本研究以大同集團為個案研究對象，從決策及資源分配掌控者觀點定義該集團企業之最終控制者，首先分析大同集團企業之董監結構及股權結構，並針對該集團之公司治理議題作探討，亦對相關之法令缺失，提出改善及政策建議。 研究結果顯示，大同集團企業之最終控制者林蔚山家族係透過交叉持股及掌握董事會席次控制權等控制途徑掌控集團企業，其集團內十一家公開發行以上公司的平均直接持股率、股份控制權、盈餘分配權分別為1.17%、21.83%、1.07%，但平均席次控制權則高達61.85%，股份控制權（席次控制權）與盈餘分配權偏離差之平均值則達20.76%（60.79%），席次控制權與盈餘分配權之偏離倍數為178.01倍，亦即最終控制者可以一單位的出資獲取178單位以席次控制力衡量的實質控制力。大同集團企業席次控制權與盈餘分配權嚴重偏離之個案研究發現，符合經營者之經營誘因不足，而財富侵佔動機較強之學術假設。此外，本研究探討該集團企業掏空資產案件、大幅減資、投資通達國際之相關財務資訊透明度，針對大同集團之股權結構與董監組成分析，提出公司治理相關議題討論。最後，本研究針對公司治理相關法令，提出改善及政策建議。 關鍵詞：集團企業、股權結構、公司治理、席次控制權 / This study employs the Tatung business group as our sample and defines the ultimate owner as the entity with ultimate influence over major decisions regarding the operation, management, and allocation of company resources. We first analyze the characteristics of different boards of directors and corporate ownership structure of the Tatung business group. Corporate governance related issues are then identified, followed by discussions on the deficiencies of relevant regulations and suggestions for improvements on government policies. The analysis indicates that cross-holdings, pyramid structure and seat control over the board members are approaches applied by the Lin Family to actively control the Tatung business group. An analysis on the measurement of voting rights, cash flow rights and board seat-control shows that direct shareholding, voting rights and cash flow rights are on average 1.17%, 21.83% and 1.07%, respectively, while the board seat-control ratio is 61.85%. The average deviation between voting right (board seat-control) and cash flow rights is 20.76% (60.79%). The number of board seats controlled by the owner is 178.01 times greater than cash flow rights. In other words, the ultimate owner gets approximately 178 units of controlling power through one unit of capital input. To the extent that ownership and control is highly deviated, a weaker disciplinary effect and a stronger entrenchment effect can be expected. In addition, in this study of the Tatung business group, we examine the emptied assets case, significant capital reduction, and the transparency of financial information of investment in Nature Worldwide Technology Corporation. For the corporate ownership structure and the characteristics of different boards of directors of the Tatung business group, we identify the critical issues regarding corporate governance. Finally, discussions on the deficiencies of relevant regulations and suggestions for improvements on government policies are provided. Keywords: Business group; Corporate ownership structure; Corporate governance; Board seat-control.

本論文以國內2001-2005年之上市櫃公司為研究對象，針對其轉投資層數與股權結構型態進行台灣集團企業股權結構複雜度與企業經營關聯性之研究。有別於集團企業之實證研究，一般均以比較集團與單一企業經營績效與公司價值，來間接推論集團化相關理論之合理性。本論文嘗試直接從形成集團企業之經濟因素著手，探討股權結構複雜度對於企業交易成本、融資成本與決策控制力等經營層面之影響，以期能更深入瞭解集團企業之成本與效益。實證結果顯示，集團企業股權結構複雜度之效益無法反映於較低之交易成本，但可反映於較低之融資利息成本。本論文之實證發現，集團企業形成複雜股權結構主要係基於財務而非營運之考量。最後在決策控制力方面，分析結果顯示，複雜股權結構與股份控制權有顯著的正向關係，為「東亞國家之最終控制者，傾向於透過金字塔結構或交叉持股，以較低現金流量極大化控制權」之說法，提供實證證據。 / We explore the relationship between the complexity of a business group’s ownership structure and operation by using a sample of Taiwanese companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and Over the Counter during 2001-2005. Instead of using Tobin’s q or ROA, we begin with the economic background of business group directly and discuss how the complexity of ownership structure influences the benefits and costs of business operation, such as operation cost, financing cost and ultimate control. Our empirical analysis indicates that the influence of complexity of ownership structure in operation cost is uncertain. According to related research in Taiwan, the main purpose of complexity of ownership structure is not for operation but for financing or restrictions of laws. This may be result in the insignificant effect on operating cost. Second, we find a positive and significant effect on financing cost. This result also supports the arguments about the purpose of complexity of ownership structure. Finally, our analysis offers empirical evidences that control is typically enhanced by pyramid structures and cross-holdings among firms in East Asian countries.

