<p>Purpose: The purpose of this research is to explore the reasons behind the abolish-ment of statutory audit in small limited firms in Sweden and to discuss whether it would be beneficial for these firms to still maintain an audit of their business after the abolishment.</p><p>Method: As a major part of this research study, qualitative interviews with auditors have been conducted to obtain professional opinion in the subject of inter-est. Previous research are presented to provide a broader perspective of the debate.</p><p>Frame of Reference: The authors present an extensive background to auditing and accounting. Stakeholder model and agency theory have been applied to aid an under-standing of the relationship between a firm and its stakeholders. Experi-ences from other European Union countries are presented to provide a ba-sis of comparison and discussion. Moreover, advantages and disadvantages of auditing are presented to facilitate a discussion of whether it is beneficial to maintain an audit of small limited firms.</p><p>Conclusion: After extensive research the authors have identified and determined the most probable reasons behind the abolishment of statutory audit. The au-thors can after a broad research conclude that the central reasons behind the abolishment are the costs of auditing. Populism and politics, as well as harmonisation motives of the European Union, are also prominent reasons for the abolishment of statutory audit in small limited firms in Sweden.</p><p>Highlighting the benefits of auditing illustrates that accomplishing an assur-ance of quality is one of the most essential motives of an audit review. Au-diting may facilitate granting of loans, longer credit periods and loyalty, a credible image of the firm, as a result of business owners providing trust-worthy information to their stakeholders. It can be concluded that it is beneficial for small limited firms to maintain an audit of their business, de-spite the abolishment of statutory audit.</p> / <p>Syfte: Syftet med denna uppsats är att utforska de bakomliggande orsakerna till revisionspliktens avskaffande i små aktiebolag i Sverige och att diskutera hu-ruvida det är fördelaktigt att behålla revision i bolagen efter slopandet.</p><p>Metod: För att erhålla en professionell åsikt kring ämnet i fråga, har denna studie till största del bestått av kvalitativa intervjuer med respondenter från revisions-byråer. Tidigare studier är även presenterade för att tillföra debatten ett bre-dare perspektiv.</p><p>Referensram: Författarna ger en omfattande beskrivning av redovisning och revision. Intressentmodellen och agentteorin har tillämpats i syfte att underlätta för-ståelsen av relationen mellan företag och dess intressenter. Erfarenheter från andra EU-länder är presenterade för att möjliggöra jämförelse och dis-kussion, dessutom beskrivs för- och nackdelar av revision för att underlätta diskussionen om huruvida det är fördelaktigt att behålla revision i små ak-tiebolag.</p><p>Slutsats: Författarna har efter omfattande forskning fastställt de troligaste orsakerna till slopandet av revisionsplikten i små aktiebolag. Sammanfattningsvis kan författarna hävda att huvudorsakerna till avskaffandet är kostnaden av att upprätthålla revision. Populism, politik och EU:s harmoniserande strävan är ytterligare framträdande anledningar till slopandet av revisionsplikt i små ak-tiebolag i Sverige.</p><p>Att erhålla en kvalitetsstämpel är den främsta fördelen med revision. Dessutom kan revisionen underlätta beviljande av lån, längre kredittider, bi-dra till ökad pålitlighet och trovärdighet av bolaget. Dessa fördelar resulterar från ägarnas pålitliga information som de förser sina intressenter med. Av-slutningsvis kan man påstå att det är gynnsamt för små aktiebolag att behål-la revision även efter slopandet.</p>

<p>Introduction: Over half of the Swedish IT-projects get delayed and more expensive than budgeted. Large corporations and governmental institutions stand before the process of investigating in new IT-systems in intervals of three to five years. In order to decrease the cost, an external consultant with large experience in IT-purchases could be used by the customers. These consultants does today work solely for the customers, helping them to find the best solution. We want to see if an external consultant instead could act as an inde-pendent moderator between the supplier and customer in the IT-systems lifecycle.</p><p>Purpose: The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze problems and possible solutions related to the involvement of third party consultants in larger IT-projects. In particular, we will investigate when and where in the project cycle it could be beneficial to use an independent moderator.</p><p>Method: We have conducted semi-structured interviews with six organizations to get an understanding about consultants in IT-projects. Four of the interviewed were IT-managers at organizations were large IT-systems are bought and implemented. Then, two of the in-terviewed represented the supplier companies that sell large IT-systems.</p><p>Frame of reference: Transaction cost theory and agency theory has been used. Transac-tion cost theory is a theory on whether you should conduct the service internally or purchase it from external firms. Agency theory describes problems in the relationship between a principal and an agent. The agent has a diversified interest towards the principal. In our case, the agent is a consultant.</p><p>Conclusion: The implementation phase benefits from using an external moderator who monitors what the customer needs, and then in a continuous interval measures if the project is aligning towards the stated goal. This can lower the failure of information and identify problem areas early and thereby prevent costly adjustments later in the project. An in-dependent moderator with a high degree of routine and specific knowledge could enhance communication, create a better fit of the implemented system and foresee opportunistic advices from suppliers. In the pre-study phase there are benefits for the customer with evaluating the need, stating specific demands and define a clear goal.</p>

