Samuel Taylor Coleridge used theories of evil and creation from Plato, Plotinus and Proclus to refine his definitions of the Trinity and the Absolute and Apostate Wills, and to move beyond the Germanic Naturphilosophie concept of self-hood as achieved by a self-objectification which emphasised differences between the persons of the Trinity rather than their similarities. His use of specific classical Greek concepts allowed him to propose that the Absolute Will�s self-substantiative act established unity and distinction as simultaneous and interrelated equals. From this, Coleridge investigated how identity and relationship rely upon unity and distinction, as he believed that identity is a unified self distinct from others, and that relationship is the unified common ground of many selves. My first chapter explains my methodology in dealing with Coleridge�s problematic relationship with both Greek and German sources, and describes how Coleridge�s philosophical investigations into evil and creation resulted from personal crises oyer his sense of self and sin. I provide an overview of the system Coleridge devised to address these concerns, concentrating upon the aspects which he believed clarified humanity�s status in relation to evil and the divine. I demonstrate how Coleridge accounts for the origin of the Apostate Will, and I explain his view of identity and relationships between the persons of the Trinity, providing a relevant overview that allows me to point out his use of the fundamental Greek concepts that anchor the subsequent chapters on Plato, Plotinus and Proclus. My second chapter examines Coleridge�s statement that Plato had formulated a triune creative principle, a concept critical to Coleridge�s need to unite God to the created universe. After describing the Platonic structure of reality and its divine creative act, I focus on the Platonic triad of Difference, Unity and Being. Plato�s account of these three principles and how they arise from the divine principle activity influences Coleridge�s view of the Trinity, what it contains in terms of distinction and unity, and how the Trinity arises from the superessential Absolute Will. I explain how Coleridge refined his definition of Christ as pleroma by referencing the way that the Form of the Good simultaneously exhibits plurality and identity. My third chapter shows how the Plotinian theory of the One�s will-based self-substantiation influenced Coleridge�s definition of the Absolute Will. I determine that Plotinus�s concept of heterotes (otherness) informs Coleridge�s view of the origin of evil, and I show how his concept of redemption is influenced by Plotinus�s account of noetic contemplation. My fourth chapter explains how Coleridge used the Proclian concept of Bound to develop the actualising quality of the Logos, in relation to Christ as a successful plurality but also in terms of Christ�s role in the redemption. My conclusion surveys all four philosophers to demonstrate how concepts drawn from Plato, Plotinus and Proclus helped Coleridge to define the Absolute Will and the way that its activity is the unity, distinction, identity and relationship of the Trinity. These three distinct yet related systems influenced Coleridge�s view of evil, as well as his understanding of the Absolute Will�s self-creative act, its relation to the Trinity, and the simultaneously fallen and divine status of humanity.

