Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Nice. / Bibliogr. p. 206-218.

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Henri Gregoire poses a problem to all scholars who see the French Revolution as an anti-religious event. Most of his fellow 'red priests', those not-so-few who in 1789 asked for some kind of democracy and more rights for the 'damned of the earth', gradually abandoned either their faith or their patriotism. Gregoire, until his death in 1831, always proclaimed the compatibility of Christianity and republic. Not only is his position representative of that of many Catholics at the beginning of the Revolution, it also asks anew the important question of the link between religion and revolution, and gives it an unusual answer. As many philosophes did, Gregoire was speaking in terms of reason, of the Enlightenments, and of natural rights---but nevertheless believed Catholicism was the only good religion. If a good Christian is the best citizen possible, how can one fight for the recognition of the 'natural rights' of the Jews and the freedom of worship for all without being inconsistant?

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The following study is an attempt to understand the fundamental ethics of Emmanuel Levinas and the phenomenology of G. W. F. Hegel as philosophies of intersubjectivity. In this study we hope to make an important contribution to Levinas scholarship by historically locating Levinas' interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in the twentieth century French-Hegelian tradition. The historical location of Levinas' thought concerning Hegel is important because a French-Hegelian reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit is not a textually accurate portrayal of Hegel's thought. We will argue that a French-Hegelian reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit actually misinterprets the meaning of "teleological" time and "the end of history" in Hegel's text, and that it does so for expressly political purposes. We will argue that Levinas' French-Hegelian misinterpretation affects both his portrayal of Hegel's phenomenology and his own ethical phenomenology. Locating Levinas' Hegel in a French-Hegelian tradition is important for understanding his phenomenology because Levinas negatively situates his own ethical account of intersubjectivity against what he takes Hegel's phenomenology of intersubjectivity to consist in. As a consequence, Levinas goes to great lengths in Otherwise than Being to describe time as "diachronous" in direct contradistinction to what we will argue is a French-Hegelian misreading of "teleological" time in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit . After we establish a proper reading of Hegel's phenomenology of intersubjectivity, and we establish how Levinas misunderstands the Phenomenology of Spirit from a French-Hegelian perspective, we will be able to access the viable similarities that actually inhere between their purportedly "diametrically opposing" phenomenologies of intersubjectivity. These similarities will give us a logical point of contact between the two philosophers in terms of which we can normatively evaluate their respecti

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

El presente trabajo tiene como tema central el concepto de acción en la Filosofía del derecho de Hegel. Buscamos alcanzar dos objetivos. En primer lugar, intentamos presentar de manera articulada y analizada la teoría hegeliana de la acción subjetiva. En segundo lugar, buscamos complementar esta teoría mediante una corrección ética acerca de la actitud moral: sostenemos que el concepto de acción tiene que integrar como constitutiva una consideración subjetiva del bien universal y objetivo. Para llevar a cabo estas tareas, este trabajo está dividido en tres capítulos. En el primer capítulo, exponemos una visión sistemática del concepto de acción en la sección de la Moralidad de la Filosofía del derecho. Nos encargamos de presentar y analizar tesis estructurales para conectar unitariamente las dimensiones del complejo concepto de acción de Hegel. En el segundo capítulo, profundizamos en los derechos que constituyen progresivamente el concepto complejo de acción. Abordamos la diferencia entre la acción y el acto, la relación entre el propósito y la intención, entre la intención y el bienestar, y entre el bienestar y el bien (que corresponde a la actitud propiamente moral). Frente al problema de la conexión interna entre el concepto de acción y de bien, en el tercer capítulo, argumentamos, por un lado, que una comprensión del bien desde el punto de vista de la Moralidad conduce tanto a la imposibilidad de la instanciación del bien en el mundo como a la realización de acciones que son solo arbitrariamente buenas. Por otro lado, una re-comprensión del bien desde el punto de vista de la Eticidad conduce a la tesis de que la normatividad inmanente de las instituciones éticas corresponde a las determinaciones objetivas mediante las cuales el sujeto ético constituye su idea de bienestar subjetivo y a los parámetros de validez intersubjetiva que orientan el reconocimiento efectivo entre los miembros de la Eticidad. Con ello, logramos alcanzar los objetivos planteados. / Tesis

