本論文採取改革-反改革循環研究途徑與克里姆林政治研究途徑，闡釋俄羅斯總統普欽重新定位民營化政策的驅動因素。 2000年，普欽當選總統後，以迅雷不及掩耳的霹靂手段，徹底解構金融工業集團，並將業已民營化的大型企業，特別是能源企業，收歸國有；同時，以漸進的方式，逐步推動以中小企業為主的民營化。 本論文認為，普欽重新定位俄羅斯民營化走向的主要目的在於，解構葉里欽勢力集團、拓展國際戰略空間、以及創造經濟改革條件；而這三項努力的終極目標，則在於掃除異己、改善經濟、攏絡民心、提升大國地位、從而鞏固個人政治權位。 / Applying reforms/counter-reforms cycle approach and kremlinological politics approach, the purpose of this study is aimed at exploring driving forces behind Russian president Putin’s efforts to reorient Russia’s privatization policy line. Immediately after his inauguration in 2000, Russian president, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, took quick and decisive steps to thoroughly undermine the financial industrial groups and renationalize those privatized big enterprises, especially, energy enterprises. At the same time, step by step, he pushed forward a new privatization policy line, concentrate on small and medium-sized enterprises. This author argues in this study that main driving forces behind Putin’s efforts to reorient Russia’s privatization policy line are identified as attempts to undermine the pro-Yel’tsin group, to develop international strategic maneuvering room, and, to create favorable conditions for economic reforms. This author contends that the ultimate aim of these efforts is to wipe out political rivals, to improve economic life in order to win support from the populace, to promote Russia’s status as a great power, and, eventually, to consolidate Putin’s personal power. Key wods: Putin, Yel’tsin, Russia’s privatization, financial oligarchs, FIG.

葉立欽時期十多年的自由民主改革實踐，使俄羅斯陷入了嚴重的困境。在殘酷的現實面前，俄羅斯人民希冀政治權威的產生。 藉由觀察尤科斯集團的崛起以及日後的「尤科斯事件」，我們發現俄羅斯社會轉型時期金融寡頭集團勢力的形成有其深刻的社會因素。隨著金融寡頭們自身實力的不斷增強，其對社會的阻礙作用日益顯露。普京上台後欲推行權威政治改革，不斷的加強總統集權，然而他所面臨的挑戰之一即是俄羅斯金融寡頭問題。為此，普京企圖以打擊經濟犯罪為名，打擊金融寡頭，藉以收攬人心，從而裂解葉立欽時期所遺留下來的「家族」集團勢力，建立以國家安全團隊為主幹的執政團隊，以鞏固其政權基礎。 普京執政以來，放棄空洞的「民主」口號，在社會政治領域建立以總統集權為核心的「可控式民主」，為社會發展和經濟提升提供了有力的保障。觀察俄羅斯近來所舉行的議會選舉和總統大選顯示出俄羅斯的政治力量對比、社會情緒和社會意識型態已發生變化。總統普京的聲望亦達到頂點。俄羅斯政治將進入以可控式民主為特點的新時期。 關鍵詞：金融寡頭、尤科斯事件、葉立欽、普京、可控式民主 / More than ten years of free demorcratic reforms of the Yeltsin’s era made the Russia society get into serious trouble. In face of the ruthless reality, Russian people call for the return of political authority. Through observing the establishment of “Yukos Group” and the development of “Yukos Incident”, we know that at the beginning of Russia transition, the financial oligarch groups came into being for deeply social reasons. With amplifying in energy, the financial oligarch groups have hampered the social development more and more seriously. After coming into power, Putin wants to promote