La tesis consta de dos partes principales, dedicadas a Aristóteles y a Kant respectivamente. El problema desde el cual se ha interrogado la obra de estos pensadores es el problema del estatuto de la imagen. La hipótesis de base que orienta la indagación es que en conexión con la imagen y la imaginación es posible reconocer las huellas de la emergencia de lo ideal en el discurso filosófico. La tesis pone en relación esta cuestión con la discusión del límite entre formas conceptuales y no conceptuales (figurales) de significación. En efecto, la distinción misma entre formas conceptuales y no conceptuales de significación involucra procedimientos figurales. Lo que intentamos sentar es que esta última información tiene su fundamento en la necesidad de incorporar componentes imaginarios en cualquier explicación del sentido en el que es posible hablar de conceptos. El examen de la obra de Aristóteles y de Kanti tiene por objeto aportar evidencia indirecta a esta última tesis, mostrando cómo, en el caso de estos dos exponentes paradigmáticos de una filosofía rigurosamente conceptual, la discusión de la imagen no sólo se presenta justo allí donde se trata del límite a partir del cual es posible hablar de conceptos, esto es, allí donde estas filosofías intentan delimitar aquella facultad (dynamis, kraft) cuyo poder es la contemplación o la formación de conceptos -dejando situada así a la imaginación entre la sensibilidad y el entendimiento-, sino que la imagen es, sutilmente, sometida a procedimientos figurales para permitir el encuentro de ambas facultades.

This thesis is essentially concerned with analyzing William Gilpin's criticism and relating it to the critical ideas of his age. Gilpin was a man of taste who lived during a significant transitional period in the history of criticism. His criticism is rooted in the classical tradition and centered around classical principles. But many of his ideas, values, and tastes are radically different in emphasis from, or directly opposite to, those of classical theory. Gilpin, in his criticism of literature, subscribes to the theories that literature imitates nature, that it imitates the ideal rather than the actual, and that it must appeal to the reason. He stresses the objective aspects of literature and asserts the importance of such classical principles as decorum, unity, simplicity and clarity. But his interest in the sensational aspects of literary pictorialism, his non-humanistic concern with landscape poetry, his interest in intuitionalism, his defence of sublime obscurity, his occasional delight in emotions for their own sake, all reveal a turning away from classical values. Gilpin makes little effort to reconcile the inconsistencies and self-contradictions in his literary criticism. In his criticism of painting Gilpin is strongly influenced by the classicism of contemporary British painting. Again he advocates the imitation of ideal reality. He believes that the image is all important in painting and that it must be a generalized representation of the ideal central form of an object. He also believes that painting must appeal to the reason, and he usually treats the perceptive imagination as an essentially rational faculty. Occasionally he acknowledges painting's ability to cause emotional transport. Of the painter Gilpin requires knowledge of objects and of the rules of art. The painter's knowledge and technical skill are, however, useful only if they are directed by genius. Gilpin judges paintings by the principles established by the Roman school—design (decorum), composition, harmony, simplicity, exactness—and discusses these principles in an essentially classical manner. But he uses them to praise the Venetians, the Baroque masters, and landscape paintings. His criticism of painting has many inherent contradictions but is superficially fairly coherent. Sculpture is treated only briefly by Gilpin. He believes in idealization and praises simplicity, grace, proportion. But he opposes the rigid neo-classicists of his day by praising animation and even recommending strong action and emotion in sculptured figures and groups. Gilpin has high praise for the classical tradition in English architecture, especially for Burlington-Palladianism. And his criteria of architectural judgement— symmetry, proportion, simplicity—are essentially those of the classical tradition. He is concerned with formal rather than associative architectural values, and he is insistent that architecture be intellectually satisfactory and not only visually effective. He defends the Gothic, especially late Gothic, by attempting to prove its conformity to classical principles. The defence is not very successful, but his appreciation of the Gothic is obviously sincere. He discusses in terms of picturesque or associative values only such minor architectural forms as cottages and ruins. Gilpin defends and evaluates the natural garden in terms of essentially classical principles. The garden is nature methodized, and the method is selection and arrangement according to the rules of art. But Gilpin's acceptance of irregularity, his concern for purely visual values, and his praise of wild nature are in conflict with his basic critical attitude to the garden. Gilpin, in his criticism of the fine arts, attempts to reconcile various conflicting critical attitudes and principles. He is not always successful, but his attempt is an interesting example of late-eighteenth-century eclectic criticism. / Arts, Faculty of / English, Department of / Graduate

