Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / Includes bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The Japanese-African aid relationship has evolved since World War Two. The majority of studies on Japan’s role in Africa have focused on the economic aspect, while Japan’s aid relationship with Africa remains a relatively underexplored area of enquiry. This thesis aims to contribute to the study of Japanese-African relations by focusing on the role of aid in Japan’s involvement with the continent. The research question focuses on the evolution of Japan’s aid relationship with sub-Saharan Africa and the factors that have shaped this relationship. The study is qualitative and exploratory in nature and makes use mostly of secondary sources. Theoretically, the study analyses the aid relationship with reference to three sources of motivation for the provision of aid, namely economic, political and moral rationales. The findings of this study highlight the fact that, before 1990, Japan’s aid relationship with Africa was motivated by all three rationales. From an economic perspective, aid served as security for resources from Africa especially after the oil crisis of 1973. From a political perspective, Japan’s aid relationship served a number of objectives that changed over time. The study highlights these changes, suggesting that, from a political perspective, Japan’s aid in respect of Africa initially served to play a critical role in the Western camp in its anti-communist struggle on the continent. It was also used to curb criticism directed at Japan by African countries for its pro-Pretoria policy. After 1990, Japan’s aid relationship with Africa from political perspective served Japan’s ambition to be recognised as a political power, most importantly to receive the support from Africa that would allow Japan to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council. From an economic perspective, it served to secure strategic natural resources for Japan that would sustain its growing economy and help to achieve its ambition of attaining global economic supremacy. From a moral perspective, the aid relationship served to promote a development path for Africa similar to that experienced in Japan’s Asian neighbourhood. Japan’s aid relationship with sub-Saharan Africa can be explained from a realist perspective, since the country’s national interests played a key role in the distribution of aid in this region. It has been important for Japan to maintain its momentum regarding global economic prominence and influence and for it to try to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. By distributing aid to Africa, it has hoped to improve its chances of achieving its economic ambition and importantly its elevation to the Security Council. The study thus suggests that political ambitions have been the primary motivating factor in the distribution of aid in sub-Saharan Africa. The areas for further investigation, as highlighted by the findings of this study, are as follows: Japan’s aid relationship with Africa remains a relatively new area of inquiry and more research could therefore be done given the available data. The study also highlights the political perspective as the primary motivating factor for Japan’s aid relationship with Africa. This served Japan’s ambitions of being recognised as a global political player that would find its greatest expression in securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council with the assistance of African nations. Future studies could investigate whether Japan has managed to achieve its global political ambition and whether African countries played a significant role in this process. Finally, future studies could study the effectiveness of the TICAD process and whether Japan’s non-Western approach to development remains a popular model. