The sixth-century-BCE Pythagorean communities included both male and female members. This thesis focuses on the Pythagorean women and aims to explore what reasons lie behind the prominence of women in Pythagoreanism and what roles women played in early Pythagorean societies and thought. In the first chapter, I analyse the social conditions of women in Southern Italy, where the first Pythagorean communities were founded. In the second chapter, I compare Pythagorean societies with ancient Greek political clubs and religious sects. Compared to mainland Greece, South Italian women enjoyed higher legal and socio-political status. Similarly, religious groups included female initiates, assigning them authoritative roles. Consequently, the fact that the Pythagoreans founded their communities in Croton and further afield, and that in some respects these communities resembled ancient sects helps to explain why they opened their doors to the female gender to begin with. The third chapter discusses Pythagoras’ teachings to and about women. Pythagorean doctrines did not exclusively affect the followers’ way of thinking and public activities, but also their private way of living. Thus, they also regulated key aspects of the female everyday life, such as marriage and motherhood. I argue that the Pythagorean women entered the communities as wives, mothers and daughters. Nonetheless, some of them were able to gain authority over their fellow Pythagoreans and engage in intellectual activities, thus overcoming the female traditional domestic roles. The fourth chapter argues that another contributing factor to the status of the Pythagorean women is the doctrine of metempsychosis. This belief led the Pythagoreans to adopt similar behaviours towards other ensouled beings. Therefore, since men and women were believed to have the same souls, they were treated with the same respect and received the same education. Finally, the fifth chapter explores how the Pythagorean views on women are taken up and developed in Plato’s Republic. I argue that, although the Pythagoreans never went as far as to have philosopher-queens and abolish private families, they took the first step towards Plato’s ‘gender equality’ theory. Overall, that of women in Pythagoreanism is the first documented case of female engagement with ancient philosophy: Pythagorean men and women lived together according to the same lifestyle, were educated on the same doctrines and played equally integral roles in the intellectual community.

