Nossa investigação explora a possibilidade de o tema da paideia ser um eixo comum em torno do qual se articulam os textos de Xenofonte de Atenas, autor do século IV a.C. Julgamos que essa perspectiva se justifica em razão da importância que esse autor atribui à construção de retratos de homens paradigmáticos. Ilustramos esse procedimento com a análise do retrato que o próprio Xenofonte constrói para si, na Anabase. É sobretudo a partir da análise desses retratos que podemos ver, em Xenofonte, a discussão do tema da paideia. Os estudos que aqui empreendemos concentram-se no tema da paideia do governante. Nesse horizonte, oferecemos uma possível leitura para o retrato daquele que o autor considera a contrafacção do governante ideal, o tirano Hierão, de diálogo homônimo. Por fim, ocupamo-nos dos elementos que compõem o retrato xenofôntico do governante paradigmático, Ciro, o velho, da Ciropédia. / Our research explores the possibility of the theme of paideia as a common axis around which are articulated the texts of Xenophon of Athens, author of the fourth century BC. We believe that this perspective is justified because of the importance this author gives to the construction of portraits of paradigmatic men. We illustrate this procedure with the analysis of the portrait which Xenophon builds for himself in the Anabasis. It is mainly based on the analysis of such portraits that we can see, in Xenophon, the discussion on the theme of paideia. The studies undertaken here focus on the theme of the ruler\'s paideia. In this horizon, we offer a possible reading for the portrait of the man the author considers the counterfeiting of the ideal ruler, the tyrant Hiero, in the corresponding dialogue. Finally we deal with the elements that make up the portrait of Xenophons paradigmatic ruler, Cyrus the Great, of the Cyropaedia.

A partir do referencial paradigmático e exemplar da figura e disciplina (eu zen) de Sócrates na obra de Xenofonte, desenvolvem-se a análise, a reflexão sobre o princípio reintegrador perante a inexorabilidade, o desconhecimento e a incerteza do real, com vistas à reconciliação proporcional, ao desenvolvimento satisfatório da integridade razoável, para que o homem possa adquirir não somente a compreensão filosófica, mas também condições de resistência, de flexibilidade estratégica - enfim, a capacidade suficiente de transformação e relacionamento com os problemas fundamentais da existência. / From the paradigmatic reference and example of socratic discipline (eu zen) in the Xenophons works, the reflections about the re-integrating principle facing the inexhaustible, uncertain and unknown reality can be developed, searching the proportional reconciliation, the satisfactory and reasonable integrity for the human being to acquire not only the philosophical understanding, but also the conditions of resistence, of strategic flexibility the sufficient capacity to deal with and transform the fundamental problems of existence.

