隨著時代的演進，今日政府的角色已大大不同於以往，從威權、統御性的角色，轉而強調傾聽人民的聲音、重視人民才是政府的頭家。政府該如何推動並執行政策，挑戰著決策者的智慧。本篇研究欲以政策行銷理論檢視1999臺北市民當家熱線這項政策，自試辦以來所運用的行銷策略及工具為何，執行成效如何，並分析此項政策後續行銷的方向，以作為政府在面對今日嚴苛的挑戰下，運用行銷管理技術的參考。這項政策不僅僅重視市政府對外行銷的能力，同時也考驗市政府內部整合及內部行銷的能力。因此，本研究試圖回答以下問題： 1.瞭解1999臺北市民當家熱線的政策目標、政策行銷策略，及是否達到政策預期效益？執行過程中，遭遇到那些問題，如何克服。 2.瞭解1999臺北市民當家熱線的內部行銷策略，市政府如何對內部進行整合及內部行銷，遭遇到那些問題，如何克服。 3.以政策行銷理論檢視1999臺北市民當家熱線往後努力的方向，以作為政府運用政策行銷理論之參考。 本研究期以政策行銷模型及內部行銷衡量指標所建構出的理論架構，分析1999市民熱線的政策行銷、1999市民熱線的內部行銷及1999未來的行銷策略。最後，提出本文的結論及研究發現，身為公務人員的一份子，見識到政府並非不作事，而是許多辛苦與努力被埋沒在層層的公文程序與機關的本位主義之下，或者未藉由良好且適當的溝通管道讓民眾瞭解並取得政策的相關資訊，導致政策無法獲得民眾的認同與配合。希望藉由此一案例分析，能使政策行銷的運用更為廣泛，並使政府能夠儘量用合作取代脅迫，用共識取代立法，主動出擊，而非被動等待、墨守成規，才能達成今日民眾對政府的期待。

在電子化政府的架構下，民眾最重要的數位意見反映管道可謂是民意電子信箱，然而近年全球許多城市開始建制市民熱線系統，讓民眾得以透過電話向政府反映意見，使整個互動介面更為接近「行動政府」的概念，而在台灣的行政系絡下，「村里長」扮演政府機關與一般民眾互動的中介角色，本研究嘗試了解電子信箱與市民熱線這兩項原意用於促進「直接民主」的意見反應管道，對於村里長的工作產生何種影響，並探討村里長使用電子信箱與市民熱線的情況，以及影響他們對這兩項管道滿意認同的變數。 本研究以台北市里長及台北市市長信箱與1999市民熱線為主要標的，透過量化與質化方法的實證資料，主要發現結果包括：(1)台北市里長較常使用市民熱線，較少使用市長信箱；(2)資訊能力、對案件的時效性要求、問題難度與複雜性將影響村里長選擇市長信箱或市民熱線進行意見反映；(3)市長信箱與市民熱線對里長的正面影響包括解決村里民問題、減少工作負擔、提昇服務時效性、減少人情壓力、可有書面或電子資料備查，作為服務表現的基礎；負面影響則包括受申訴的機會增加、村里長工作有被管道取代的危機；(4)服務品質構面的「資訊可信度」、「問題解決程度」及「易用性」，有用性構面中的「解決里民問題」與「有助工作程度」五個變數對管道的滿意度有正向的影響。 本研究根據研究發現，提出三點實務建議：(1)重視「管道問題適用性」之宣傳；(2)促進村里長與意見反映管道結合的服務綜效；(3)思考管道如何對市民產生「有用性」，以提昇公共接觸效果。 / Under the framework of E-government, e-mail is the most important response channel for citizens to interact with governments. However, many cities around the world start to build citizen hotline systems, allowing people reflect their ideas and suggestions via phone. This fact reveals the opportunities of Mobile Government. In Taiwan, Li-chiefs simultaneously reflect residents’ opinions and help delivery public services. The author tries to figure out (1) how Taipei City Mayor’s E-mail Box and 1999 Citizen Hotline affect the daily works of Li-chiefs; (2) their usage of these two response channels, and (3) what variables might affect Li-chiefs’ satisfaction toward e-mail and citizen hotlines. The study uses Taipei City Mayor’s E-mail Box and Taipei 1999 Citizen Hotline as case examples, and collects both qualitative and quantitative empirical data. The author finds that: (1) The Li-chiefs in Taipei use Taipei 1999 Citizen Hotline more frequently than City Mayor’s E-mail. (2) Information literacy, timeliness and task complexity will affect Li-chiefs’ motives to reflect suggestions via e-mail or citizen hotline. (3) Li-chiefs can use these two channels to solve problems and enhance timeliness. On the other hand, the response channels allow citizens to complain to Li-chiefs more easily, and the positions of Li-chiefs might be replaced by the two channels; and (4) information reliability, problem solving ability, ease of use, the effect of solving citizens’ problems, and helping Li-chiefs’ jobs will positively affect the satisfaction of the channels. Based on the finding, the author suggests the government should: (1) emphasize the “appropriate or right questions” when prompting the channels; (2) teach Li-chiefs how to use response channels well to create synergy; and (3) rethink how response channels produce usefulness for citizens.