A presente tese inicia-se por uma encruzilhada e um segredo: na encruzilhada está a psicologia, entre os apelos instrumentais, antropológicos e neurocientíficos; já o segredo refere-se à quase desconhecida leitura de Kierkegaard por Foucault. Os dois filósofos se inscrevem na esteira da experimentação filosófica, caminho oposto ao da metafísica. Experimentação, aqui, não diz respeito a qualquer empirismo; inspira-se nos exercícios espirituais da Antiguidade grega e romana, e nas práticas da ironia, do cuidado de si e da parresía filosófica. As aproximações possíveis entre o pensamento de Kierkegaard e o de Foucault por esse viés da filosofia antiga, visam a contribuir para uma compreensão da psicologia e de suas práticas que permita o enfrentamento dos dilemas acima referidos, ou seja, os instrumentais, antropológicos e neurocientíficos. O percurso do trabalho tem como ponto de partida as suspeitas direcionadas à psicologia, desde o questionamento colocado por Canguilhem há mais de cinqüenta anos acerca das intenções pouco claras da disciplina, passando pelas críticas aos processos de subjetivação psicologizantes, até chegar ao grave enquadramento contemporâneo que busca convencer os sujeitos de que são, em última análise, nada mais do que cérebros. Os processos de subjetivação engendrados pelas práticas psi se vêem, pois, colocados hoje frente a impasses de difícil solução. Tantas são as suspeitas e temores quanto aos efeitos psi, que os próprios profissionais da área têm, em muitos casos, assumido a posição de que a psicologia se tornou inviável e deve desaparecer. As referências objetivantes ou antropológicas, quando priorizadas pela psicologia, de fato não deixam saídas, tornando urgente o encontro com outros referenciais que possibilitem respirar novos ares. O pensamento de Kierkegaard e o de Foucault surgem como intercessores em face desse horizonte sombrio. Os dois filósofos se dedicaram a tornar o homem atento a si e ao mundo, priorizando saídas singulares e criativas em lugar da reprodução dos modos de ser hegemônicos que ameaçam igualar tudo e todos. Desnaturalizadores do presente e avessos às grandes especulações teóricas sobre a vida, escreveram obras que é preciso experienciar, mais do que simplesmente ler, a fim de captar-lhes a atmosfera e com elas operar. A partir dessa atitude, a psicologia experimental ou interpretativa pode dar lugar a uma psicologia experimentante, que acompanha o cotidiano ao invés de se colocar como uma curiosidade sem paixão. Tal psicologia segue de maneira interessada os movimentos da existência e a apropriação pessoal da verdade, que deixa de ser transcendente, metafísica ou sonhada, e aparece encarnada nas lutas, receios, enganos, ações e tensões do dia-a-dia dos sujeitos de carne, osso e espírito. É na tensão constituinte-constituído que o sujeito se forja, seja ele lançado por Deus, como pensa Kierkegaard, seja, como propõe Foucault, mergulhado nos esquemas e objetivações que toma como naturais: a tarefa do sujeito é tornar-se si mesmo, participando de forma mais livre da própria constituição, exercendo de maneira refletida e ética a liberdade e transparecendo a si mesmo, ao invés de tomar como suas as determinações que lhe são oferecidas. A presente tese visa, portanto, a estabelecer o diálogo entre Foucault e Kierkegaard, pelo viés da filosofia antiga, buscando inspiração para promover, no tempo presente, processos de subjetivação outros que os modos desesperados de ser, e práticas psicológicas mais experimentantes e menos disciplinadoras. / This dissertation begins at a crossroads and a secret: at the crossroads there is Psychology, among its instrumental, anthropological and neuroscientific appeals; the secret refers to the almost unknown reading of Kierkegaard by Foucault. Both philosophers are inserted in the wake of philosophical experimentation, the opposite path to metaphysics. Experimentation, here, is not related to empirism; it is inspired by the spiritual exercises of Greek and Roman Ancient History, and in the practice of irony, self-care and philosophical parresía. The possible approximations between the thoughts of Kierkegaard and Foucault through this approach of Ancient Philosophy aim at contributing to an understanding of Psychology and its practices that allow the facing of the above-mentioned dilemmas, that is, the instrumental, anthropological and neuroscientific ones. The course of this work has its starting point at the suspicions directed at Psychology, from the questioning posed by Canguilhem over fifty years ago about the unclear intentions of the subject, through the critiques to the processes of psychological subjectivizing, up to the serious contemporary framing that seeks to convince human beings that they are, ultimately, no more than brains. The subjectivizing processes carried out by the psi practices are, then, today, faced with difficult predicaments. There are so many suspicions and fears about the psi effects that the area professionals themselves have, in many cases, assumed that psychology has become not viable and must disappear. The objecting or anthropological references, when prioritized by Psychology, actually leave no way out, urging the finding of new referentials that make it possible to breathe new air. Kierkegaards and Foucaults thoughts arise as interceders in the face of this somber horizon. Both philosophers are devoted to taking man as attentive to himself and the world, prioritizing singular and creative exits instead of reproducing the hegemonic ways of being that threaten to equal everything and everyone. Unnaturalizing the present and contrary to great theoretical speculations about life, both have written works that must be experienced, more than simply read, so as to capture their atmosphere and operate it. From this attitude, Experimental or Interpretive Psychology can give way to an Experiencing Psychology, which follows everyday life instead of presenting itself as passionless curiosity. This Psychology follows interestingly the movements of existence and personal appropriation of the truth, which stops being transcendent, metaphysical or dreamed, and appears layered in struggles, fears, mistakes, actions and tensions of the everyday life of subjects made of flesh, bone and spirit. It is in this constituting-constituted tension that the subject is forged, either cast by God, as Kierkegaard thinks, or, as Foucault proposes, sunk in the schemes and objectivations he takes for natural: the subjects task is to take himself, participating in a freer way of his own constitution, exercising freedom in an ethical and thoughtful manner and manifesting himself, instead of taking as his own the determinations which he is offered. This dissertation aims, therefore, at establishing the dialogue between Foucault and Kierkegaard, through the approach of Ancient Philosophy, seeking inspiration to promote, in the present time, processes of subjectivation other than the desperate ways of being, and psychological practices which are more experimenting and less disciplining.