O epicurismo apresentou teorias sobre a física que constituíam, em boa parte, uma continuidade do pensamento materialista antigo, ainda assim, há certamente muitos elementos originais em seu pensamento para destacá-lo e torná-lo em um sistema reconhecido por sua própria importância. Como se desenvolveu em uma filosofia de amplo alcance, e por isso mesmo muito visada por adversários, além dos conteúdos de sua física, ética e canônica, disciplinas principais de seu pensamento, Epicuro e os membros de sua escola viam-se compelidos a opinar em assuntos que transcendiam esse grupo de investigações. É notório o conjunto de opiniões que a escola teria apresentado sobre o lavor poético e a veiculação de mitos; testemunhos de Plutarco, Sexto Empírico, Cícero e outros marcam essa postura como de oposição a essas expressões, oposição essa que certamente encontra respaldo na orientação pela busca pela felicidade por meio da remoção do indivíduo das fontes de perturbação com as quais normalmente essas formas de expressão se associam. Ainda assim, a obra mais apreciada dessa mesma escola, o poema De rerum natura do romano Tito Lucrécio Caro, escrito no século I a.C. é notória por transigir com relação a essas modalidades de expressão \"rechaçadas\" por sua escola. Além dessa aparente transgressão, um outro elemento digno de nota nesse poema é a recusa em se usar um termo apenas para referenciar os átomos, definitivamente singularizado por Epicuro por meio do termo ἄτομος e ocasionalmente retomado também por meio termo σομα pelo autor grego. As opções de cunho estético (uso da forma poética e de elementos míticos) revelam a adesão a um programa didático estabelecido e nos convidam a relativizar a postura epicurista e a buscar elementos mais sólidos que corroborem uma visão não tão sectária como a veiculada pelos críticos da doutrina. De outra parte, a variação vocabular reflete o desenvolvimento do programa didático encampado, no qual se faz uso de posições de outros pensadores (pré-socráticos) a respeito dos componentes essenciais da matéria, posições essas que são convenientemente deturpadas como forma de desqualificar escolas de pensamento ativas e influentes na época de Lucrécio (estoicismo e a academia). Outra função que esse expediente cumpre é a de adiantar ao leitor a explicação de conceitos complexos sobre o atomismo, a partir dos quais a exposição das teses epicuristas possa se dar de uma forma mais rápida e completa. / Epicureanism presented theories on physics that can be seen to continue, for the most part, the ancient materialistic thought of the pre-socratics. Even so, it has certainly many original ele-ments on itself so it may be considered to have its own relevance and importance. As it became a well known philosophy in its time, and therefore a constant target for its adversaries, it needed to approach other subjects beyond the contents of its intended fields: physics, canonics and ethics. For this reason, Epicuro and the members of its school were compelled to provide posi-tions on aesthetic matters, even though this was not a primordial object of inquiry. The set of opinions that the school may have presented on subjects such as poetic creation and the propa-gation of myths is well known; testimonies of Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Cicero and others mark epicureanism stance as of oppositon to these forms of expressions. This alledged hostility certainly finds endorsement on the guidance for the pursuit of happiness by means of the re-moval of sources of disturbance normally associated with those means of expression. Still the most appreciated work of the epicurean school, the poem De rerum natura by the Roman author Titus Lucretius Carus, writen in the 1st century BC, is notorious for its compromise with regard to those modes of expression \"repeled\" by epicureans. Beyond this apparent violation, another noteworthy element in this poem is the refusal of a single term to mean \'atom\', which was definitively singularized by Epicuro by means of the term ἄτομος and, occasionally referred also by the term σομα. The options of aesthetic matrix (use of the poetical form and mythical elements) disclose Lucretius\' adherence to an established didactic program and invite us to rel-ativize the epicurean position and to search for more solid elements that support a view on aesthetic and mythic matters less sectarian than the one propagated by the critics of the doctrine. On the other hand, the vocabulary variation reflects the development of the didactic program, in that sense Lucretius makes use of positions of other thinkers (pre-socratic thinkers) regarding the essential components of matter. Those positions are conveniently misrepresented so to dis-qualify active and influential schools of thought at the time of Lucretius (stoicism and the Acad-emy). These misrepresentations help Lucretius to guide the reader throught complicated con-cepts and by this mean the exposure of the Epicurean thesis can be performed in a faster and more complete way.