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die hulpverhouding tussen Japan en Afrika het sedert die Tweede Wêreldoorlog ontvou. Die studie van Japan se rol in Afrika het tot dusver grootliks op die ekonomiese aspek gekonsentreer, terwyl Japan se hulpverlening aan Afrika’n betreklik onderontginde studieveld bly. Hierdie tesis wil tot die studie van Japan-Afrika-betrekkinge bydra deur op Japan se hulpverlening aan die vasteland te konsentreer. Die navorsingsvraag handel oor die ontwikkeling van Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika suid van die Sahara, en die faktore wat hierdie verhouding gevorm het. Die studiemetodologie is kwalitatief en verkennend, en maak hoofsaaklik van sekondêre bronne gebruik. Wat teorie betref, ontleed die studie die hulpverhouding aan die hand van drie motiverings vir hulpverlening, naamlik ekonomiese, politieke en morele beweegredes. Die studieresultate toon dat Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika voor 1990 deur ál drie bogenoemde beweegredes aangevuur is. Uit ’n ekonomiese hoek het hulp as sekuriteit vir hulpbronne uit Afrika gedien, veral ná die oliekrisis van 1973. Uit ’n politieke hoek het Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika ’n aantal oogmerke help bevorder wat mettertyd verander het. Die studie beklemtoon hierdie veranderinge, en doen aan die hand dat, wat politiek betref, Japan se hulpverlening aan Afrika aanvanklik belangrik was in die Westerse kamp se stryd teen kommunisme op die Afrikavasteland. Dit is ook gebruik om Afrika-kritiek op Japan se pro-Pretoria-beleid te smoor. Ná 1990 het die hulpverhouding met Afrika Japan op politieke gebied help naam maak en veral Afrikasteun help werf om ’n permanente setel vir Japan in die Veiligheidsraad te bekom. Uit ’n ekonomiese hoek het dit as waarborg gedien vir strategiese natuurlike hulpbronne wat Japan se groeiende ekonomie kon ondersteun en tot sy strewe na wêreldwye ekonomiese heerskappy kon bydra. Uit ’n morele perspektief wou Japan Afrika ’n soortgelyke ontwikkelingsroete as dié van Japan se Asiatiese bure laat inslaan. Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika suid van die Sahara kan aan die hand van die realistiese perspektief verklaar word, aangesien die land se nasionale belange ’n kernrol in die verspreiding van hulp na hierdie streek gespeel het. Vir Japan was dit belangrik om sy stukrag in die strewe na wêreldwye ekonomiese statuur en invloed te behou en ’n permanente setel in die Veiligheidsraad te probeer bekom. Deur hulp aan Afrika te verleen, het Japan gehoop om sy kanse op sukses in sy ekonomiese strewes en veral ook sy verheffing tot die Veiligheidsraad te verbeter. Die studie gee dus te kenne dat politieke ambisies die hoofbeweegrede was vir hulpverlening aan Afrika suid van die Sahara. Gebiede vir verdere navorsing wat uit die bevindinge van hierdie studie spruit, is soos volg: Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika bly ’n betreklik nuwe studieveld met min beskikbare data, dus is verdere navorsing daaroor nodig. Meer bepaald beklemtoon die studie die politieke perspektief as hoofbeweegrede vir Japan se hulpverhouding met Afrika: Dit het Japan as internasionale politieke speler help vestig, en Afrikalande sou Japan uiteindelik help om die gesogte permanente setel in die Veiligheidsraad te bekom. Toekomstige studies kan verken of Japan in sy internasionale politieke strewe geslaag het en watter rol Afrikalande daarin gespeel het. Laastens kan verdere studies ook ondersoek instel na die TIKAO-proses en of Japan se nie-Westerse benadering tot ontwikkeling ’n gewilde model bly.

Thesis (MBA (Business Management))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The motive for this research was to provide clarity on the increasingly divergent opinions on the role and behaviour of South African companies in the rest of the African continent. The key question that can be asked is: “Are South African investments, saviour or villain of African Development” (Thomas, 2007)? Are they “exporting Apartheid” (Mkhabela, 2007) or are the fears raised against South African companies unfounded? The primary research objective of this study is to assess MTN-C’s contribution to the economic development of Cameroon. The specific research questions addressed in this study are: 1. What are the possible areas of economic impact? 2. How can the effects of MTN-C’s presence in Cameroon be measured—both qualitatively and quantitatively? 