An interpretive approach to performing two works by Franz Krommer for wind ensemble. Including a short history of Harmoniemusik, with origins, development, and chronology of the instruments and repertoire, the roles of "better-known" composers of Harmoniemusik, and its importance in both general music history and history of the wind band. An account of known biographical detail concerning Franz Krommer, his life, his musical involvement and career in Europe, and his place in music history. An overview of his compositions for wind groups other than the Harmoniemusik, including his symphonic music and concertos. Detailed analyses of the two octet-partitas, Partita in F, Op. 57 and Partita in E-flat, Op. 79, with discussion of thematic, harmonic, melodic, articulation, and formal characteristics illustrated through score examples. Examination of issues for a conductor to consider when approaching a performance of these works such as instrumentation (modern vs. period instruments, selecting 16-foot instrument), taking (or not taking) repeats with respect to form, interpreting articulations, determining metronomic tempos, ensemble balance, and style based on wind music of the Classical period. Also, how this music can (and why it should) be used by wind conductors as both a teaching supplement and a compositional model for pieces from the Classical period. Conclusion includes a call for further research on Krommer and his works.

Notre mémoire dégage la nature du rapport de la conscience et de la vérité dans la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel selon deux aspects. D'un côté, la vérité est ce à quoi la conscience se rapporte comme une réalité en soi normative qu'elle distingue de son savoir. Mais, dès lors qu'elle veut s'assumer de la vérité de son savoir, elle fait l'expérience de la non-vérité de ce qu'elle tenait pour le Vrai. Cette expérience que fait la conscience et qui entraîne la perte d'elle-même, Hegel l'appelle la dialectique. De l'autre côté, l'absolu n'a pas seulement pour Hegel la teneur d'une substance, il est bien plutôt sujet, c'est-à-dire auto-mouvement mouvement d'advenir qui se manifeste phénoménalement en se déployant au cœur de l'opposition conscientielle du concept et de l'être, pour s'y montrer comme leur unité fondamentale. Le mémoire tente de cerner comment ces deux mouvements se concilient et quelles en sont les modalités d'accomplissement.

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This dissertation is an exposition and critique of Robert Brandom's theory of discursive objectivity. It discusses this theory both within the context of Brandom's own systematic philosophical project and, in turn, within the ideas and questions characteristic of the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition in German philosophy. It is argued that Brandom's attempt to articulate a theory of the objectivity of discursive norms (and hence also of the content of discursive attitudes) resembles J.G. Fichte's development of themes central to Kant's philosophy. This "Fichtean" approach to the problem of objectivity is then compared and contrasted to that of G.W.F. Hegel. Though Brandom, Fichte and Hegel share the desire to derive an account of the conditions of objectivity from the social character is discursive practices, Hegel offers a version of this project that differs with respect to the nature of self-consciousness, sociality and truth. It is then argued that Brandom's theory suffers significant internal inconsistencies that could be avoided by adopting a more "Hegelian" approach to these three themes. More specifically, Brandom's own project requires that he recognize the necessity and irreducibility of firstperson and second-person discursive attitudes, as well as that he recognize the role of "I-We" social practices for discursive objectivity. Furthermore, he must include in his explanations some form of natural teleology and hence he must abandon his deflationary approach to semantic explanation. However, Brandom's methodological and metaphysical commitments prevent him from doing so.

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar justamente la Ciencia de la Lógica, texto en el que Hegel por primera vez presenta formalmente su método dialéctico (al cual llama, justamente, el Método, en la última parte del Libro III), el cual no es otra cosa que una manera de visualizar la realidad que, siguiendo fundamentalmente los planteamientos de Heráclito, se muestra como una total alternativa a la lógica tradicional de Aristóteles. Las palabras recién citadas de Ernst Bloch, ya adelantan la peculiaridad del pensamiento del filósofo que aquí se comienza a estudiar.

