Art is the final product of the system and the ground can gain a complete intuition of itself through works of art. Art therefore becomes the final destination of the system. Schelling thinks that only the works of art can completely unify thinking and reality, the infinite and the finite, the universal and the particular, the subjective and the objective, give equal respect to each opposing pole, completely reflect the original identity and fulfill the primordial demand. What Schelling in his philosophy of art reveals is that philosophizing or reflection is not sufficient to solve the ultimate questions asked by itself. Thinking or rationality is not the foundation of world and reality. In fact, thinking and reality are equally the products of the ground. Hence, it is unreasonable and one-sided to make any one product the dominant factor and even the first principle of the unification and the whole system. / Before Schelling, Kant has already placed aesthetics in a system of philosophy, but he is not genuinely concerned about the question of art. Schelling is the first philosopher who places art within a system of philosophy and endows art a paramount role in the system. For Schelling, at least in his early thinking, art is not only a necessary question in philosophy, but is also its very origin and final destination. This position is quite extraordinary to for philosopher. Why does Schelling, as a philosopher, make such claim? How can art become the origin and destination of philosophy and sciences? What is the true essence and significance of art? These are the major questions of this dissertation. Schelling's discourse on art in his System of Transcendental Idealism and Philosophy of Art will be explicated. In order to make Schelling's contention more apparent, the discussions on art in Hegel and the early German romantic such as Friedrich Schlegel, Holderlin and Novalis will be included as well. / From the discourse on art, we see that Schelling, who is known as a German idealist, pays much attention to the question of existence and gives much respect to reality as such. Hence, Schelling's intellectual identity is quite ambivalent and should be re-examined. The second major task of this dissertation is to deliberate whether Schelling is an early German romantic or a German idealist, and whether there is a transition from romanticism to idealism in Schelling's philosophy. In order to answer these questions, the general positions of early German romanticism and German idealism should be first articulated. Then, the consistency of Schelling's thought will be verified. This dissertation argues for consistency of Schelling's system throughout his life and for Schelling's reconciliation of romanticism and idealism. Instead of being a preparation to Hegel's system, this dissertation will show that Schelling's fundamental concern and position are incompatible with that of Hegel. Despite his affinity with the romantic thought, the position of the demand of the ground and the final anticipation of future development are different in Schelling and the romantics. / The ground is for Schelling nothing else but the original One and the primordial demand. In order to explain and attain the unity of everything, the ground is posited as original identity; in order to explain the origin of existence and thinking, the ground is posited as a primordial demand. This demand is the demand for intuiting or knowing itself. Since the first principle is a demand, the system therefore becomes a dynamic and dialectical one. The whole system of Schelling is thus constructed according to two basic activities originated from the primordial demand: separation and unification. / Unlike contemporary aesthetic discussions, Schelling's discourse on art is never detached from the context of philosophy or metaphysics. For Schelling, what philosophy or metaphysics ultimately questions about are the unity and the ground of existence and thinking. Following Kant, Schelling, like his romantic and idealistic contemporaries, recognizes that the problem of unity is the fundamental question of philosophy. But diverging from Kant, Schelling thinks that there is no way to attain and explain the unity unless the ground is first investigated. / Wong, Wing Yuen. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-01, Section: A, page: 0210. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 309-322). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese.

Tesis para optar al grado de Magister en Filosofía mención en Axiología y Filosofía Política. / El problema que intentaré esbozar en las páginas que siguen intenta una reflexión sobre la noción de comunidad, como mundo ético, es decir mundo en el que se dan las relaciones intersubjetivas. Problema presente en las diferentes reflexiones actuales y que conlleva a pensar por el sentido bajo el cual estamos pensando eso común sea como reunión, como esencia común (bien) o como un no lugar entre los hombres que entrega la posibilidad de considerar aquello que ponemos en común (don) comunidad de lo no común (ficción). Con ello me interesa ir por otra vía que aquella que distingue la esfera intersubjetiva como el problema político planteado por las posturas comunitaristas y liberales. El problema que abordo en esta tesis se da desde una perspectiva que podríamos llamar “trascendental”, es decir pensar la comunidad en base a un cierto principio articulador.

