The thesis investigates Plotinus' concept of beauty. Chapter 1 focuses on two methodological issues: development in Plotinus' thought and topics of the concerned Enneads. Since Plotinus wrote two Enneads directly devoted to this topic which were numbered and named by Porphyry I.6 On beauty and V.8 On intellectual beauty, these two treatises are addressed first in the context of other relevant Enneads (chapters 2 and 3). The outcome of these chapters is that beauty is primarily to be found in Intellect and that it is closely linked with unity in multiplicity, so this topic is further investigated in more detail. Five mutually interconnected perspectives Plotinus assumes to describe the unity in multiplicity specific to the Intellect, are outlined. Two of them that are related to the nature of intellection and intelligible objects are discussed in chapters 2 and 3. The one related to Intellect's genesis is analysed throughout the thesis. Therefore, most of chapter 4 focuses on the remaining two perspectives which are connected with Intellect's hierarchical (Ennead VI.2) and structural (Ennead VI.6) unity in multiplicity. In chapter 5, Ennead VI.7 is analysed in order to deepen the concept of beauty and refine its relation to the Good, life and other predicates. The last chapter presents a systematic...

No single volume of mythological or philological research exists for Hades. In the one moment Hades appears in archaic Greek literature, speaking for only ten lines, Hermes stands nearby. Thus, to understand and journey to Hades is to reckon with Hermes’ close presence. As I synthesize research by writers from several different disciplines, may some light be brought into the depths. May we analyze Hades’ brief appearance in archaic Greek literature, examining how what I define as the “Hermetic” emits from his breath in the one moment he physically appears and speaks.

Selon Aristote, la cause finale est double, suivant ce qu’il indique en cinq endroits stratégiques du corpus : à propos de la relation causale entre la finalité et la matière, dans Physique II ; par rapport à la finalité de la reproduction animale, dans De Anima II ; et un peu plus loin, dans cette même ouvrage, le dualisme est affirmé pour éclairer la manière dont l’âme est fin pour le corps ; dans l’Éthique à Eudème, où il s’agit de préciser la façon dont le dieu est fin pour la sagesse pratique ; enfin, concernant la causalité téléologique du Premier Moteur, dans Métaphysique Λ. Ce dualisme téléologique, formulé dans les occurrences du De Anima II à travers l’expression technique τὸ οὗ et τὸ ᾧ, ayant été développée dans une étude qui ne nous est pas parvenue, est fréquemment comprise en fonction de la finalité de la production technique et traduite par « le but visé » et « le bénéficiaire ». Toutefois, cette tentative d’éclaircir cette expression laconique pose des problèmes assez importants, dont celui de sa pertinence pour l’approche des phénomènes naturels qu’elle est censée expliquer. Cette étude cherche à restituer ce dualisme de la fin au centre de la compréhension aristotélicienne de la téléologie. L’examen des occurrences, ainsi que l’étude des thèmes majeurs de la finalité dans la philosophie de la nature d’Aristote, nous conduisent à mettre en avant deux notions qui permettent expliciter ce à quoi fait référence le dualisme téléologique : la notion d’usage, χρῆσις, et celle de préservation, σωτηρία. / According to Aristotle, the final cause is twofold, as it indicates in five strategic places of the corpus: concerning the causal relation between finality and matter, in Physics II; with respect to the purpose of animal reproduction, in De Anima II; and a little further on, in this same work, this dualism is affirmed to enlighten the way in which the soul is end for the body; in Eudemian Ethics, where is it to specify the way in which the god is an end for practical wisdom; finally, concerning the teleological causality of the Prime Mover, in Metaphysics Λ. This teleological dualism, formulated in the occurrences of De Anima II through the technical expression τὸ οὗ and τὸ ᾧ, having been developed in a study that has not survived to our times, is frequently understood in terms of purpose in technical production and translated by "purpose" and "beneficiary". However, this attempt to clarify this laconic expression raises quite significant problems, including that of its relevance for the approach of the natural phenomena that it is supposed to explain. This study attempts to restore this dualism of the end at the centre of Aristotelian understanding of teleology. The examination of occurrences, as well as the study of the major themes of finality in Aristotle's philosophy of nature, lead us to put forward two notions that make explicit what the teleological dualism refers to: the notion of usage, χρῆσις, and that of preservation, σωτηρία.