本研究採用個案研究方法，以德隆及復星兩大中國民營上市集團企業為對象，從最終控制者的觀點，針對股權結構及董事會組成分析中國民營集團企業之控股型態，以及公司治理指標衡量之議題進行探討。具體而言，本研究首先分析中國民營企業股權結構特性，發展大陸上市公司股份控制權、盈餘分配權及席次控制權的衡量方法，並比較兩個案集團在控股型態及公司治理模式上的異同。 研究結果顯示，德隆及復星企業集團（系）股權仍屬集中，集團旗下上市公司均有持股超過三成的單一大股東，且均透過金字塔之股權結構控制其集團企業，但交叉持股情形不明顯。其中，德隆系大都透過未上市公司取得集團內上市公司持股控制，復星系則大都透過集團內上市公司轉投資未上市公司，並經由各未上市公司再持股其他上市公司(屬間接互相持股性質)，取得股權控制。以傳統偏離指標（盈餘分配權與股份控制權之偏離）上，兩集團偏離程度相近；但以盈餘分配權與席次控制權或以席次控制權與股份控制權之偏離比率來衡量偏離程度時，德隆系偏離程度明顯高於復星系。此外，兩大集團均設有獨立董事，及由職工代表出任監事會；但分析結果亦顯示，法令雖規定應由職工代表監事席次，但集團內仍有部分上市公司未依法設置。 / Based on an ultimate controller(s) perspective and using a case study approach to two private business groups—DeLong and Fuson—in China, this research analyzes the ownership structure, board structure, and measurement of governance indicators of theses groups. In specific, this research first discuss the attributes of ownership structure of the individual business group, followed by the computation of voting rights, cash-flow rights, the degree of control through board seats (board-seat control), and the related deviation between theses control power owned by the ultimate controller. In addition, in-depth comparisons of governance features between these two groups are also performed. The analysis indicates that the concentration of ownership is relatively high for both DeLong and Fuson groups. There exits one single largest shareholder with more than 30% of shareholdings, and the formation of pyramidal ownership structure is also common for both groups. However, cross-holding is not obvious for either group. In DeLong, the ultimate owners exercise their voting control through their unlisted companies. In contrast, the ultimate owners of Fuson exercise their voting rights through unlisted companies that invested by the listed companies. The deviation between cash-flow rights and voting rights of these two business groups are similarm while the deviation between cash-flow rights and board-seat control and the deviation between voting rights and board-seat control is significantly higher for DeLong groups. Furthermore, the corporate boards of DeLong and Fuson groups are composed of both independent board directors and workers' representatives on the supervisory board. Although it is mandatory to have a minimum numbers of workers' representatives on the supervisory board, it is not uncommon to find the lack of full compliance to this requirement.

