Zugl.: Diss. / Literaturverz. S. 183 - 189.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:23:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 3900209 bytes, checksum: b1e2ed8dcb2d322a9cfab6ad1b784a8e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-10-20 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This Master Dissertation is linked to the Research Line: Regional History , of Post-Graduation Program in History of the Paraíba Federal University, which has Historical Culture and History as its Area of Concentration. Our research have as objective to analyze above all, the use of the political censorship on protest music during the called shot years of the military dictatorship in Brazil. With this intent we have focused mainly on the judgments elaborated by the censors themselves, between 1969 and 1974, during the censure practice, to justify the vetos on the protest songs, censureds for having political protests opposite the political regime in vigour, established in Brazil by the militaries with the stroke of 1964. Therefore, we have tried to demonstrate that, besides the moral censorship which held in the country during the military dictatorship and that had been applied since the mid 40 s, also during that military regime themselves, there was a political censorship on the Brazilian popular music, wich acted with more vigour during the shot years and mainly on the protest music, which directioned more its contestations for the political situation in Brazil at that moment. Besides, no refuse wich happened in that period themselves a moral censorship on the popular music made in Brazil. Though, we have tried to show too that there was, at certain moments, an interconnection between the political and moral motivations for the censorship of determinates songs. / Esta Dissertação de Mestrado está vinculada à Linha de Pesquisa: História Regional , do Programa de Pós-Graduação em História da Universidade Federal da Paraíba, o qual tem como Área de Concentração: História e Cultura Histórica . Nossa pesquisa teve como objetivo analisar, sobretudo, o uso da censura política sobre a música de protesto durante os chamados anos de chumbo (1969-1974) da ditadura militar no Brasil. Com esse intuito nos detemos mais sobre os pareceres elaborados pelos próprios censores entre 1969 e 1974, quando da prática censória, para justificarem os vetos sobre as canções de protesto, censuradas por conterem protestos políticos contra o regime político vigente implantado no Brasil pelos militares com o golpe de 1964. Portanto, procuramos demonstrar que, além da censura moral que vigorava no país durante a ditadura militar, e que já vinha desde meados da década de 1940, também ocorreu, durante esse mesmo regime militar, uma censura política sobre a música popular brasileira, a qual atuou com mais vigor durante os anos de chumbo e principalmente sobre a música de protesto, que direcionava mais suas contestações para a situação política do Brasil naquele momento. Além disso, não negamos que tenha ocorrido nesse mesmo período uma censura moral sobre a música popular produzida no Brasil. Não obstante, também procuramos mostrar que havia, em certos momentos, uma interconexão entre as motivações políticas e morais para a censura de determinadas canções.

No abstract available / History / M.A.

When the national Democratic Party began to transform to progressive era politics because of the New Deal, conservative reactionaries turned against the social welfare programs and used red scare tactics to discredit liberal and progressive New Deal Democrat professors in higher education. This process continued during the Second World War, when the conservatives in Texas lumped fascism and communism in order to anchor support and fire and threaten professors and administrators for advocating or teaching “subversive doctrine.” In 1948 Texas joined other southern states and followed the Dixiecrat movement designed to return the Democratic Party to its original pro-business and segregationist philosophy. Conservatives who wanted to bolster their Cold Warrior status in Texas also played upon the fears of spreading communism during the Cold War, and passed several repressive laws intended to silence unruly students and entrap professors by claiming they advocated communist doctrine. The fight culminated during the Civil Rights movement, when conservatives in the state attributed subversive or communist behavior to civil rights organizations, and targeted higher education to protect segregated universities. In order to return the national Democratic Party to the pro-business, segregationist philosophy established at the early twentieth century, conservatives used redbaiting tactics to thwart the progressivism in the state’s higher education facilities.

No abstract available / History / M.A.

The aim of this master's thesis is to define and analyse the anti-Communist cycle: a group of several dozen feature films, which were produced in the United States since the late forties until the end of the fifties. The thesis adopts a critical approach to the current research on the cycle; it considers that scholars have not taken into account much of the relevant context and have described the cycle only as a reflection of some social phenomena. This project enriches the debate by considering the plurality of differently motivated participants. In addition to shifts in the society as a whole, the emphasis is put on the interests of both the film industry and ones, who expressed their disagreement with the dominant form of anti-Communism, but not with the anti-Communism itself. The anti-Communist cycle is thus presented as a dynamic group of various films in terms of ideas, style or genres; among these films a discreet tension was created. This general hypothesis is tested by three extensive chapters. The first chapter deals with the context and defines the role of all participants. It is divided into two parts: (a) the historical context, (b) the context of the film industry. The second chapter summarizes the long continuity of production of anti-Communist films in the United States; then it...