This dissertation is a study of the differing explanatory criteria used for the assessment of epistemic medical claims, particularly anatomical claims, in the work of Galen of Pergamum (129-c. 216 CE). It focuses on Galen's use of anatomy and anatomical exegesis to position himself in relation to the various medical sects or haireseis active in the Late Roman Empire. Consequent on the emergence of invasive anatomical investigations in the early Hellenistic period (3rd cent. BCE), the explanatory and therapeutic value of anatomical information came to be a defining characteristic of competing medical sects. The Empiricists, who, we are told, were reacting to what they believed was the theoretical promiscuity of other medical thinkers, took their name from their reliance on experience rather than theory, the latter a methodological commitment they attributed to other medical thinkers whom they grouped under the broad category of Dogmatists. This sensitivity to theoretical claims is apparent from the fact that the Empiricists eschewed anatomical dissections, on the grounds that they required analogical moves from structures in corpses to structures in living creatures. If Galen is to be taken at his word, by the second century CE, sectarian disputes between the medical sects had risen to a fever pitch. Galen, who was at pains to make a place for his own medical beliefs in this debate, stresses the need for explanatory theoretical accounts of the body and things relevant to its biological function but also insists that these theoretical accounts be based in empirical observations. One of the arguments he must overcome is the problem of anatomical analogy, raised by the Empiricists. Galen not only engages with this issue from an abstract point of view but, this dissertation argues, he engages with it through the narrative structure of his anatomical accounts throughout his work and especially in his procedural anatomical handbook, De Anatomicis Administrationibus. Historically, this treatise has either been ignored by scholars or studied as a technical treatise that lacks in artifice. This dissertation questions this approach and considers the argumentative role of Galen's anatomical exegesis in the debate over the explanatory value of anatomy in Greco-Roman medicine. It takes as one of its main focuses, Galen's accounts of elephantine anatomy. It argues that these accounts are governed by different norms of assertion, which do not place the same premium on accurate reporting of anatomical detail, from the surrounding anatomical narrative in De Anatomicis Administrationibus. To that end, it shows the need for a more nuanced reading of fachprosa, such as Galen's anatomical work, than these texts have historically received. / text

Samuel Taylor Coleridge used theories of evil and creation from Plato, Plotinus and Proclus to refine his definitions of the Trinity and the Absolute and Apostate Wills, and to move beyond the Germanic Naturphilosophie concept of self-hood as achieved by a self-objectification which emphasised differences between the persons of the Trinity rather than their similarities. His use of specific classical Greek concepts allowed him to propose that the Absolute Will�s self-substantiative act established unity and distinction as simultaneous and interrelated equals. From this, Coleridge investigated how identity and relationship rely upon unity and distinction, as he believed that identity is a unified self distinct from others, and that relationship is the unified common ground of many selves. My first chapter explains my methodology in dealing with Coleridge�s problematic relationship with both Greek and German sources, and describes how Coleridge�s philosophical investigations into evil and creation resulted from personal crises oyer his sense of self and sin. I provide an overview of the system Coleridge devised to address these concerns, concentrating upon the aspects which he believed clarified humanity�s status in relation to evil and the divine. I demonstrate how Coleridge accounts for the origin of the Apostate Will, and I explain his view of identity and relationships between the persons of the Trinity, providing a relevant overview that allows me to point out his use of the fundamental Greek concepts that anchor the subsequent chapters on Plato, Plotinus and Proclus. My second chapter examines Coleridge�s statement that Plato had formulated a triune creative principle, a concept critical to Coleridge�s need to unite God to the created universe. After describing the Platonic structure of reality and its divine creative act, I focus on the Platonic triad of Difference, Unity and Being. Plato�s account of these three principles and how they arise from the divine principle activity influences Coleridge�s view of the Trinity, what it contains in terms of distinction and unity, and how the Trinity arises from the superessential Absolute Will. I explain how Coleridge refined his definition of Christ as pleroma by referencing the way that the Form of the Good simultaneously exhibits plurality and identity. My third chapter shows how the Plotinian theory of the One�s will-based self-substantiation influenced Coleridge�s definition of the Absolute Will. I determine that Plotinus�s concept of heterotes (otherness) informs Coleridge�s view of the origin of evil, and I show how his concept of redemption is influenced by Plotinus�s account of noetic contemplation. My fourth chapter explains how Coleridge used the Proclian concept of Bound to develop the actualising quality of the Logos, in relation to Christ as a successful plurality but also in terms of Christ�s role in the redemption. My conclusion surveys all four philosophers to demonstrate how concepts drawn from Plato, Plotinus and Proclus helped Coleridge to define the Absolute Will and the way that its activity is the unity, distinction, identity and relationship of the Trinity. These three distinct yet related systems influenced Coleridge�s view of evil, as well as his understanding of the Absolute Will�s self-creative act, its relation to the Trinity, and the simultaneously fallen and divine status of humanity.