the authoritarian political reforms and enhance president’s absolute power continuously. However, one of the challenges he faced to is the problem of Russian financial oligarch groups. Because of this, Russian president Putin was attempted to wipe out some of these oligarchs in the name of combat against economic crimes, in order to rally the popular support, to wipe out the “Family” force left by Yeltsin’s regime and replace them with a new ruling command of national security elite, and to consolidate his own power. Since Putin took power from Yeltsin, he has dropped empty “ Democratic” slogans and instituted “ Controllable Democracy” in the socio- political field with presidential power as the core, providing powerful guarantee for socio- political development and economic rejuvenation. Through observing the recent parliamentary and presidential elections held in Russia, it shows that Putin’s power and influence have reached the climax with the change in the balance of political forces, social mood and social ideology in Russia. With this, Russia has entered into a new period featuring “ Controllable Democracy”. Keywords: Financial Oligarchs, Yukos Incident, Yeltsin, Putin, Controllable Democracy

論文摘要 ● 論文摘要： 上海會審公廨是一個生成於十九世紀上海租界的法院，主要職責是裁判租界華民的民、刑事案件。由於加入「外籍人士會同審理」的重大變因，使得這個原應屬傳統中國衙門的機關，無可避免的成為兩種不同法律文化交戰與融合的場域。 傳統關於會審公廨的論述多滲入了國族、民族情緒，或僅止於約章的探討。本文首先跳脫上述窠臼，從地理、人文、法律文化等層面，探究上海會審公廨的生成背景，以及上海租界在邁向現代化都市的過程中，與上海會審公廨的互動關係;其次，以會審公廨為載體，觀察透過會審公廨呈現的華洋政體權力的變遷，以及華洋政體與租界華民間權力關係的變遷。本文並提出了「帝國之鞭」與「寡頭之鍊」兩種對比權力關係的論點，並在兩種權力關係相互競逐的假設上，鋪陳會審公廨於各個轉型期的權力關係變遷與特色。 本文發現，上海會審公廨不僅是一個「會審裁判機構」，由於讞員承繼了傳統中國地方官吏「通包式」的職責，進而使得華洋政體的權力競逐，從司法層面更全方位的延伸至行政、立法等領域。更重要的是，除了權力的競逐以外，華洋政體的權力基礎以及在此基礎上生成的社會控制思維與模式，也產生了融合與質變，進而使得透過會審公廨所呈現的權力關係，有著不同於傳統中國禮法社會與現代西方法治社會的特色。 在回眸上海會審公廨呈現的權力關係變遷之餘，本文也從上海會審公廨的經驗中，獲得了有關社會控制的重要啟示：每個社會的社會控制思維與模式，顯然都有其意義，以及與彼時社會情狀相互呼應的原因，而其權力基礎，不見得就來自法規範。在汲汲於追求法治社會的當代，這些隱匿於法律之外的權力，更是我們不可忽視的面向，也更值得法律人去省思其間的利弊得失。

本文旨在透過克里姆林宮政治研究途徑，來探討俄羅斯總統普欽對媒體政策之走向。本文認為普欽的媒體改革，為其鞏固政權的一環。 本文認為，1990年代俄羅斯媒體帝國崛起的主要驅動因素，乃是葉里欽企圖藉助於金融寡頭及其所掌控的媒體，以掃除蘇聯遺留下來的保守勢力，從而鞏固其政權；而普欽任內致力解構媒體帝國的主要驅動因素，則是普欽企圖以打擊經濟犯罪為名，打擊金融寡頭，藉以收攬人心，並從而解構葉里欽遺留下來的 「家族」集團勢力，建立以國家安全團隊為主幹的執政團隊，鞏固其政權基礎。 因此，本文認為： 一˙府會之爭導致「震盪療法」改革迅速失敗，繼之而起的執政團隊推動以大型企業為主軸的民營化改革導致金融工業集團應運而生。而官僚派系掠奪國家資產以擴張政治版圖，導致金融寡頭坐大進而建立媒體帝國。葉里欽為了鞏固政權競選連任與金融寡頭建立聯盟進而收編媒體帝國。 二˙普欽於2000年當選總統後，藉由剷除金融寡頭來收回國家資產以收攬人心；藉由剷除金融寡頭以鏟除葉里欽人馬所憑藉的權力堡壘；藉由剷除金融寡頭以接收媒體帝國從而鞏固政權。 / The main purpose of this study is to explore, through the Kremlin politics approach, the orientation of Russia’s policy on media under Vladimir Putin. In this study, the author argues that Putin’s media reforms constitute an indispensable link for the consolidation of his power. It is hypothesized in this study that the driving forces behind the rise and fall of Russia’s media empire are the efforts by Boris Yel’tsin and Vladimir Putin to consolidate their power respectively. Allying with the financial-industrial oligarchs, who had controlled Russian mess media, Yel’tsin strove for wiping out the conservative forces left by the Soviet regime in order to consolidate his power. On the contrary, Putin has sought to wipe out the oligarchs and restructure the media empire, in order to rally the popular support, to wipe out the “Family” forces left by Yel’tsin’s regime and replace them with a new ruling command of national security elite, and, consequently, to consolidate his own power. The above-mentioned hypothesized proposition can be further developed into the following logically consequential sub-propositions: First of all, in the wake of the “shock therapy” ruined by the conflict between the parliament and the Kremlin, the following privatization reforms orienting on the creation of big enterprises gave rise to the creation of financial-industrial groups. Consequently, the corruption committed by bureaucrats who preyed upon state-owned enterprises led to the expansion of oligarchs’ strength so as to establish influential enormous media empire. Thereafter, aiming at consolidating his power and winning the coming presidential election, Yel’tsin formed an alliance with the financial oligarchs and thus put the newly-established media empire on his orbit. Secondly, after Putin was elected president in 2000, he strove for wiping out the financial oligarchs in order to accomplish the following three tasks: to renationalize the state properties in order to rally popular support; to wipe out Yeltsin’s power base; and, to take over and restructure media empire in order to consolidate his regime. Key words: Kremlin politics approach, Oligarchy, Putin, Russia’s media

本論文是以1996年俄羅斯總統選舉為分析主體，並從葉爾欽政府現狀、媒體經營者的利益、媒體本身的作為和俄羅斯選民的態度等四個面向來探討俄羅斯媒體自由化的轉變。按此，本論文共分成五章，第一章為緒論，說明研究動機、研究方法同時整理分析相關文獻。1996年總統選舉是俄羅斯媒體參與最深的一次選舉活動，媒體大亨為了保障自身利益，紛紛透過傳播媒體製造輿論，協助葉爾欽步上連任之路。由於，此時的俄羅斯選民，同時被民主制度的自由和共產主義的穩定所吸引。因此，媒體傾力幫助葉爾欽重新灌輸民眾--這次的總統選舉不是在選候選人，而是在選擇兩個根本不同的體系和生活型態。第二章首先對蘇聯時期和俄羅斯聯邦的媒體生態作一概論性介紹，並且深入探討媒體自由化、市場化和集團化對整個媒體產業和俄羅斯民眾的影響。第三章開始介紹1996年總統選舉各個候選人的背景、民調支持率和選舉結果。第四章則針對俄羅斯聯邦法律有關媒體在選舉活動中的規範，以及各個總統候選人與電視媒體的合作關係，分析媒體影響選舉過程和結果的操作手法。第五章為結論，透過1996年的總統選舉個案與媒體運作模式的分析，揭示俄羅斯媒體自公開性之後的媒體自由化現象。透過選舉的合法過程和媒體的幫助，導致俄羅斯政治家和金融寡頭們更加忽視人民的利益和態度，相信選舉結果關鍵不在於民衆的態度，而在於誰的資金雄厚，誰對媒體控制得更緊。電視螢幕沒有呈現人民的需要與聲音，公民意見無法體現，反倒成為政治人物與媒體寡頭意見集中體現與爭執的地方。這些紛爭導致政府績效不佳，社會問題加劇，媒體自由化程度退化。