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Tesis para optar al grado de Magister Filosofía mención en Axiología y Filosofía Política. / El objetivo de esta investigación es explorar esa misma relación pero en el sentido opuesto. Esto es, desde el conocimiento a la política, intentando una visión del modo en que las categorías conceptuales, que han servido de fundamento a la reflexión filosófica sobre el conocimiento, han modelado la forma de comprender el fenómeno político.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:26:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2012-09-28Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:13:30Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 oliveira_cr_me_mar.pdf: 912883 bytes, checksum: b9c10f91b23054ffb3ada1e3ed112165 (MD5) / É possível perceber ao longo das principais obras de Hegel a presença de uma ética, desde os escritos da juventude cujo interesse se volta exclusivamente às temáticas religiosas até os escritos da maturidade, com preocupações com a coletividade. No entanto, como apresentaremos ao longo do texto, não se trata de uma ética normativa. Procuramos apresentar os momentos de amadurecimento do ethos, partindo da noção de religião popular, enquanto totalidade, tomando como modelo a denominada “bela” vida ética grega dos tempos de Tübingem, até o conceito de família como primeiro momento da eticidade apresentada na “Filosofia do Direito” (1821). Entre estes dois momentos, destacaremos a recepção hegeliana à filosofia moral kantiana em Berna, como também o conceito de destino e amor, momentos de unificação por influência de Hölderlin em Frankfurt. Com efeito, estes momentos de unificação já se apresentam em O “Sistema da vida ética” nos primeiros anos de Hegel em Iena. No “Sistema da vida ética” a família é apresentada como potência ética natural e o povo como potência ética absoluta. O texto pode ser compreendido como a sistematização dos escritos da juventude. As potências éticas, família e povo, que neste momento guardam dentro de si o direito natural, como escreve Hegel no artigo “Sobre as maneiras científicas de tratar o direito natural”, na “Fenomenologia do Espírito” (1807) se exteriorizam. Como diz Hegel no § 437 da referida obra trata-se da luta pelo reconhecimento nas figuras históricas de Antígona e Creonte. Deste modo no primeiro capítulo da dissertação teremos a construção do edifício ético natural, no segundo capítulo, se manifesta a cisão entre a família e a cidade. Por fim, concluímos o trabalho apresentando a família a partir do § 157 da “Filosofia do Direito” como vida ética inaugural... / It can be seen along the main works of Hegel, from the writings of youth whose interest turns exclusively to religious themes to the writings of maturity with concerns about the community, the presence of an ethics. However, as throughout the present text, it is not merely (a ruling ethics) ethical rules. We present the moments of maturity of ethos based on the notion of popular religion as a whole, taking as model the so-called beautiful Greek ethical life of the Tübingen times until the notion of family as the first moment of an ethics presented in the Philosophy of Right (1821). Between these two moments we will highlight the Hegelian reception of the Kantian moral philosophy in Bern, as well as the notion of fate and love as moments of unification under the influence of Hölderlin in Frankfurt. Indeed, these moments of unification present themselves in the System of Ethical Life, written in the first years of Hegel in Jena. In the System of Ethical Life, the family is presented as a potent natural ethics and the people as absolute ethical power. The text can be understood as the systematization of the writings of youth. These potent ethics, people and family that at the moment hold within themselves the natural right, as Hegel writes in the article About the Scientific Manners of Approaching the Natural Right, as well as in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) are exteriorized. As Hegel mentions on the §437 of the Phenomenology, the struggle ist for recognition of the historical characters of Antigona and Creonte. This way, as in the first chapter of the dissertation we have the building of an ethical nature, in the second chapter there is the separation of the family and the city. Finally, we finish the work presenting the family as seen from the § 157 of Hegel's Philosophy of Right the initial ethical life... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)