A pesquisa pretendeu encontrar na experiência jurídica grega dos séc. VI a IV a.C. um novo modal normativo, para além dos clássicos permitido, proibido, facultado, cujo conteúdo se emoldurasse num caráter constitutivo. A partir dos estudos do direito grego desenvolvidos desde o final do séc. XIX, especialmente daqueles trabalhados pelos atuais scholars europeus e norte-americanos, buscou-se resgatar nesta experiência uma forna de pensar o conteúdo normativo de modo diverso do presente, tentando escavar na leitura da norma e no relacionamento dos homens com o fenômeno jurídico uma maneira de ver o direito enquanto direito constitutivo de virtudes e de subjetividades austeras. Para tanto, foram fundadas algumas premilinares essenciais, capazes de justificar o porquê dos estudos sobre o direito grego sobretudo no Brasil ; a necessidade de olhar a experiência clássica como algo radicalmente diverso e novo experiência exterior e não recobro histórico; bem como o método arqueogenealógico condutor da aproximação com os antigos. Em seguida, foram levantadas as principais contribuições da experiência jurídica grega, do seguinte modo: a análise da juridicidade (norma e jusracionalidade), da estrutura deste jurídico (instituições, materialidade e processualidade), e do modo de agir/ser normativo (educação jurídica, jurista e essência do direito). Ao final, aspirou-se definir os traços desta forma de ver a experiência jurídica grega enquanto direito constitutivo: uma maneira peculiar de ler a filosofia do direito enquanto saber constitutivo, os contornos deste direito bem como os seus vetores epistemológicos e seu fim / The research has intended to find in Greek juridical experience between the VI and IV centuries b.C a new normative modal as an exclusive moral issue normative modal beyond the classical allowed, forbiden and granted. Drawing heavily on the current North-American and European scholars and also since by those started at the bottom of XIX century, the research has tried to dig up in the norm and the relationship between citizents and that one, a particular manner of think law as constitutive law of virtues and austere subjectives. After has founded some essential questions: the reason of study greek law namely in Brazil and the construction of the thesis greek approach like the archeogenealogical method and the outside philosophical experience, the research has defined the substance of ancient greek law: starting from the singular structure of law and its applications, passing by the rationality, the basic material e procedure rules and arriving at normative way of acting and being. Finally, the research has attempted to define the features of this way of looking at ancient greek law experience as constitutive law, by analyzing a particular way of read philosophy of law as constitutive thinking, the outlinings of this law and the epistemological vector and its bounds as well.

O objetivo deste trabalho está relacionado à questão de saber qual a natureza da virtude em Platão; para tanto, procuramos demonstrar que a virtude na ética platônica possui diferentes fases. A primeira, trata da virtude a partir da visão socrática, considerada a fase de juventude de Platão; nesta fase, o conceito de virtude coincide com conhecimento, ou seja, todo princípio ético deve estar fundamentado pela razão, portanto o conhecimento é o princípio fundamental e unificador de todas as virtudes. Na segunda fase, o conhecimento continua sendo o princípio unificador, no entanto, o conceito de virtude se evidencia como uma unidade que se harmoniza pelo pressuposto das diferenças, isto é, Platão faz emergir a ação, o conflito, conseqüentemente isto leva à superação do intelectualismo socrático, no sentido de mostrar que o conhecimento é necessário, mas não suficiente para unificar as virtudes. E por último, temos a questão do ensino da virtude a partir do diálogo Mênon. Embora o citado diálogo negue a possibilidade do ensino da virtude, entretanto deixa em aberto a mesma possibilidade no que diz respeito à natureza da virtude ser ensinável. / The objective of this paper concerns the question of knowing what the nature of virtue in Plato is. In order to achieve it, we aim to demonstrate that the virtue in the platonic ethics has different phases. The first one deals with virtue from the socratic vision, known as the phase of Plato\'s youth; in which the concept of virtue coincides with knowledge, that is, all ethical principles must be based on reason, therefore knowledge is the basic and unifying principle of all virtues. In the second phase, in spite of the fact that knowledge is still regarded as the unifying principle, the concept of virtue is evidenced as a unit that is harmonized through the assumption of differences, that is, Plato makes the action and the conflict emerge, which consequently leads to the overcoming of the socratic intellectualism, in that it shows that `knowledge is necessary, but not enough to unify the virtues. Finally, there is the question of the teaching of virtue from the Menon dialogue. Although the aforementioned dialogue denies the possibility of the teaching of virtue, yhe same possibility concerning the nature of the teaching of virtue remains unresolved.

Orientador: Lucas Angioni / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-05T22:11:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Terra_CarlosAlexandre_M.pdf: 705013 bytes, checksum: 7ba5888677695541a639f5bd834d8087 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: Pretendemos estudar a solução apontada por Aristóteles, no livro II dos Segundos Analíticos, para o problema da apreensão dos princípios da ciência. Atentamos para as relações entre os conceitos de indução (epagoge) e inteligência (nous) presentes no capítulo 19, que parecem confirmar que a aquisição dos princípios se dá por meio de um processo de observação empírica. Examinamos o método proposto, nos capítulos 13 a 17, para a correta formulação de definições, o que parece atribuir à dialética a tarefa de descobrir os princípios. Aristóteles parece, assim, indicar dois métodos ¿ de um lado, a observação empírica coroada pela inteligência dos princípios, e, de outro lado, a dialética ¿ para a apreensão dos princípios. Pretendemos estudar possíveis soluções para o problema da concorrência entre esses dois métodos de modo a refutar tanto uma leitura estritamente empirista quanto uma leitura estritamente dialética / Abstract: Our purpose is to study Aristotle¿s solution, in the second book of the Posterior Analytics, for the problem of the apprehension of the principles of science. We attend to the relations between the concepts of induction (epagoge) and intelligence (nous) found in the chapter 19, which seems to confirm that the acquisition of the principles is reached by a process of empirical observation. We examine the method, proposed in chapters 13 to 17, for the right formulation of definitions, which seems to attribute to dialectics the task of finding the principles. Aristotle seems to indicate two different methods ¿ on one hand, the empirical observation followed by intelligence, on other, the dialectics ¿ for the apprehension of the principles. Our purpose is to study possible solutions for the problem of the concurrence between these two methods in order to refute as much a strictly empiricist interpretation as a strictly dialectical one / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

