性與特性報紙在競爭行為上的差異。 本研究認為，台灣報紙產品市場競爭行為，在報禁後產生大幅變化，主要原因有四：（1）報業開放後市場結構改變，造成市場競爭行為轉趨激烈：（2）報紙消費者消費型態轉變，變相加強了報業市場的競爭行為；（3）市場趨同性，造成報業市場競爭行為日漸普及；（4）台灣報業市場產品同質性漸高，以競爭行為建立有限差異性。 而在觀察各報競爭行為的發展與不同屬性特性報紙在競爭行為上的異同時。本研究發現，報紙產品市場競爭行為發展，深受外在市場環境、報紙本身特性屬性與市場內競爭者市場行為三者因素的牽制與制約。因此在不同市場環境下，不同特性屬性報紙在面對市場上形形色色的市場競爭者時，會在市場競爭行為上有不同的反應。 最後，本研究整理報禁開放後台灣報紙產品市場競爭行為走向，梳理出其大致發展趨勢為二：（一）市場導向；（二）「強者愈強、弱者愈弱」。

BPCIA在2010年三月生效後，生物相似藥廠商開始可以利用簡化的文件向美國食品和藥物管理局（FDA）申請藥品許可證，這個新醫療法賦予FDA決定如何落實法案的權力。基於不同生物製劑之間缺乏比較性這個已知的事實，加上公眾安全的考量，在還沒有累積大量經驗可以歸納出哪些是比較分析必要的資訊之前，FDA會保守的要求生物相似藥廠商以BPCIA提出申請時，必須提供臨床試驗資料來證明與參照藥品之間沒有臨床上有意義的差異。 雖然BPCIA給出了解決專利糾紛的框架，俗稱專利舞蹈(patent dance)，依照目前聯邦巡迴上訴法院對BPCIA的解釋，認為BPCIA法案不強制生物相似藥申請者遵循其規定之專利糾紛解決程序，雖然就目前的最新發展來看，迴避專利舞蹈可以避免一些程序上的麻煩，但真正參照藥品廠商和生物相似藥公司的輸贏仍是在訴訟戰場上見真章。 美國FDA在2015年3月6日核准了的一個生物相似藥-Zarxio( filgrastim-sndz)，目前尚不清楚均等論這種不確定性在生物相似藥上影響的程度，但藉由簡化新藥申請上市的小分子藥物所涉入的侵權訴訟做有限度的推論可以發現，小分子藥物的均等謬論案件是牽涉到外圍專利，當專利不再提供足夠的誘因去激勵專利權人時，學名藥廠商就會贏得均等論謬論案件。因為生物製劑是一種製程決定的產物，因此其專利通常是集中在製程。以BPCIA和專利法為框架來分析過去的相關侵權訴訟，可以預測生物相似藥廠商在轉化前步驟、轉化步驟、調劑、或包裝做改變，其成功的機會較大，而在細胞培養會純化步驟做改變，成功的機會最小。然而，最終還是要看法院將來如何解決生物相似藥的侵權問題，各方都要意識到科學與法律議題的複雜性，及妥適解決侵權訴訟的重要性。 台灣廠商要進入生物相似藥的領域，是困難重重的。生物相似藥的開發及法規成本，不如想像中低，鑒於蛋白質藥『產能』一直被看作是市場發展受阻的主要原因，藥廠委外合作(CRO、CMO或NRDO) 的模式能快速與國際藥廠接軌，逐步奠定台灣在藥物開發的供應鏈合作利基並提昇國際知名度。 / The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation of 2009 was activated on March in 2010. Now the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) can approve biosimilars and was empowered to how to practice. Given the known issues with lack of comparability between different biologics preparations, and the Agency’s strong interest in protecting public safety, it is probable that, until it has developed a body of experience with regards to the amount and kind of data needed to make comparability evaluations, the FDA will adopt a conservative approach and require at least some clinical studies before approving biologics under BPCIA. Though BPCIA provide the frame for resolving patent issues, that is so-called patent dance, Federal Circuit said that parties were not compelled to dance. Thus the law uncertainty was shifted to patent infringement. FDA approved the first biosimilar, Zarxio (filgrastim-sndz), on 6, March, 2015. It is unclear how biosimilar will be treated in court based on doctrine of equivalence. Based on the experience from generics, courts tends to adjust the scope of equivalents to improve the correspondence between patent scope and desired patent incentives. In contrast, biologics is path depended. That is to say process decided what biologics would be. Both the BPCIA and patent law guide the shape of infringement suits. Follow-on biologics companies will be most successful when they make a change in the pretransformation process, the transformation process, the formulation, or the packaging. They will be least successful when they make a change in the cell culture conditions or the purification process. It remains to be seen how courts will address issues of infringement for follow-on biologics, but all parties should be aware of the complexity of the scientific and legal issues and the importance of addressing them properly. The cost for development and the complexity of regulation in biosimilars were tremendously high. Thus it is difficult for biopharmaceutical industries in Taiwan to enter this field. In the light of unmet production capacity in protein drug, pharmaceutical industries in Taiwan could apply the mode of CRO, CMO or NRDO to integrate into global biopharmaceutical community.

