This essay looks at the Government of British Columbia’s ‘New Relationship’ with indigenous people and how British Columbia’s history can inform this public policy debate. Specifically, I draw on the approach used by historian Quentin Skinner to identify two distinct periods in British Columbia’s early history, the coastal fur trade and the colonial period, and to identify how the relationship between indigenous people and Europeans was fundamentally different during these periods. After identifying the key features that made these relationships different, I challenge policymakers to look beyond the colonial period and its effect on our intellectual heritage. Through looking back to the fur trade period, I argue that we can begin to meet the promise contained in the ‘New Relationship’ and its statement of vision.

The existing rights paradigm in Aboriginal law accepts Crown sovereignty claims grounded in ethnocentric conceptions of terra nullius and discovery, and views Aboriginal rights as arising out of prior occupation. The Supreme Court of Canada has shaken this paradigm by characterizing Crown sovereignty as merely de facto until reconciled with Aboriginal sovereignty and legitimated by a treaty, by developing the duty to consult, and by characterizing reconciliation as a process that is part of a generative constitutional order. The moves the Court toward a new paradigm rooted in the principle of the equality of peoples in which treaties provide a framework for sharing sovereignty. As part of the Canadian federation, Aboriginal sovereignty can strengthen Canadas territorial integrity and contribute to Canadas economic development.<p> In the past, courts allowed the act of state doctrine to shield Crown assertions of sovereignty from scrutiny. This doctrine protects Canadas territorial integrity, but does not shield the Crowns actions from legal and constitutional scrutiny. The fundamental constitutional principle of rule of law and the de facto doctrine will protect interests that relied on assumptions of Crown sovereignty that lacked constitutional legitimacy.<p> The transformation in the fundamental principles of Aboriginal law has parallels to Thomas Kuhns description of a paradigm shift in the natural sciences. The rights paradigm is in a crisis with moral and practical dimensions. It is incommensurable with the equality paradigm, and therefore the choice of paradigms will depend on normative criteria. Fundamental principles of the Canadian constitution, international standards of human rights and the perspectives of growing numbers of practitioners in the field that are of Aboriginal ancestry are all forces that will complete the shift to the equality paradigm.<p> An equality paradigm will result in the abandonment of some Aboriginal law doctrines, and the modification of others. Aboriginal title is inconsistent with an equality paradigm because it assumes the legitimacy of the Crowns claims to sovereignty, gives the Crown a superior title, and limits Aboriginal nations to a burden of only limited and subordinate rights. The fiduciary relationship rooted in the honour of the Crown will grow into a non-hierarchical relationship with reciprocal obligations.<p> Decisions of courts can play a supporting role, but only negotiations and treaties can build a genuine partnership, effective and equitable sharing of sovereignty and ultimately reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada.

In Canada, the duty to consult doctrine has been articulated as a legal remedy to address the potential infringement of Aboriginal and treaty rights by the Crown. The political dimension and implications of this legal duty on the evolving federal relationship between First Nations and the provincial Crown concerning lands and resources have yet to be fully explored. This research presents the argument that the duty to consult jurisprudence and the new relationship policy in British Columbia are moving towards the articulation of a treaty federalism relationship between the Crown and First Nations. The implications of these findings are then analyzed within the Saskatchewan policy environment, and a potential consultation framework is offered for this province. Crucial linkages between duty to consult jurisprudence and Aboriginal governance, and their implications for policy are highlighted, which contribute to further understanding the complex relationship between First Nations and the Crown in Canada on land and resources.

In Canada, the duty to consult doctrine has been articulated as a legal remedy to address the potential infringement of Aboriginal and treaty rights by the Crown. The political dimension and implications of this legal duty on the evolving federal relationship between First Nations and the provincial Crown concerning lands and resources have yet to be fully explored. This research presents the argument that the duty to consult jurisprudence and the new relationship policy in British Columbia are moving towards the articulation of a treaty federalism relationship between the Crown and First Nations. The implications of these findings are then analyzed within the Saskatchewan policy environment, and a potential consultation framework is offered for this province. Crucial linkages between duty to consult jurisprudence and Aboriginal governance, and their implications for policy are highlighted, which contribute to further understanding the complex relationship between First Nations and the Crown in Canada on land and resources.