Orientador: Lucas Angioni / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-21T10:12:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silvestrini_RenataChristinaCeroni_M.pdf: 982563 bytes, checksum: e7d976593e9f916a4b036a8dccbc57f6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: Em I.7.1098b16-18, Aristóteles afirma que a eudaimonia é a "atividade da alma em acordo com a virtude (e, havendo mais de uma virtude, em acordo com a melhor e a mais completa", no entanto tal afirmação não nos parece vaga e acaba por suscitar mais questões do que esclarecer. De que virtude Aristóteles estaria falando? A que ele poderia referir ao dizer "na melhor e na mais completa"? Já estaria ele comprometido com alguma tese específica a respeito da eudaimonia em I.7? Na Ética Nicomaquéia Aristóteles, ao tentar estabelecer o que seria o bem supremo para o homem, acaba não deixando claro se o identifica com um único bem ou com um conjunto organizado de bens constitutivos, numa linguagem mais contemporânea, intruduzida por W.F.R Hardie, em "The Final Good in Aristotle Ethics", se estaria ele defendendo uma tese inclusiva, na qual a eudaimonia seria um bem não contável com os demais que inclui, concatena e organiza, de algum modo, os demais bens (bens da alma, bens do corpo e bens exteriores) num todo harmonioso, como parece indicar o livro I, e parte significativa dos demais livros da Ética Nicomaquéia e mais claramente a Ética Eudemia, ou se estaria ele defendendo uma tese dominante, na qual a eudaimonia seria estritamente identificada com a sabedoria teorética, como parece indicar o livro X e certas passagens dos demais livros da Ética Nicomaquéia. Diante destas questões, nosso objetivo na pesquisa que realizamos no Mestrado foi estudar que concepção de eudaimonia estaria defendendo Aristóteles na Ética Nicomaquéia, concentrando-nos na análise conceitual e argumentativa detalhada e cuidadosa do texto de Aristóteles, fundamentalmente, do livro I, com especial atenção nos argumentos expostos no capítulo 7 e na descrição dos tipos de vida e dos tipos de bens a elas relacionados feita nos capítulos 5 e 8, e do livro X, capítulos 6, 7 e 8, no qual Aristóteles afirma que a eudaimonia concorda com a virtude daquilo que existe de mais elevado em nós, a sabedoria teorética. Também fizemos um estudo dos textos indicados na bibliografia secundária com o objetivo de ajudar a mapear melhor o problema e entender como ele vem sendo tratado pelos comentadores. Por fim, apresentamos uma possibilidade interpretativa a respeito da concepção de eudaimonia que acreditamos que Aristóteles está defendendo na Ética Nicomaquéia destacando o caráter fundamental desempenhado pelas características que apresenta na primeira parte de I.7 ("completo sem mais", "autossuficiente" e "não contável com os demais") e pelos tipos de bens (bens da alma, bens do corpo e bens exteriores) na sua consecução, cujo entendimento acreditamos ser fundamental ao consequente entendimento de que concepção de eudaimonia estaria Aristóteles defendendo / Abstract: In I.7.1098b16-18 Aristotle states that eudaimonia is the "activity of soul in accordance with excellence (and, if there is more excellences than one, in accordance with the best and most complete". However this statement is vague and raises more questions than it clarifies. What virtue was Aristotle talking about? What would he like to refer to by saying "the best and most complete one"? Would he be committed to some specific thesis about eudaimonia in I.7 yet? In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle trying to establish what would be the highest good for man he just make it unclear whether he identifies it as a specific isolated good or as an organized set of constitutive goods. In a more contemporary version of the issue introduced by W.F.R Hardie in "The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics", exist two possibilities. Would he be defending an inclusive thesis, in which eudaimonia would be a non-countable good with other goods which it somehow includes, concatenates and organizes (the goods for the soul, for the body and any other external thing understood as good) into a harmonious whole, as it seems to indicate Book I and more clearly a significant part of the remaining books of the Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics? Or would he be defending a dominant thesis in which eudaimonia would be strictly identified with the theoretical wisdom, as the Book X and some passages from other books of Nicomachean Ethics seem to indicate? Faced with these issues, the objective in our Master Degree Research was to study what conception of eudaimonia Aristotle would be defending in Nicomachean Ethics focusing on a careful and detailed argumentative and conceptual analysis of the Aristotle's text. Book I has deserved a special attention mainly to the arguments presented in Chapter 7 and to the description of the types of life and types of good things related to them found in Chapters 5 and 8, and Book X, chapters 6, 7 and 8, in which Aristotle states that eudaimonia is in accordance with the virtue which represents the highest good in us, the theoretical wisdom. We have also studied the texts listed in the secondary bibliography aiming to help map the problem and better understand how it is being addressed by the commentators. Finally, we present an interpretative possibility of the conception of eudaimonia that we believe Aristotle is defending in the Nicomachean Ethics highlighting the fundamental role played by characteristics that he presents in the first part of I.7 ("complete with no more", "self-sufficient" and "not countable with others") and by types of goods (goods of the soul, goods of the body and external goods) in its achievements, which we believe is fundamental to have a full comprehension for the consequent understanding of what conception of eudaimonia Aristotle would be defending / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

