Whether it is in private or professional lives, people are called to make decisions and they tend to seek expert advice. The old adage indicates that more heads are better than one. Receiving more information is often helpful to decisions. However, getting multiple conflicting expert advice might put decision makers in difficult situations. Little is known about their feelings, thinking, and behaviors under such conditions. This research aims to fill the gap and understand the abovementioned consequences of taking multiple conflicting expert advice when making professional (i.e., business or personnel-related) decisions. Using an interview-based qualitative approach, this research sheds light on contextual characteristics where conflicting expert advice may be more beneficial (or harmful), which contributes practical recommendations to improve professional decisions. In sum, this research seeks to verify whether the common wisdom of “more is better” holds up to empirical scrutiny, and suggests that it is “no pain, no gain”.

Since the early days of psychology, practitioners have recognised that metacognition - or the act of thinking about one's own thinking - is intertwined with our experience of the world. In the last decade, scientists have started to understand metacognitive signals, like judgments of confidence, as precise mathematical constructs. Confidence can be conceived of as an internal estimate of the probability of being correct. As such, confidence influences both advice seeking and advice taking while allowing people to optimally combine their views for joint action and group coordination. This work begins by exploring the idea that confidence judgments are important for monitoring not only uncertainty associated with one's performance but also, thanks to their positive covariation with accuracy, the reliability of social advisers, particularly when objective criteria are not available. I present data showing that, when adviser and advisee's judgments are independent, people are able to detect subtle variations in advice information, irrespective of feedback presence. I also show that, when such independence is broken, the use of subjective confidence to track others' reliability leads to systematic deviations. I then proceed to explore the differences existing between static and dynamic social information exchange. Traditionally, social and organisational psychology have investigated one-step unidirectional information systems, but many real-life interactions happen on a continuous time-scale, where social exchanges are recursive and dynamic. I present results indicating that the dynamics of social information exchange (recursive vs. one-step) affect individual opinions over and above the information that is communicated. Overall, my results suggest a bidirectional involvement of confidence in social inference and information exchange, and highlight the limits of the mechanisms underlying it.

During an audit, if an audit team does not have sufficient knowledge when auditing a complex issue they often call upon subject matter experts to provide advice. While these experts are the knowledge experts in their area, the quality of the advice depends upon their ability to fully understand and incorporate client specific facts. PCAOB inspection reports suggest that audit teams are neglecting to perform the required work to assess the quality of experts' recommendations. Additionally, the decision to use subject matter experts can be made during planning or when a complex issue surfaces during the audit. As such, auditors may or may not be a priori aware that an expert's use is planned before auditing a complex issue. In this dissertation, I examine how receiving advice of different levels of quality in terms of whether it incorporated all relevant client facts (lower or higher), and a priori awareness of the use of a subject matter expert (aware or unaware), can impact auditors' use of the advice and the resulting effort and judgment accuracy. I conducted a computerized experiment where professional auditors read a case study and made an initial judgment around a complex issue, received advice, and then made a final judgment. Based on advice-taking literature, I predict and find support that auditors who are a priori unaware of the use of a subject matter expert will employ lower effort in understanding the client facts and thus be less discerning and more accepting of the advice received. Being a priori unaware and receiving low quality advice can lead to lower judgment accuracy than receiving high quality advice with a priori unawareness. Auditors who are a priori aware are expected to, and found to employ greater effort, thus reducing the accuracy differences between receiving high and low quality advice. These findings can help improve the professions' understanding of auditors' advice taking behavior and the conditions under which expert advice is accepted without performing the required quality assessment. / Ph. D.