The existing rights paradigm in Aboriginal law accepts Crown sovereignty claims grounded in ethnocentric conceptions of terra nullius and discovery, and views Aboriginal rights as arising out of prior occupation. The Supreme Court of Canada has shaken this paradigm by characterizing Crown sovereignty as merely de facto until reconciled with Aboriginal sovereignty and legitimated by a treaty, by developing the duty to consult, and by characterizing reconciliation as a process that is part of a generative constitutional order. The moves the Court toward a new paradigm rooted in the principle of the equality of peoples in which treaties provide a framework for sharing sovereignty. As part of the Canadian federation, Aboriginal sovereignty can strengthen Canadas territorial integrity and contribute to Canadas economic development.<p> In the past, courts allowed the act of state doctrine to shield Crown assertions of sovereignty from scrutiny. This doctrine protects Canadas territorial integrity, but does not shield the Crowns actions from legal and constitutional scrutiny. The fundamental constitutional principle of rule of law and the de facto doctrine will protect interests that relied on assumptions of Crown sovereignty that lacked constitutional legitimacy.<p> The transformation in the fundamental principles of Aboriginal law has parallels to Thomas Kuhns description of a paradigm shift in the natural sciences. The rights paradigm is in a crisis with moral and practical dimensions. It is incommensurable with the equality paradigm, and therefore the choice of paradigms will depend on normative criteria. Fundamental principles of the Canadian constitution, international standards of human rights and the perspectives of growing numbers of practitioners in the field that are of Aboriginal ancestry are all forces that will complete the shift to the equality paradigm.<p> An equality paradigm will result in the abandonment of some Aboriginal law doctrines, and the modification of others. Aboriginal title is inconsistent with an equality paradigm because it assumes the legitimacy of the Crowns claims to sovereignty, gives the Crown a superior title, and limits Aboriginal nations to a burden of only limited and subordinate rights. The fiduciary relationship rooted in the honour of the Crown will grow into a non-hierarchical relationship with reciprocal obligations.<p> Decisions of courts can play a supporting role, but only negotiations and treaties can build a genuine partnership, effective and equitable sharing of sovereignty and ultimately reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada.

Le présent mémoire est consacré à l'étude de l'obligation faite à l'État canadien de consulter les autochtones lorsqu'il envisage de prendre des mesures portant atteinte à leurs droits et intérêts. On s'y interroge sur le sens que peut avoir cette obligation, si elle n'inclut pas celle de s'entendre avec les autochtones. Notre étude retrace d'abord l'évolution de l'obligation de consulter dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada, pour se pencher ensuite sur l'élaboration d'un modèle théorique du processus consultatif. En observant la manière dont la jurisprudence relative aux droits ancestraux a donné naissance à l'obligation de consulter, on constate que c'est en s'approchant au plus près de l'idée d'autonomie gouvernementale autochtone - soit en définissant le titre ancestral, droit autochtone à la terre elle-même - que la Cour a senti le besoin de développer la consultation en tant que véritable outil de dialogue entre l'État et les Premières nations. Or, pour assurer la participation réelle des parties au processus de consultation, la Cour a ensuite dû balancer leur rapport de forces, ce qu'elle a fait en admettant le manque de légitimité du pouvoir étatique sur les autochtones. C'est ainsi qu'après avoir donné naissance au processus de consultation, la jurisprudence relative aux droits ancestraux pourrait à son tour être modifiée substantiellement par son entremise. En effet, l'égalité qu'il commande remet en question l'approche culturaliste de la Cour aux droits ancestraux, et pourrait l'amener à refonder ces droits dans le principe plus égalitaire de continuité des ordres juridiques autochtones. Contrairement à l'approche culturaliste actuelle, ce principe fait place à la reconnaissance juridique de l'autonomie gouvernementale autochtone. La logique interne égalitaire du processus de consultation ayant ainsi été exposée, elle fait ensuite l'objet d'une plus ample analyse. On se demande d'abord comment concevoir cette logique sur le plan théorique. Ceci exige d'ancrer la consultation, en tant qu'institution juridique, dans une certaine vision du droit. Nous adoptons ici celle de Lon Fuller, riche de sens pour nos fins. Puis, nous explicitons les principes structurants du processus consultatif. Il appert de cette réflexion que l'effectivité de la consultation dépend de la qualité du dialogue qu'elle engendre entre les parties. Si elle respecte sa morale inhérente, la consultation peut générer une relation morale unique entre les autochtones et l'État canadien. Cette relation de reconnaissance mutuelle est une relation de don. / In this essay, we study the Canadian State's duty to consult Aboriginal peoples when it purports to infringe on their rights and interests. We start with the following question: What meaning, if any, does the duty to consult have, if it does not include a duty to reach a consensus ? Our study is divided in two parts. First, we trace the evolution of the duty to consult in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Secondly, we discuss a theoretical model for the consultation process. Our study of the genesis and subsequent evolution of the duty to consult reveals that this duty gains some ambit when the Court is called upon to define the notion of aboriginal title - the type of aboriginal right that cornes closest to full aboriginal self-government on a piece of land. In its effort to construct the consultation process, the Court soon realizes that if it wants both parties to really engage in it, it has to balance their relationship, something the Court does by admitting the State's lack of legitimate authority over the Aboriginals. But affirming the equal status of both parties in the consultation process leads to further consequences than the mere effectiveness of that process. Aboriginal equality does not fit weIl within the Court's cultural approach to aboriginal rights. The common law doctrine of continuity of the aboriginal legal orders is more congenial to that equality, as it leads naturally to the legal recognition of a measure of aboriginal autonomy within Canada. Thus, after giving birth to the consultation process, the law of aboriginal rights could itself be substantially modified through the logical implications of its own offspring. Having exposed the egalitarian logic inherent to the consultation process, we proceed to study that logic in further detail. We ground our quest for the inherent structure of consultation in a larger understanding of the law itself, which proceeds from Lon Fuller' s view of law as facilitating human interaction. We then discuss the principles that give content to a consultation process directed to achieve reconciliation. Effective consultation depends on the quality of the dialogue that it generates. Appropriately conceived and implemented, the consultation process between Aboriginal peoples and the State embodies a unique moral relationship, one of mutual recognition, capturing the' spirit of giving'.