O volume de literatura secundária sobre o conceito aristotélico de noûs produtivo é proporcional à brevidade e à obscuridade com que ele é apresentado no quinto capítulo do terceiro livro do \"De Anima\". Esta dissertação visa investigar as razões que fazem deste texto terreno fértil para as mais diversas interpretações. Para tanto, este estudo parte do comentário analítico de DA III 4-5, destacando as possibilidades interpretativas de cada passagem e as variantes textuais mais significativas. Procurou-se explorar outras passagens do corpus aristotélico que podem ser utilizadas para elucidar o conteúdo desses capítulos, considerando as opções adotadas pelos principais comentadores antigos. Após mostrar que o texto comporta igualmente as leituras mais díspares, buscou-se evidenciar como elementos extratextuais, tais como a filosofia e o método exegético predominante no tempo de cada interprete podem ser identificados nas opções adotadas. Para tanto, adotou-se a obra de Alexandre de Afrodísia como objeto de exposição e análise, uma vez que sua identificação do nous produtivo à Causa Primeira de Met. XII 7-9 é a mais influente e polêmica das exegeses deste conceito. Para tanto, foram apresentadas suas principais teses e contrastadas com a base textual aristotélica, de modo pôr em relevo as características do método do Exegeta. / The amount of secondary literature on the Aristotelian concept of productive nous is proportional to the briefness and obscurity of its presentation in the fifth chapter of the Book Three of the De Anima. This thesis aims to investigate the reasons why this text offers a fertile ground for the most varied interpretations. Therefore, this text begins with an analytical commentary on DA III 4-5, highlighting the interpretative possibilities and the most significant textual variants of each passage. We searched for other passages of the Aristotelian corpus that could help us elucidate the content of these chapters, considering the options adopted by the main ancient commentators. After showing how the text equally accepts the most disparate readings, we tried to evidence how extra-textual elements, such as the philosophy and exegetical method predominant in the time of each interpreter can are present in the adopted options. For this, the work of Alexander of Aphrodisias was adopted as object of exposition and analysis, since its identification of the productive nous to the First Cause of Met. XII 7-9 is the most influential and polemical exegesis of this concept. His main arguments were presented and contrasted with the Aristotelian textual background, to highlight the characteristics of the Exegete\'s methods.

In this paper, we discuss some possible readings of Physics IV 2, where Aristotle identifies the Platonic χώρα of the Timaeus with ὕλη, μεταληπτικόν and μεθεκτικόν. We will study common features that bring the receptacle of the Timaeus closer to Aristotelian matter and space, and that make it natural for Aristotle to identify χώρα with matter. However, we will try to show that, in spite of the similarities between the receptacle and what Aristotle understands for place and matter, the mechanics of appropriation of the Platonic text that the Stagirite operates, forcing an equivalence with his own technical terms, possibly implies a distortion that, in the end, does not do justice to the formulations of the teacher. / En el presente trabajo, discutiremos algunas lecturas posibles de Física IV 2, donde Aristóteles identifica la χώρα platónica del Timeo con ὕλη, μεταληπτικόν y μεθεκτικόν. Estudiaremos rasgos comunes que acercan el receptáculo del Timeo con la materia y el espacio aristotélicos, y que hacen que Aristóteles encuentre natural identificar la χώρα con la materia. Sin embargo, intentaremos mostrar que, a pesar de las semejanzas entre el receptáculo y lo que Aristóteles entiende por lugar y materia, la mecánica de apropiación del texto platónico que opera el Estagirita, forzando una equivalencia con sus propios términos técnicos, posiblemente implique una distorsión que no termina de hacer justicia a las formulaciones del maestro.

