The 17th October 2014 the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) introduced an intelligence operation in Stockholm archipelago after receiving credible observations regarding illegal underwater activities. Following the data collection and associated analysis it could be stated with certainty that a foreign submarine had violated the Swedish territorial waters. Media depend on SwAF to provide them with accurate information due to the confidentiality in these matters and the general area of investigation is therefore how the actions of the Swedish Armed Forces, in the submarine incident 2014, were portrayed in the Swedish media. Newspapers and blogs of defense policy represent the media and the thesis is based on the theories constructed by Graham Allison, the rational actor, organizational behavior and governmental politics. Furthermore, it is relevant to examine if there are any similarities or differences in how the submarine incident is illustrated, and what may be the reason for any possible occurrences. The conclusion shows that the same tendency of frequent used theories occur equivalent throughout the media where the rational actor was highlighted, and few attempts were made to include governmental politics. The newspapers adopt a descriptive character whereas the blogs mainly focus on discussions regarding operational improvements, which probably vary due to the different types of platforms and their time-dependent interest in the matter.

The 17th October 2014 the Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) introduced an intelligence operation in Stockholm archipelago after receiving credible observations regarding illegal underwater activities. Following the data collection and associated analysis it could be stated with certainty that a foreign submarine had violated the Swedish territorial waters. Media depend on SwAF to provide them with accurate information due to the confidentiality in these matters and the general area of investigation is therefore how the actions of the Swedish Armed Forces, in the submarine incident 2014, were portrayed in the Swedish media. Newspapers and blogs of defense policy represent the media and the thesis is based on the theories constructed by Graham Allison, the rational actor, organizational behavior and governmental politics. Furthermore, it is relevant to examine if there are any similarities or differences in how the submarine incident is illustrated, and what may be the reason for any possible occurrences. The conclusion shows that the same tendency of frequent used theories occur equivalent throughout the media where the rational actor was highlighted, and few attempts were made to include governmental politics. The newspapers adopt a descriptive character whereas the blogs mainly focus on discussions regarding operational improvements, which probably vary due to the different types of platforms and their time-dependent interest in the matter.

論文摘要 〈論純粹知性概念之推證〉一章可以說是《純粹理性批判》當中最重要的章節之一。康德在這個章節中企圖證明完全根源於知性自身的純粹知性概念（也就是範疇）運用到經驗對象上的可能性，並藉此劃定認知的有效範圍。這是《純粹理性批判》企圖解決形上學紛爭的一個重要關鍵。然而，這個章節同時也是康德宣稱他花費了最大心力，並在第二版《純粹理性批判》當中完全改寫的篇章之一，在這個短短的五六十頁的篇幅當中卻包含了許多詮釋上的爭議。而本論文則以第二版〈推證〉為主要討論範圍，並嘗試回答其中三個詮釋上的問題：1. 〈推證〉是否包含了一個反懷疑論的論證？2. 第二版〈推證〉可區分出的兩個部份分別負擔了什麼任務？3. 先驗統覺在〈推證〉中扮演了什麼角色？並在確立對以上幾個問題的觀點之後，提供一個的對第二版〈推證〉的細部解釋。 為了回答這幾個問題，筆者比較了Paul Guyer、Dieter Henrich、Henry Allison等幾個詮釋者的觀點。而本論文總共包含了五個章節。第一章作為導論，介紹筆者在本論文中所欲處理的問題以及對論文所安排的架構。在第二章當中，筆者以Guyer作為一個反懷疑論式詮釋〈推證〉的類型，並指出這種詮釋方式與文本的不合之處。在第三章當中，筆者將介紹Henrich針對第二版〈推證〉所提出的「一個證明兩個步驟」的詮釋架構以及對兩個步驟的詮釋，並藉由Allison的批評，介紹另一種同樣在「一個證明兩個步驟」下且筆者認為更適當的詮釋方式。在第四章當中，筆者嘗試回答關於解釋統覺的諸問題，它們包括了統覺的含義、統覺與雜多表象的關係、統覺原理的邏輯地位、統覺原理在〈推證〉中起的作用等。在確立了以上諸觀點後，筆者在第四章和第五章當中，按照兩個步驟的架構提供一個對第二版〈推證〉的完整解釋。 / Abstract "On the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding" is widely agreed to be the most important chapter in the Critique of the Pure Reason. In this chapter Kant attempts to demonstrate that the pure concepts of understanding, namely, categories, which completely stem from understanding itself, can be applied to empirical objects and thereby define the boundary of cognition. This is critical to resolve the dispute in the metaphysics of his predecessors. However, Kant also claims that this chapter is the part, which costs him the greatest effort and which he entirely rewrites in the second edition of the Critique. There are so many controversial interpretations related to this chapter, which is yet only complied up to 50-60 pages. In this thesis I focus on Deduction in the second edition of the Critique and try to answer the following three questions about these controversies: 1. Whether the Deduction contains an anti-skeptical argument? 2. What are the tasks of the two parts respectively that can be distinguished in B-Deduction? 3. What is the role that transcendental apperception plays in the Deduction? After establishing these answers, I will contribute a detailed explanation of whole B-Deduction. In order to answer the questions, I compare the perspectives of three interpreters of Kant, namely, Paul Guyer, Dieter Henrich and Henry E. Allison. This article is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction, in which I introduce the problems that I hope to resolve and the structure of the thesis. In Chapter 2, I introduce Guyer's interpretation of Deduction, which is an anti-skeptical Model, and I will indicate that his interpretation doesn't conform to the Kant's text. In Chapter 3, I introduce Henrich's famous thesis about the structure of the B-Deduction, namely, the thesis of two-steps-in-one-proof, and his interpretation of the contents of the two steps.Then I introduce Allison's criticism against Henrich and his alternative interpretation of B-Deduction under the frame of two-steps-in-one-proof. I believe this interpretation is more consistent and more conformable to the text. In Chapter 4, I try to answer the questions about the interpretation of apperception, where the issues such as the meaning of apperception, the relation between apperception and manifold, the principle of apperception's logical status, the apperception's role in the Deduction etc. will be discussed. After establishing my perspectives about these interpretative problems, I will present a complete and detailed explanation of B-Deduction according to the two-step structure.

This thesis considers Kant's departure from moral naturalism. In doing so, it explores the relationship between ethics, naturalism, normativity and freedom. Throughout this exploration, I build the case that Kant's ethics of autonomy allows us to make better sense of ethics than Hume's moral naturalism. Hume believes that morality is ultimately grounded in human nature. Kant finds this understanding of ethics limiting. He insists that we are free - we can critically reflect upon our nature and (to an extent) alter it accordingly. This freedom, I contend, renders the moral naturalist's appeal to nature lacking. Of course, a Kantian conception of freedom - some form of independence from the causal order - is fairly unpopular in contemporary circles. In particular, a commitment to naturalism casts doubt on such a notion of freedom. I argue with Kant that such a conception of freedom is essential to the conception of ourselves as rational agents. The critical turn, unlike naturalism, warrants this conception of freedom, accommodating the point of view of our rational agency. It thus allows Kant's ethics of autonomy to better grasp certain key elements of morality - normativity and our agency - than Hume's moral naturalism.