The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the constitutional right of the Métis to hunt in the Canadian legal consciousness in the four levels of court that heard the Powley case and comment on the judicial approach and observations. After a comparative analysis of the precedent setting Powley decision, a brief examination is undertaken of two recent cases regarding Métis rights in Canada: Laviolette and Willison. <p>Ultimately, the purpose of this research has been to show the treatment of Métis and First Nations Aboriginal rights have not been treated equally and to confront the challenges that this analysis raises. Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution has not provided the protections to Aboriginal rights that one would expect. In order to make changes to the legal system I have identified some fundamental problems with Aboriginal law in Canada associated with the identification of the source of those rights. <p>Further, I have made some suggestions on the approaches that could be taken to change the direction of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding its interpretations of Métis rights.

The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the constitutional right of the Métis to hunt in the Canadian legal consciousness in the four levels of court that heard the Powley case and comment on the judicial approach and observations. After a comparative analysis of the precedent setting Powley decision, a brief examination is undertaken of two recent cases regarding Métis rights in Canada: Laviolette and Willison. <p>Ultimately, the purpose of this research has been to show the treatment of Métis and First Nations Aboriginal rights have not been treated equally and to confront the challenges that this analysis raises. Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution has not provided the protections to Aboriginal rights that one would expect. In order to make changes to the legal system I have identified some fundamental problems with Aboriginal law in Canada associated with the identification of the source of those rights. <p>Further, I have made some suggestions on the approaches that could be taken to change the direction of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding its interpretations of Métis rights.