This dissertation consists of two largely stand-alone chapters. The first chapter presents a goal-activation theory of the antecedents of advice taking. I propose that three separate categories of goals - decision quality, social standing, and emotional well-being - influence receptivity to advice. Decision quality goals increase striving toward a good outcome in the decision for which the advice was given. Social standing goals focus attention on the social effects of the act of taking or rejecting the advice. Emotional well-being goals are related to establishing or maintaining a desired affective state. Each of these goals can be activated by attributes of the situation, advice, advisee, and advisor. Because they increase striving toward different ends, the goals direct attention to disparate advice-related cues and affect the evaluation of those cues. This results in different responses to advice. At the current time, nearly all research on advice taking has addressed decision quality goals and related cues. By presenting this theory, I hope to increase interest in a wider set of antecedents of advice taking. The second chapter reports a series of studies testing hypotheses derived from the theory presented in the first chapter. Specifically, I contrast the effects of an advisor's relative expertise to effects of the advisor's relative hierarchical position on advice taking. I hypothesize that the effects of expertise are driven by decision quality goals, while the effects of relative hierarchical position relate to social standing goals. I further hypothesize that advisees' conceptions of appropriate leader-follower relations (specifically, follower co-production role orientation; Carsten & Uhl-Bien, 2012) activate social standing goals, but not decision quality goals. Lastly, I propose that outcome accountability increases attention to decision quality goals and reduces attention to social standing goals.

<p>People give each other advice on a variety of topics throughout their lifetimes. In this dissertation, I ask: Do advisors accurately perceive the impact of their advice? Or, do they possess blind spots that prevent them from doing so? I focus on whether advisors recognize the information they need in order to form judgments of the impact of their advice, which I call "impact judgments". Four studies demonstrate that advisors have blind spots in their perceptions of their influence and that these blind spots have consequences for advisors' accuracy and subsequent behavioral intentions. First, a free-recall task (Study 1) and a manipulated scenario task (Study 2) showed that advisors failed to recognize when they were missing information needed to form accurate impact judgments, namely, information on the advisee's initial, pre-advice opinion, unless they were prompted to think about why they need that information. Second, an experiment where participants were assigned the role of advisor or advisee (Study 3) demonstrated that advisors' impact judgments were less accurate when advisors did not know the advisee's initial, pre-advice opinion. Third, participants' recollections of a time they gave advice (Study 4) showed that advisors relied on their impact judgments for forming downstream behavioral intentions such as willingness to give advice again, even when they recognized that they were lacking needed information. I conclude with a discussion of the implications for advice giving by individuals and members of organizations, a general framework for impact judgments, and areas for future research.</p> / Dissertation

