Czech regulation of limited companies from the point of view of the 'law and economics' school Abstract Law and economics has a potential to provide us with an uncommon and to the Czech jurisdiction often neglected point of view on laws. The aim of this paper is to apply economic theories on directors' liability for breach of fiduciary duties and to consider its consequences on the economic efficiency of companies. The critical question is whether not having such liability could provoke an increase of wealth of all stakeholders. The paper also aims to come up with instruments capable of minimizing the lost caused to companies by mandatory rules regarding director's liability. At the end of the thesis, the Czech laws regarding the director's liability for breach of fiduciary duties are analyzed in the point of view of economic analysis. The analysis is followed by proposition of instruments that could make companies operating in Czech legal environment more effective. Directors' liability, which can result in an aversion to make risky decisions, can cause significant losses to companies (so called agency costs). For that reason, the possibility to determine the scope of director's liability given to shareholders can have, in some cases, positive effect on the company's efficiency. The paper concludes that...

Background: Theoretical, it’s been questioned why dividends exists in companies based upon the fact that there is a separation between ownership and control. According to the agency theoretical perception, dividends is used as a manner to unify the interest of this separation, which in turn lower the agency cost, and increase the efficiency of companies. Purpose: The aim of this master thesis is to scrutinize and analyse the association between Swedish firms’ owner structure and owner types and their inclination to dividend. Method: We attack the problem with a hypothetical-deductive research method by using the existence of a universal theory, the agency theory. From our theoretical framework we propose a set of hypotheses. Through these hypotheses we intend to empirical investigate the agency theoretical explanations regarding ownership and dividend policy in Swedish public firms. The empirical material has been gathered from annual reports, Börsguide and Ägarna och Makten. The data has then been statistical processed and analyzed which consecutively resulted in our conclusions. Conclusions: The findings from our study indicate that ownership affects companies dividend policy. The most striking findings in our study show that there is a significant positive relationship with owner concentration and dividends. Comparing to other studies in the field this is a rather controversy conclusion. According to Schooley and Barney (1994) and Farinha (2003) our results confirm the proposal that there is a U-shaped relationship between internal ownership and dividends. Suggestions for further research: Our suggestion for further research is to expand our study by investigate a time-serie of data and compare Swedish listed firms with firms in other European countries. Further suggestion is to proceed the identification of ownership as a mechanism for corporate governance. Based on the fact that the market context in Sweden has developed, it would be of great interest to investigate ownership affection on the procurement of raising capital. / Bakgrund: Det har länge förts en kraftfull debatt om ägarstrukturens påverkan på företag. Viss teori har ifrågasatt varför utdelningar överhuvudtaget förekommer i företag där kontrollen är skild från ägarna. Enligt det agentteoretiska perspektivet är utdelning en metod att föra samman företagsledningens och ägarnas intressen, vilket samtidigt ökar företagetseffektivitet. Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka och analysera sambandet mellan svenska företags ägarstruktur samt ägartyper och företags utdelningsnivå. Vi vill således undersöka ägandets påverkan på företags utdelningsnivå. Metod: Vi använder oss av ett hypotetiskt-deduktivt angreppssätt genom att vi utgår ifrån befintlig universell teori i form av agentteori. Utifrån vår teoretiska referensram har vi utformat hypoteser för att på så sätt empiriskt undersöka de agentteoretiska förklaringarna angående ägande och utdelningspolicy i svenska företag. Det empiriska materialet har vi samlat in från årsredovisningar, Börsguide samt Ägarna och Makten. Informationen har sedan statistiskt bearbetats samt analyserats vilket har mynnat ut i våra slutsatser. Slutsatser: Den generella slutsats vi kan dra genom vår studie är att ägarstruktur och ägartyper har en viss inverkan på företags utdelningspolicy. De mest utmärkande slutsatserna vår studie har visat är för det första ett signifikant positivt samband mellan ägarkoncentration och utdelningar. Jämfört med andra studier på området är detta en motsägande slutsats. För det andra, i enlighet med Schooley och Barney (1994) och Farinha (2003) bekräftar våra resultat antagandet att det finns en U-formad relation mellan internt ägande och utdelningar. Förslag till fortsatt forskning: Vårt förslag till fortsatt forskning är att utöka denna studie genom att undersöka en längre tidsperiod samt att jämföra svenska företag med företag i andra europeiska länder. Ytterligare förslag till vidare forskning är att fortsätta identifiera ägandet som en mekanism för hur företag styrs. Då det har skett en utveckling i Sverige beträffande själva marknadskontexten så anser vi det vara av intresse att utreda hur kapitalanskaffningen går till i svenska börsbolag.

