My dissertation, titled Hanging-Together: Kant, Goethe, and the Theory of Aesthetic Modernism, observes that many of the composers, artists, and writers working in the early twentieth century developed theories of aesthetic coherence (Zusammenhang) that contradict the canonical interpretation of the period in terms of discontinuity and fragmentation. I show that the modernists drew on Goethe’s morphology in order to conceive of the inner coherence of the work of art as neither an aggregate (in which the parts precede the whole), nor as a system (in which an idea of the whole precedes its parts), but as a morphological nexus of formal variations. My thesis is that aesthetic modernism negates the ‘outer coherence’ of the work of art in order to reveal its ‘inner coherence,’ and that this morphological concept of inner coherence does not entail the totalizing ideal maintained by the poetic and aesthetic tradition from Aristotle to Kant. I develop this argument over the course of five chapters: the first examines Kant’s concept of systematic unity; the second focuses on Goethe’s critical response to Kant’s philosophy of nature; while the last three trace Goethe’s morphology through the theoretical reflections of a modernist composer, painter, and writer—Arnold Schönberg, Wassily Kandinsky, and Alfred Döblin. What emerges is a theory of aesthetic modernism that takes into account the historical specificity of the period without reducing its significance to the ‘break’ it supposedly effects with tradition.

Chan Chun Hang Henry. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 129-138). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Notes on the sources of the works of Immanuel Kant and keys to abbreviations --- p.i / Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter CHAPTER ONE: --- The Supersensible in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason / Chapter I. --- Introduction --- p.8 / Chapter II. --- "Brief Survey to the Scholarships on the ""Dialectic""" --- p.11 / Chapter III. --- The Supersensible in the first Critique: A Problematic / Emergence of the Transcendental Ideas --- p.16 / Bound determination and Reason --- p.17 / Antinomy and the Supersensible Totality --- p.24 / Concluding remarks --- p.34 / Chapter IV. --- The Supersensible in the second Critique: Reality of Freedom as Practical Reason --- p.36 / """Keystone “ of the critical system" --- p.37 / Pure practical reason and freedom --- p.39 / Chapter V. --- Tension between the Two Critiques --- p.44 / Chapter VI. --- Conclusion to the Chapter --- p.48 / Chapter CHAPTER TWO: --- A Transition from Nature to Freedom and the Power of Judgement / Chapter I. --- Introduction: From Urtheil to Urtheilskraft --- p.50 / Chapter II. --- Experience as a System and the Urtheilskraft --- p.55 / Chapter III. --- System of Philosophy and the Urtheilskraft --- p.59 / Chapter IV. --- Aesthetic Judgement as Reflective Power of Judgement --- p.64 / Chapter V. --- The Moments of Taste --- p.67 / First Moment: Taste as disinterested --- p.67 / Second Moment: Taste as universal --- p.69 / Third Moment: Taste as purposiveness without purpose --- p.71 / Fourth Moment: Taste as necessary liking --- p.72 / Chapter VI. --- "Imagination, Harmony, and the Deduction of Aesthetic Judgement" --- p.74 / Imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason --- p.76 / Deduction of taste --- p.81 / Chapter VII. --- Concluding Remarks to the Chapter --- p.85 / Chapter CHAPTER THREE: --- Reflective Judgement and the Supersensible Substrate / Chapter I. --- Introduction --- p.86 / Chapter II. --- Analogy and Teleological Judgement --- p.88 / Analogy as reflective judgement --- p.89 / Teleological Judgement: Between mechanism and purposiveness --- p.92 / Chapter III. --- Intuitive Understanding and the Supersensible Substrate of Reality --- p.97 / The peculiarity of human cognitive power --- p.99 / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR: --- Problems and Legacy of Kant's Concepts of Reflective Judgement and Supersensible Substrate / Chapter I. --- Introduction: Recapitulation of the Systematic Problem of Kant's Philosophy --- p.108 / Chapter II. --- The Supersensible Substrate as seen through Reflective Power of Judgement --- p.113 / Chapter III. --- An Indeterminate Ground of Critical Philosophy --- p.116 / Indeterminate ground of philosophy; or the destination of human freedom? --- p.120 / Chapter IV. --- Concluding Remarks --- p.125 / Conclusion --- p.126 / Bibliography --- p.129

Rousseau and Kant were philosophers of freedom. Both believed freedom was the essence of humanity, and both believed that "freedom is self-legislation." This thesis examines what they understood to be self-legislation. According to Rousseau natural freedom was lost with the establishment of society. Society is an "unnatural" order and the true basis of society is simply convention. Man is free only if he is subject to laws of his own making, or at least to those laws to which he has consented. The ideal state, according to Rousseau, is the republic based on laws that have been created and adopted by each members of the community. It is in this sense of freedom, for Rousseau, is self-legislation. Kant believed the important issue was demonstrating the metaphysical possibility of freedom, not the reconstruction of society. Kant argued that freedom could be demonstrated, and morality reaffirmed, by focusing on the 11 ought" of reason. The 11 ought 11 transcends the physical world and was a pure law of reason. It is not subject to the physical laws of causality. Man has the ability to act according to this law of reason. Man is transcending the physical realm, and the physical laws of nature, whenever he makes a moral decision based on what he 11 ought 11 to do, or whenever he puts duty before his physical desire. This, Kant argues, is self-legislation, and only here may man hope to be free.