My thesis is an exposition and defence of Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics. The first part of my thesis is an exposition of Aristotle's cryptic and challenging view on mathematics and is based on remarks scattered all over the corpus aristotelicum. The thesis' central focus is on Aristotle's view on numbers rather than on geometrical figures. In particular, number is understood as a countable plurality and is always a number of something. I show that as a consequence the related concept of counting is based on units. In the second part of my thesis, I verify Aristotle's view on number by applying it to his account of time. Time presents itself as a perfect test case for this project because Aristotle defines time as a kind of number but also considers it as a continuum. Since numbers and continuous things are mutually exclusive this observation seems to lead to an apparent contradiction. I show why a contradiction does not arise when we understand Aristotle properly. In the third part, I argue that the ontological status of mathematical objects, dubbed as materially [hulekos, ÍlekÀc] by Aristotle, can only be defended as an alternative to Platonism if mathematical objects exist potentially enmattered in physical objects. In the fourth part, I compare Aristotle's and Plato's views on how we obtain knowledge of mathematical objects. The fifth part is an extension of my comparison between Aristotle's and Plato's epistemological views to their respective ontological views regarding mathematics. In the last part of my thesis I bring Frege's view on numbers into play and engage with Plato, Aristotle and Frege equally while exploring their ontological commitments to mathematical objects. Specifically, I argue that Frege should not be mistaken for a historical Platonist and that we find surprisingly many similarities between Frege and Aristotle. After having acknowledged commonalities between Aristotle and Frege, I turn to the most significant differences in their views. Finally, I defend Aristotle's abstractionism in mathematics against Frege's counting block argument. This whole project sheds more light on Aristotle's view on mathematical objects and explains why it remains an attractive view in the philosophy of mathematics.

No description available.

Legalism, as one of the most useful philosophies of government, has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. The work of Han Fei—one of the most influential proponents of Legalism—has been scrutinized and critiqued for centuries as immoral. I intend to show Legalism, especially the Han Feizi, is moral through focusing on four aspects of Han Fei’s work. First, his understanding of human nature. Han Fei states people are born with a hatred of harm and a love of profit. This understanding of human nature can never lead to a cognitive distortions in governing. So it is a moral basic of a philosophy. The second element is a focus on the context of Han Fei’s writings. If his works are read in detail back to his age, one cannot reach an immorality conclusion. Then, based on his understanding of subjects and his correspondingly suggested strategies, his goal is moral because he wants to built a peaceful and stable society, which was unobtainable at that time. Finally, Han Fei’s conception of punishment, which has been thought of immoral, actually is a moral tool to protect the majority of subjects who are innocent.

In this thesis I try to answer the question of what attitude the ancient sceptics had towards the notion of belief. I concern myself exclusively with Pyrrhonic scepticism, as it was described by Sextus Empiricus in his book Pyrrhoniai hypotyposeis. Pyrrhonic scepticism was an epistemological system with ethical ramifications, that questioned most of the conventional wisdom of the time, I begin by evaluating two infleuntial readings, by Michael Frede and Casey Perin. I then go on to make my own assessment. Ultimately, I show why Frede's view is the more plausible; the sceptics allowed themselves to hold beliefs about reality, not just appearance.