本研究旨在探討我國行政機關電話服務專線人員之工作滿意、工作倦怠與離職傾向之現況及其相互關係，並以臺北市政府1999臺北市民當家熱線作為探討個案。本研究藉由國內外相關文獻之探討，以建立工作滿意、工作倦怠與離職傾向間的影響關係模式，並藉由此些理論與研究之檢視，發展出本研究的調查問卷，複經專家學者審查後，針對研究對象以立意抽樣法進行問卷施測。 本研究共發放問卷99份，回收有效問卷計81份，採描述性統計、獨立樣本t檢定與單因子變異數分析等方法進行資料分析；獲致的結論如次： 一、1999話務人員之工作滿意的現況為中等，於工作倦怠之現況為中等略偏低，在離職傾向的現況為中等。 二、除了婚姻狀態此項以外，不同背景變項的1999話務人員在離職傾向上無顯著差異。 三、1999話務人員的內在及外在滿意度兩構面，皆與情緒耗竭及去人性化兩構面，呈顯著負相關。 四、1999話務人員的內在及外在滿意度兩構面，皆與離職傾向構面，呈顯著負相關。 五、1999話務人員的情緒耗竭及去人性化兩構面，皆與離職傾向構面，呈顯著正相關。 / The main purpose of this study was to explore the recently psychological situation and the relationships among job satisfaction, burnout and turnover intention, and Taipei City Government 1999 Citizen Hotline as a case. This study collected and absorbed the essence of other related documents and records, to construct the model of effectiveness and to raise the hypotheses what the study wanted to examine and conclude. The questionnaires were supervised by experts, and then they were sent to ninety nine Telephonists of Taipei City Government 1999 Citizen Hotline and retrieved 81 effective questionnaires. The statistical methods used to analyze the data were descriptive statistics, t-test and one-way ANOVA. The conclusions were as follows: 1. The 1999 telephonists’ recently situation of the extent of the job satisfaction was “medium”, the burnout was “medium low”, and the turnover intention was “medium”. 2. The individual status variables were no significant difference except for “marriage status” among turnover intention of the 1999 telephonists. 3. Both the eternal and external job satisfactions were determined and had negative correlation with Emotional Exhaustion and Diminished Personal Accomplishment. 4. Both the eternal and external job satisfactions were determined and had negative correlation with turnover intention. 5. Both the Emotional Exhaustion and Diminished Personal Accomplishment were determined and had negative correlation with turnover intention.