3. What recommendations can be made to MTN-C? To answer these questions, the researcher takes a multi-dimensional view of the economic impact across eight areas, viz., inflow of foreign direct capital, interaction with government, training and development of local staff, employment creation, local procurement, spread of local shareholding, the local mobile communications sector and corporate social investment initiatives. She assesses each of the above-mentioned eight elements and then draws some conclusions on what is perceived to be the true effect of MTN-C’s investments in Cameroon. After close to three years of in-depth research, which included several trips to Cameroon, in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, direct observation, group discussions and survey research, it can be concluded that MTN-C has indeed had a positive impact in areas like Corporate Social Investment, training and development of local staff, employment creation and the inflow of foreign capital. However, much still needs to be done. The areas that have been identified as weak include the development of local suppliers, the interaction with government and the spread of local shareholding. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die studie is gemotiveer deur die soeke na groter helderheid met betrekking tot uiteenlopende beoordelings van die rol en optrede van Suid-Afrikaanse ondernemings in die res van die Afrika-kontinent. Die kernvraag is: “Are South African investments saviour or villains of African development?” (Thomas, 2007) Is hulle besig om apartheid “uit te voer” (Mkhabela, 2007) of is dié vrese teenoor Suid-Afrikaanse ondernemings ongegrond? Die primêre navorsingsoogmerk is die beoordeling van MTN Cameroon se bydrae tot die ekonomiese ontwikkeling in Kameroen. Spesifiek drie vrae word aangespreek. 1. Watter dimensies word ingesluit in ‘n studie van die “ekonomiese impak”? 2. Hoe kan die invloed van MTN Cameroon se teenwoordigheid in dié land gemeet word – sowel kwalitatief asook kwantitatief? 3. Watter aanbevelings kan op grond van dié beoordelings aan die maatskappy gemaak word? Om hierdie vrae te beantwoord word ‘n multi-dimensionele benadering gevolg, gebaseer op agt verskillende invloed-gebiede. Hulle sluit in die invloei van buitelandse kaptiaal, interaksie met die regering, opleiding en ontwikkeling van plaaslike werknemers, werkskepping, plaaslike aankope, die verspreiding van plaaslike aandeelhouding, die mobiele kommunikasiebedryf en sosiale investerings-inisiatiewe. Elkeen van dié elemente word ontleed op grond van vraelys-reaksies en ander insigte. Dit lei tot gevolgtrekkings op elkeen van die vlakke, wat tesame die volle omvang van die betrokkenheid weerspieël. Na drie jaar se interaksie van die navorser met Kameroen, diepte-onderhoude met vername rolspelers, direkte waarnemings, groepbesprekings en 40 voltooide vraelyste kom sy tot die gevolgtrekking dat MTN Cameroon wel ‘n positiewe rol speel in gebiede soos korporatiewe sosiale investerings, opleiding, werkskepping en die invloei van kapitaal, maar dat daar nog heelwat ruimte vir verbeterings is, veral wat plaaslike aankope, interaksie met die regering en plaaslike aandeelhouding betref.

Dissertation (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Dr. A.L. Geyer's appointment in June 1950 as the Union's new High Commissioner to London was largely due to the political objectives of the then government. He was confronted by a number of related challenges, i.e. the furthering of the existing multifaceted South-African-British relations, the promotion of the apartheid policy and convincing the Union's critics as to the merits of the above policy. Geyer, a loyal Afrikaner and staunch republican, experienced soon after arrival that the policy of apartheid and the Union Government's insistence on the transfer of the High Commission territories were placing the existing diplomatic relations under considerable strain. To Geyer's frustration the Union Government failed to realise that the application of the apartheid policy 'was affecting South Africa's foreign relations detrimentally. The effect of the Union's domestic policies was therefore prohibiting any possibility of the transfer of the British-controlled neighbouring territories. Geyer was thus faced with maintaining a delicate balance between white-centred aspirations in South Africa, championing South Africa's interests overseas and his own evolving perspective that the application of the apartheid policy was not going to be acceptable to the outside world. Geyer was also well aware that the Cold War would contribute substantially to the constitutional liberation of the former British colonies in Africa, which in turn would affect the composition of the Commonwealth and South Africa's