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía

Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales / El presente ensayo realizará en un análisis de los aspectos relevantes de la obra de Immanuel Kant para aproximarse al positivismo durante el siglo XX, entendiendo que el intento kantiano de depurar el trabajo científico al intentar establecer los límites del conocimiento humano y modelos formales para una ética universal significó una metodología rigurosa en forma temprana en términos históricos, comprendiendo así la extensión de la obra del filósofo en el trabajo de autores fundamentales para el desarrollo intelectual de la etapa señalada en el marco de las ciencias sociales y en particular del derecho, para posteriormente aproximarse, desde la perspectiva kantiana comentada, tanto a la propuesta de Max Weber, quien elaboró una metodología para la investigación de los fenómenos propios de las ciencias sociales, para el desarrollo efectivamente científico de estas y comprendiendo estos avances como fundamentales para tal disciplina en el contexto al cual pertenece, como también a la Teoría Pura del Derecho de Hans Kelsen, la cual comparte la finalidad pretendida por Weber pero respecto de la comprensión de aquello que es propiamente jurídico en forma depurada de otras disciplinas y teniendo un éxito bastante amplio en el debate jurídico. Finalmente, desde la teoría del reconocimiento extraída a partir de los escritos de Jena realizados por G. W. F. Hegel, se criticará la posición adoptada por Kant, extendiendo dicho ejercicio al trabajo de los autores influidos por el filósofo antes señalados, analizando la posibilidad de existencia de un método diverso al sostenido por Weber y Kelsen, tanto en las ciencias sociales como en el derecho, desde una comprensión integral de la realidad empírica y además desde la eticidad como totalidad respecto de la relación entre los fenómenos estudiados por estas ciencias y los seres humanos, particularmente como alternativa a los esfuerzos más influidos por la filosofía pura.

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We live in an age of public accountability. For university-based business schools, housed within institutions with responsibilities for fostering public wellbeing, public accountability represents major challenges. The specific challenge of this dissertation is interpreting that accountability in moral, as opposed to legal or bureaucratic terms. Much of the academic attention to public accountability has focused on the legal aspects of compliance and regulation. The systemic nature of the educative-formative problem of moral accountability argued herein is especially evident inside postgraduate management education. I argue that nascent ideas of moral accountability foreground a systemic and inescapable challenge to the legitimacy of the now ubiquitous Masters of Business Administration (MBA) within university based management education. Illustrating the formative-educative problem via a case study at an Australian university and drawing on a critical review of the management studies literature I argue that current approaches to meeting those public responsibilities are at risk of being marginal at best. This is a view increasingly recognised by those within the management studies field already committed to redressing amoral management theory and practice. Efforts to professionalise management by bringing management studies inside universities have long been abandoned in favour of following market logic - a predominantly financially driven logic that is formatively amoral - thus exposing universities' moral legitimacy to rising public skepticism, if not acute and justifiable concern. Beyond the professionalisation efforts and the compliance mentality of corporate governance and against the commonplace smorgasbord approach to business ethics (foreclosing engagement with larger and relevant political, ethical and philosophical dimensions) I argue for cultivating a specific capability for management graduates - one area that will yield considerable philosophical scope and pedagogical options while meeting the university's public responsibility. I make a case for cultivating reflective judgment on matters of moral accountability {and specifically at the individual level} as a defining capability in management studies - a capability that is worthy of public trust in universities. To that end I argue for a Kantian approach to cultivating reflective moral accountability. The scope of this approach is global, the mode is action-guiding principles under public scrutiny, where reverence for individual human dignity is at its base: a civic or enlightened accountability, oriented to earning and warranting public trust, by individuals and through institutions. Kantian hope in a cosmopolitan ethical commonwealth sustains practical-idealist commitment to cultivating this capability. This Kantian approach is shaped by Kant's grossly under-recognised moral anthropology: a composite of a modest metaphysical framework of justice intersecting with his almost completely ignored philosophy of experience / anthropology. The pedagogical approach developed here is based on Kant's moral anthropology and notion of maturity. It is oriented to deeply experiential organic learning as university-based preparation for reflective moral judgment in pressured, complex situations of uncertainty. The aim here is fostering ideas on approaching what is problematic not to develop a comprehensive theory of moral accountability in the MBA. Taken together this Kantian response sees paideia as central to the public role of university education, and as such represents a radical challenge to seemingly unassailable assumptions of authority in management theory and practice. I follow a phronesis approach in this research, a perspective on knowledge that views the social sciences as categorically different from the natural sciences, calling less for universal laws and more for knowledge drawing on wisdom and moral judgment derived through extensive experience. Flyvbjerg's phronetic approach to the social sciences guides the case study, influences the selection of perspectives in both the literature review and the Kantian considerations. I approach this educative-formative problem out of liberal-humanist, social-contract traditions.