Text in Afrikaans / Die portefeulje Verdediging het vanaf 1948 tot 1959 besondere eise aan F.C. Erasmus gestel. Hy moes 'n parate en doeltreffende Unieverdedigingsmag, wat Suid-Afrika teen moontlike kommunistiese aggressie kon verdedig, daarstel. Hy moes ook die Nasionale Party se verdedigingsbeleid, tot nag toe abstrakte beginsels vervat in die partyprogram, implementeer. Erasmus het die Mag d.m.v. 'n ingrypende hervormingsprogram met 'n Suid-Afrikaanse identiteit beklee en Afrikaanssprekendes in groat getalle daarheen gelok. Nieteenstaande die beperkte hulpbronne tot die land se beskikking en sterk kritiek teen hom, het Erasmus Suid-Afrika se verdediging met rasse skrede laat vooruitgaan. Hy het die organisasie, opleiding en krygstuig van die Mag uitgebou en gemoderniseer, en ook die grondslag van 'n onafhanklike, plaaslike krygstuigvervaardigingsbedryf gele. Voorts het Erasmus 'n prominente rol in Suid-Afrika se internasionale militere strategie gespeel. Hy bet onvermoeid gepoog om die Europese koloniale moondhede te oorreed om 'n Afrika-verdedigingsorganisasie op die been te bring. 'n Hoogtepunt van sy dienstermyn aan die internasionale front was Brittanje se oordrag van Simonstad aan Suid-Afrika. / The Defence portfolio placed heavy demands on F.C. Erasmus from 1948 to 1959. He had to transform the South African armed forces into an efficient and combat ready Union Defence Force. He also had to implement the National Party's defence policy, which hitherto consisted of abstract principles contained in the party's political programme. Erasmus made far reaching changes to the Union Defence Force, furnishing it with a distinct South African identity. Despite criticism against him and the country's limited resources Erasmus improved South Africa's defence significantly. He modernized the organization, training and equipment of the Union Defence Force and established the basis for an independent local armaments industry. Erasmus also played a prominent role in South Africa's international military strategy. He laboured unceasingly to persuade the European colonial powers to enter into an African defence alli~nce. One of his greatest achievements is the transfer of Simonstown to South Africa. / History / M.A. (Geskiedenis)

Text in Afrikaans / Die portefeulje Verdediging het vanaf 1948 tot 1959 besondere eise aan F.C. Erasmus gestel. Hy moes 'n parate en doeltreffende Unieverdedigingsmag, wat Suid-Afrika teen moontlike kommunistiese aggressie kon verdedig, daarstel. Hy moes ook die Nasionale Party se verdedigingsbeleid, tot nag toe abstrakte beginsels vervat in die partyprogram, implementeer. Erasmus het die Mag d.m.v. 'n ingrypende hervormingsprogram met 'n Suid-Afrikaanse identiteit beklee en Afrikaanssprekendes in groat getalle daarheen gelok. Nieteenstaande die beperkte hulpbronne tot die land se beskikking en sterk kritiek teen hom, het Erasmus Suid-Afrika se verdediging met rasse skrede laat vooruitgaan. Hy het die organisasie, opleiding en krygstuig van die Mag uitgebou en gemoderniseer, en ook die grondslag van 'n onafhanklike, plaaslike krygstuigvervaardigingsbedryf gele. Voorts het Erasmus 'n prominente rol in Suid-Afrika se internasionale militere strategie gespeel. Hy bet onvermoeid gepoog om die Europese koloniale moondhede te oorreed om 'n Afrika-verdedigingsorganisasie op die been te bring. 'n Hoogtepunt van sy dienstermyn aan die internasionale front was Brittanje se oordrag van Simonstad aan Suid-Afrika. / The Defence portfolio placed heavy demands on F.C. Erasmus from 1948 to 1959. He had to transform the South African armed forces into an efficient and combat ready Union Defence Force. He also had to implement the National Party's defence policy, which hitherto consisted of abstract principles contained in the party's political programme. Erasmus made far reaching changes to the Union Defence Force, furnishing it with a distinct South African identity. Despite criticism against him and the country's limited resources Erasmus improved South Africa's defence significantly. He modernized the organization, training and equipment of the Union Defence Force and established the basis for an independent local armaments industry. Erasmus also played a prominent role in South Africa's international military strategy. He laboured unceasingly to persuade the European colonial powers to enter into an African defence alli~nce. One of his greatest achievements is the transfer of Simonstown to South Africa. / History / M.A. (Geskiedenis)

The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model, this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met, why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola or Afghanistan?” As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and Afghanistan in arming RENAMO. Was the United States Government still trapped in the “Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the 3 same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? A significant part of this study is devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians (both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the doctrine indirectly applied through third parties? In 1989 when the Reagan Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy? / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model, this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met, why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola or Afghanistan?” As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and Afghanistan in arming RENAMO. Was the United States Government still trapped in the “Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the 3 same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? A significant part of this study is devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians (both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the doctrine indirectly applied through third parties? In 1989 when the Reagan Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy? / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)