<p>Background: Theoretical, it’s been questioned why dividends exists in companies based upon the fact that there is a separation between ownership and control. According to the agency theoretical perception, dividends is used as a manner to unify the interest of this separation, which in turn lower the agency cost, and increase the efficiency of companies.</p><p>Purpose: The aim of this master thesis is to scrutinize and analyse the association between Swedish firms’ owner structure and owner types and their inclination to dividend.</p><p>Method: We attack the problem with a hypothetical-deductive research method by using the existence of a universal theory, the agency theory. From our theoretical framework we propose a set of hypotheses. Through these hypotheses we intend to empirical investigate the agency theoretical explanations regarding ownership and dividend policy in Swedish public firms. The empirical material has been gathered from annual reports, Börsguide and Ägarna och Makten. The data has then been statistical processed and analyzed which consecutively resulted in our conclusions.</p><p>Conclusions: The findings from our study indicate that ownership affects companies dividend policy. The most striking findings in our study show that there is a significant positive relationship with owner concentration and dividends. Comparing to other studies in</p><p>the field this is a rather controversy conclusion. According to Schooley and Barney (1994) and Farinha (2003) our results confirm the proposal that there is a U-shaped relationship between internal ownership and dividends.</p><p>Suggestions for further research: Our suggestion for further research is to expand our study by investigate a time-serie of data and compare Swedish listed firms with firms in other European countries. Further suggestion is to proceed the identification of ownership as a</p><p>mechanism for corporate governance. Based on the fact that the market context in Sweden has developed, it would be of great interest to investigate ownership affection on the procurement of raising capital.</p> / <p>Bakgrund: Det har länge förts en kraftfull debatt om ägarstrukturens påverkan på företag. Viss teori har ifrågasatt varför utdelningar överhuvudtaget förekommer i företag där kontrollen är skild från ägarna. Enligt det agentteoretiska perspektivet är utdelning en metod</p><p>att föra samman företagsledningens och ägarnas intressen, vilket samtidigt ökar företagetseffektivitet.</p><p>Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka och analysera sambandet mellan svenska företags ägarstruktur samt ägartyper och företags utdelningsnivå. Vi vill således undersöka ägandets påverkan på företags utdelningsnivå.</p><p>Metod: Vi använder oss av ett hypotetiskt-deduktivt angreppssätt genom att vi utgår ifrån befintlig universell teori i form av agentteori. Utifrån vår teoretiska referensram har vi utformat hypoteser för att på så sätt empiriskt undersöka de agentteoretiska förklaringarna angående ägande och utdelningspolicy i svenska företag. Det empiriska materialet har vi samlat in från årsredovisningar, Börsguide samt Ägarna och Makten. Informationen har</p><p>sedan statistiskt bearbetats samt analyserats vilket har mynnat ut i våra slutsatser.</p><p>Slutsatser: Den generella slutsats vi kan dra genom vår studie är att ägarstruktur och ägartyper har en viss inverkan på företags utdelningspolicy. De mest utmärkande slutsatserna vår studie har visat är för det första ett signifikant positivt samband mellan ägarkoncentration och utdelningar. Jämfört med andra studier på området är detta en motsägande slutsats. För det andra, i enlighet med Schooley och Barney (1994) och Farinha (2003) bekräftar våra</p><p>resultat antagandet att det finns en U-formad relation mellan internt ägande och utdelningar.</p><p>Förslag till fortsatt forskning: Vårt förslag till fortsatt forskning är att utöka denna studie genom att undersöka en längre tidsperiod samt att jämföra svenska företag med företag i andra europeiska länder. Ytterligare förslag till vidare forskning är att fortsätta identifiera ägandet som en mekanism för hur företag styrs. Då det har skett en utveckling i Sverige beträffande själva marknadskontexten så anser vi det vara av intresse att utreda hur kapitalanskaffningen går till i svenska börsbolag.</p>

Esta dissertação analisa a representação direta voluntária a partir de três âmbitos: (i) histórico, (ii) estrutural e (iii) econômico. O perfil histórico é abordado a partir de uma breve construção historiográfica do desenvolvimento da representação desde o período clássico romano, passando pela Idade Média e suas transmutações, com concessões ao brocardo romano alteri stipulari nemo potest, até a construção proposta pela pandectística germânica na figura de Laband. A construção labandiana, lapidada por Hupka, é analisada, posteriormente, sob a perspectiva civilista atual, retomando algumas propostas do modelo idealizado por Laband-Hupka e algumas críticas a este modelo, trazendo como ponto central a questão da abstração da representação em relação ao contrato de mandato e outras figuras gestórias. A figura representativa é, então, colocada sob análise econômica, sob a lupa da Análise Econômica do Direito. A análise ultrapassa a questão de economia de custos que a representação oferece, e que é de meridiana clareza, para analisar, sob a perspectiva da Teoria de Agência e da Teoria de Custos de Transação, os custos gerados por esta figura na negociação e conclusão de contratos / This dissertation analyzes the direct and voluntary representation from three different scopes: (i) historical, (ii) structural, and (iii) economical. The historic profile is broached from a brief historiographical construction of the development of representation from tha classical Roman period, through the Middle Ages and its transmutations, with concessions made to the Roman maxim alteri stipulari nemo potest, until the construction proposed by German Pandect author, Laband. The Laband construction, improved by Hupka, is analyzed, subsequently, under the present civil perspective, retaking some of the proposals of the model idealized by Laband-Hupka and some criticism to this model, bringing as central point of discussion the abstraction of representations towards the contract of mandate and other management relationships. The representative figure is, then, put under economical analysis, under the magnifying glass of Law and Economics. The analysis exceeds the matter of economy of costs that is offered by representation, and which is rather explicit, to analyze, under the perspective of the Agency Theorie and the Costs of Transaction Theorie, the costs generated by this figure in transaction and closing of contracts