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1 Abstract Meaning of numbers between Plato and Aristotle Antonín Šíma The dissertation titled "The Transformation of the Concept of Number between Plato and the Early Academy" deals with the problem of numbers in early Platonism between Aristotle and Plato. In Plato's dialogues, within professional mathematical disciplines of knowledge, numbers fulfil a function of propaedeutic procedure to the method of thinking − dialectic. Dialectic engages in the most general structures of thinking whose centre is the problem of being and good, which is only mentioned marginally in our thesis. The philosophy of dialogues is based on the ontological and epistemological dignity of unchanging and eternally existing ideas. In Metaphysics A Aristotle describes Plato's and the Platonic doctrines of the early Academy in whose centre there are principles expressed by numbers: one and indefinite two, which are assessed according to Aristotelian principles doctrine as form and matter. Aristotle mentions Platonic dialectical method which focuses on researching the general in speech. This method distinguishes Platonic thought from Pythagorean philosophy in Aristotle's precursors' philosophy overview. In the criticized doctrine, numbers have the same meaning as ideas or ideal numbers standing on the scale of ontological dignity...

Os historiadores da filosofia parecem quase todos de acordo ao atribuir a Parmênides o início da reflexão a respeito do ser. Mas no Poema encontramos também um discurso a respeito do não-ser. A deusa, a voz de Parmênides, diz que o caminho do não-ser é caminho impercorrível e que ademais, o não-ser não pode nem ser dito e nem ser pensado como origem da geração e da corrupção das coisas. Melisso aparentemente leva esse preceito à últimas conseqüências, pois se não há geração e corrupção, para ele o mundo é infinito, eterno, uno e imutável. Além disso, Melisso nega totalmente os fenômenos, julgando-os um engano dos sentidos. Surge a pergunta: eles estarão falando do mesmo não-ser? Este trabalho tem por objetivo estabelecer as noções respectivas de não-ser em Parmênides e em Melisso. Verificadas as noções de não-ser, elas são comparadas de forma a evidenciar as diferenças: a noção de não-ser de Parmênides aponta para a contradição (noção ontológica); a noção de não-ser de Melisso aponta para o nulo (noção lógica). O trabalho conclui que Melisso transgride o preceito da deusa parmenidiana, usando o não-ser no discurso e no pensamento, pois para ele já não era um conceito contraditório, mas um conceito de ausência, próximo ao nosso conceito de zero. Como complemento, a pesquisa aponta que na seqüência histórica, o conceito de não-ser criticado pelos filósofos posteriores é mais o conceito de Melisso do que aquele de Parmênides. Esse apontar complementar é obtido com um rápido sobrevôo nas filosofias de Górgias e de Platão, com o intuito de abrir a problemática dos próximos passos da pesquisa. Nosso trabalho confirma também o isolamento histórico de Parmênides, tendo sido um inovador sem seguidores. / Almost all the philosophy historians seem to agree attributing to Parmenides the beginning of the reflection about being. In the Poem, however, we also find a speech about not being. The goddess, voice of Parmenides, says that the way of not being is a non accessible way and furthermore not being cannot be said nor thought as the origin of coming-to-be and passingaway of all things. Melissus seems to convey that precept to its boundaries, for if there is no coming-to-be and no passing-away, the world is infinite, eternal, one and immutable. Furthermore, Melissus denies the entire world of experiences, considering it a mistake of senses. There arises a question: are they speaking about the same? This work aims to set up the notions of not being in Parmenides and Melissus. Once examined that notions, they are confronted to make evident he difference: the notion of not being in Parmenides points towards a contradiction (ontologic notion); the notion of not being in Melissus points towards the null (logic notion). The work reaches the conclusion that Melissus transgresses the precept of the parmenidian goddess, using not being in saying and thinking, for it wasnt, in his vision, a contradictory concept, but a concept of absence, close to our concept of zero. In order to complement, our inquiry indicates that, in the historical sequence, the concept of not being rejected by subsequent philosophers is more the Melissus concept than Parmenides one. The direction given is obtained in a quickly overflying in Gorgias and Platos philosophies, with the aim of opening the problematic to next steps of inquiry. Our work confirms also the loneliness of Parmenides, for he was a renovator without followers.