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía

Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía / La presente tesis mostrará las implicaciones ontológicas que la concepción del tiempo formulada en la filosofía de la libertad de Friedrich Schelling trae en relación a la consideración del hombre y su relación con la totalidad. La propuesta se defenderá que la perspectiva expuesta en Las edades del mundo acerca de un sistema temporal funciona como un entramado que se manifiesta en distintos niveles, siendo la linealidad del tiempo solo una forma humana y limitada de comprensión. Para ello, el estudio contemplará dos perspectivas. En un primer momento se estudiará y analizará la obra mencionada para entender a cabalidad sus postulados y determinar la importancia del concepto de tiempo allí expuesta. En una segunda parte se analizarán las consecuencias ontológicas que el entendimiento lineal del tiempo trae al hombre como el único de los seres que vive en la indeterminación y en el deseo de manifestarse como una voluntad propia, ajena al sistema universal.

xii, 259 p. Print copy also available for check out and consultation in the University of Oregon's library under the call number: B105.L45 A76 2008 / The question of freedom has been a present and constant concern since the inception of the occidental philosophical tradition. Yet after a certain point the manner in which this question is to be asked has been canonized and sedimented: do humans (subject) have the capacity (predicate) for free and spontaneous action? The third antinomy of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, I argue, demonstrates the necessary failure, the perpetual aporia, of continuing to discuss whether humans conceived of as subjects possess the predicate freedom. I argue that if we do not want to fall either into the Third Antinomy, we must steer away from thinking of freedom as a predicate of a subject and reconfigure it as an experience or a comportment. Following suggestions from Jean-Luc Nancy's The Inoperative Community, Being Singular Plural, and The Experience of Freedom, my dissertation argues that re-thinking of freedom as an experience simultaneously requires a re-thinking of identity, in terms of ecstasy, ek-stases, or ex-position, and accordingly a re-thinking of the activity of thinking itself. Nancy cites Schelling and Heidegger as the thinkers who have made an attempt to think about ecstasy seriously as a fundamental ontological fact about the constitution of things. This reconfiguration of the constitution of things as either parts of organic structures (Schelling) or beings in a world (Heidegger), demands that we recognize how our identities are perpetually being constituted in all of our acts of relating with the world. We are constituted and constituting by our engagement with the things that environ us, and this environing is active and alive. If this is accepted as an ontological fact, this requires that we reconsider what it would mean to think, as all of our engagements with the world would be creative-both of ourselves and of what it is that we encounter. This would also mean that the meaningfulness of all things is wildly contingent, in fact necessarily, so. Accordingly, I defend that freedom, as the experience of possibility through our awareness of this contingency due to the lack of an origin, emerges for us in the experience of thinking. / Adviser: Peter Warnek

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 5517.pdf: 2939809 bytes, checksum: 8eaa0095527bc6ab7198d67022872090 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-03-09 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / The aim of this work is to examine some of the psychic aspects of the process of acquisition of verbal language in the theory of Freud. In a psychoanalytical perspective, this process takes place in the individual itself as well as in culture as a whole. Accordingly we examine it in its different stages, up to the point when the individual has acquired the use of verbal language. Even then, traces can be located of the process that led to language as such in verbal wit, in works of art, and in psychoanalytic therapy as conceived by Freud. Special emphasis is given to the mutual dependence, stated by Freud, between the physiological and psychological processes involved in the formation of language. Given that for Freud language arises in the individual at a moment when consciousness and the unconscious are yet to be completely separated from each other, it is only natural that he conceives the mechanisms that operate in grammatical languages to be absent and the symbols of expression to signify nothing beside themselves. Freudian conception of primeval language can then be said to be symbolic in the strong, philosophical acceptation of the term, as defined by Schelling: in this transitory form of language, words are not signs of conceptions nor do they point to external things, they are rather taken as things in themselves, complete and independent from all external reference. For Freud, their use prepares the individual for the advent of indirect, allegorical use of words that is typical of languages in their plain, grammatical form. But symbolic language does not disappear completely and without trace from the psyche, once verbal language has settled. Verbal wit, works of art, psychoanalytical therapy are instances of the permanence of the symbolic use of words in the realm of culture, and are as such to be taken as means of access to the unconscious. / Este trabalho tem como propósito apresentar alguns aspectos psíquicos do processo de aquisição da linguagem verbal na teoria freudiana. Abordamos esse processo no indivíduo e na cultura, bem como a retomada de aspectos psíquicos envolvidos nessa aquisição, quando a linguagem verbal já se consolidou, por meio do chiste, da obra de arte e da clínica psicanalítica freudiana. Ao tomarmos os processos psíquicos como encadeados e em situação de dependência dos processos fisiológicos, temos que a aquisição da linguagem faz parte de um processo de tradução dos estímulos incidentes no sistema nervoso, até a representação psíquica desses estímulos sob a forma de ligação entre representações-coisa e representações-palavra. Na primeira tópica da teoria freudiana, o aparelho psíquico é composto por diferentes sistemas e o processo de aquisição da linguagem ocorre justamente no período em que consciência e inconsciente ainda não se encontram completamente diferenciados. Indicamos esse período como sendo um período simbólico conforme a concepção schellinguianna de símbolo. Desse modo a linguagem erigida nesse período é chamada por nós de linguagem simbólica. Uma linguagem transitória em que palavras são tomadas como coisas e que abrange as características tanto consciência quanto do inconsciente, até que sobrevenha a ligação entre representações-coisa e representações-palavra e haja uma total separação entre os sistemas. O chiste, a obra de arte e a sessão analítica seriam situações em que esse período é retomado por haver, nessas situações, uma suspensão da barreira da censura e, como que, um mergulho da consciência no inconsciente.