When society, and especially the financial markets, experience a downturn real estate companies are often front and center of discussions. This sector is a capital-intensive industry which often carries a large fraction of borrowed funds. The last decade has been marked by good economic growth, low interest rates, and rising property values which the real estate market has profited from. Public real estate companies appraise investment properties exclusively on fair value, which means that estimated market values influence companies’ financial reports. The study aims to scrutinize how property values impact debt, and further shed light on the pro-cyclical nature of property values. Using a deductive approach, fair value changes of real estate in relation to debt are analyzed through a correlation analysis and multiple regression. The study applies two dependent variables where debt-equity ratio constitutes one of them, and interest-bearing debt in relation to net operating income constitutes the other. The result shows that fair value changes have a significant weak negative correlation to the debt-equity ratio, and a non-significant weak positive correlation to interest-bearing debt to net operating income. The authors conclude that the weak correlation found in debt-equity ratio implies that real estate companies react to fair value changes. The non-significant correlation with interest-bearing debt in relation to net operating income indicates that fair value changes increase companies’ debt. Furthermore, the study shows that there are individual differences between companies. / När samhället, och i synnerhet de finansiella marknaderna, upplever försämrade tider är ofta fastighetsbolag på tapeten. Sektorn är en kapitalintensiv bransch som ofta förfogar över en stor del lånade medel. Det senaste årtiondet har präglats av god ekonomisk tillväxt, låga räntor och stigande fastighetsvärden vilket har gynnat fastighetsbranschen. Börsnoterade fastighetsbolag värderar förvaltningsfastigheter uteslutande till verkligt värde, vilket innebär att uppskattade marknadsvärden ger effekt på bolagens finansiella rapporter. Studien ämnar särgranska huruvida fastighetsvärdet inverkar på skuldsättning och vidare belysa fastighetsvärdens procykliska natur. Ur en deduktiv ansats analyseras orealiserade värdeförändringar på fastigheter i relation till skuldsättning genom en korrelationsanalys och en multipel regression. Studien tillämpar två beroende variabler där skuldsättningsgrad utgör den ena och räntebärande skulder i förhållande till driftnetto utgör den andra. Resultatet visar att orealiserade värdeförändringar har ett statistiskt signifikant svagt negativt samband med skuldsättningsgrad och ett icke statistiskt signifikant svagt positivt samband med räntebärande skulder i förhållande till driftnetto. Författarna kommer fram till att det svaga sambandet med skuldsättningsgrad antyder att fastighetsbolag agerar på orealiserade värdeförändringar. Det ickestatistiskt signifikanta positiva sambandet med räntebärande skulder i förhållande till driftnetto indikerar att orealiserade värdeförändringar ökar bolagens skuldsättning. Avslutningsvis visar studiens resultat att det finns individuella skillnader mellan bolagen

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explain how the share of independent boardmembers, controlling for different forms of independence, and agency costs correlate within Swedish firms listed on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm list for large firms. The goal is to extend the understanding of board independence in relation to agency costs while adding empirical insight into the Swedish Code requirements on the board of directors. Theoretical Perspective: With a theoretical anchor in agent theory, this study presents the two conflicts assumed to exist between the agent and the principals within the firms. The first conflict is between agent and principal, and the second is between principal and principal. The agency perspective is used to explain how agency costs arise, within which conflict they arise, and how board members' independence should mitigate these. Method: This study applied a positivistic, deductive research approach using a quantitative strategy. Data was collected from annual reports and the databases Orbis, Holdings, and Retriever Business. Proxies were used for measuring agency costs. The statistical analysis ofthe data consisted of Pearson correlation, linear regressions, and binary logistic regressions. Conclusion: No unambiguous negative correlation could be confirmed between independent board members and agency costs when examined separately. A tradeoff in board members'independence and total agency costs can be confirmed. This implies that when coexisting board members’ different independence works in opposing directions for reducing the residual loss tied both to the agent-principal conflict and the principal-principal conflict