L’ambition de cette thèse est de confronter les interprétations heideggérienne et patočkienne des concepts fondamentaux de la Physique d’Aristote. Un point d’accord relie les deux philosophes : Aristote conçoit le mouvement comme une détermination ontologique fondamentale. Le mouvement (κίνησις/μεταβολή) se conçoit fondamentalement en effet comme un procès d’éclosion, d’advenue au paraître des étants dans la présence manifeste. Cependant, Heidegger et Patočka ne comprennent pas de la même manière le sens de ce mouvement ontologique au cœur de la nature (φύσις) : c’est à examiner ces différences que cette thèse est consacrée, de sorte à faire ressortir, à la faveur de l’interprétation d’Aristote, deux conceptions distinctes et à bien des égards opposées chez ces deux auteurs du sens et du statut de l’ontologie phénoménologique elle-même. Cette thèse conclut à l’idéalisme philosophique de Heidegger, ainsi qu’à la tendance contraire chez Patočka à un réalisme cosmologique qui conteste, jusqu’à un certain point, l’identité de l’être et du sens. Dans le cadre de cette thèse, une attention toute particulière est accordée au concept qui concentre en lui toute la charge de la tension : à savoir le concept de matière (ὕλη). / This thesis confronts the Heideggerian and Patočkian interpretations of the fundamental concepts of Aristotelian Physics. Both interpretations share a point in common: according to Heidegger and Patočka, Aristotle conceives movement as a fundamental ontological determination of Being. Indeed, movement (κίνησις/μεταβολή) is conceived by Aristotle as a process of unconcealment, of coming into presence of entities in the openness of manifest being. Nevertheless, Heidegger and Patočka disagree on the way that one should understand the meaning of this ontological movement at the core of nature (φύσις). This thesis is entirely dedicated to examining these differences. Our aim is to show, through Heidegger’s and Patočka’s interpretations of Aristotle, that there are two distinct and by all means opposed conceptions of the meaning and status of phenomenological ontology itself. This thesis concludes both to Heidegger’s philosophical idealism, and to Patočka’s contrary attempt to build a cosmological realism that challenges to a certain extent the identity between Being and meaning. In the working out of this thesis, a very particular focus is drawn on the concept that concentrates the entire charge of the tension, i.e. the concept of matter (ὕλη).

[pt] A cadência argumentativa da República de Platão é organizada principalmente em torno de um único recurso formal, a analogia alma-cidade. Para entendermos melhor como ela funciona e que uso Platão poderia esperar dela, procuramos entender, nesta dissertação, os sentidos de proporção e elementos empregados neste contexto, tendo por instrumento a explicitação de uma comparação que o próprio Platão faz por meio de Sócrates: aquela entre o ordenamento das letras em palavras e o de partes que compõem conjuntos unitários (sejam eles indivíduos ou cidades). A partir desta estrutura podemos entender mais qualificadamente as tripartições da cidade e da alma sugeridas pelo diálogo, a teoria do desejo contida nelas e a possível harmonização das nossas motivações conflitantes, que levam a um conceito coletivo de felicidade. / [en] The course of the argument in Plato s Republic is primarily organized around a single formal engine, the city-soul analogy. To better understand its procedure and the use that Plato might have expected from it, we will seek to understand, in this dissertation, the meanings of proportion and elements employed therein by making more explicit the comparison that Plato himself makes through Socrates: the one between the order of letters in words and the sets of parts that make up units (either in the case of individuals or cities). From this understanding we can address more throughly the tripartions of the city and the soul the dialogue suggests, the theory of desire contained therein and the possible harmonization of our conflicting motivations, which lead to a collective concept of happiness.