在複雜動態競爭市場中，生產者的價格競爭行為一直是一個研究的重點，相較於生產者動態價格競爭，零售商的價格競爭行為鮮少被探討，因此本研究針對零售商價格競爭行為進行研究。針對零售商之間的價格競爭行為，除了考量零售商與對手零售商的價格互動，不可忽略的是上游供應商的競爭互動與下游消費者的學習行為在市場中與零售商端互動下錯綜複雜的動態影響，緣此，本研究以零售商端的角度，想了解供應商競爭與消費者學習行為對零售商競爭的影響，再以單一零售商角度，分析各情況下所應對的價格調整策略。 本研究將零售商、供應商及消費者互動形成之競爭市場視為一個複雜適應性系統（Complex Adaptive System ，簡稱CAS），應用代理人基塑模與模擬（Agent-based Modeling and Simulation，簡稱ABMS）方式建構考量供應商競爭與消費者學習行為之零售商價格競爭模式，將演化賽局理論應用於價格競爭中，探討不同的消費者學習及供應商價格競爭行為如何動態影響零售商價格競爭型態，以及不同價格調整策略之績效表現。 研究結果發現一，市場中消費者呈現不同的學習行為，對零售商競爭將造成不同的衝擊。「貨比三家無學習」型消費者將造成零售商端低價競爭，使其平均價格最低及獲利最低。「自我式學習」型消費者將造成零售商高價合作，使其平均價格最高及獲利最高。「群體式學習」型消費者同樣使零售商端偏向高價合作，且其平均價格及獲利相當接近自我式學習市場，雖然兩種學習行為具有近似的平均價格與獲利，「群體式學習」卻會導致零售商價格競爭之型態轉為劇烈，包括獲利領先轉換方式由漸進轉為瀑布，領先方式從勢均力敵轉為大幅領先，領先互換的頻率由低轉為高。另外，消費者購買決策之理性程度對零售商端競爭形態有影響，不論在何種供應商行為下，高理性購買決策在群體式學習下將導致零售商端價格競爭較激烈，在自我式學習下卻導致零售商端競爭行為較緩和。 研究發現二，市場中供應商的價格競爭行為會對零售商端的價格、獲利與競爭型態造成衝擊。供應商呈現價格競爭行為下，在「貨比三家無學習」之消費者行為市場中，將減緩零售商價格競爭，使零售商端之平均價格及獲利提高。在「自我」與「群體式」學習消費者市場中，將增強零售商價格競爭強度，使零售商端之平均價格及獲利降低。 研究發現三，不同的競爭市場中，零售商之最佳價格調整策略也將不同。基本上在供應商無競爭行為下，無論消費者呈現何種行為，零售商採取開放式價格調整策略具有明顯優勢。在供應商呈現競爭行為下，開放式價格調整策略在「無學習」及「群體式學習高理性程度」行為市場仍為優勝策略，在「自我式學習」及「群體式學習低理性程度」下，保守型價格調整策略則表現較佳。 在實務意涵上，若零售商可使消費者行為偏向自我或群體式學習，並穩定供應商價格競爭下，整體而言零售商端競爭可獲得最高的獲利，若當此刻競爭零售商採取保守型價格策略，而本身採取開放式價格調整策略，則獲利最大。然而面臨群體式學習消費者，由於競爭強度的增加，需留意市場動態，須隨時靈活調整本身價格策略，避免因價格策略的僵化，而成為虧損之零售商。 / The pricing competitive model traditionally assumes that consumers will buy from the firm selling the homogeneous product at the lowest price, thus discarding any possibility of learning behavior on the demand side. But if, as in real competition, consumers learn adaptively and competition is a dynamic process, then some attention should be paid to consumers' behavior. In a multiple supplier – multiple retailer supply chain, multiple price competitive forces interact to influence firm price decisions. These forces include: (1) the supplier level competition each supplier faces from others producing the same product, (2) the retailer level competition among the retailers selling the same set of goods, and (3) the vertical interaction competition between the retailer and supplier. We are interest in these questions: How does the consumer learning behavior affect the retailer pricing competitive model? How does the competition of supplier affect the retailer pricing competitive model? What is the optimal adaptive pricing strategy for retailer performance in such competitive market including retailers, suppliers and consumers. Therefore, this research study a version of the pricing competitive (Bertrand) model in which consumer exhibit dynamic adaptive learning behavior when deciding from what retailers they will buy. And we consider to join the supplier competitive pricing behavior into the retailer pricing competitive model and formulate their interaction as evolutional game and to analyze the competition of supplier effect and its impact on the pricing competition of retailers. This research uses a complex adaptive system perspective to construct a retailer pricing competitive model which considers both competitive supplier and learning consumer behavior. Using agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) to construct the competitive market include retailers, suppliers and consumers, and use the fuzzy logic, genetic algorithms to model the pricing decision and learning behavior of retailers and suppliers, and use reinforcement learning and swarm algorithms to model consumers’ learning behavior. The simulation results demonstrate that: The retailer level obtains the highest profit when the consumer behavior following reinforcement learning. When the consumer behavior displays swarm learning, the retailer level also obtains high profit near the highest profit. However swarm learning increases the competitive intensity on the retailer level. The competitive supplier increases the competitive intensity and decrease profit on the retailer level when the consumer behavior displays reinforcement learning and swarm learning. The performance of retailer following a closed adaptive pricing strategy (high exploitation low exploration) exceeds that of retailer following an open adaptive pricing strategy (low exploitation high exploration) when the consumer behavior displays reinforcement learning and supplier display competitive behavior. However when the consumer behavior displays swarm learning and supplier display competitive behavior, the performance of retailer following an open adaptive pricing strategy exceeds that of retailer following a closed adaptive pricing strategy. The proposed pricing competitive model with adaptive learning of consumer behavior and competition of supplier can help retailers to analyze pricing strategy and further discovery and design the more optimal pricing strategy.