The thesis examines factors that influence sustainability and success of microfinance institutions in Ghana. The topic is important, particularly in poverty stricken Africa, where microfinance institutions play a significant role in supporting governments¿ initiatives to reduce/alleviate poverty. The developed model is tested using data collected from 14 face-to-face interviews and 114 questionnaires. The data is analysed using different techniques- descriptive statistics, cross-tabulations and regression analysis. The research design and scale of the study are appropriate to both the problem addressed and doctoral level research. A number of factors in the model developed were found to be influencing the sustainability and success of microfinance institutions. A model was proposed that seeks to offer an explanation of sustainability and success of Microfinance Institutions in Ghana. The proposed model identified five categories being: institutional characteristics, agency costs, business strategy, environment/governance and success. Single factor analysis established positive relationships between sustainability and all the five factors but placed more emphasis on three out of the five factors namely; success, business strategy and environment/ governance. Multiple factor analysis established no significant differences in the sustainability with respect to the type of MFI, ownership and source of funding. Multiple Regression which allows for the testing of theories or models established a significant relationship between the Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS) and the predictors, especially the drop-out rate of clients and average loans. The Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) was calculated for the various types of MFIs and the result was a high dependency ratio especially among the FNGOs. Though the dependency is on the decline, it is very slow indicating that most MFIs will depend on subsidies for a very long time to come. Finally it was observed that the relatively high interest rates charged by most of the MFIs tended to defeat the purpose for which the microfinance movement came about. Not only did the study confirm the research model, but it also revealed that most owners did not exhibit a deep sense of involvement and used general knowledge to practice in Ghana. The study concluded that success factors, business strategy, and environment/governance were the most critical of the sustainability factors in Ghana. It is therefore important that managers develop institutional capacities especially in managing the agency problem effectively if they have to be sustainable and successful.

Актуальность темы исследования обусловлена ростом количества смен топ-менеджеров как в российских, так и в зарубежных компаниях, и очевидной связью между основными экономическими показателями фирмы (доходность акций, рентабельность активов, прибыль, динамика выручки и др.) и этими сменами топ-менеджеров. Цель диссертации – выявить и сравнить факторы, влияющие на смену топ-менеджеров в российских и зарубежных компаниях нефинансового сектора. Научная новизна исследования заключается в том, что были изучены более новые данные, т.к. большую часть исследовательской базы составили данные российских и зарубежных компаний за 2015–2016 гг., т.е. годы не начала экономического кризиса, а явной стагнации в российской экономике. Собранные данные показали, что акционеры-собственники, реагируя на негативную динамику основных показателей, либо меняли своих топ-менеджеров, в единичных случаях вынуждены были либо продавать контрольные пакеты акций своих компаний, либо объединяться с другими компаниями, т.е. запускать процессы слияния или поглощения. Тем не менее, к таким радикальным мерам прибегала лишь малая часть исследованных компаний, большинство же из них пыталось выправить ситуацию внутри компании путем смены руководства. Кроме того, удалось сравнить частоту смены топ-менеджеров в различных компаниях по результатам двух крупных экономических кризисов: 2008 года и 2014 года. Практическая значимость исследования обусловлена тем, что выводы, сформированные в результате исследования, позволяют выработать рекомендации по совершенствованию механизмов корпоративного управления в части мониторинга деятельности топ-менеджеров. / The relevance of the research topic is due to the increase in the number of turnover of CEOs in both Russian and foreign companies, and the obvious link between the main economic indicators of the company (stock returns, return on assets, profit, revenue dynamics, etc.) and these changes of top managers. The purpose of the thesis is to identify and compare the factors affecting the change of top managers in Russian and foreign companies in the non-financial sector. The scientific novelty of the research lies in the fact that newer data has been studied, since Most of the research base was made up of data from Russian and foreign companies for 2015–2016, i.e. The years did not start an economic crisis, but an apparent stagnation in the Russian economy. The collected data showed that the shareholders, in response to the negative dynamics of the main indicators, either changed their top managers, in isolated cases they had to either sell controlling stakes in their companies, or merge with other companies, i.e. launch merger or acquisition processes. Nevertheless, only a small part of the companies studied resorted to such radical measures, most of them tried to rectify the situation within the company by changing top-managers. In addition, it was possible to compare the frequency of change of top managers in different companies based on the results of two major economic crises: 2008 and 2014. The practical significance of the study is due to the fact that the conclusions formed as a result of the research allow developing recommendations for improving the corporate governance mechanisms in terms of monitoring the activities of CEOs.