Orientador: Zeljko Loparic / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-31T22:15:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Perez_DanielOmar_D.pdf: 23253273 bytes, checksum: 25b8d364a554274e1a0272e7ed27b736 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2002 / Resumo: Abordaremos a tarefa da filosofia kantiana a partir da pergunta pela possibilidade das proposições sintéticas. Deste modo, indagaremos as operações que permitem a significação dos conceitos usados na formulação de proposições. Isto é, apresentaremos os processos de doação de significação outorgada aos conceitos que constituem os diferentes tipos de proposições possibilitando seu sentido e a formulação adequada de problemas. Seguindo esse fio condutor, estaremos em condições de mostrar que a tarefa kantiana torna-se uma atividade desarticuladora / doadora de sentido, realizando o trabalho crítico contra a metafísica tradicional e elaborando campos semânticos para os diferentes tipos de proposições. Para verificar essa labor precisamos reconstruir os problemas do significado dos conceitos que Kant levanta desde os textos pré-críticos e que só poderá explicar sistematicamente nos textos críticos. Isto nos levará a apresentar dois aspectos dessa atividade como subproblemas: 1 ¿ a preocupação kantiana pelo sistema, isto é, o que significa sistema no texto kantiano no seu duplo aspecto, por um lado, como se desenvolve a questão do sistema da metafísica e, por outro lado, como a crítica é uma atividade sistemática. 2 ¿ a questão de como se estabelece aquilo que existe em relação com os conceitos de cada tipo de proposição, isto é, do que significa existir, não apenas como posição, mas como efetividade dos conceitos ou aquilo ao qual o conceito se refere... Observação: O resumo, na íntegra, poderá ser visualizado no texto completo da tese digital / Abstract: We will broach the task of Kant¿s philosophy from the question of the possibility of the synthetics propositions. In this way, we¿ll wonder about the operations that allow the meaning of the concepts used in the formulation of the propositions. In others words, we¿ll show the procedure of meaning¿s donation that had been given to the concepts that constitute all differents kinds of propositions making possible their meaning and appropriate formulation of problems. It following this way, we will be able to show that the Kant¿s task turn into a dislocate / donor activity of meaning, it making the critical work against the traditional metaphysical and preparing semantics spots to differents kinds of propositions. To check this work out we will need to rebuild the problems of the concept¿s meaning that Kant work out since the precriticals texts and just can be systematically clear in the critical texts. It will make us to show two aspects of this activity as subproblems: 1. the Kant¿s concerns about the system, that is, the meaning of system in the Kant¿s texts in your double aspect, for one side, how is developing the question of metaphysical system and, for other side, how the critic is a systematic activity. 2. the question of how is establishing that wich exists in relation of the concepts in each kind of proposition, that is, what means to exist, not just like position, but like effectiveness of the concepts or that wich the concepts is about... Note: The complete abstract is available with the full electronic digital thesis or dissertations / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: Roberto Romano da Silva / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-23T19:09:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Santos_EdmilsonMenezes_D.pdf: 11036601 bytes, checksum: 97355afa3697b9ac87a73d0ad61cc1d8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1998 / Resumo: Não informado / Abstract: Not informed. / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: Zeljko Loparic / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-19T14:54:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tomaz_VeraLuciaBlum_M.pdf: 33974284 bytes, checksum: e6896c1d8db75ab1e5ab5f88f9d33796 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1994 / Resumo: Esta tese focaliza o estatuto cognitivo dos conceitos metapsicológicos, especialmente os conceitos energéticos, segundo a teoria kantiana das idéias. O propósito geral deste trabalho é abordar a questão da justificação dos conceitos metapsicológicos através da concepção heurística de pesquisa empírica. Procura-se mostrar, através dos textos freudianos, que a interpretação da metapsicologia como teoria explicativo-causal parece ser equivocada. O reconhecimento de Freud da incognoscibilidade do inconsciente implica que as suas representações metapsicológicas não podem ser objetivamente justificadas. Ao afirmar que as hipóteses relativas à estrutura e funcionamento do aparelho psíquico (as representações metapsicológicas) são aproximações por meio de analogias da realidade incognoscível, Freud se desobriga de qualquer compromisso ontológico com as entidades que postula. Por conseguinte, o mero uso da terminologia fisicalista não implica, em Freud, na afirmação da existência absoluta dos referentes lingüísticos. Os conceitos metapsicológicos devem, portanto, ser considerados apenas convenções necessárias. Procura-se mostrar como os conceitos metapsicológicos adquirem conteúdo intuitivo por meio do procedimento do esquematismo analógico. Procura-se mostrar também que por meio de regras mentalistas de reflexão, convenciona-se o significado específico dos símbolos energéticos empregados na teoria para representar os processos psíquicos inconscientes, incognoscíveis / Abstract: Not informed. / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía

La ética deontológica de Kant ha despertado una gran cantidad de interpretaciones, especulaciones y problemáticas que se desarrollan hasta nuestros días. El análisis de solo una de las categorías morales usadas por Kant requiere de una extensa bibliografía. Quizá este dramatismo se ve reducido cuando tratamos sobre una categoría poco acotada sobre la ética kantiana. La felicidad –categoría problemática dentro de muchas corrientes y reflexiones éticas– se suele ver como un término desdeñado y poco observado por Immanuel Kant. Sin embargo, algunas interpretaciones que se hacen sobre el papel de la felicidad kantiana han develado una problemática que parecía inexistente. Pues no hay consenso en torno a la esencia y el lugar de la felicidad kantiana debido a las distintas nociones que Kant ofrece de la misma. Ante tal problemática, esta investigación se propone entender el papel de la felicidad kantiana a través una interpretación de los distintos matices que Kant ha mostrado a lo largo de su obra. Además, busca comprender los errores cometidos por algunas de las interpretaciones que se han hecho sobre esta categoría kantiana. Finalmente, se formula un juicio acerca de cómo las reflexiones morales de Kant pueden aportar algo a nuestro tiempo y circunstancia. / Tesis

This dissertation defends a Kantianism that espouses an ethics of principles while emphasizing the role of revising moral principles. It claims that the resources to account for moral revision can be found in Kant’s theory of reflective judgment, the cognitive power required for forming new concepts or principles on the basis of experience. Reflective judgment, on the interpretation elaborated here, involves both the incorporation of new moral particulars into a standing moral conceptual repertoire and the revision of moral universals on the basis of such alterations. The alteration of moral universals and accommodation of recalcitrant particulars are among the operations of what is termed the ‘reflective dimension’ of practical reasoning for Kant, alongside the moral dimension of application of a priori moral principle (most notably, the categorical imperative) typically taken to exhaust Kant’s moral philosophy. Incorporating a reflective dimension into practical deliberation calls for a broader virtue, namely the taking up of a critical stance to one’s principles in general, as well as the cultivation of inventiveness towards the formation of new principles or revision of preexisting ones. Autonomy presupposes heautonomy: the practical requirement of universalizing a given maxim presupposes, first, that one create this maxim, with a critical awareness of its perpetual revisability.

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