There have been recent explosions of interest in two fields: Madhyamaka-Pyrrhonism parallels and Pyrrhonism itself, which seems to have been misunderstood and therefore neglected by the West for the same reasons and in the same ways that Madhyamaka traditionally has often been by the West and the East. Among these recent studies are several demonstrating that grounding in Madhyamaka, for example, reveals and illuminates the import and insights of Pyrrhonean arguments. Furthermore it has been suggested that of all European schools of philosophy Pyrrhonism is the one closest to Buddhism, and especially to Madhyamaka. Indeed Pyrrho is recorded to have studied with philosophers in Taxila, one of the first places where Madhyamaka later flourished, and the place where the founder of Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna, may have received hitherto concealed texts which became the foundation for his school. In this dissertation I explore just how similar these two philosophical projects were. I systematically treat all the arguments in the Pyrrhonist redactor Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against Dogmatists and compare them to the most similar arguments available in the Madhyamaka treatises and related texts. On this basis, I ask whether the Pyrrhonists and the Buddhists would satisfy each other’s self-identifying criteria, or what characteristics would disqualify either or both in the other’s eyes. I also ask what questions arise from the linguistic and historical evidence for interactions between the Pyrrhonist school and the Madhyamaka school, and how sure we can be of the answers. Did Pyrrho learn Buddhism in Taxila? Was Nāgārjuna a Pyrrhonist? Finally I bring the insights of the living commentarial tradition of Madhyamaka to bear on current scholarly controversies in the field of Sextan Pyrrhonism, and apply the subtleties of interpretation of the latter which have developed in recent scholarship to Madhyamaka and its various difficulties of interpretation, to scrutinize each school under the illumination of the other. With this hopefully illuminated view, I address for example whether Sextus was consistent, whether living Pyrrhonism implies apraxia, whether Pyrrhonism is philosophy at all, and whether Madhyamaka is actually nihilism.

This thesis investigates whether beliefs acquired by way of prophecy are safe. By ‘prophecy’ I have in mind the presentation of the prophetic method as found in the Guide of the Perplexed, which was Moses Maimonides’ philosophical masterpiece. And by ‘safe’ I have in mind the work by Timothy Williamson on the safety condition for knowledge. Both authors have proven to be dominant forces on these respective topics. The significance of this investigation derives from the centrality of prophecy to the three monotheistic religions. My main goal in this thesis is to identify those safety risks associated with the prophetic method. In this manner I aim to undermine any presumption in favor of prophetic beliefs as a whole being safe. Importantly, this general conclusion does not entail of a specific prophetic belief p that p is unsafe. Additionally, the scope of these results is restricted to the model of prophecy found in the Guide. The thesis begins with a critical elucidation of Williamson’s extensive work on the safety condition for knowledge. Particular attention is paid to those issues related to method individuation and Williamson’s cumulative conception of bases. Matters concerning these two topics inform the reading of Maimonides on prophecy found in the second chapter. In particular, I argue that Maimonides should be read as defending a cumulative conception of prophecy. As I emphasize several times during the chapter, the epistemology of prophecy cannot be reduced to the epistemology of testimony since prophecy for Maimonides does not involve the transfer of a proposition from God to the prophet. The third chapter is devoted to identifying those elements of the prophetic method that involve room for error. I argue that while all belief-forming methods in a fallibilist epistemology contain room for error, some are riskier than others. Prophecy should be considered one of the riskier sort. The fourth and final chapter shifts attention to non-standard semantics for ‘knows,’ David Lewis’s in particular. I argue that the interaction between such semantics and the laws governing prophecy in Jewish law is problematic. In particular, I demonstrate that such semantics destabilize the prophetic phenomenon. As such, we must either choose invariantism and gain stability, or choose non-standard semantics for ‘knows’ and live with this lack of stability.

This thesis builds on recent scholarship on Dio’s φύσις model to argue that Dio’s view of the fall of the Republic can be explained in terms of his interest in the relationship between human nature and political constitution. Chapter One examines Dio’s thinking on Classical debates surrounding the issue of φύσις and is dedicated to a detailed discussion of the terms that are important to Dio’s understanding of Republican political life. The second chapter examines the relationship between φύσις and Roman theories of moral decline in the late Republic. Chapter Three examines the influence of Thucydides on Dio. Chapter Four examines Dio’s reliance on Classical theories of democracy and monarchy. These four chapters, grouped into two sections, show how he explains the downfall of the Republic in the face of human ambition. Section Three will be the first of two case studies, exploring the life of Cicero, one of the main protagonists in Dio’s history of the late Republic. In Chapter Five, I examine Dio’s account of Cicero’s career up to the civil war between Pompey and Caesar. Chapter Six explores Cicero’s role in politics in the immediate aftermath of Caesar’s death, first examining the amnesty speech and then the debate between Cicero and Calenus. Chapter Seven examines the dialogue between Cicero and Philiscus, found in Book 38. In Section Four is my other case study, Caesar. Chapter Eight discusses Caesar as a Republican politician. In Chapter Nine, I examine Dio’s version of the mutiny at Vesontio and Caesar’s speech. Chapter Ten examines Dio’s portrayal of Caesar after he becomes dictator and the speech he delivers to the senate. The Epilogue ties together the main conclusions of the thesis and examines how the ideas explored by Dio in his explanation of the fall of the Republic are resolved in his portrait of the reign of Augustus.