The general focus of my dissertation, which consists of two essays, is on how changes in the financial and economic environment surrounding a firm affect managerial incentives and firm policies regarding investment in physical capital, innovation, equity offerings, and repurchases. The first essay in my dissertation examines how product market competition affects firms' investment decisions. While competition among firms benefits consumers via lower prices, greater product variety, higher product quality, and greater innovation, recent studies provide evidence that competition has been declining in the U.S. economy over the past decade. The evidence shows that American firms' profits are at near-record levels relative to GDP and are persistent. Industries have become more concentrated as a result of mergers and acquisitions, and barriers to entry have risen and the rate of new entry has been declining for decades. Taking these findings at face value, we examine empirically whether companies feel less compelled to invest in physical capital and in research and development because they face fewer threats from rival firms. Using both traditional proxies and recently developed text-based measures of industry concentration, we show that firms operating in competitive industries invest significantly more in both physical capital and research and development relative to their peers in concentrated industries. We also report that the propensity to invest less by managers of monopolistic firms is partially mitigated by superior corporate governance that reduces the agency problem, and by certain product market characteristics such as low pricing power and low product differentiation/entry barriers. However, after accounting for all these mitigating factors, the negative association between industry concentration and investment persists. Our results are robust to including various control variables and exclusion of firms from industries that face significant competition from imports. The results are also robust to controlling for endogeneity caused by missing time-invariant and time-varying industry level factors that could potentially be related to both the level of concentration and investments. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that firms in competitive industries have a greater incentive to invest and innovate to survive and thrive in a competitive environment relative to the managers of the firms in more concentrated industries whose incentive to invest and innovate is to maintain their monopoly rents. Our findings have obvious policy implications in that investment and hence economic growth is being adversely affected in the current era of increasing industry concentration and declining competition. The second essay in my dissertation investigates whether information contained in equity issues and buybacks is fully incorporated into prices such that the market reaction to subsequent earnings announcements is unrelated to those corporate actions. Korajczyk at al. (1991) argue that firms prefer to issue equity when the market is most informed about the quality of the firm to prevent adverse selection costs associated with new equity issues. This implies that equity issues tend to follow credible information releases contained in earnings announcements. However, analyzing a sample of 19,466 SEO pricing dates between 1970 and 2015 and 15,106 buyback announcements between 1994 and 2015 shows that a considerable number of equity offerings and repurchase announcements take place before the announcement of earnings. About 28% of buybacks and 32% of SEO pricings are made in the three weeks prior to an earnings announcement. Given these statistics, we examine whether these corporate actions provide information about upcoming earnings announcements (earnings predictability) to the extent that new information has not been fully incorporated into prices by market participants. We find evidence of earnings predictability: the market reaction to earnings following buyback announcements is higher by 5.1% than the reaction to earnings following equity issues over the (-1,+30) window when four-factor abnormal returns are used; the difference is 2.2% when unadjusted returns are considered. The results are robust to several alternate sample construction methodologies. There are at least two puzzling effects of earnings predictability that are difficult to reconcile with the market efficiency hypothesis. First, there is an incomplete adjustment to SEO pricings and buyback announcements that results in residual market reaction to earnings announcements. Second, prices continue to drift after earnings announcements: upward for buybacks and downward for SEO pricings. Unlike post-earnings announcement drift, the drift documented here does not depend on the market reaction to earnings announcement. We test several reasons for this anomalous behavior including prior returns, price, size of buyback or SEO, analyst forecast errors, and bid-ask spread. We find that information asymmetry proxies partially explain the persistence of earnings predictability following SEO pricings and buyback announcements. / Ph. D. / It is well documented that corporate investments in research and development (R&D) and physical capital are important drivers of economic growth and higher standards of living. Recent articles published by academic community and popular