future membership. He therefore took Union politicians to task for actions that were geared to satisfy short-term party-political expectations, without taking into account both the national and international ramifications of such actions. Geyer did not differ fundamentally with the principles and objectives of apartheid; however, he was no stereotyped Afrikaner who simply supported apartheid without any questioning. In his public appearances he emphasised the historical, cultural and sociopolitical motivation for apartheid, the practical embodiment of the policy and the rights and role of the whites in South Africa. He portrayed apartheid as a political model that envisages equal, but separate development for all races that would ensure the peaceful co- existence of a multi-racial community. Geyer continuously emphasised that only visible and positive results emanating from the application of apartheid, would guarantee acceptance of the policy and also secure the future of the white population in South Africa. Geyer was therefore very critical of the government's inability to give meaningful content to the policy of apartheid. Geyer's biggest personal disappointment was the inability of his mentor and friend, Dr. D.F. Malan, to rise above the role of the party politician in becoming a competent Minister of Foreign Affairs and as Prime Minister, a statesman of international stature. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Politieke oogmerke het daartoe gelei dat die Unieregering vir dr. A.L. Geyer in Junie 1950 na Londen gestuur het as die Unie se nuwe Hoë Kommissaris. Hy is deur verwante uitdagings gekonfronteer, naamlik om die veelvlakkige Suid-Afrikaans-Britse betrekkinge uit te bou, om die apartheidsbeleid te bevorder en om die kritici van die Unieregering te oortuig dat daar geregverdigde meriete in die beleid is. Geyer, 'n lojale en republikeinsgesinde Afrikaner, het na sy aankoms ervaar dat die Unieregering se apartheidsbeleid en die volgehoue aandrang om die oordrag van die Hoë Kommissariaatgebiede, toenemende diplomatieke spanning tussen die lande veroorsaak het. Tot Geyer se frustrasie kon die Unieregering nie insien dat die toepassing van die apartheidsbeleid direkte invloed uitoefen op Suid-Afrika se buitelande betrekkinge nie, wat weer die oordrag van die Brits-beheerde gebiede onmoontlik gemaak het. Geyer moes gevolglik 'n delikate balans handhaaf tussen die blanksentriese verwagtinge in die Unie, die bevordering van Suid-Afrika se belange in die buiteland en sy groterwordende perspektief dat die toepassing van die apartheid nie vir die buitewêreld aanvaarbaar is nie. Geyer was ook terdeë daarvan bewus dat die Koue Oorlog, die grondwetlike ontvoogding van Brittanje se Afrika-kolonies sou verhaas, wat weer beduidende implikasies vir die samestelling van die Statebond en die Unie se voortgesette lidmaatskap ingehou het. Hy het Unie-politici dus gewaarsku teen optredes wat daarop toegespits was om korttermyn partypolitieke verwagtinge te bevredig, sonder om die nasionale en ook internasionale implikasies van die uitsprake te verreken. Geyer het geen fundamentele verskille met die beginsels en oogmerke van apartheid gehad nie, maar terselfdertyd was hy ook nie 'n stereotipe Afrikaner en naprater van apartheid nie. In sy optredes het hy deurentyd die historiese, kulturele en sosio-politieke beweegredes vir apartheid, die beliggaming van die beleid en die blanke se aanspraak op en rol in Suid-Afrika beklemtoon. Apartheid is voorgehou as 'n politieke model wat ten doel het om deur middel van gelykwaardige, maar afsonderlike ontwikkeling die ruimte te skep vir die vreedsame voortbestaan van 'n veelrassige gemeenskap. Geyer het groot erns daarvan gemaak om te beklemtoon dat die aanvaarding van die apartheidsbeleid en die blanke se voortbestaan in Suid-Afrika nou verbind word aan die positiewe en sigbare gevolge van die toepassing van apartheid. Geyer het dit dan ook nodig gevind om kritiek uit te spreek oor die regering se klaarblyklike onvermoë om daadwerklike inhoud aan positiewe apartheid te gee. Die grootste persoonlike teleurstelling wat Geyer egter beleef het, was sy ontnugtering dat sy mentor en vriend, dr. D.F. Malan, nie sy rol as partypolitikus kon ontgroei en ontwikkel in 'n bekwame minister van Buitelandse Sake en 'n Eerste Minister wat 'n staatsman van internasionale statuur is nie.

