This thesis is a study of aboutness. It defends the claim that we have singular thoughts about ordinary objects and argues that an essential part of how we do so is by maintaining singular representations. This proposal allows us to avoid traditional, unsatisfying conceptions of the scope of singular thought while restoring the sense in which such thought is a distinctively epistemic achievement. Reconnecting the study of aboutness with epistemology promises to alleviate the sense of directionlessness in the contemporary literature, offering a firmer grip on the phenomenon along with new, systematic resources for its investigation. Chapters 1-2 explore the effects of contextualist machinery on orthodox views about singular thought. It is widely thought that if there is to be a plausible connection between the truth of a de re attitude report about a subject and that subject's possession of a singular thought, then there can be no acquaintance requirement(s) on singular thought. Chapter 1 shows that this view rests on a faulty picture of how we talk about attitudes. Indeed, the truth of a de re attitude report cannot be taken to track the singular/non-singular distinction without collapsing it. A new, contextualist picture is needed. That there must be a distinction between singular and non-singular intentionality is emphasized in Chapter 2, where a key explanatory role for singular thought - brought out by a thought experiment due to Strawson - is examined. I show that the role does not call for any distinctive kind of mental content. Once we abandon the two widespread views questioned in Chapters 1-2, our grip on the phenomenon of singular aboutness is loosened: it is not constitutively tied to the kinds of attitude-reporting data or mental content by which it is often assumed to be revealed. Where are we to look for insight? What makes something the object of a singular thought? According to Russell, it is a datum of intuition that singular thought involves a kind of knowledge; a theory of aboutness will precisify the intuitive notion of 'knowing which thing one is thinking about' in order to capture this demand in a philosophically revealing way. If Russell is right, teasing out this connection to knowledge will allow us to see what it takes for a particular thing to be the immediate subject matter of thought. Chapter 3 discusses Evans's theory of this kind. Chapter 4 examines recent work by Dickie. While serious concerns emerge in each case, insights recovered are used to precisify Russell's requirement, leading to a novel picture of singular representation and the epistemic character of this achievement. While the chapters follow a narrative, providing an extended rationale for the proposal in Chapter 4, each may be read in isolation by those familiar with the philosophical issues. For those who are not, the Introduction provides sufficient background.

This thesis concerns the nature of knowledge-how, in particular the question of how we ought to combine philosophical and linguistic considerations to understand what it is to know how to do something. Part 1 concerns the significance of linguistic evidence. In chapter 1, I consider the range of linguistic arguments that have been used in favour of the Intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Chapter 2 considers the idea that sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V' involve a free relative complement, and the relation between this claim and the Objectualist claim that knowledge-how is a kind of objectual knowledge. Chapter 3 argues that Intellectualism about knowledge-how faces a problem of generality in accounting for the kinds of propositions that are known in knowledge-how, which is analogous to the generality problem for Reliabilism. Part 2 turns to philosophical considerations, offering an extended inquiry into the point of thinking and talking about knowledge-how. Chapter 4 considers why we should want to work with a concept of knowledge, isolating two hypotheses: i) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to pool skills, and ii) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to engage in responsible practices of co-operation. Chapter 5 criticises the former hypothesis by arguing against the suggestion that there is a knowledge-how norm on teaching. Chapter 6 offers an indirect argument for the latter hypothesis, arguing for a knowledge-how norm on intending. Part 3, which consists of chapter 7, offers a positive account of knowledge-how which takes into account both philosophical and linguistic considerations. According to what I will call the Interrogative Capacity view, knowing how to do something consists in a certain kind of ability to answer the question of how to do it.