<p>The Enron collapse in 2001 has resulted in an increasing attention to corporate governance. Even in Sweden, some scandals have occurred, for example Skandia, ABB, Trustor; a parallel could be drawn, implying that these scandals have resulted in increased attention to corporate governance. Corporate governance concerns the relationship between a corporation’s management, board of directors, shareholders and other stakeholders. The problems with the relationship between managers and share-holders are referred to as the principle-agent problem. The increase in corporate governance disclosure can be seen as a way by the corporations to regain the trust from the shareholders. Can agency theory be used to explain why some corporation disclose more corporate governance information than others?</p><p>The purpose with this master thesis is, with starting point in agency theory, to contribute to the understanding of which factors that influence corporations to disclose corporate governance information in the annual reports.</p><p>For this thesis, a quantitative research has been performed. Annual reports from corporations listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange have been examined, to be able to develop a corporate governance disclosure index and to measure 15 characteristics, derived from the agency theory and two control variables. The data was analysed in SPSS , using both linear and multiple regressions.</p><p>The analysis showed that role duality actually measured if a corporation had a foreign parent company and corporations listed on the O-list other on Stockholm Stock Exchange served as proxies for smaller corporations. Therefore, it was possible to con-clude that corporations were influenced by the origin of the parent company and the size of the corporation to disclose corporate governance information. Another conclusion was that corporate governance characteristics derived from agency theory is not appropriate when trying to find factors that influence corporations to disclose corporate governance information. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is inappropriate to take the starting point in the agency theory.</p>

Univ., Diss.--Wageningen, 2006. / Zsfassung in niederländ. Sprache.

Wirtschaftswiss. Fakultät der Humboldt-Univ., Diss.--Berlin, 2006. / Zsfassung in dt. Sprache.

Wiss. Hochschule für Unternehmensführung, Diss--Koblenz, 2006.

Ett allt vanligare fenomen i dagens arbetsliv är inhyrning av personal. För många företag ses det som ett sätt att öka flexibiliteten och därmed minska osäkerheten i företaget, och för många människor ses det som en väg in i arbetsmarknaden. Men hur ser möjligheterna till lärande och utveckling ut för dessa individer? Syftet med denna studie har varit att belysa relationen bemanningskonsulter och deras lär- och utvecklingsmöjligheter i arbetet. För att belysa syftet utvecklades tre frågeställningar; ”Hur upplever bemanningskonsulten att lärande och utveckling sker på kundföretaget när denne är inhyrd?”; ”Hur upplever bemanningskonsulten att kundföretaget bidrar till lärande och utveckling på arbetsplatsen för denne?” samt ”Hur upplever bemanningskonsulten att bemanningsföretaget bidrar till lärande och utveckling för denne?”. Utifrån dessa granskades sedan tidigare forskning som gjorts på området bemanningskonsulter och arbetsplatslärande för att ge en bakgrundsförståelse. Därefter genomfördes åtta semistrukturerade intervjuer med bemanningskonsulter från två olika bemanningsföretag. Empirin från dessa intervjuer analyserades utifrån ett sociokulturellt perspektiv med hjälp av Lave och Wengers teorier om situerat lärande och praktikgemenskaper. Resultatet diskuterades därefter i relation till den tidigare forskningen. Det visade att något som var viktigt i bemanningskonsulternas lärprocess var det sociala samspelet med kollegor, samt att delaktighet upplevdes som positivt för lärandet. Denna delaktighet såg dock olika ut i kundföretaget och bemanningsföretaget. Kundföretaget kunde erbjuda ett bemötande som var likvärdigt med övrig personal för att bidra till lärande och utveckling. Bemanningsföretaget kunde å andra sidan skapa möjligheter för lärande genom att fungera som en plattform mellan bemanningskonsulter samt ge förutsättning för utveckling genom att placera dem på utvecklande uppdrag. / An increasingly common phenomenon in today’s working life is the use of temporary workers. To many companies this is seen as a way to increase flexibility and thus reduce uncertainty in the company, and for many people it is seen as a way into the labour market. But what do the opportunities for learning and development look like for these individuals? The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between temporary agency workers and their learning and development opportunities in client companies. In order to highlight the purpose three questions were developed; “In what way do temporary agency workers perceive that learning and development take place at the client company when they are working there?”; “In what way do temporary agency workers perceive that the client company contributes to learning and development in the workplace for them?” And finally “In what way do temporary agency workers perceive that the temporary agency contributes to learning and development for them?”. After that previous research done in the field of temporary agency work and workplace learning was audited to provide a better understanding of the subject. This was followed by eight semi-structured interviews with temporary agency workers from two different temporary agencies. Empirical data from these interviews were then analyzed on the basis of a socio-cultural perspective, with the help of Lave and Wenger's theories of situated learning and communities of practice. The result has been discussed in relation to the previous research. It has shown that something that is important to temporary agency workers’ learning process is social interaction with colleagues, and that participation is seen as positive for learning. This participation was, however, different in the client company and the temporary agency. The client company could treat the temporary agency worker equally with other staff to contribute to learning and development. The temporary agency could, on the other hand, create learning opportunities by serving as a platform between temporary agency workers, as well as provide good conditions for development by placing them on challenging assignments.