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities / Department of Government and Public Administration

The clash between South Africa's dual need of a new political identity and economic viability reflects not only the difficulty in conducting a traditional foreign policy with a strong ideological overlay but also has spurred the debate over whether her foreign policy is to be conducted on the basis of expediency or principle. This study argues that although the shift to a post-apartheid society has created the context for South African foreign policy to be shaped by a new culture of human rights, it remains an interest-based pragmatic activity rather than an exercise in the projection of ethical values or ideological principles. It seems that the African National Congress (ANC)-led government has not yet resolved the basic contradictions that have bedevilled its international thinking since it came into power. Faced with this dilemma, South Africa is often reduced to straddling the fence by half-heartedly supporting principles on one occasion (as in its relationship with the Republic of China), and on another pursuing its economic interests (as her intention to sell arms to the People's Republic of China attests). The government's basic goal of developing fruitful political and economic linkages without sacrificing the principles which underpin wider policy has proved elusive. The central proposition of this study is that the defining parameters of South African foreign policy have remained largely indeterminate because of the realities of the conflicting interests posed by its domestic and external concerns. In essence, the inability to reconcile primary foreign policy goals (preservation of national economic interest) with new foreign policy aspirations (promotion of human rights and peace through the pursuit of justice and fair-play) reflects a tense ambivalence in the founding principles of post apartheid South African foreign policy. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2001.

Both interventionist and anti-interventionist scholars have advanced the view that the 2011 Libyan conflict probes the need to establish an international organisation to settle disputes between nations with a view to maintaining international peace and security. Ironically, 67 years after the founding of the United Nations, post-colonial African states remain deeply troubled and affected by conflicts that are often exacerbated by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions. The 2011 Libyan conflict was not a war for democracy; rather, it represented and demonstrated clearly the asymmetrical relations between Africa and Europe. This study therefore, is anchored on the thesis that the Western Countries—especially Britain and France—within the UNSC ignore the values that are embodied in the Treaty of Westphalia which established state sovereignty. Some Permanent five (P5) members of the UN were typically insensitive to Libya’s sovereignty and to the creed of democracy and this inevitably undermined the national security of the state in favour of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ clause. The outsourcing of the UNSC’s mission, among other things, in Libya to ensure ‘international peace and security’ to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was a critical reason for the loss of human lives and values in the 2011 Libyan pogrom. The introduction of a no-fly zone over Libya and the use of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) contained in UNSC Resolution 1973 clearly stoked the conflict in Libya in order to further the political and pecuniary interests of some of the P5 members. The involvement of NATO and the attendant bombing campaign in Libya served to undermine the militarily weak continent of Africa in its effort to broker peace under the umbrella of the African Union (AU). In order to secure these political and economic interests, the NATO jet bombers declared war against a sovereign UN member state and openly participated in the eventual overthrow and death of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. In essence, this study underscores that the use of Responsibility to Protect in Libya was orchestrated at the highest level of international politics to justify external interference and ultimately, to secure regime change in Libya. The net effect of the outcome of the 2011 Libyan conflict is the post-war imperial control of Libya’s natural resources facilitated by the National Transition Committee established by these imperial forces. The extent of the damage caused by the UN-backed NATO intervention in Libya is also the result of the collective failure of the African Union to assert itself in the Libyan situation. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development- NEPAD is the continued search by African people and its leaders to develop Pan African structures that will initiate social and economic transformation in a rapidly globalizing world which continues to marginalize Africa. According to the human indicators of the United Nations Development Programme, Africa remains the poorest continent under the sun. Half of Africa's 875 million people survive on US $ 1 daily and they have little access to socio - economic infrastructure. South Africa, guided by her foreign policy, which advocates respect for human rights, democracy and economic development, is at the forefront in efforts to promote NEPAD. South Africa's promotion of NEPAD is encouraged by her will to promote the philosophy of African Renaissance, to maintain her prestige in Africa and to assert South Africa's leadership in Africa. Many internal and external problems have been encountered by South Africa whilst promoting NEPAD. Internal problems have been; unemployment, poverty, tuberculosis, HIV I AIDS, corruption and an excruciating debt. The forces of globalization such as economic marginalisation and the non-representation of South Africa within the multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization have presented external problems. NEPAD should develop social policies that complement liberal policies in order to address internal problems such as unemployment and poverty. African .governments should not withdraw from being involved in their nation's economies and solely rely on liberal policies for economic capital flows. Lastly, NEPAD should fight for the restructuring of the multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization. / M.Admin. (PSIS) North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, 2004

No description available.