民國八十七年亞洲金融危機引發本土性金融風暴後，集團企業交叉持股在掌握經營權、炒作股價及企業間利益輸送所造成之負面經濟影響，再次成為議題的焦點。在台灣證券管理交易法規中，企業交叉持股行為僅能由母公司代子公司公告窺知一二。國內文獻中對於交叉持股之探討亦偏重法律制度及盈餘管理層面，對於透過交叉持股之資金操縱行為則較少著墨。 有鑒於交叉持股「能載舟亦能覆舟」之經濟重要性，及現行公告實務未能窺知交叉持股行為全貌，本研究嘗試以投資餘額變動頻率異常作為潛在的交叉持股行為代理變數，將民國八十三年至八十八年第三季之台灣上市公司按投資餘額變動之頻繁程度區分為高變動群與低變動群樣本，進行其財務性操縱行為的探討。本研究主要的實證議題有二：（1）投資餘額變動較頻繁之公司其盈餘管理行為是否異於投資餘額變動較不頻繁之公司？及（2）投資餘額變動較頻繁之公司其資金操縱行為是否異於投資餘額變動較不頻繁之公司？ 實證結果顯示，在盈餘管理行為上，高投資變動公司有顯著利用裁決性應計項目操縱盈餘的現象，且此現象在曾發生財務危機的高投資變動公司更為顯著。高投資變動公司在多頭市場時，投資收益顯著較低投資變動公司為大；空頭市場時，兩者在真實盈餘操縱變數上並無顯著差異。在資金操縱方面，高投資變動公司質押成數變動率顯著大於低投資變動公司，且曾發生財務危機的高投資變動公司變動程度更為明顯。此外，高投資變動公司債務活動在多頭時期較低投資變動公司活絡，顯示債務活動活躍是高投資變動公司重要特性之一。基於現行法規實務與資料來源的限制不易直接偵測具經濟實質之負面交叉持股行為，本研究之綜合實證發現高投資變動公司與真實負面交叉持股行為有相當程度的關聯性，是故投資餘額變動頻率異常似乎是研究負面交叉持股公司極為重要的參考指標之一。

在經濟自由化、國際化的浪潮下，現代企業為加強其市場競爭力，勢必走向資金密集、技術密集為主的型態，因此企業的大型化、多元化以及專業化將成為未來的發展趨勢。另一方面，由於一般企業對於外部資金的倚賴甚深，因此融資決策為企業最重要的功能政策之一。故集團企業在融資上是否較非集團企業占優勢，即為本研究的主要目的。 　　本研究以上市公司為研究對象，以公開財務資料與問卷為資料來源，利用卡方分析、ｔ檢定、無母數統計與主成份分析等統計方法來比較集團企業在融資上是否較非集團企業占優勢，研究結果如下： 　　不論是集團企業或非集團企業，融資決策都占有重要的地位。一般企業多有專人或專責部門負責公司的融資活動，且多會編製融資計劃，也都認為融資決策應與總體策略和功能政策配合。 　　集團企業的的負債成本與加權平均資金成本明顯低於非集團企業；權益成本亦低於非集團企業，但僅獲統計上部分支持。 　　集團企業以抵押貸款與股票兩者為融資來源時，其取得資金的時間低於非集團企業，而在信用貸款、票券、公司債上並無顯著差異。但就一般而言，集團企業的融資彈性較非集團企業為佳。 　　若以資金成本與融資彈性來衡量融資上的競爭優勢，發現集團企業較非集團企業在融資上有優勢存在。

本研究透過三個台灣大型MNCs(集團企業)的深度訪談，期望了解集團成員入如何產生與移轉特定地主國知識的議題。台灣MNCs(集團企業)在國際化時，地主國環境不同於母國，使得台灣MNCs(集團企業)海外成員不足以利用其擁有的經驗與知識去因應環境差異所產生的挑戰與問題，而需要產生新的解決辦法。台灣MNCs(集團企業)海外成員所在地之經營環境與母國環境有差異時，其處理方式有二：規劃性(定期會議處理各階段所面臨之問題)及隨機性(臨時會議對於臨時狀況進行處理)；另外，在地主國發生的突發事件亦會產生地主國知識。當集團海外成員所面臨之經營環境與母國環境差異越大者，所產生特定地主國知識的量會越多。 透過每次在該地主國設廠及執行每一次新產品發展流程的經驗過程中各階段中因為與地主國環境介面互動而產生特定地主國知識，所以台灣MNCs(集團企業)是以漸進方式累積集團成員在特定地主國面對問題解決問題的方法。當遇到問題越多時，台灣MNCs(集團企業)海外子公司特定地主國知識累積速度越快；但每種特定地主國問題的解決方法是需要各階段多方人員不斷地溝通才能產生的，所以當內外部溝通成本越高時，會減緩海外成員累積特定地主國知識累積速度；為了加快累積特定地主國知識，台灣MNCs(集團企業)大量借助資訊科技及人員面對面溝通，期望加速溝通效率以因應快速變動的環境。 在同一地主國，透過三個台灣大型MNCs(集團企業)的深度訪談發現，台灣MNCs(集團企業)在特定地主國知識移轉機制路徑有三，且在探究過程中發現海外總部(OHQs)的存在，所以進一步探討，在特定地主國中，集團成員間移轉地主國知識時，海外總部(OHQs)所扮演的角色及其存在的價值；在取得這個知識的過程中，有哪些因素會影響移轉機制中正式化機制與非正式化機制使用比例？知識移轉時，正式化機制與非正式化機制之間是一個連續帶的概念，而影響集團成員間知識移轉機制選用時，正式化與非正式化機制搭配比例的影響因素包含：知識特性、子公司自主性、知識情境鑲嵌性、經營模式(產品相似性、技術差距性)以及地理距離。 台灣MNCs(集團企業)在知識移轉制度建立初期，較仰賴非正式化機制，隨著制度建立完備程度增加，正式化機制使用的比重提高，但是非正式化機制對於知識移轉機制的效力仍然存在於中高階主管層級，對於基層主管及員工而言，則會完全仰賴正式化機制，以確保自身工作上的權責釐清。台灣MNCs(集團企業)進行國際擴張時，海外成員初期國際化知識是從MNCs總部遺傳而來。台灣MNCs(集團企業)海外成員間特定地主國知識移轉路徑有三：1)透過集團總部(HQs)移轉、2)子公司間移轉及3)透過集團海外總部(OHQs)。本研究認為當台灣MNCs(集團企業)總部在特定地主國設立集團海外總部(OHQs)後，集團海外總部(OHQs)在特定地主國知識移轉上會取代集團企業總部的角色(意即地主國知識移轉時，路徑三會取代路徑一)。 台灣MNCs(集團企業)國際策略在大陸拓展的廣度(各個集團成員(產品不同)赴大陸投資)及深度(負責新產品發展流程階段越多)增加，使總部須處理的專業知識涵蓋範圍廣且處理資料量大，對於位於台灣的MNCs(集團企業)總部而言，處理資訊成本是很高的；再者，集團在大陸據點越多，對於總部監督成本上亦是很大的負擔，所以在大陸設立海外總部(OHQs)，以與集團總部進行某種程度的分工；同時，當世界各地子公司均需將地主國知識回傳至台灣MNCs(集團企業)總部時，台灣MNCs(集團企業)總部即將面臨很複雜的處理及整合成本，所以海外總部(OHQs)有存在的必要。台灣MNCs(集團企業)設置的海外總部(OHQs)所進行的交流、整理及儲存的資訊較複雜和多元化，其設立目的包含：降低監督成本、降低整合成本、降低協調成本、降低知識移轉過程中由於資訊不對稱所產生的無效率情形。