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Kooperatives Verhalten lässt sich in vielen Bereichen menschlichen Zusammenlebens sowie im gesamten Tierreich beobachten. In evolutionären Modellen wurde gezeigt, dass Netzwerkstrukturen die Kooperation erhöhen können. Empirische Studien versuchten vergeblich diesen Mechanismus auch bei Menschen nachzuweisen. Es scheint, als würden Netzwerke nur dann die Kooperation erhöhen, wenn die Strukturen nicht statisch sind, sondern dynamisch. Das heißt, dass die Individuen die Möglichkeit haben, ihre Partner zu wechseln. Eine wichtige – aber bislang unerforschte – Eigenschaft dynamischer Netzwerke ist jedoch, dass derartige Wechsel von Partnern in der Regel Kosten verursachen, ob in Form von Zeit oder Ressourcen. Kapitel I meiner Arbeit schließt diese Lücke, in dem es sich mit den Effekten von Kosten auf dynamischen Netzwerken befasst. Ich konnte nachweisen, dass Menschen seltener Interaktionen mit Partnern beendeten, wenn die Kontaktaufnahme mit einem neuen Partner mit Kosten verbunden war. Bei sehr hohen Kosten, wurden Partner so selten gewechselt, dass das Netzwerk fast statisch war. Interessanterweise blieb die Kooperation dennoch sehr hoch. Das bedeutet, dass für kooperatives Verhalten entscheidend ist, ob man die Möglichkeit hat, Partner zu wechseln. Im Gegensatz zu bisherigen Annahmen ist es daher nicht wichtig, wie oft tatsächlich Partner gewechselt werden, sondern lediglich ob es die Möglichkeit dazu gibt. In Kapitel II beschäftige ich mich mit optimalem Entscheidungsverhalten. Im sogenannten Judge-Advisor-System geht es darum, dass eine Person, der Judge, eine unbekannte numerische Größe schätzen will. Dazu erhält der Judge eine zweite unabhängige Schätzung als Rat von einer zweiten Person, des Advisor. Schließlich ist die Frage, wie der Judge optimal den Rat verwerten kann um seine Anfangsschätzung zu verbessern. Bisherige Forschung konzentrierte sich hauptsächlich auf zwei mögliche Methoden, (i) das Bilden des Mittelwerts und (ii) das Wählen der besseren Anfangsschätzung. Das Hauptargument für diese einfachen Methoden ist deren häufige Verwendung in bisherigen Experimenten. Allerdings wurden sehr wohl auch andere Gewichtungen beobachtet und daher ist eine gründliche Analyse der optimalen Gewichtung erforderlich. In der vorliegenden Arbeit leitete ich ein normatives Modell her, das beschreibt, unter welchen Bedingungen welche Methode das bestmögliche Ergebnis liefert. Es wurden drei Methoden verglichen: (i) das Bilden des Durchschnitts, (ii) das Wählen der besseren Anfangsschätzung, und (iii) das Bilden eines gewichtetet Mittelwerts, wobei das Gewicht vom Kompetenzunterschied abhängt. Welche Methode optimal ist, hängt davon ab, wie groß der Kompetenzunterschied ist und wie gut er vom Judge erkannt wird. Die Durchschnittbildung ist immer dann vorteilhaft, wenn der Kompetenzunterschied nicht groß ist, oder nur schwer richtig eingeschätzt werden kann. Wenig überraschend lohnt sich das Wählen der besseren Anfangsschätzung, wenn der Kompetenzunterschied hinreichend groß ist, vorausgesetzt es wird tatsächlich die bessere Anfangsschätzung gewählt. Wenn der Kompetenzunterschied vom Judge gut eingeschätzt werden kann, ist eine Entsprechende Gewichtung immer die beste Methode, unabhängig vom tatsächlichen Unterschied. In Übereinstimmung mit bisheriger Forschung wurde auch die Kombination von Durchschnittbildung und Wählen der besseren Anfangsschätzung untersucht. Diese Kombinationsmethode beruht darauf, bei als gering eingeschätztem Kompetenzunterschied den Durchschnitt zu bilden und ansonsten die bessere Anfangsschätzung zu wählen. Interessanterweise schneidet diese Kombinationsmethode sehr schlecht ab, was hauptsächlich daran liegt, dass zu oft die falsche Anfangsschätzung genommen würde. Insgesamt ist das gewichtete Mittel also eine geeignete Methode für einen großen Parameterbereich.

This dissertation investigates the psychological processes relevant to consumers relinquishment of decision control to surrogates (e.g., physician, financial advisor). While the first essay investigates the antecedents of relinquishing decision control to surrogates, the second essay focuses on the consequences of such relinquishment of control. The first essay proposes that a key reason for consumers reluctance to relinquish the control of their decisions to expert surrogates is that such relinquishment contradicts their inherent motivation to experience an internal perceived locus of causality (PLOC) for their decisions. Based on this, I hypothesize that consumers become more likely to relinquish decision control either (1) when their motivation to maintain an internal PLOC is weakened or (2) when contextual factors specific to the decision itself are present that shift the anticipated PLOC for it from internal to external. Evidence from three studies provides strong support for this theoretical framework. I show that consumers willingness to relinquish decision control increases when an external PLOC is induced directly (Study 1), when an external event restricts the set of available alternatives (Study 2), and when an incentive to choose a particular alternative is present (Study 3). Based on the self-regulatory strength model and prior research on self-esteem threats, the second essay predicts and shows that delegating decisions to surrogates depletes consumers limited self-regulatory resources more than making the same decisions independently, thus impairing their subsequent ability to exercise self-control. This is the case even though decision delegation actually requires less decision making effort than independent decision making (Study 1). However, the resource depleting effect of decision delegation vanishes when consumers have an opportunity to affirm their belief in free will (Study 2). Moreover, remembering a past decision that one delegated impairs self control more than remembering a decision that one made independently (Studies 3 and 4). The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. / Marketing