在當前的治理環境下，公共任務比以往更需要整合政府及各部門組織的行動方能克盡其功。因此，多數的公共管理者應會同意，行政組際協調已成為「治理時代」重要且迫切的議題之一，公共管理者需要擁有全新的能力，從解決民眾問題的角度來回應民眾需求。本文將行政組際協調定義為「藉由兩個或兩個以上行政組織的一致行動，使特定政策或計畫的執行，能達成最少的冗餘、不一致與空隙的執行結果」。在此定義下，本文討論的行政組際協調涉及三個層面：第一個層面為跨行政組織如何產生一致行動的問題；第二個層面為行政組織間的互動關係；第三個層面為跨行政組織執行成果的問題。 本文建構的「行政組際協調嵌套賽局模型」假定官僚制度中的專業分工與獲利轉換機制的制度設計，是造成行政組織分工但不合作的主因。在此前提下，筆者引入「效用損失」的概念，做為發展行政組織行為效用函數的基礎。在行政自主性「效用損失」的概念下，筆者僅保留與行政組織政策或計畫執行最相關的自變項，分別是相依關係、溝通、管轄領域、民意監督、外部課責與內部課責等六種，來解釋行政組織的合作行為以及協調的結果等兩種依變項。由於本文將制度視為對參賽者的限制與機會，在制度陳述概念的輔助下，筆者得以清楚地設定行政組際協調的賽局情境，並將行政責任的思考轉化為外部課責與內部課責等兩種課責參數型態。在此課責制度框架下，筆者建立行政組際協調的空間結構，透過行政組織自主性效用之簡單損失函數以及制度空間模型的運用，成功建立起一個階層管理者、兩個行政組織的行政組際協調嵌套賽局模型。這個模型依據外部課責是否一致，以及內部課責是否存有共識等兩個面向，將行政組際協調賽局情境區分為四種類型，並在分別推演參賽者的行為變化後，提出十項理論命題。為詮釋這些命題在現實環境中的意義，筆者在臺北市政府研考會的同意下，引用該會於2010年10月辦理之1999跨機關陳情案件問卷調查資料，進行次級資料分析。 綜合而言，本文建構的「行政組際協調嵌套賽局模型」，是建立在一個嚴格的假定條件之上的，因此其理論的解釋力與預測能力都僅能限縮在一定的範圍內，特別是一階層管理者、兩行政組織的三人完全訊息賽局。換言之，超出這個範圍之外的行政組際協調現象，就不適合使用本模型進行解釋。本文雖然只使用極精簡的相關研究變項，卻也足以展現一個理論模型應具備的解釋與預測能力。當然，本文的研究僅是一個開端，不論在模型的廣博性以及適用性都還有極大的待改善空間。筆者也鼓勵後繼的學者，能持續地擴展與修改本文提出之理論模型，讓行政組際協調研究領域能朝向更正面的發展。 / Under the present governance environment, the government would need more efforts to coordinate different organizations’ actions than before to make sure the public services would be provided successfully. Thus, most public managers would not only agree that the interorganizational coordination has become one of the important and urgent issues in the governance era, but also they need to learn new abilities to response the citizens’ needs. The author defined the concept of interorganizational coordination as “The end-state of a public policy or program which is implemented by two or more organizations in a consistent way is characterized by minimal redundancy, incoherence and lacunae.” Under this definition, the author discussed three different questions of interorganization coordination in public administration. The first question is How can we formulate a set of consistent actions for implementing a public policy or program? The second question is “How can we explain the interactive relationship between the organizations in public administration?” The third question is “What kind of results would be produced by multi-organizational implementation?” The nested game model of this dissertation has been assumed that the specification and unique side payment system of bureaucracy are the fundamental institution of interorganizational coordination. Under this assumption, the author introduced the concept of simple loss function and structure-induced equilibrium to create an utility function of public organizations and a spatial model for deducing propositions of interorganizational coordination in public administration. In order to verify the propositions of the nested game model of this dissertation, the author did a case study which was including 52 appealed cases of 1999 Citizen Hotline of Taipei City Government and tested the hypothesis derived from the propositions. Finally, the author concluded that there are six independent variables, including interdependency, communication, territory, supervision, outside accountability and inside accountability which can be used to explain two dependent variables, including cooperative behaviors and the result of interorganizational coordination. The author admitted that the interorganizational coordination is a contingent process and should be carefully defined its game rules before discussing what happened in this process. This dissertation has provided a simplicity model for explaining interorganizational coordination with one hierarchical organization and two horizontal organizations within four different situations. The author hoped that other researchers can modify this simple model to explain more complex situations of interorganizational coordination. Thus, this field could be continually developed in a positive way.