We live in an age of public accountability. For university-based business schools, housed within institutions with responsibilities for fostering public wellbeing, public accountability represents major challenges. The specific challenge of this dissertation is interpreting that accountability in moral, as opposed to legal or bureaucratic terms. Much of the academic attention to public accountability has focused on the legal aspects of compliance and regulation. The systemic nature of the educative-formative problem of moral accountability argued herein is especially evident inside postgraduate management education. I argue that nascent ideas of moral accountability foreground a systemic and inescapable challenge to the legitimacy of the now ubiquitous Masters of Business Administration (MBA) within university based management education. Illustrating the formative-educative problem via a case study at an Australian university and drawing on a critical review of the management studies literature I argue that current approaches to meeting those public responsibilities are at risk of being marginal at best. This is a view increasingly recognised by those within the management studies field already committed to redressing amoral management theory and practice. Efforts to professionalise management by bringing management studies inside universities have long been abandoned in favour of following market logic - a predominantly financially driven logic that is formatively amoral - thus exposing universities' moral legitimacy to rising public skepticism, if not acute and justifiable concern. Beyond the professionalisation efforts and the compliance mentality of corporate governance and against the commonplace smorgasbord approach to business ethics (foreclosing engagement with larger and relevant political, ethical and philosophical dimensions) I argue for cultivating a specific capability for management graduates - one area that will yield considerable philosophical scope and pedagogical options while meeting the university's public responsibility. I make a case for cultivating reflective judgment on matters of moral accountability {and specifically at the individual level} as a defining capability in management studies - a capability that is worthy of public trust in universities. To that end I argue for a Kantian approach to cultivating reflective moral accountability. The scope of this approach is global, the mode is action-guiding principles under public scrutiny, where reverence for individual human dignity is at its base: a civic or enlightened accountability, oriented to earning and warranting public trust, by individuals and through institutions. Kantian hope in a cosmopolitan ethical commonwealth sustains practical-idealist commitment to cultivating this capability. This Kantian approach is shaped by Kant's grossly under-recognised moral anthropology: a composite of a modest metaphysical framework of justice intersecting with his almost completely ignored philosophy of experience / anthropology. The pedagogical approach developed here is based on Kant's moral anthropology and notion of maturity. It is oriented to deeply experiential organic learning as university-based preparation for reflective moral judgment in pressured, complex situations of uncertainty. The aim here is fostering ideas on approaching what is problematic not to develop a comprehensive theory of moral accountability in the MBA. Taken together this Kantian response sees paideia as central to the public role of university education, and as such represents a radical challenge to seemingly unassailable assumptions of authority in management theory and practice. I follow a phronesis approach in this research, a perspective on knowledge that views the social sciences as categorically different from the natural sciences, calling less for universal laws and more for knowledge drawing on wisdom and moral judgment derived through extensive experience. Flyvbjerg's phronetic approach to the social sciences guides the case study, influences the selection of perspectives in both the literature review and the Kantian considerations. I approach this educative-formative problem out of liberal-humanist, social-contract traditions.

At present two options are available that can lead to a determination of how moral education may be possible in practice. One takes its formulation from the work of Kant, the other stands in the tradition of Aristotle. Kant emphasizes the importance of duty mid obligation. In contrast, Aristotle attempts to construct a theory of moral life on the practice of virtue. Both theoretical perspectives have debilitating deficiencies. A spectrum of moral experience is presented that represents the wood opportunities available to the agent in life experience. The polarities of this spectrum pull most naturally towards either an Aristotelian or a Kantian perspective, although neither perspective is capable of addressing the requirements of the entire spectrum. The Aristotelian perspective is associated with the life of non-dilemmic virtue, undertaken in community, where relational realities and the contextual contingency of moral life is emphasized. The Kantian perspective is associated with dilemmic situations to be resolved by a process of moral The central problem of the dissertation acknowledges the antithetical nature of these perspectives, and the dichotomous nature of their philosophical roots. The central task of the dissertation is the establishment of a dialogic process that has the potential to reconcile this dichotomy, and to allow these perspectives to mutually inform and reinforce each other. This task is accomplished by providing responses to a central research question that is accompanied by a series of subsidiary questions. From an analysis of various theories of moral education, Kohlberg's theory of structural developmentalism is chosen for reformulation as it is informed by the exploration of the requirements of the dialogic process. To address the research questions, additional Spectra are offered to provide an epistemological and ontological basis for a five-step dialogic treatment that combines, through a developmental climacteric, the Magistral dialogue of Vvgotsky Socratic dialogue of Bakhtin. The five-step model is comprised of a recursive loop through the four steps of the Magistral dialogue prior to an entrance into a Socratic dialogue. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)