Diese Dissertation untersucht aus der Perspektive der ökologischen Rationalität (ÖR) die Frage, wie Menschen Entscheidungen in sozialen Kontexten treffen, z.B. in Gruppen oder mit Hilfe von Ratschlägen. Zentral waren die Fragen, wie und welche Umweltfaktoren die Verwendung und Güte von verschiedenen Entscheidungsstrategien beeinflussen. Ziel war es, den Forschungsrahmen der ÖR mit der Gruppenforschung und Literatur zum Thema Ratgeben zu verknüpfen, um für die jeweiligen Forschungsstränge neue Erkenntnisse zu gewinnen. Im ersten Projekt wurden die Leistungen von Einzelpersonen und Zweiergruppen in einer Strategielernaufgabe miteinander verglichen. Aufgabe war es, mit Hilfe von Feedback, die Strategie zu lernen, die adaptiv in Bezug auf die Struktur der Umwelt war. Dabei war es entweder adaptiv, auf den besten diskriminierenden Cue zu setzen und die weniger validen Informationen zu ignorieren (take-the-best), oder aber alle vorhandenen Informationen zu verrechnen (weighted additive). Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sowohl Einzelpersonen als auch Gruppen die jeweils beste Strategie erlernten, wobei Gruppen einen schnelleren Lernerfolg zeigten, wenn take-the-best adaptiv war. Das zweite Projekt untersuchte, ob Gruppen Entscheidungsstrategien verwenden, die auf ihre Zusammensetzung hinsichtlich aufgabenrelevanter Faktoren abgestimmt sind. Ergebnisse eines Experiments, in dem 3-Personen-Gruppen eine Paarvergleichsaufgabe bearbeiteten, zeigten, dass Gruppen dazu in der Lage sind, den Strategien zu folgen, die am erfolgversprechendsten sind. Das dritte Projekt untersuchte den Einfluss von Aufgabenschwierigkeit auf die Güte und Verwendung von zwei häufig verwendeten Strategien (mitteln und auswählen) zur Integration von Ratschlägen. Wahrgenommene Aufgabenschwierigkeit schlug sich in verschiedenen statistischen Merkmalen der Umweltstruktur nieder, was wiederum die potentielle Güte der Strategien. Zudem stimmten Personen ihre Strategien auf die Aufgabenschwierigkeit ab. / This dissertation is an investigation from an ecological rationality (ER) perspective of how people make decisions in social contexts, for example, when people collectively make decisions in small groups or with the help of another person’s advice. Of particular interest were the questions of what and how environmental factors influence the use and performance of different decision strategies. The studies thus were aimed at linking the framework of ER with research on group decision making and advice taking, respectively, in order to derive new insights for the related research streams. A first project compared the performances of individuals and two-person groups in a strategy-learning task. The task was to learn with the help of feedback the most adaptive strategy for a given task environment. One environment favored take-the-best (i.e., the strategy to rely on the best discriminating cue and ignore the rest); the second environment favored the weighted additive strategy, which weights and adds all available cues. Results show that individuals and dyads learned to select the most appropriate strategy over time, with a steeper learning rate in dyads when take-the-best was adaptive. A second project investigated whether small groups apply decision strategies conditional on the group’s composition in terms of task-relevant features. Results of an experiment with three-member groups working on a paired-comparison task support the hypothesis that groups indeed adaptively apply the strategy that leads to the highest theoretically achievable performance. A third project investigated the impact of perceived task difficulty on the performance and use of choosing and averaging, two prominent advice-taking strategies. Perceived task difficulty was reflected in the statistical properties of the environment, which, in turn, determined the theoretical accuracy of choosing and averaging. Further, people were found to adaptively use the strategies in different task environments.