press have provided evidence that the overall competition among U.S. firms has declined. The evidence shows that concentration has increased in 75% of the US industries, the economy has lost about 50% of its publicly traded firms, and the rate of new-business formation has fallen. Given the documented association between corporate investments and economic growth & social welfare, a natural question arising would be whether declining competition is detrimental to investment in both physical capital and R&D. The first chapter of my dissertation aims to answer this question by examining whether companies feel less compelled to invest in physical capital and in R&D because they face fewer threats from rival firms. Our findings show that firms operating in concentrated industries invest significantly less in both physical capital and research and development relative to their peers in competitive industries, consistent with the notion that firms in competitive industries have a greater incentive to invest and innovate to survive and thrive in a competitive environment relative to the managers of the firms in more concentrated industries whose incentive to invest and innovate is to maintain their monopoly rents. Our findings have obvious policy implications in that investment and hence economic growth is being adversely affected in the current era of increasing industry concentration and declining competition. The wealth of the shareholders of publicly traded firms is tied to managers’ decisions about corporate actions such as equity offerings, buybacks, dividends, and mergers as these actions can potentially affect the stock prices and the value of shareholders’ portfolios. The second part of my dissertation investigates whether buybacks or equity offerings announced within a few weeks prior to earnings provide information about upcoming earnings announcements to the extent that new information has not been fully incorporated into prices by market participants. We find that earnings coming after equity offerings are likely to contain bad news and earnings coming after buybacks are likely to contain good news. This implies that buying the shares of the companies that announce a buyback before their earnings and short selling the shares of the companies that issue equity before their earnings will yield a significant return for the investors.

En dépit des réformes visant à faciliter l’accès aux marchés, les grandes firmes françaises s’endettent en majeure partie auprès des banques. Cette thèse tente donc de comprendre les décisions d’endettement des entreprises, et plus particulièrement leur choix entre dettes directes et/ou indirectes. Ce choix a un impact sur la valeur boursière à court terme des grandes sociétés françaises. En effet, les résultats de l’étude d’événements indiquent que le marché réagit positivement aux annonces d’emprunts bancaires, mais ne réagit pas aux annonces d’emprunts obligataires. L’effet de signal positif est d’autant plus important lorsque les annonces concernent le renouvellement de dettes bancaires, des échéances relativement courtes et des emprunts bancaires syndiqués. La structure d’endettement des grandes firmes dépend en fait de certaines de leurs caractéristiques. Ce sont essentiellement les plus grandes sociétés françaises, celles qui bénéficient d’une certaine notoriété, qui ont le plus de chance d’émettre des emprunts directs. Toutefois, un certain nombre d’entre-elles tirent avantage de leur envergure pour accéder à la dette de marché, alors qu’elles présentent un risque de crédit relativement élevé. Ces firmes continuent donc à se financer en majeure partie auprès des banques afin de bénéficier d’une plus grande flexibilité. Par ailleurs, les entreprises innovantes optent pour une structure d’endettement mixte, qui leur permet de choisir leur source de dette en fonction de la confidentialité des projets à financer. Les variables de gouvernance jouent également un rôle dans les choix d’endettement des firmes. Au final, les deux types de dettes sont plus complémentaires que substituts. / In spite of public market deregulation in the 1980s, large French companies continue borrowing predominantly from commercial banks. To understand corporate debt decisions, this thesis examines the choice between arm’s-length debt obtained in public market and/or monitored debt supplied by banks. This choice has an impact on firms’ common stock prices. Bank loan announcements convey information to the capital market and generate positive share price effects, while bond debt announcements do not. Market reaction is even more important when announcements are related to bank credit renewals, to shorter maturities and to syndicated loans. In fact, corporate debt ownership structure depends on several firm characteristics. Results indicate that largest and oldest firms are most likely to issue public debts. However, some of them draw advantage from their scale to reach bond markets, whereas they have a relatively high credit risk. These firms continue borrowing from banks to benefit by a greater flexibility. Moreover, firms with sensitive information have a mixed structure of debt, since they choose their debt source according to the confidentiality of the projects to be financed. Corporate governance variables also play a part in the corporate debt choices. Finally, the two types of debts are more complementary than substitute.