集團海外總部(OHQs)亦促進地主國集團成員間知識快速流通，且將知識從母國或其它地主國之集團成員處引入，也就是大量的知識流入與流出的主要樞紐。當集團型態是屬於聯邦分權式時，集團海外總部(OHQs)的設立是有困難的。集團海外總部(OHQs)可能設立在主要市場地理居中位置、交通便捷之處或離知識最接近的地方，以降低「集團」海外成員開會時的交通成本。 集團海外總部(OHQs)是在集團總部(HQs)監控下創造出其在特定地主國知識移轉扮演的角色獨特性及存在必要性，為避免集團海外總部(OHQs)憑藉結構洞角色壟斷所有特定地主國知識，進而取代集團總部(HQs)，集團總部(HQs)透過其與集團海外成員間稽核性連結及其對集團海外總部(OHQs)的正式控制(包含所有權控制及組織層級控制)來防堵集團海外總部(OHQs)坐大，以有效管理集團海外總部(OHQs)。 正式機制與非正式機制間是一個連續帶的概念。然而，在移轉過程中，哪些因素會影響到正式與非正式機制搭配的比例呢？ 當海外成員自主性高時，採用正式化機制強迫集團海外成員間進行知識分享，亦搭配非正式化機制的社會互動，來緩和彼此間因競爭所產生不願意分享的情形；當知識的情境鑲嵌性程度越高，越需要使用非正式機制來縮小正式機制中知識再利用的可能性；當產品相似性很高，知識來源者與接收者若能搭配少部分(短時間、次數少)的人員互動，便能加快知識再利用的速度；當技術越接近時，知識需求方較可準確地預估需求單上的要項，雙方技術差距越大，越需要仰賴非正式關係使知識來源者願意「多」花時間來教導知識接收者；當集團成員地理距離愈遠時，透過正式化機制，如海外總部(OHQs)進行地主國資料蒐集以避免資訊不對稱造成的知識移轉障礙，以克服因為地理距離所產生的知識移轉障礙。 / Knowledge about host countries and international environment is needed when firms enter international markets. A firm encounters more challenges when it enters a new market with no knowledge. After entry, it then can gain valuable experiential knowledge about the host country (i.e., host-country-specific knowledge) and this knowledge is helpful for further operation in the country and internationalization (Yu, 1990). A firm can gain hands-on knowledge by operating in a host market and then it can filter the information gained into forms it needs for internationalization later on. The purpose of the study addresses host-country-specific-knowledge generating and accumulating by overseas member firms in business groups by identifying factors that affect how business groups from an emerging economy transfer host-country-specific knowledge among their group members. We have found that formal and informal mechanisms were helpful in facilitating the transferring of host-country-specific knowledge. In the literature, it is often assumed that knowledge can be easily and automatically transferred within business groups. Our study confirms that business groups do transfer knowledge among subsidiaries purposely and has also demonstrated that some mechanisms are needed to realize this intent. While the business group’s network provides a platform for facilitating flows of host-country-specific knowledge, the mere existence of such a network does not automatically result in knowledge transfer. From managerial viewpoint, both formal and informal mechanisms should be in place to promote and encourage host-country-specific knowledge transfer. Gaining a good understanding of the mechanisms contributing to knowledge transfer is strategically important for knowledge management. Regarding the use of mechanisms, our results indicate that the buildup of internationalization knowledge can go along with a firm’s development in foreign markets and also can allow for accumulation of various types of knowledge. The more significant the difference between the contexts encountered by foreign