Na presente dissertação de mestrado, propomos uma interpretação do Livro IV da República de Platão, que defende a fórmula to ta hautou prattein, ou \"fazer o que lhe é próprio\", como uma definição plausível de justiça. A busca por tal definição mobiliza as bases do pensamento de Platão, pois toca na pergunta de tipo socrático \"o que é?\", insere-a no contexto metafísico dos Diálogos Médios e demanda o sentido de uma virtude moral. O problema central discutido nesta pesquisa é compreender a resposta de Platão - fundamentada \"nas coisas\" (en autois Rep. 444A4-6) - à pergunta \"o que é a justiça\", em contraste com a alegação de haver \"a Forma da justiça ela mesma\", κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶδος, (Rep. 435b2). O principal objetivo desta investigação é reconstruir os pressupostos que conferem à justiça a fórmula definicional \"fazer o que lhe é próprio\" (Rep. 443c-444a to ta hautou prattein). Nossa leitura testa a hipótese de que há, de fato, uma definição de justiça na República, averiguando se a expressão \"fazer o que lhe é próprio\" cumpre, adequadamente, o papel definicional e explica o conteúdo moral dessa virtude. Concluímos que \"fazer o que lhe é próprio\" constitui uma definição de tipo paradigmática. Considerando que a referida fórmula é o princípio de construção de exemplares perfeitos de justiça, preenchemos os critérios formais de universalidade e igualdade entre o definiens e o definiendum - como era demandado pelos diálogos socráticos -, ao mesmo tempo em que atendemos ao critério ontológico de se adotar uma Forma como referente - tal como requerido pela metafísica dos Diálogos Médios. Quanto à função explicativa da definição de justiça, a fórmula delimita, precisamente, o sentido da virtude buscada porque aponta o caso mais exemplar de justiça, no melhor mundo possível. Desse modo, a pesquisa contribui para uma postura interpretativa mais unitarista do corpus platônico, ao sugerir que o projeto de encontrar uma definição universal, unificada e explicativa não foi completamente abandonado nos Diálogos Médios. / In this master\'s thesis, we propose an interpretation of Book IV of Plato\'s Republic, which defends the formula to ta hautou prattein, or \"to do what is proper\", as a plausible definition of justice. The quest for such a definition mobilizes the basis of Plato\'s thought, for it touches on the Socratic-type question \"what is it?\", inserts it in the metaphysical context of the Middle Dialogues and demands the sense of a moral virtue. The central problem discussed in this research is to understand Plato\'s answer - based on \"things\" (en autois Rep. 444A4-6) - to the question \"what is justice\", in contrast to the claim that there is \"the Form of justice in itself \", κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶδος, (Rep. 435b2). The main objective of this investigation is to reconstruct the assumptions that give justice the definitional formula \"to do what is proper\" (Rep. 443c-444a to ta hautou prattein). Our reading tests the hypothesis that there is, indeed, a definition of justice in the Republic, investigating whether the expression \"doing what is proper\" appropriately fulfills the definitional role and explains the moral content of that virtue. We conclude that \"doing what is proper\" is a paradigmatic definition. Considering that this formula is the construction principle of justice perfect examples, we meet the formal criteria of generality and equality between definiens and definiendum - as demanded by the the Socratic dialogues -, while we fulfill the ontological criterion of adopting a Form as a referent - as required by the metaphysics of the Middle Dialogues. As for the explanatory function of the definition of justice, the formula precisely delimits the meaning of the virtue sought because it points to the most exemplary case of justice, in the best possible world. In this way, the research contributes to a more unitarian interpretation of the Platonic corpus by suggesting that the project of finding a universal, unified and explanatory definition was not completely abandoned in the Middle Dialogues.