My dissertation concerns Hegel’s mature theoretical philosophy. I focus on the role of logic, meant here in a much more conventional sense of the term than is usually thought relevant to Hegel’s thought. I argue that Hegel’s main achievement in logic is to attempt a noncircular derivation of its laws and materials. Central to my interpretation is a sympathetic treatment of Hegel’s claim that Kant did not have a comparably rigorous justification for logic. In Hegel’s view, the critical philosophy’s pervasive reliance on logic precludes it from evaluating the latter in a non-question-begging way. As a result, Kant is forced to ground logic psychologically (though not “psychologistically” in Frege’s sense). For Hegel, Kant’s critical philosophy is insufficiently self-critical with respect to its own logical foundations. It is therefore vulnerable to criticism on logical grounds — especially from a Hegelian direction. As I also hope to show, Hegel rejects Kant’s critique of metaphysics, arguing that its logical presuppositions are unfounded. Once those presuppositions are overhauled, the true source of the metaphysical tradition’s impasses becomes apparent, and a non-Kantian-idealist, metaphysical solution is at hand. The lesson is that metaphysics is an enduring possibility, provided it is based on secure logical foundations.

This dissertation defends a Hegelian model of our relationship to social roles. This model functions both as a new interpretation of Hegel’s own view, and as a contribution to the contemporary debate about role obligations. On this model, it is constitutive of our agency, and therefore obligatory, to carry out our social roles. Yet, ‘carrying out’ our roles also necessarily involves that we persistently develop our roles, and the social order of which they are part, towards realizing the human good. In that process, we are required to lead society through a process of social evolution, whose basic structure mirrors the development of natural life at a higher, self-conscious level. From the standpoint of Hegel scholarship, the main upshot of my interpretation is that Hegel’s vision of social participation does not only leave room for social critique, as commentators have recently argued, but rather centrally requires such critique. In fact, I argue that Hegel has – what I will call – a Neo-Aristotelian model of social critique (centered around the idea of ‘living unity’) that is an essential component of his account of how we should relate to social roles, but that has been hitherto overlooked. From the standpoint of the contemporary debate on role obligations, the main upshot of my interpretation is that Hegel offers an account that neither limits the normativity of social roles to those roles we have actually accepted, nor to the roles that are reflectively acceptable. Instead, Hegel develops an account on which even reflectively unacceptable roles give us obligations – namely obligations to evolve them, through a process of social experimentation, into something better. It is this view – and the central function that it attributes to social evolution as part of our role obligations – that make Hegel an interesting, but often overlooked, contributor to the debate about role obligations today.

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciada en Filosofía / [...] Como un ejemplo de esta constante víctima de sacrificio o subestimación es como hallamos al infinito hegeliano. Aunque en los estudiosos de Hegel este concepto no ha pasado desapercibido, la importancia se le ha otorgado más bien por la originalidad de esta idea en la historia de la filosofía que por sus repercusiones en el mismo pensamiento hegeliano. Es cierto, esta idea del infinito, con toda la complejidad y multiplicidad de facciones que posee, es una idea única e innovadora. En el presente trabajo veremos cómo ésta, nutriéndose de los conceptos más peculiares del pasado, supera las anteriores nociones que tenían los filósofos de lo infinito. Sin embargo, aunque necesitamos entender este concepto a partir de sus antecedentes —y esta es la principal razón por la que aquí nos remitiremos a la historia del concepto antes de Hegel—, no deberá entenderse que este es el foco de la tesis. El propósito primordial de esta tesis se dirige a destacar la importancia que tiene este concepto en el mismo sistema hegeliano. Nos proponemos desvelar una nueva lectura de Hegel, que no se abra a partir de necesidades personales o circunstanciales de la época o contexto del lector, sino que se inicie a partir del mismo Hegel, como una necesidad oculta del mismo sistema. Esta nueva lectura se caracterizará por poner un acento en la infinitud, considerándola no sólo como un concepto interesante y novedoso de Hegel, sino como el concepto que le da el sentido y que necesita para la sobrevivencia el movimiento dialéctico.

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