subsidiaries and headquarters is, the more the quantity of knowledge the former will create regarding the host country. When foreign subsidiaries encounter similar problems within a tight time frame in a host country, the accumulation of knowledge about the host country will be faster. In the early stages, setting up knowledge transferring system relies more on informal mechanisms. The more mature the system is, the higher the proportion of formal mechanisms is used. However, although informal mechanisms are effective for chief executive officers and senior vice presidents, primary executives and operators rely solely on formal mechanisms in order to clarify responsibilities. With more important strategic position of the host country, the headquarters will establish overseas headquarters in order to quickly respond to the market requirements. In a specific host country, overseas headquarters, established by the HQs, may substitute for the headquarters in transferring host country-specific knowledge among member firms via formal mechanisms. When a business group belongs to federal decentralization, external market mechanisms will be adopted to transfer knowledge among its member firms. The overseas headquarters hardly governs transferring knowledge among overseas member firms and the headquarters. When the overseas headquarters is established, the headquarters adopts auditing connection to prevent the host country from monopolizing host-country-specific knowledge. A headquarters can successfully implement multiple formal and informal mechanisms for knowledge transfer. With respect to knowledge transfer, the higher the level of subsidiary autonomy, the greater the necessity the headquarters rely on formal mechanisms to transfer host-country-specific knowledge among member firms. Encouraging sharing within a business group through some managerial mechanisms can wear down the negative influence caused by opportunism and information asymmetry on the part of the subsidiary and the inter-member competition for the transfer of host-country-specific knowledge. Overseas headquarters accumulates a vast experience and are capable of absorbing, transferring and applying knowledge adequately. They can transcend the geographical limitations and establish good cooperation relations between knowledge originator (the subsidiaries in the host country) and knowledge receiver (other sister firms and the headquarters), warranting the success of the knowledge transfer. Provided that knowledge is tacit, information technology is necessity in transferring knowledge initially documented while social interaction is needed in transferring the rest knowledge embedded in persons. Finally, product and technology similarity are factors affecting how headquarters rely on formal mechanisms in transferring knowledge among member firms.