Cette thèse de doctorat consiste en une nouvelle édition critique avec introduction, traduction en italien et commentaire de l’« Éryxias » pseudo-platonicien, un dialogue socratique ayant été transmis parmi les œuvres de Platon mais qui était déjà connu par les anciens pour être inauthentique et faussement attribué au grand philosophe (voir par exemple Diogène Laërce 3, 62). L’édition critique la plus récente du texte, publiée dans la « Collection des Universités de France » par les soins de Joseph Souilhé en 1930, est fondée sur une reconstruction de la tradition manuscrite qui a été remise en question par les études de L.A. Post (1934). En outre, malgré le récent retour d’intérêt pour les dialogues « apocryphes » du corpus platonicien, l’« Éryxias » reste méconnu et peu étudié : après les deux dissertations allemandes d’O. Schrohl (Göttingen 1901) et G. Gartmann (Bonn 1949), il n’y a pas eu de travaux dédiés spécifiquement au dialogue, exception faite de la décevante traduction annotée par R. Laurenti (Bari 1969). L’hypothèse avancée au cours de ce travail voit en l’« Éryxias » un produit composé à l’école fondée par Platon, l’Académie, après la mort du fondateur et plus précisément pendant la première moitié du troisième siècle avant Jésus-Christ : cela ferait du dialogue un témoin de la reconstruction de la pensée et de l’activité littéraire de l’Académie hellénistique. L’introduction est divisée en quatre chapitres. Les deux premiers abordent les problèmes plus strictement philologiques, liés à la transmission du corpus et du dialogue dans l’antiquité et à la chronologie du texte, notamment fixée par les savants sur la base de la présence d’un magistrat – le gymnasiarque – qui n’apparaît pas à Athènes avant la fin du quatrième siècle avant Jésus-Christ. Le troisième chapitre porte sur le contenu philosophique : le sujet de l’« Éryxias » est le rapport entre richesse (ploutos) et vertu (arete). Deux conclusions différentes sont présentées, en s’appuyant sur deux définitions différentes de la richesse : selon la première, ayant trait au concept de valeur, le sage est le plus riche des hommes ; selon la seconde, identifiant la richesse à la possession de biens matériels (chremata), le plus riche des hommes sera le plus méchant. Les deux conclusions sont parfaitement en accord avec un arrière-plan philosophique constitué par les dialogues de Platon et s’insèrent dans une tentative visant à accorder les divers traitements de la richesse dans les écrits authentiques. La recherche menée dans l’« Éryxias » peut bien être contextualisée dans le mouvement général de « renaissance du Socratisme » qui a été individué par les savants durant la première moitié de l’époque hellénistique (voir A. A. Long, Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy, CQ 38, 1988, 150-171 ; F. Alesse, La Stoa e la tradizione socratica, Napoli 2000). L’Académie, comme le montre la production de dialogues socratiques, occupe un rôle central dans ce mouvement, ayant l’effort de revendiquer l’héritage de Socrate à travers son disciple, Platon. Le quatrième chapitre porte sur l’aspect littéraire : l’« Éryxias » a été reconnu par les savants comme le plus soigné des dialogues inauthentiques en ce qui concerne la cure de l’élément artistique. Après un paragraphe sur la poétique du dialogue dans l’« Éryxias », nous relevons une étude approfondie du proème, qui se montre particulièrement détaillé, ainsi que de Socrate et des autres personnages. À la fin du chapitre, le style et la langue du dialogue sont examinés. À la suite d’une note sur la tradition manuscrite, est donnée une nouvelle édition critique avec apparat du dialogue, suivie d’une traduction en italien. Le commentaire extensif porte sur des questions de détail s’insérant dans le plus grand cadre tracé au cours de l’introduction : son approche est autant philologique-littéraire qu’historique et philosophique. Un appendice de tables et une bibliographie sont ajoutés en qualité d’instruments nécessaires au lecteur. / This PhD thesis consists in a new critical edition with introduction, italian translation and commentary of the pseudo-platonic Eryxias, a Socratic dialogue transmitted inside the corpus of Plato’s works but already known in antiquity (see Diogenes Laertius 3.62) to be inauthentic and falsely attributed to the ancient philosopher. The latest critical edition of the Eryxias, which dates back to 1930 and was published by J. Souilhé in the «Collection des Universités de France», is not reliable, as it depends on a misleading reconstruction of the manuscript tradition, outdated at least since the pioneering work of L. A. Post (1934, The Vatican Plato and its Relations, Middletown); moreover, notwithstanding the text’s philosophical and literary interest and length inside the group of the Platonic spuria, the Eryxias has not been object of specific studies in the past century, exception made for the two dissertations by O. Schrohl (Göttingen 1901) and G. Gartmann (Bonn 1949), two works that remain hardly accessible even to scholars in the field, and for the italian edition by R. Laurenti (Bari 1969). Even in recent years, when the spurious dialogues have seen a renaissance as a field of study (see for example the volume edited by K. Döring, M. Erler and S. Schorn, Pseudoplatonica, Stuttgart, 2005), the Eryxias remains less studied than other items in the corpus, mainly due to its extension – fifteen pages of the canonic edition by Stephanus (1578) – and to its overall complexity. In spite of this marginal role in recent studies, the Eryxias had attracted since the 18th century the interest of scholars and historians of ancient economy, as it presents an ancient discussion on the value of wealth and material goods. The first part of the introduction deals with the philological issues and the general problems related to the transmission of the text in antiquity. In the second chapter I turn to the philosophical content. The theme of the Eryxias is an enquiry on the relationship between wealth (ploutos) and virtue (arete), led by Socrates together with his interlocutors Erasistratus, Eryxias and Critias (the tyrant). Two definitions of wealth are investigated: according to the first, which is centered on value (axios) the wealthiest man will be the wise man (sophos), as wisdom is the greatest value for mankind. According to the second, which identifies wealth with the possession of material goods (chremata), the richest man will be the most wicked. Both of these conclusions are consistent with the main model of the dialogue, that is to say the authentic writings of Plato. In the introduction I argue that the philosophical aim of the Eryxias is in fact an attempt to draw a coherent doctrine of wealth based on the Platonic dialogues and on the research developed inside Plato’s school, the Academy, in the first decades of the third century: to prove this point I show the coherence with many parallel passages in Plato’s writings, which show a careful study of the whole body of work associated to the name of the founder of the Academy, and I try to set the Eryxias in its historical frame, namely the «return to Socrates» that historians have seen in the first part of the Hellenistic Age (see A. A. Long, Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy, CQ 38, 1988, 150-171; F. Alesse, La Stoa e la tradizione socratica, Napoli 2000). In the third and final chapter I concentrate my attention on the literary aspect, with a particular interest in the reception of the models of Socratic literature in the composition of the dialogue. Follows a note on the medieval tradition. After the text and translation, the extended commentary focuses on issues of detail, both literary-philological and philosophical. An appendix with tables as a full bibliography are included.