nÃo hà / A linguagem, como objeto da investigaÃÃo filosÃfica, à uma das temÃticas mais importantes herdadas do Ãltimo sÃculo. Benjamim toma este tema, em suas investigaÃÃes, para se contrapor Ãs tentativas filosÃficas de cientificizar a linguagem. Para Benjamim, em sua filosofia, a linguagem à objeto de si, dentro de uma anÃlise ontolÃgica, em que uma linguagem particular se eleva pela traduÃÃo à linguagem pura do nome. Esta anÃlise à amparada, conforme o prefÃcio de Origem do Drama Barroco, na tradiÃÃo dialÃtica platÃnica-hegeliana. Esta dissertaÃÃo tem como objetivo expor o desenvolvimento da filosofia da linguagem de Walter Benjamim, a partir de trÃs textos especÃficos: Sobre a linguagem Geral e a Humana â Ãber die Sprache Ãberhaupt und Ãber die Sprache des Menschen (1916), A Tarefa do Tradutor â Die Aufgabe des Ubersetzers (1921) e o prefÃcio da obra Origem do Drama Barroco AlemÃo - Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiel (1924-25). A meta desta exposiÃÃo à mostrar que na filosofia benjaminiana a linguagem se dà no processo de desdobramento histÃrico da totalidade do real no ato de nomear humano.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T14:23:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ernane Guimaraes Neto.pdf: 18724840 bytes, checksum: 7a8b5d588ce400e5c7c89815d31174ae (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-05-14 / This dissertation investigates ontological attributes of electronic games and books. This approach is founded on Philosophy, Communication and Ludology authors, contrasted and connected to each other. The principles in Nelson Goodman s nominalist philosophy ground the dialogue among different authors. A philosophy of language is constructed, aiming for the combination of concepts such as Heidegger s errancy and the thoughts on fiction since Plato and Aristotle. The tools obtained from this structure of relations are used for an interpretation of the Final Fantasy VII electronic game. Game researchers, such as Gonzalo Frasca and James Paul Gee, as well as Ludology epitomes such as Johan Huizinga and Roger Caillois, are summoned to support the understanding of this specific subject. From that game emerges a functional separation between independent narrative planes, related either to the fictional plot or playability. Following reflections on the ontology of electronic games, an exercise of translating Final Fantasy VII to e-book format is proposed. Marshall McLuhan helps thinking about the inherent potential in every new expressive medium; Walter Benjamin bridges traditional Western fiction and features of the reception experience, which are regained by digital media-laden interaction. Marie-Laure Ryan, among others who applied Literary Studies to understand games, complements the resulting e-book s conception. As a result, this research intends to accomplish a threefold role. It discusses language fundamentals and their ethical consequences for the work of communicators; analyzes a culturally relevant document in its mechanics and its fictional structure; presents an interactive book as an example of the electronic media potential in enriching the reading experience of fictional texts, even for non-game products / Esta dissertação investiga atributos ontológicos de jogos e livros eletrônicos. A abordagem fundamenta-se em autores da Filosofia, da Comunicação e da Ludologia, contrastados e articulados. Os princípios da filosofia nominalista de Nelson Goodman baseiam esse diálogo entre autores. Constrói-se uma filosofia da linguagem que vise a combinação de conceitos como a errância de Heidegger e a ficção desde Platão e Aristóteles. Os instrumentos desenvolvidos a partir dessa estrutura de relações são aplicados a uma interpretação do jogo eletrônico Final Fantasy VII. Pesquisadores de jogos, como Gonzalo Frasca e James Paul Gee, passando por referências da Ludologia como Johan Huizinga e Roger Caillois, são invocados em apoio à compreensão específica desse objeto. Emerge nesse jogo uma separação funcional entre planos narrativos independentes, relacionados ao roteiro ficcional ou à jogabilidade. A partir de reflexões sobre a ontologia do jogo eletrônico, propõe-se um exercício de tradução de Final Fantasy VII para o formato de livro eletrônico. Marshall McLuhan auxilia a pensar sobre o potencial inerente a cada novo meio de expressão; Walter Benjamin faz a ponte entre a tradição ficcional ocidental e características da experiência da recepção, resgatadas pela interatividade proporcionada pelos meios digitais. Marie- Laure Ryan, entre outros autores que utilizaram o repertório dos Estudos Literários para a compreensão dos jogos, complementa a concepção do livro eletrônico produzido. Como resultado, a pesquisa pretende cumprir um triplo papel. Discute conceitos fundamentais da linguagem e suas consequências éticas para o trabalho dos comunicadores; analisa um documento cultural relevante em suas mecânicas e em sua estrutura ficcional; apresenta um livro interativo como exemplo do potencial dos meios eletrônicos de enriquecer a experiência de leitura do texto ficcional, mesmo para produtos que não sejam jogos

In clear and lively prose that avoids jargon, the author carefully and systematically examines the many kinds of subtly nuanced words or word-pairs of everyday discourse such as 'and'-'but', 'before'-'ere', 'Chinese'-'Chink', and 'sweat'-'perspiration', that have proven resistant to truth-conditional explanations of meaning. / https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu_books/1108/thumbnail.jpg