This dissertation carries out a study of the American pragmaticist C.S. Peirce and constructively applies his thought to a religious understanding of nature called "ecstatic naturalism," a philosophy developed by Robert S. Corrington that conjoins American pragmatism and Continental phenomenology. In this project I explore how the modality of possibility functions in the disclosure of a "divine life," that is, the life of a developing cosmos taken to be sacred in its continual processes of evolutionary growth and transformation. Possibility, found in Peirce's category of experience known as "Firstness," provides organisms with the ontological conditions required for any immediately felt qualitative experience--experience that is the site for potential religious experience. "Religious" experience here means the ecstatic contraposition of finite being before "infinite" being. I consider infinite being first as an honorific sheer availability of being (potential or possible being: becoming) and then in terms of how inquiry may reveal nature to be an encompassing infinite that locates and situates finite organisms. It is my thesis that, as it is found in Peirce's category of Firstness, possibility serves as a ground for the disclosure of this infinite, "the divine life," by enabling its presence to come forward as a feeling of the sacred-- a feeling found when inquirers muse over nature and establish beliefs about the universe in which they are situated. To the end of making these claims more concrete, I draw on figures such as the German existential phenomenologist Martin Heidegger, and the German idealist F.W.J. Schelling so as to identify how possibility may serve as a ground (Abgrund) for divine disclosure, and to identify understandings of existence that take nature to be a sacred life of φύσις (phusis), dynamically revealing and concealing before finite and situated organisms.

Submitted by Cássio da Cruz Nogueira (cassionogueirakk@gmail.com) on 2017-01-04T11:53:18Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_ArteIntuicaoIntelectual.pdf: 1028120 bytes, checksum: 2ee337d219d0e8a80299e5b02e8807c4 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Edisangela Bastos (edisangela@ufpa.br) on 2017-01-09T12:32:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_ArteIntuicaoIntelectual.pdf: 1028120 bytes, checksum: 2ee337d219d0e8a80299e5b02e8807c4 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-01-09T12:32:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertacao_ArteIntuicaoIntelectual.pdf: 1028120 bytes, checksum: 2ee337d219d0e8a80299e5b02e8807c4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-11-03 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O objetivo desta dissertação é investigar a relação entre arte e intuição intelectual em Schelling a partir da perspectiva das preleções da Filosofia da arte e do Sistema do idealismo transcendental. Dentro do conceito de filosofia da arte como construção do absoluto na forma da arte, pretendemos analisar a importância da absolutez da exposição simbólica para a objetividade das Ideias da filosofia. Assim, pelo lado desse modo absoluto de exposição, a arte pode realmente exibir os arquétipos da filosofia em um objeto concreto. Pelo lado da intuição, como nos mostra a sexta parte do Sistema do idealismo transcendental, isso significa que a produção da intuição estética é a única forma de objetivação da intuição intelectual, a qual permanece dubitável nas esferas teórica e prática por não haver objetos na experiência que correspondam ao objeto inteligível dessa intuição nesses dois âmbitos. / The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the relationship between art and intellectual intuition in Schelling from the perspective of his lectures on Philosophy of art and of the System of transcendental idealism. By the conception of philosophy of art as a construction of the absolute in the form of art, we intend to analyze the importance of the absoluteness of the symbolic exposition for the objectivity of the Ideias of Philosophy. Thus, on the side of this absolute way of exposing, art can really exhibit the archetypes of Philosophy through a concrete objet. On the side of intuition, as the sixth part of the System of transcendental idealism shows, this means that the production of the aesthetic intuition is the only form of objectification for the intellectual intuition, which remains doubtful in the theoretical and practical fields. For, there are no empirical objects that correspond to the intelligible objet of this intuition in these two fields.