Le présent mémoire est consacré à l'étude de l'obligation faite à l'État canadien de consulter les autochtones lorsqu'il envisage de prendre des mesures portant atteinte à leurs droits et intérêts. On s'y interroge sur le sens que peut avoir cette obligation, si elle n'inclut pas celle de s'entendre avec les autochtones. Notre étude retrace d'abord l'évolution de l'obligation de consulter dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada, pour se pencher ensuite sur l'élaboration d'un modèle théorique du processus consultatif. En observant la manière dont la jurisprudence relative aux droits ancestraux a donné naissance à l'obligation de consulter, on constate que c'est en s'approchant au plus près de l'idée d'autonomie gouvernementale autochtone - soit en définissant le titre ancestral, droit autochtone à la terre elle-même - que la Cour a senti le besoin de développer la consultation en tant que véritable outil de dialogue entre l'État et les Premières nations. Or, pour assurer la participation réelle des parties au processus de consultation, la Cour a ensuite dû balancer leur rapport de forces, ce qu'elle a fait en admettant le manque de légitimité du pouvoir étatique sur les autochtones. C'est ainsi qu'après avoir donné naissance au processus de consultation, la jurisprudence relative aux droits ancestraux pourrait à son tour être modifiée substantiellement par son entremise. En effet, l'égalité qu'il commande remet en question l'approche culturaliste de la Cour aux droits ancestraux, et pourrait l'amener à refonder ces droits dans le principe plus égalitaire de continuité des ordres juridiques autochtones. Contrairement à l'approche culturaliste actuelle, ce principe fait place à la reconnaissance juridique de l'autonomie gouvernementale autochtone. La logique interne égalitaire du processus de consultation ayant ainsi été exposée, elle fait ensuite l'objet d'une plus ample analyse. On se demande d'abord comment concevoir cette logique sur le plan théorique. Ceci exige d'ancrer la consultation, en tant qu'institution juridique, dans une certaine vision du droit. Nous adoptons ici celle de Lon Fuller, riche de sens pour nos fins. Puis, nous explicitons les principes structurants du processus consultatif. Il appert de cette réflexion que l'effectivité de la consultation dépend de la qualité du dialogue qu'elle engendre entre les parties. Si elle respecte sa morale inhérente, la consultation peut générer une relation morale unique entre les autochtones et l'État canadien. Cette relation de reconnaissance mutuelle est une relation de don. / In this essay, we study the Canadian State's duty to consult Aboriginal peoples when it purports to infringe on their rights and interests. We start with the following question: What meaning, if any, does the duty to consult have, if it does not include a duty to reach a consensus ? Our study is divided in two parts. First, we trace the evolution of the duty to consult in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Secondly, we discuss a theoretical model for the consultation process. Our study of the genesis and subsequent evolution of the duty to consult reveals that this duty gains some ambit when the Court is called upon to define the notion of aboriginal title - the type of aboriginal right that cornes closest to full aboriginal self-government on a piece of land. In its effort to construct the consultation process, the Court soon realizes that if it wants both parties to really engage in it, it has to balance their relationship, something the Court does by admitting the State's lack of legitimate authority over the Aboriginals. But affirming the equal status of both parties in the consultation process leads to further consequences than the mere effectiveness of that process. Aboriginal equality does not fit weIl within the Court's cultural approach to aboriginal rights. The common law doctrine of continuity of the aboriginal legal orders is more congenial to that equality, as it leads naturally to the legal recognition of a measure of aboriginal autonomy within Canada. Thus, after giving birth to the consultation process, the law of aboriginal rights could itself be substantially modified through the logical implications of its own offspring. Having exposed the egalitarian logic inherent to the consultation process, we proceed to study that logic in further detail. We ground our quest for the inherent structure of consultation in a larger understanding of the law itself, which proceeds from Lon Fuller' s view of law as facilitating human interaction. We then discuss the principles that give content to a consultation process directed to achieve reconciliation. Effective consultation depends on the quality of the dialogue that it generates. Appropriately conceived and implemented, the consultation process between Aboriginal peoples and the State embodies a unique moral relationship, one of mutual recognition, capturing the' spirit of giving'. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit, option recherche". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 5% des mémoires de la discipline. Commentaires du jury : "Excellent mémoire qui devrait être soumis aux fins de publication et à différents concours pour les prix récompensant des mémoires de maîtrise".

La Cour suprême du Canada (« Cour ») prône « ses propres valeurs» dans la détermination des droits économiques des Autochtones, dont la prédominance des intérêts économiques des non Autochtones, ainsi que la protection du couple souveraineté canadienne/primauté du droit. Ces valeurs sont maintenues avec constance par la Cour, malgré l'évolution du cadre juridique canadien applicable aux revendications des droits économiques par les Autochtones. Ce mémoire démontre que, depuis la constitutionnalisation des droits économiques des Autochtones en 1982, le domaine de la preuve - tant par l'invocation de règles de preuve que par l'appréciation de la preuve - est le principal outil invoqué par la Cour en rhétorique au soutien de la détermination des droits économiques des Autochtones selon ses propres valeurs. De plus, notre recherche nous a également permis de formuler plusieurs critiques relatives à l'indiscipline de la Cour dans l'application du domaine de la preuve dans les décisions portant sur les droits économiques des Autochtones. / When determining the scope of Aboriginal economic rights, the Supreme Court of Canada (« Court ») values the economic interests of non-Aboriginals and the reaffirmation of Canadian sovereignty/rule of law over Aboriginal claims. These values are advanced by the Court despite developments in the Canadian legal framework applicable to Aboriginal economic rights claims. This thesis demonstrates that, since 1982, when Aboriginal economic rights were granted constitutional protection, the Court began to utilize the law of evidence to justify the espousal of their values when determining the scope of Aboriginal economic rights. The Court manipulates both its weighing of the evidence and the rules of evidence in order to justify their values. My research has led me to develop several criticisms related to the methodology used by the Court in its manipulation of the rules and in its appreciation of evidence.