本文以 Oates and Schwab (1988) 及 Lockwood (2004) 兩篇文章為基礎。採用 Oates and Schwab (1988) 中各地方政府同時選擇資本稅率及環境標準的模型為主要架構，並結合 Lockwood (2004) 中從量及從價資本稅之相關設定，將公共財及環境品質納入代表性個人的效用函數中，求得對稱納許均衡解 (symmetric Nash equilibrium) 。我們發現在考慮地區間策略性行為 (strategic behavior) 時，不論地區採用從量或從價資本稅以融通地區性公共財，均衡稅率及環境品質皆會低於最適水準，其中又以從價資本稅的扭曲更為嚴重。而中央集權時，無論採用從量或從價稅制，均衡稅率及環境品質皆為最適水準；完全地方分權時，從量稅和從價稅兩者等價，各區間彼此競爭，不論在公共財或環境水準， 都有向下沉淪 (race to the bottom) ，偏離最適解的結果。 / The thesis is based on the setting of Oates and Schwab (1988) and Lockwood (2004). I consider that each local government has two policy instruments available: the capital tax and the environmental standard. Local governments levy tax on the capital of polluting industries, with either unit taxes or ad valorem taxes.All capital tax revenues are used to provide local public goods. The aim of the thesis is to examine whether the two distinct capital tax systems lead to different outcomes. I find that when strategic behavior among jurisdictions is considered, both the tax rates and the environmental standards are set below the optimal levels under the two tax systems. Compared to the unit tax case, it's even more inefficient with the ad valorem tax. Another finding is that the government would set both tax rate and environmental standard at the optimal level under the centralized case. Contrarily, under the decentralized cases, the competition among jurisdictions will lead to a race to the bottom in both local public goods provision and environment policy. Unit taxes and ad valorem taxes are equivalent in these two special cases.

In recent time, several reports have been published about a more and more unhealthy population world wide, with increasing Body Mass Index (BMI) in welfare countries, such as Sweden. Diseases, such as obesity and diabetes, which is strongly connected to a high BMI, have increased and together with them also the medical expenses for society/state. Several initiatives have been started, in different countries, to tackle these problems and some have introduced a “sugar tax” on unhealthy products, like candy and soda, which has become a well- debated subject also in Sweden today. In this MBA master thesis, a literature study has been conducted with the goal of evaluating if an excise tax should be introduced in an efficient way on unhealthy sugar-sweetened beverages in Sweden. This case study is built on secondary data where reports and official statistics, from governments and health authorities/organizations, have been studied both for Sweden as well as from other countries. There has been a particular focus on Sweden's neighbouring countries Denmark and Finland, who has both experiences in the implementation of a “sugar tax”. Our theory is that introducing an excise tax on sugar-sweetened beverages will reduce the demand and consumption of these products, which will reduce welfare disease such as obesity and diabetes and yield a tax income for the state. However it is important to have in mind that the reduced consumption also will result in less tax income from the no longer sold goods, fewer personnel employed in the producing industries etc. The results showed that the overall sugar consumption actually has decreased in Sweden, as well as the overall consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages. However during the same time period the average calorie consumption and BMI has continued to increase resulting in a more unhealthy population that results in increased medical expenses. In conclusion an excise tax on sugar-sweetened beverages will not solve the welfare disease problems but may positively influence health. However it comes with a price also for the state from both gains and loss in tax incomes and increased administrations costs for managing the new tax. Finally it should be noted that since sugar-sweetened beverages are unhealthy products, which do not contribute to any positive health effects, sugar taxation might still be considered.

La conversion des tarifs spécifiques en leur équivalent ad valorem est un sujet d’actualité en ce sens qu’elle fait partie des priorités dans les discussions des membres de l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC). Peut-on mieux comprendre et anticiper les choix de tarifs par les pays dans un contexte de négociation commerciale? Le présent mémoire se propose d’apporter une réponse à cette question. Nous avons utilisé un modèle à deux étapes. La première consiste au choix du type de tarif par les pays. La deuxième, quant à elle, est la phase de négociation. Le modèle est composé de deux pays et deux biens, des fonctions d’utilité Cobb Douglas et des dotations comme fonctions de production (tel que développé par Kennan and Riezman (1988)). La détermination des équilibres de négociation a été possible grâce au produit de Nash (Nash, 1950). Nous avons trouvé que le petit pays a tendance à utiliser un tarif ad valorem et que le grand pays est indifférent entre un tarif spécifique et un tarif ad valorem lorsque celui-ci négocie avec un petit pays. Lorsque les deux pays sont de même taille, l’équilibre de négociation est le libre-échange. L’apport à la recherche scientifique dans le domaine est d’une importance à préciser. Cette étude est la première à investiguer le choix des instruments de politique commerciale par un pays dans un contexte de négociation. En effet, jusque-là, très peu de travaux scientifiques se sont intéressés aux questions de modélisation des négociations commerciales. Le présent mémoire est donc une esquisse de compréhension des équilibres de négociation via une modélisation mathématique s’inspirant de travaux précédents sur la guerre des tarifs. / The conversion of specific tariff into its ad valorem equivalent is one of the key issues for current World Trade Organization (WTO) discussions. An important question this thesis addresses is whether we are able to anticipate and understand the choice between specific and ad valorem tariffs by a country in trade negotiations. We use a two-stage model to find the solutions for trade negotiations between two countries. In the first stage, countries choose between specific and ad valorem tariffs. In the second stage, they negotiate over tariff rates. The model includes two countries and two goods, Cobb Douglas utility functions and endowments as production functions as in Kennan and Riezman (1988). To find the negotiation solutions, we use the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950). This thesis is the first to investigate the choice of policy instrument in trade negotiations. We find that a large country is indifferent between specific and ad valorem tariffs when negotiating with a small country. We also find that a small country prefers ad valorem tariff. Finally, when two countries are equal in size, the negotiation equilibrium is free trade.