viii, 189 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / The question of the present study concerns the relationship between language and nature as it has been taken up in the history of Western philosophy. The goal of this study is to show how language and nature are held together by thinking the transition between them, through the figure of silence. I will show this by drawing primarily on the work of Merleau-Ponty, who, as a phenomenologist expressly concerned with the senses, the body, and language, attempted to describe and understand the passage between language and nature in a manner that could maintain their ontological continuity. Silence was the hinge of this passage, in which language, in its emergence from the silence of nature, turns back to disclose nature as already expression. Merleau-Ponty's late interrogation into how philosophical language might both emerge from and return to silence turned on the example of Proust's literary language. This study will also draw on Proust's meta-novelistic awakening to his literary calling, as it is recounted near the end of Le Temps Retrouvé, which discusses explicitly how Proust's language makes a turn through silence in order to emerge as literature. This provides an example of the emergence which Merleau-Ponty describes. I will then make the case that Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy can be read as the thinking of being as nature, and that it begins to think how language roots human beings in nature as it blossoms out of nature's soil. I will show how Merleau-Ponty repeats a structure of thought traversed by Schelling in his essay on freedom, which will further show how philosophical attention to language discloses nature as a radical excess. Finally, I will discuss how the negotiation between language, nature, and silence, as it is practiced by Merleau-Ponty, Proust, and Schelling, is another turn in a long story of the human place in language and in nature, a story which is at least as old as the mythical thought of ancient Greece. / Committee in charge: Peter Warnek, Chairperson, Philosophy; Naomi Zack, Member, Philosophy; Ted Toadvine, Member, Philosophy; Jeffrey Librett, Outside Member, German and Scandinavian

LOPES, Adriana Alves de Lima. O conceito de natureza em Schelling: um estudo sobre os escritos de 1797-1799. 2007. 110f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2007. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-05T16:45:56Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2007-DIS-AALLOPES.pdf: 462263 bytes, checksum: edd45aa734ebfcbdf93b2d4f969d4155 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-05T18:23:51Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2007-DIS-AALLOPES.pdf: 462263 bytes, checksum: edd45aa734ebfcbdf93b2d4f969d4155 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-05T18:23:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2007-DIS-AALLOPES.pdf: 462263 bytes, checksum: edd45aa734ebfcbdf93b2d4f969d4155 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / Este trabalho visa analisar a concepção de natureza de Schelling a partir de seus escritos iniciais para mostrar que, à luz do jovem Schelling, a Filosofia da Natureza surge como um avanço da teoria de Fichte (que reduz a natureza ao Não-eu) numa dinamicidade da própria natureza. Mas, por outro lado, surge também como um resgate desta postura que assume um Eu absoluto e incondicionado como fundamento de todo saber racional. A partir desta relação originária entre Eu e Não-eu, Schelling elabora a idéia de uma natureza enquanto produtividade livre, orientada por uma atividade originária e incondicionada. Desse modo, sua Filosofia da Natureza surge como física especulativa, onde se faz necessário considerar não apenas os seus produtos, mas também sua produtividade; logo, há na natureza uma organização, de onde se deduz que tudo o que é comprovado na experiência é fruto de um princípio constitutivo da própria natureza, e não simplesmente por princípios regulativos (como pensara Kant). Portanto, para além de uma metafísica da natureza de Kant, Schelling a concebe como unidade objetiva de matéria e forma.