This study examines the existence of pay-performance sensitivity in total compensation and bonus during the financial crisis, using data between 2007-2010 from Swedish 196 listed firms. We perform panel data regression analysis of CEO compensation on financial performance measured as stock returns. Our results indicate that there is, although not significant, a weak positive relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance during 2007-2010. However during 2009-2010 in a market state defined as post-crisis we find weak negative pay-performance sensitivity at a significance level of 10 %. Nevertheless, as regards to the bonus paid to executives there was a significantly positive relationship relative bonus % and firm performance. These results contribute to our understanding of the pay-performance sensitivity in times of financial disturbance, highly relevant to the existing debate considering CEO compensation.

The reported study investigated temporal agency (i.e., the assignment of cause for temporal shift) in newlyweds’ courtship narratives. Transcripts of courtship narratives generated by each partner of 23 recently married couples (approximately 3 months) participating in the PAIR project (Huston, McHale, & Crouter, 1986) were analyzed for the presence of different linguistic strategies for encoding temporal shift. Statements were coded as “human agency assignments” when they assigned the cause of temporal shift to humans (e.g., we started seeing each other in June); statements that assigned temporal shift to abstract entities such as the events themselves (e.g., the summer started out well for us) or to the relationship (e.g., the relationship started to slow down) were coded as “abstract agency assignments.” The frequency with which narrators mentioned positiveand negative emotions was also coded to explore the possibility that emotional valence mediated agency assignments. The frequency of different agency assignments and emotion words were considered in the context of portions of the courtship accounts that narrators designated as describing “upturns” (episodes that increased the likelihood of marriage) or “downturns” (episodes that decreased marriage likelihood). Results indicated that the frequency of human agency assignments and positive emotion mention were higher in upturn than downturn narrative segments; in contrast, abstract agency assignments and negative emotion mention were more frequent in downturn than upturn segments. Subsequent analyses indicated that positive word mention partially mediated human agency assignments in upturns and that negative word mention partially mediated abstract agency assignments in downturns. These findings are consistent with previous research demonstrating an association between the emotional valence of an event and temporal agency assignment: In general, people assign temporal agency to themselves when describing positive events, but prefer abstract agency assignments for negative events (McGlone & Pfiester, 2009). / text

Credit rating agencies are controversial yet influential financial gatekeepers. Many have attributed the recent failures of credit rating agencies to conflicts of interest, such as the agencies’ issuer-pays business model and the agencies’ provision of ancillary services. This report identifies these conflicts; examines recently-finalized Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations proscribing these conflicts; and suggests other possible regulatory measures. The strategies available to regulators are diverse and differ widely in their political and administrative feasibility. These strategies include outright prohibition of conflicts; removing regulatory references to credit ratings; enhancing agency liability; organizational firewalls; performance disclosures; demonstrating due diligence and its results; increasing competition; staleness reforms; internal governance; administrative registration; and requiring alternative business models. While the report primarily focuses on how the most recent financial crisis—and the related market for asset-backed securities—highlighted conflicts of interest at credit rating agencies, this report also examines how credit ratings—and their limitations—affect sovereign debt markets. / text