Une des principales réalisations du Cycle de l’Uruguay fut la transformation de nombreuses barrières non tarifaires en tarifs. Le désir d’accroître l’efficience et la transparence des politiques commerciales motivent une démarche de simplification des tarifs dans le cycle de Doha. Cette démarche encourage les pays-membres à utiliser des tarifs ad valorem plutôt que des tarifs spécifiques ou autres. Les tarifs spécifiques sont moins populaires que les tarifs ad valorem, étant surtout utilisés pour limiter les importations de produits agricoles. Une importante différence entre les deux types de tarifs est que la marge entre le prix interne et le prix mondial décroit avec le prix mondial pour le tarif ad valorem alors que cette marge est constante pour le tarif spécifique. Comme les prix des produits agricoles sont très volatiles, on pourrait s’attendre à ce que ces deux instruments de protection ne soient pas équivalents. Nous modélisons une filière avec des détaillants dotés de pouvoir de marché qui achètent leurs intrants sur le marché mondial à prix fixe et de producteurs agricoles preneurs de prix dont le comportement est caractérisé par une aversion aux pertes. Les tarifs optimaux sont dérivés en présence d’un prix mondial stable et d’un prix mondial volatile. Des simulations numériques sont faites pour faciliter les comparaisons des deux types de tarifs. Le tarif spécifique est démontré meilleur instrument que le tarif optimal ad valorem pour les importateurs de produits agricoles, lorsque le prix mondial est volatile. La taxe optimale n’est pas zéro, mais négative à moins que le prix mondial soit très élevé. Sur un marché concurrentiel, la taxe optimale est zéro et positif respectivement face à des prix internationaux volatiles et une aversion aux pertes des producteurs. L’aversion aux pertes des producteurs fait diminuer la taille du subside optimal sur un marché peu concurrentiel. Ainsi, l’argument d’aversion aux pertes justifie la popularité des tarifs spécifiques en agriculture mais n’explique pas le niveau élevé des tarifs observés. Les tarifs élevés ne font qu’amplifier les problèmes de concurrence découlant de la présence de peu de détaillants/distributeurs agroalimentaires dans la plupart des pays.

Submitted by Rodrigo Zingales Oller do Nascimento (zingales@zgadv.com.br) on 2012-03-14T14:41:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Final - Publicada.pdf: 4563422 bytes, checksum: cbb36d8289303a5dfb89127251830a30 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2012-03-14T17:37:43Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Final - Publicada.pdf: 4563422 bytes, checksum: cbb36d8289303a5dfb89127251830a30 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-03-14T18:01:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Final - Publicada.pdf: 4563422 bytes, checksum: cbb36d8289303a5dfb89127251830a30 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-02-15 / Neste trabalho faz-se uma análise crítica sobre a atual política antitabagista brasileira e propõe-se sua reformulação de forma a compatibilizar, de um lado, os interesses de saúde pública e arrecadatórios e, de outro, os interesses dos agentes econômicos instalados no mercado, especialmente aqueles de pequeno e médio porte, de forma a se evitar a monopolização privada do setor e incentivar a inovação de produtos que não façam mal à saúde dos indivíduos. Para contextualizar a análise, faz-se uma revisão histórica sucinta do crescimento do consumo de cigarro em nível mundial, dos efeitos desse consumo à saúde pública e das principais medidas implementadas em nível global para o combate ao consumo, fabricação e comercialização de cigarros, explicitadas na Convenção-Quadro da Organização Mundial da Saúde de 2003, e que conta atualmente com a adesão de mais de 170 países. Apresenta-se também a política brasileira para erradicação do consumo de cigarro, que contempla, dentre outras medidas, restrições à propaganda e venda de cigarros, à entrada de novos fabricantes, ao teor de nicotina, alcatrão e de monóxido de carbono liberado, ao consumo em locais públicos e, ainda, medidas de natureza fiscal para elevação do preço do bem e o combate ao contrabando. Discutem-se as consequências das políticas antitabagistas brasileiras na estrutura de mercado e na dinâmica competitiva doméstica, destacando-se os efeitos anticompetitivos decorrentes das restrições à publicidade de cigarros e da adoção de um sistema de tributação fixa para o Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados - IPI, incidente sobre a fabricação e comercialização de cigarro. Analisam-se criticamente os modelos teóricos para o desenvolvimento de políticas públicas que objetivam uma intervenção direta do Estado nas atividades de fabricação e distribuição de cigarro. Finalmente, nesse estudo propõem-se, para discussão e debate, ajustes na atual política brasileira antitabagista, que compatibilizem as preocupações com saúde pública, arrecadação, competição e inovação, recomendando para tanto a criação