公司因應「企業全球化」趨勢，追求全球資源最佳配置下，交易大多在集團內部進行。透過移轉訂價政策，作為集團企業間關係人交易價格的制定依據。 此趨勢之下，我國集團企業間關係人交易採用移轉訂價政策的情況為何？本研究以我國上市櫃公司之集團企業為研究對象，探討分析移轉訂價查核準則實施對我國集團企業間移轉訂價制定因素之影響，並彙整我國集團企業對移轉訂價查核準則規範內容的意見。 一、我國集團企業移轉訂價政策之運用現況及考量因素： 1、目前僅有五成的集團企業有建立明確移轉訂價政策作為關係人交易訂價的依據：公司規模愈大、對外投資期間愈長、關係人交易總額愈多、而關係企業家數在5家以下的集團企業，採用比例也愈高。 2、以移轉訂價查核準則規範之「可比較未受控價格法」及「成本加價法」之傳統交易基礎法採用為多。整體租稅負擔並非主要考量因素，各國移轉訂價法令規定及我國財務會計準則公報第六號規定為最主要的因素。規模越大、關係企業家數越多、越重視法令規定的企業，採用交易基礎移轉訂價法的機率愈高。惟，綜合集團整體內外經濟因素加以考量時，則偏向利潤基礎法。 二、我國集團企業受移轉訂價查核準則影響及意見： 1、透過組織管理架構的調整，將關係人交易價格的重心轉為事前規劃，進而考量移轉訂價稽查之因應。 2、目前我國集團企業多數認為準則並無不合理且頗具可行性。 / With the trend of globalization, companies use global resources to pursue best interest of the group enterprises as a whole within related party transactions. Through the transfer pricing policy, conglomerates can determine the prices for transactions between related parties. This study uses the conglomerate enterprises of Listed and OTC companies in Taiwan as questionnaire samples. The study analyses the impact of implement action of Taiwan transfer pricing regulations on conglomerate enterprises and the factors of transfer pricing among the conglomerates in Taiwan. The results of the research are as follows: 1.Nowadays, only 50% of the conglomerates in Taiwan establish a stated transfer pricing policy in determining the prices for transactions between related parties. We also focus that the larger size, the longer time of investment and the great investment amount, the higher proportion to adopt the transfer pricing policy. 2.The conglomerates in Taiwan tend to “The Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method” and “The Cost Plus Method” . The groups do not regard world-wide tax burden as an important factor, rather they emphasize more on the other countries’ transfer pricing regulations and financial accounting standards No.6 as the main factors. 3.The larger size, the more related companies, and paying more attention to regulations, the higher probability of transaction-based transfer pricing method. When the comprehensive internal and external economic factors are considered, the conglomerate companies tend to adopt profit-based transfer pricing method. 4.Through the adjustment of the organizational structure, and planning the price for transactions between related parties in advance, the conglomerate enterprises take tax audit into account. 5.Most of conglomerates in Taiwan regard the criteria of Taiwan transfer pricing regulations as rational and feasible at present.