隨著全球化深化發展，人才作為一種生產要素其價值不斷提升。不論在公開發行公司還是非公開發行公司中，員工獎酬制度對於提高公司績效之作用愈來愈明顯。而員工獎酬制度是否能夠發揮激勵員工，並促進公司經營之效果，在很大程度上仰賴於良善的公司治理制度。同時，當員工獎酬制度是以股票形式向員工發行時，其可能對原股東、員工、債權人等產生一定影響，本文將進一步就其對各主體之影響分析發行員工獎酬制度之利弊。 本文將論述之重點放在台灣現行公司法中的四種員工獎酬制度，包括員工酬勞、員工新股認股權、員工認股權憑證及限制員工權利新股。其中員工酬勞與員工新股認股權制度為對員工事前之獎勵，為公司法法定強制要求；員工認股權憑證與限制員工權利新股制度為對員工事後之獎勵，公司自主選擇是否發行該股票。本文著重從四種制度之決定機關、發行價格、發行對象等角度進一步說明其合理性及產生之理論與實務之問題。 此外，本文亦著重分析大陸2016年出台之「上市公司股權激勵管理辦法」，亦從其對決定機關、發行價格、股票來源及發行對象等角度說明制度之設計原因，並對「管理辦法」之修正內容進行進一步分析，包括強化資訊揭露與擴大律師等專業人士之參與程度。 本文亦通過對非公開發行公司所運用之契約條文條款與實務中，分析員工認股權憑證制度在實務運用之作用，同時進一步比較兩岸在員工獎酬制度之異同點。通過上述之分析，本文結合台灣公司法全盤修正委員會所提出之建議，強調公司自治之重要性，對台灣與大陸現行員工獎酬制度就決定機關、發行價格、發行對象提出具體之意見。

公司的順利有效運作仰賴企業整體共同努力，透過發放以公司績效為計算基礎的酬勞及紅利，期望能增加董監與員工的工作動機，進而達到提升公司績效之目的。然而，我國於費用化制度實施前，董監酬勞與員工紅利之會計處理係作為盈餘分配項，而非列為薪資費用，此作法受到外資及投資法人的批評，認為台灣企業的財務報表無法允當表達其實質經營狀況。為消除相關人士的抨擊，並與國際會計準則接軌，我國陸續修訂法律、頒布公報及解釋函令，規定自2008年1月1日起，員工分紅及董監酬勞費用化制度正式開始實施。 本研究欲探討在費用化制度實施後，公司的酬勞及紅利制度將產生什麼變化，且該項制度的變動是否會改變對董監及員工的激勵誘因，進而影響公司績效。本研究實證結果顯示，員工分紅費用化制度實施後，公司發放的董監酬勞佔稅後淨利比例無顯著變化。在員工紅利部分，現金紅利比重提高，股票紅利比重則降低。無論於費用化制度實施前或後，給予員工現金或股票紅利，皆有助於公司提升經營績效；惟費用化後，現金紅利之激勵效果變差，股票紅利則變好。此外，若同時比較員工現金與股票紅利兩者，可發現無論是費用化實施前或實施後，現金紅利對於提升公司經營績效之效果皆較佳。 / The success of corporate operations relies on the efforts of all people in the firm. By distributing compensation and bonus which are based on corporate performance, it not only can enhance directors’ and employees’ work motivation, but also achieve the purpose of better corporate performance. The accounting treatment for director compensation or employee bonus used to be recognized as a part of corporate earnings distribution, not as an expense. This method was, however, criticized for its failure to present the true operating results of a company. In order to solve this problem and in accordance with the IFRS treatment, the government amended the related laws and required that both director compensation and employee bonus be recognized as salary expense after January 1, 2008. The purpose of this study is to investigate the changes in director compensation and employee bonus after the above new regulation took effect. This study also examines whether this change alters the incentives to directors and employees. The empirical results show that after the new accounting treatment, no significant changes in the percentage of director compensation to net income. When it comes to employee bonus, the percentage of cash bonus increased, but the stock bonus declined. In addition, employee cash and stock bonus, no matter being treated as an expense or not, did help the firms to enhance performance. However, cash bonus’ motivation effect became lesser, whereas stock bonus’ effect increased. Furthermore, cash bonus was more effective than stock bonus in improving corporate performance before and after the expense treatment for employee bonus.

本研究主要針對目前企業績效不佳，董事會成員坐領高額董監酬勞之情況進行研究。本研究首先從權力與監督兩構面分析目前影響董監酬勞水準之因素，並進一步從權力與監督構面探討執行業務董監領取員工分紅產生之激勵或稀釋效果對公司價值與股東權益之影響。 實證結果顯示，董事會成員之權力擴張會導致較高水準之董監酬勞，尤其是執行業務董監之員工分紅部分，且執行業務董監領取員工分紅對於公司股東權益及公司未來價值具有負向之影響。家族企業之董監酬勞並不會隨著權力擴張而有較高的水準。在內部監督機制方面，獨立董監之監督效果較不明顯；在外部監督機制方面，主動機構投資人相較於被動機構投資人，具有抑制董監酬勞自利行為之效果。 / Based on a sample of Taiwanese companies listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange over the period of 1996-2004, this thesis examines the determinans of compensation of board directors from the power and monitoring perspectives. In addition, this thesis investigates the effect of equity-based compensation of executive directors on firm value and return on equity. The empirical result indicates that the entrenchment of managerial power determines the level of directors’ pay, especially on equity-based compensation. The more powerful the board of directors, higher the level of compensation, lower the company value and the return on stockholders` equity. However, as compared to non-family-controlled firms, the directors of family-controlled firms tend to have lower level of compensation. Moreover, we find that active institutional investors have greater monitoring effect on the compensation level of board of directors.