This is the first study of official relations between South Africa and Australia as conducted through resident High Commissions or Embassies. It reaches the conclusion that, though neither country loomed large on the other's scale of priorities, the relationship was at the outset perceived to be of greater value to Australia than to South Africa. It was initiated by the Australian government in 1945 as was the airlink which connected the two countries in 1952. Then flown by propeller-driven aircraft, the air route led to the expansion of Australian territory when the United Kingdom transferred to Australia sovereignty over the Cocos (Keeling) Islands in the Indian Ocean, eight hours flying time from Perth and an essential refuelling stop en route to Southern Afnca. The first Australian High Commissioner, Sir George Knowles, arrived in South Africa in August 1946. The Smuts government did not attach much value to the relationship. Pleading shortage of staff, and to the embarrassment of the Australian government, it had not reciprocated with its own appointment by the time of its fall in May 1948. On assuming office the following month the new Prime Minister, Dr Malan responded positively to an Australian reminder about the lack of a South African High Commissioner. Dr P.R. Viljoen was appointed to the position and arrived in Canberra in June 1949. The relationship lacked substance and for relatively lengthy periods in the 1950s the High Commissioner's post was left vacant on both sides. The Australian government had proposed the establishment of relations on grounds inter alia that members of the British Commonwealth should be informed about each other's attitudes, policies and problems in the work of the United Nations. Yet it was the United Nations, particularly its composition, which subjected the relationship to its greatest strains. In focusing on the role and functions of individual diplomats the study throws light on what the profession or occupation of diplomacy encompassed at the time. Also canvassed is the development of the South African and Australian Departments of External Affairs from their beginnings to the early 1960s. / D. Litt et Phil. (History)

This thesis explores the political, economic and theoretical underpinnings of the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR’s) development policies towards the Third World between c.1960 and 1990. Particular attention is paid to Africa. Case studies of assistance to SWAPO and the ANC further focus the attention of the reader on southern Africa in particular. Aspects of both military and civilian aid are considered, including both development initiatives overseas in Africa, and development training for Africans within the GDR itself. Since German “reunification”, the GDR’s history has been explored largely from a West German perspective. The present work attempts to provide a more balanced view of successes and shortcomings of the GDR’s policies towards, and interaction with, African countries and liberation movements. It also aims to bring to the attention of English-speaking readers German archival sources, other primary sources and published works which they would otherwise have been unlikely to encounter. From its formation, the GDR made strenuous efforts to develop relations with countries which were either free from colonial dependency or were struggling for freedom. Over the course of thirty years, it followed a number of different approaches, and developed diverse objectives. These were shaped in the wider context of the cold war, the Hallstein doctrine (which established that the FRG – and, in effect, its allies - would not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognised the GDR), the relationships between the GDR and partner socialist states, and the economic difficulties faced by the GDR. Arising from this complex situation, from time to time, both internally in the GDR and in terms of its foreign affairs, tensions and discrepancies arose between theoretical objectives and political and economic reality. Despite these severe constraints, during the period under review, the volume and range of the GDR’s relationships with developing countries increased dramatically. For example, between 1970 and 1987, the number of developing countries with which the GDR had foreign economic relations on the basis of international agreements grew from 23 to 64. Viewed within its economic context, the state was arguably far more committed to development aid than the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, there is a great deal of evidence that “solidarity” with developing nations and the oppressed enjoyed a considerable degree of popular support.