Este trabalho é uma tradução da Poética de Aristóteles (com exceção dos capítulos 19 a 22, que não são discutidos aqui) acompanhada de comentários. A intenção dele é estabelecer um texto que leve em conta as várias contribuições dadas pelas principais traduções francesas, inglesas, italianas e portuguesas, e situar, por meio dos comentários, a Poética dentro do corpus da filosofia aristotélica, especialmente a ética de Aristóteles e sua teoria da ação. / This paper is a translation into Portuguese of Aristotle\'s Poetics (with the exception of chapters 19 trough 22, which are not discussed here), with accompanying commentaries. Its intention views the establishment of a text that takes into account several contributions given by the main French, English, Italian and Portuguese translations. The commentaries consider Poetics as a part of the Aristotelian philosophy teachings, especially Aristotle\'s ethics and his action theory.

The paper aims to examine the nature of the relationship between beauty and the city. I examined this relationship by first providing a summary of relevant philosophers and their thoughts concerning aesthetics. Second, I compared their thoughts to my own creating my own abstract framework. Third, I implemented my abstract framework through the lens of architecture. This art form is the most organic to study the relationship of beauty within the city because it merges elements characteristic of one’s being like political discourse with the longing for some type of excitement or stimulation which might transfigure one’s self to a higher understanding, something that can only be achieved by experiencing beauty. In other words, buildings and the spaces around them drive the way in which humans interact with each other and their surroundings. I found that the beautiful is desirable and at a point becomes essential to a person’s happiness. To achieve a sense of beauty within the city, the ruling class must possess practical wisdom. A type of knowledge that allows them to pursue the appropriate and promote a kind of creativity that not only respects tradition but also aims to unveil some new form of experience.

This report examines the sectarian backdrop for Galen of Pergamum's medical epistemology. It considers the justificatory role that experience (empeiria) and theoretical accounts (logoi) play in Empiricist and Dogmatist epistemology in an attempt to track how Galen incorporates experience into theoretical accounts as a means by which to undergird them. Finally, it briefly considers the exiguous evidence for Methodism, Galen's main medical rivals in the Roman world and claims that Galen forges a middle path between these sects. / text

A philosophical and philological commentary on Cicero, first book of the Tusculan Disputations.

In a famous argument at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that the function and good of the human being is the "actuality of the soul in accordance with virtue". Presenting a view critical of the widespread intellectualist reading of Aristotle's Ethics, in this thesis I argue that the characteristic function of the human being is constitutive of a distinctly human life as a dynamic formal cause teleologically operative in human awareness. I argue for the validity of my own view in a preliminary way in the introduction by way of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic forms. In the second chapter, I argue that the processes of the non-rational part of the soul are acquired and actively operate once acquired independently of singular dictates of active reason within the individual. By this I mean that the virtues do not obey reason in the sense that they receive individual commands from discursive reason to desire or feel in certain ways. Rather, although the moral virtues are formed gradually by repeated acts of choice, as affective states, they are activated by being affected from without by external stimuli. These external stimuli produce impulses in the soul which are conducive to virtuous action, including a cognitive element: primarily, non-rational and non-discursive evaluative judgments of phantasia, which supply a human agent immediately with the ends of his action and the beginning-points of deliberation. These judgments are the awareness of sensible particulars as pleasant. In the third chapter, I turn to the De Anima in order to illuminate the cognitive conditions of human praxis. Following on the arguments contained in the second chapter, I argue that there are two primary cognitive moments which are necessary conditions of action. While the ends of desire are immediate objects of awareness and move humans as unmoved movers, motivational desires, which move as efficient causes, are initiated by a distinct cognitive power: proclamations to pursue or avoid.