L’objectif poursuivi dans ce mémoire de maîtrise est de proposer une réflexion sur la problématique trop souvent ignorée de la « nature » de la philosophie. Défendant une position historiciste et non essentialiste, la philosophie ne pouvant être comprise, définie et expliquée qu’à partir de ses formes historiques, j’ai décidé d’étudier la présence de la philosophie dans la vie et dans l’oeuvre d’Albert Camus, surtout reconnu pour être un homme de lettres. La pensée de Camus se positionnant contre la philosophie abstraite et théorique de ses contemporains, il sera question de l’examiner à la lumière des travaux de Pierre Hadot sur la philosophie antique. La comparaison avec les Anciens sera précieuse sur plus d’un plan. Elle prouvera que Camus réactualise l’idéal de la philosophie comme mode de vie, dont les thèses directrices seront explicitées dans les prolégomènes. J’espère ainsi faire voir la possibilité d’une conception « moderne » de la philosophie ancrée dans la pratique. Le présent travail se divisera en trois parties : la première visera à clarifier le sens des concepts et des différentes parties du Mythe de Sisyphe; la deuxième tâchera de rapprocher sa philosophie de l’absurde des thèses directrices de la philosophie comme mode de vie, offrant une interprétation novatrice de son Sisyphe; la troisième exposera succinctement sa philosophie de la révolte à partir d’une analyse de L’Homme révolté, de façon à démontrer que sa morale s’inscrit aussi dans le sillage de cet idéal philosophique. / The purpose of this master’s thesis is to propose a reflection on the all-too-often ignored issue of philosophy’s “nature”. Defending a historicist and non-essentialist position since philosophy cannot be understood, defined and explained without studying its historical forms, I decided to examine the presence of philosophy in the life and in the work of Albert Camus, who is essentially known as a man of letters. The thinking of Camus, which is positioned against the abstract and theoretical philosophy of his contemporaries, will be studied in light of the works of Pierre Hadot on ancient philosophy. The comparison with the classical Greeks will be precious in many ways. It will prove that Camus extends the ancient ideal of philosophy as a way of life, which guiding theses will be presented in the prolegomena. I therefore wish to bring forward the possibility of a “modern” conception of philosophy that is anchored in practicality. This research will be divided into three parts : the first will aim to clarify the meaning of the concepts and various parts of the Myth of Sisyphus; the second will seek to liken his philosophy of the absurd to the guiding theses of philosophy as a way of life, offering an innovative interpretation of his Sisyphus; the third will briefly present its philosophy of revolt from an analysis of The Rebel in order to demonstrate that its moral can also be likened to philosophy as a way of life.

This thesis compares the interaction of philosophy and literature in Plato and Lucretius. It argues that Plato influenced Lucretius directly, and that this connection increases the interest in comparing them. In the Introduction, I propose that a work of philosophical literature, such as the De Rerum Natura or a Platonic dialogue, cannot be fully understood or appreciated unless both the literary and the philosophical elements are taken into account. In Chapter 1, I examine the tradition of literature and philosophy in which Plato and Lucretius were writing. I argue that the historical evidence increases the likelihood that Lucretius read Plato. Through consideration of parallels between the DRN and the dialogues, I argue that Plato discernibly influenced the DRN. In Chapter 2, I extract a theory of philosophical literature from the Phaedrus, which prompts us to appreciate it as a work of literary art inspired by philosophical knowledge of the Forms. I then analyse Socrates’ ‘prelude’ at Republic IV.432 as an example of how the dialogue’s philosophical and literary teaching works in practice. In Chapters 3 and 4, I consider the treatment of natural philosophy in the Timaeus and DRN II. The ending of the Timaeus is arguably an Aristophanically inspired parody of the zoogonies of the early natural philosophers. This links it to other instances of parody in Plato’s dialogues. DRN II.333-380 involves an argument about atomic variety based on Epicurus, but also, through the image of the world ‘made by hand’, alludes polemically to the intelligently designed world of the Timaeus. Through an examination of Plato’s and Lucretius’ polemical adaptation of their predecessors, I argue that even the most seemingly technical passages of the DRN and the Timaeus still depend upon literary techniques for their full effect. The Conclusion reflects briefly on future paths of investigation.