A presente tese explora, como solução para o controvertido quadro geral da moderna história da crítica sobre Pitágoras e seu movimento, a definição do pitagorismo como categoria historiográfica. Superando tanto o dilema entre ceticismo e confiança nas fontes, como a pretensão de alcançar uma única chave hermenêutica que permita resolver a questão pitagórica, procura percorrer a história da tradição em busca de uma imagem suficientemente plural a ponto de possibilitar a compreensão do pitagorismo em sua irredutível articulação de bíos e theoría e não apesar dela. A configuração da comunidade e de seu bíos é percebida como elemento central de identificação do pitagorismo. A análise das duas teorias que mais decididamente contribuíram para a definição do pitagorismo ao longo da história, a transmigração da alma imortal e a doutrina dos números, procura definir as condições de possibilidade de atribuí-las ao pitagorismo mais antigo e as formas pelas quais ambas teriam contribuído, ao longo da história, para a definição do pitagorismo como categoria historiográfica. As fontes pré-socráticas, a platonização do pitagorismo, o testemunho aristotélico sobre os assim chamados pitagóricos, a literatura pseudoepigráfica helenística e o pitagorismo de época imperial são entendidos como momentos de um percurso histórico que resulta em uma imagem poliédrica de um dos maiores fenômenos intelectuais da história ocidental. / This thesis explores the definition of Pythagoreanism as historiographical category, seen as solution for the controversial general framework of modern history of criticism about Pythagoras and his movement. Overcoming both the dilemma between skepticism and faith in the sources and the claim to achieve a single hermeneutical key to solve the Pythagorean question, in it searches are made throughout the history of tradition looking for an image sufficiently plural in order to understand Pythagoreanism in accordance with its irreducible articulation of bíos and theoría, not despite it. The setting of the community and its bíos is understood as central element for Pythagorean identification. An analysis of the two theories that more decisively contributed to the definition of Pythagoreanism throughout history, the transmigration of the immortal soul and the doctrine of numbers, attempts to define the conditions of possibility to assign them to the earlier Pythagoreanism and the ways in which these have contributed throughout history to the definition of Pythagoreanism as historiographical category. Presocratic sources, the platonization of Pythagoreanism, Aristotle\'s testimony about the \"so-called\" Pythagoreans, the hellenistic Pseudoepigrapha and Pythagoreanism in imperial age are understood as moments of an historical route resulting in a polyhedral image of one of the greatest intellectual phenomena in Western history.

The Cognitive Role of φαινόμενα and its Scientific Use in Aristotle’s Treatises of Science”. We examine a classical discussion about the meaning of the term φαινόμενα in Aristotle. We criticize G. E. L. Owen’s interpretation who identifies its meaning with that of opinion (ἔνδοξα). Based on Aristotle’s treatises of science we propound another interpretation about this topic. Thus, we may emphasize the cognitive role that φαινόμενα have; for this, we highlight the functionthat they have while there are source of the knowledge of principles (cf. APr. I 30) as well as that they are judges of theoretical proposal with which they are in contradiction. In effect, one of the problems to be resolved is how is it possible that a contradiction exists between the principles of a science and the φαινόμενα. / Examinamos una discusión ya clásica sobre el sentido del término φαινόμενα en Aristóteles. Criticamos la interpretación de G. E. L. Owen, quien identifica su significado al de opinión (ἔνδοξα). Con base textual en los tratados de ciencia de Aristóteles, proponemos otra interpretación sobre este tópico. Así,podremos enfatizar el rol cognitivo que poseen los φαινόμενα; para ello, destacamos la función que tienen en tanto que son fuente del conocimiento de los principios (cf. APr. I 30) así como en cuanto se erigen en jueces de propuestas teóricas con las cuales entran en contradicción. En efecto, uno de los problemas a resolver es precisamente cómo es posible que exista una contradicción entre los principios de una ciencia y los φαινόμενα.