de uma agência reguladora para coordenar os agentes do setor e, em especial, para a fixação de um preço mínimo de revenda para os cigarros; de um sistema de quotas máximas por fabricante, para produção de cigarros; e, ainda, a divulgação de marcas de cigarros que reduzissem ou até mesmo eliminassem os problemas à saúde dos indivíduos. / In this work, a critical analysis of the present Brazilian antismoking policy is presented along with the proposal of its reformulation aiming at harmonizing public health and tax revenue collection, and, simultaneously, meeting the interests of economical agents, specifically those of small and medium size companies, in order to avoid the private monopolization of this sector and to improve research and development of “good” cigarettes. To contextualize the analysis, an overviewed historical revision of the global growth of the tobacco consumption, its effects on public health, and the main measures implemented globally to reduce the consumption, manufacturing and sales of cigarettes are presented. These measures are specified in the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, issued in 2003 by the World Health Organization, and followed by more than 170 countries. We also introduce the Brazilian policy for the eradication of cigarette consumption, which contemplate, among others, restrictions to: propaganda and cigarette sales, entry of new manufacturers in the local market, nicotine and tar cigarette content and carbon monoxide liberation, and smoking in public places. Additionally, tax measures to increase the cigarette price and to combat cigarette smuggling are also specified. In this piece of work we discuss the consequences of the adoption of the Brazilian antismoking policies on the domestic market structure and competitive dynamics, emphasizing the anticompetitive effects resultant from restrictions to cigarette advertisement and the adoption of a specific excise tax system. Theoretical models to the development of public policies aiming a direct intervention of the State in the manufacturing and distribution of cigarettes are critically analyzed. Finally, for discussion and debate, we propose adjustments in the present Brazilian antismoking policy that reconcile, on the one hand, public health themes and tax revenues and, on the other, a competitive environment, which ensures the existence of efficient small and medium companies and free competition, and the recommendation for the creation of a regulatory agency to coordinate the agents of the tobacco sector, and, particularly, to set a minimum price for cigarette resale; a system of maximum shares per cigarette manufacturer; as well as, the release of cigarette brands and advertisements only for products that have reduced or even eliminated the the individuals’ health problems.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese-Solon-Sehn-25-11-2015.pdf: 1845933 bytes, checksum: 21648572dc0f2ab5539d2efa9c47062a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-12-18 / After a literature review and a critical analysis of existing theories, the thesis presents a new theory concerning the imposition of the tax on import under the Brazilian law. The study, based on a hypothetic-deductive method, concluded that the tax rule has as material criterion the behavior of import (verb) goods (complement), or the act of introducing goods into the national territory with the intention of incorporated into them. The space criterion is the Customs territory. The time criterion is the moment when a person did or should have done the registration of customs declaration. The creditor (active subject) is the Federal Union, while the debtor (passive subject) is the importer. The customs duties shall be calculated on an ad valorem basis consistent with the methods of valuation established by the GATT Valuation Code. The rate of duty, on the other hand, vary according the origen and the nomenclature under which particular goods should be classified / Após a revisão bibliográfica e a análise crítica das teorias existentes, a tese apresenta uma nova proposta para a compreensão dos pressupostos de incidência do imposto de importação no direito brasileiro. O estudo, baseado no método hipotético-dedutivo, concluiu que o critério material da hipótese de incidência compreende a conduta de importar (verbo) e produtos (complemento), isto é, a introdução de bens móveis e corpóreos no território nacional com a finalidade integradora. O critério espacial corresponde ao território aduaneiro. Já o critério temporal, ao momento em que se promove ou deveria promover o registro da declaração de importação perante a autoridade aduaneira. O credor (sujeito ativo) é a União Federal, recaindo a sujeição passiva sobre o importador (devedor). A base de cálculo equivale ao valor aduaneiro, determinado de acordo com os métodos de valoração do Acordo de Valoração Aduaneira (AVA). As alíquotas ad valorem, por sua vez, são determinadas em função com a origem e a classificação fiscal do produto