L’objet de ce travail de recherche est de définir la relation de Samuel Beckett au classicisme français du dix-septième siècle. L’analyse préliminaire de différents manuscrits permet d’identifier les sources primaires et secondaires de ce dernier sur Pascal et Racine, et de mettre en avant, dans un second temps, les différentes correspondances, esthétiques et littéraires, entre l’œuvre de l’écrivain irlandais et Port-Royal. L’arrière-plan philosophique se définit par la conjonction de la logique, de l’éloquence et de la passion au cœur de l’œuvre racinienne, que l’on retrouve dans la rhétorique des Pensées, et l’analyse du langage dans la Logique ou l’art de Penser (1662) d’Arnauld et de Nicole. Les différents aspects de cette filiation intellectuelle sont établis à partir de l’analyse comparée des propos de Beckett dans ses séminaires sur la ‘modernité’ de Racine à Trinity College, Dublin, et des écrits théoriques de contemporains français parmi les plus illustres autour du ‘classicisme moderne’ et de ‘l’antirhétorique’. L’étude de l’essai sur Proust, écrit en 1931, suivra ce bilan historiographique afin démontrer que l’œuvre de Beckett se situe dans le prolongement de l’augustinisme littéraire français,qu’il connaissait au moins à partir des écrits et en particulier du roman de Sainte-Beuve, Volupté. En outre, les thèmes augustiniens parcourent l’œuvre plus tardive, notamment la trilogie de romans français, Molloy, Malone Meurt, et L’Innommable comme les textes courts tels que Le Dépeupleur et Sans. L’intertextualité entre les écrits de Pascal et ceux de Beckett, doublée d’une analyse stylistique, démontrera que la syntaxe appauvrie de l’œuvre beckettienne est profondément inspirée du pessimisme augustinien vis-à-vis du langage. En effet, Beckett, adoptant le français comme principale langue d’expression, choisit le style des Pensées comme l’un de ses modèles les plus fondamentaux. / This thesis examines Samuel Beckett’s understanding of seventeenth century French classicism. Thepreliminary analysis of genetic material, that allows the identification of Beckett’s primary andsecondary sources on Pascal and Racine, leads to a discussion of literary and aesthetic connectionsbetween the works of Beckett and the writers of Port-Royal. The philosophical backdrop of thatinfluence derives from the unique fusion of logic, eloquence, and passion manifested in the works of Racine, together with the conception of language in the Pensées and Arnauld and Nicole’s1662 Logique ou l’art de Penser. Literary theories on style and ‘modern literature’ that are contemporary to Beckett’s Trinity College lectures and early critical writings are examined here in the aim to define the different aspects of that intellectual filiation. A close reading of Beckett’s 1931 monograph on Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu follows the initial historiographical study, so as to show that the presence of French literary Augustinianism, manifested in the works of Sainte-Beuve, particularly his only novel Volupté, also underlies some of Beckett’s later prose. This includes the trilogy of French novels, Molloy, Malone Dies, and The Unnamable, and pieces belonging to the later period, particularly Le Dépeupleur/The Lost Ones, and Sans/Lessness. Beckett’s ‘syntax of weakness’, based on reduction and impoverishment, is inspired by the Augustinian pessimism towards language at work in the Logique. As such, the anthropological vision of Port-Royal anticipated Beckett’s definition of being as chaos, so much so that Pascal’s style crucially defined his use of the French language itself.

Hegel's view of poetry clarifies the overall role of language in his system and allows him to makes sense of a difficult linguistic issue: how to distinguish between poetry and prose. For Hegel, this distinction is crucial because it illuminates the different ways poetry and prose allow us to understand ourselves as members of an ethical community. In this paper, I argue, using Hegel, that the distinction between poetry and prose can only properly be understood in terms of their fundamentally different kinds of content instead of in terms of any formal differences between the two. Then, I address an objection to Hegel by Paul de Man which uses Hegel's concept of memory to collapse the distinction between poetry and philosophical prose. Finally, I argue that Hegel can respond to this objection by showing how de Man misunderstands how philosophical thought conceptually develops from memory.

This study aims at investigating Wittgenstein&rsquo / s conception of meaning. In this sense, philosopher&rsquo / s early and later periods will be examined. Key notions of Wittgenstein&rsquo / s philosophy of language, picture theory of meaning, language-game, rule following, Private Language Argument and his assertion that &lsquo / meaning is use&rsquo / will be analyzed. Out of this analysis, Wittgenstein&rsquo / s answer to the following basic question will be sought: How is meaning derived in a language? The outcome of this query will be comparatively read with four linguistic theories so as to position Wittgenstein&rsquo / s conception of meaning with regard to the linguistic turn. As a result of this, it will be argued that Wittgensteinian meaning can be regarded as the very first step of post-structural understanding of meaning and discourse theory.

Thesis (M.A.)--Indiana University, 2010. / Title from screen (viewed on February 26, 2010). Department of Philosophy, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI). Advisor(s): Cornelis de Waal, André De Tienne, Nathan R. Houser. Includes vitae. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-114).

In Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference, Saul Kripke posited two kinds of reference involved in every use of a designator—a semantic reference, to the object picked out by the meaning of the words used—and a speaker reference, to the object to which the speaker aimed to call attention by deploying the designator. Kripke tentatively defined the notion of the speaker’s referent as the object that (i) the speaker wishes to call attention to, on a given occasion, and (ii) that he believes fulfills the conditions for being the description’s semantic referent. Although offered as a definition, this account is best interpreted as a tentative statement of the normal success conditions of speaker reference. As such, it raises the question of how special a role semantic reference plays in successful speaker reference. This report addresses that question by evaluating Kripke’s tentative account in the light of an extended series of examples in which definite descriptions are used to speaker refer to objects other than the objects to which the descriptions uniquely semantically refer. The report concludes that words’ semantic characteristics are only one of several forms of evidence that audiences regularly rely on to discern what object a speaker intends to call attention to by a particular act of reference. / text