In a famous argument at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that the function and good of the human being is the "actuality of the soul in accordance with virtue". Presenting a view critical of the widespread intellectualist reading of Aristotle's Ethics, in this thesis I argue that the characteristic function of the human being is constitutive of a distinctly human life as a dynamic formal cause teleologically operative in human awareness. I argue for the validity of my own view in a preliminary way in the introduction by way of Aristotle's critique of the Platonic forms. In the second chapter, I argue that the processes of the non-rational part of the soul are acquired and actively operate once acquired independently of singular dictates of active reason within the individual. By this I mean that the virtues do not obey reason in the sense that they receive individual commands from discursive reason to desire or feel in certain ways. Rather, although the moral virtues are formed gradually by repeated acts of choice, as affective states, they are activated by being affected from without by external stimuli. These external stimuli produce impulses in the soul which are conducive to virtuous action, including a cognitive element: primarily, non-rational and non-discursive evaluative judgments of phantasia, which supply a human agent immediately with the ends of his action and the beginning-points of deliberation. These judgments are the awareness of sensible particulars as pleasant. In the third chapter, I turn to the De Anima in order to illuminate the cognitive conditions of human praxis. Following on the arguments contained in the second chapter, I argue that there are two primary cognitive moments which are necessary conditions of action. While the ends of desire are immediate objects of awareness and move humans as unmoved movers, motivational desires, which move as efficient causes, are initiated by a distinct cognitive power: proclamations to pursue or avoid.

In both the Meno and the Protagoras, Plato investigates the unity, acquisition and nature of virtue (ἀρετή). Although these dialogues appear to reach opposing conclusions—the Protagoras that virtue is knowledge and the Meno that virtue is divinely dispensed true opinion—in fact they both articulate the same moral principle. Both dialogues argue that virtue is knowledge of the good. I investigate these two dialogues independently and on their own respective terms, dedicating Chapter 2 to the Protagoras and Chapter 3 to the Meno. Although both dialogues argue that virtue is knowledge of the good, neither offers an account of the good. This is because each dialogue is but a single part of a larger argument which culminates in the Republic, wherein we find a more complete explanation of knowledge of the good in the description of the philosopher-king.

Much has been said about the influence of Plotinus, the Platonist philosopher, on the ideas of Augustine of Hippo, the Western Church Father whose writings had the largest impact on Western Europe in the Middle Ages. This thesis considers both writers’ ideas concerning matter, evil, and language. It then considers the way in which these writers’ ideas influenced their style of writing in the Enneads and the Confessions. Plotinus’ more straightforward negative attitude towards the material word and its relationship to the One ultimately makes his writing more academic and less emotionally powerful. Augustine’s more complicated understanding of the material world and its relationship to God results in a more mystical and more emotionally powerful style, which derives its effectiveness especially from its use of antithesis and the first and second person.

This dissertation is a study of the ontological foundations of true and false speech in Plato’s Sophist. Unlike most contemporary scholarship on the Sophist, my dissertation offers a wholistic account of the dialogue, demonstrating that the ontological theory of the “communing” of forms and the theory of true and false speech later in the dialogue entail one another. As I interpret it, the account of true and false speech in the Sophist is primarily concerned with true and false speech about the forms. As Plato sees it, we can only make true statements about spatio-temporal beings if it is possible to make true statements about the forms. Statements about the forms, however, make claims about how forms “commune” with other forms, that is, how forms are intelligibly related to and participate in one another. If forms stand in determinate relations of participation to other forms, however, then forms, as the relata of these relations, must compose structured wholes. Yet if they compose structured wholes, there must be a higher order normative principle that explains their structure. This creates a regress problem. In order to ground the structure of spatio-temporal beings, forms must be the highest explanatory principles. The theory of the “communing” of forms, however, makes it seem as if the forms require further explanation. This dissertation argues (1) that in the Sophist Plato solves the regress problem and (2) that, by doing so, he is able to ground true and false speech about the forms. I demonstrate that he solves the regress problem by differentiating a form’s nature from a form qua countable object. Then I show that this distinction between a form’s nature and a form qua countable object explains how true and false statements about the forms are possible.

Aquest treball gira entorn a la controvèrsia que, des de finals del segle XIX, va generar el passatge de les Confessions (VIII, 6-12) on Agustí relata la seva crisi decisiva, viscuda a Milà l'estiu de l'any 386, que l'acabaria portant a l'aparent definitiva conversió al cristianisme. Els motius de fons de la controvèrsia són dos de clars. En primer lloc, i a la llum del que nosaltres entenem per gènere autobiogràfic, s'imposa aclarir si un relat com el de les Confessions s'hi pot adscriure, i per tant si ens relata una sèrie d'esdeveniments viscuts per Agustí històricament, o bé si cal interpretar els elements que l'autor desplega al llarg de la narració com a símbols d'un missatge que supera la narració que es troba a la superfície. La segona qüestió, directament vinculada a la primera, és el sentit que cal donar a aquesta conversió en relació a la noció de forma de vida filosòfica, i la influència que tindrà aquesta noció en la biografia i el pensament d'Agustí. / This work analyses the controversy that arises at the end of the XIX century around the passage of Confessions VIII, 6-12 where Augustine reveals his decisive crisis, which took place in Milan during the summer of 386, and that apparently lead him to the definitive conversion to Christianity. The main reasons of the controversy are two. First of all, and in relation of what we understand by autobiographical genre, we need to understand if a narrative like Confessions can be related to autobiography, and so, if this work tells us a chain of events historically lived by Augustine, or if we must interpret the events that the author develops along the narrative as a symbolic whole that stands beyond the surface of the narrative. The second question, directly related to the first one, is the sense we have to give to this conversion in relation to the concept of philosophical form of life, and the influence that this notion will have in Augustine's biography and thought.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Université de Paris IV-Sorbonne, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [313]-326) and index.

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Este trabalho é uma tradução da Poética de Aristóteles (com exceção dos capítulos 19 a 22, que não são discutidos aqui) acompanhada de comentários. A intenção dele é estabelecer um texto que leve em conta as várias contribuições dadas pelas principais traduções francesas, inglesas, italianas e portuguesas, e situar, por meio dos comentários, a Poética dentro do corpus da filosofia aristotélica, especialmente a ética de Aristóteles e sua teoria da ação. / This paper is a translation into Portuguese of Aristotle\'s Poetics (with the exception of chapters 19 trough 22, which are not discussed here), with accompanying commentaries. Its intention views the establishment of a text that takes into account several contributions given by the main French, English, Italian and Portuguese translations. The commentaries consider Poetics as a part of the Aristotelian philosophy teachings, especially Aristotle\'s ethics and his action theory.

A partir do referencial paradigmático e exemplar da figura e disciplina (eu zen) de Sócrates na obra de Xenofonte, desenvolvem-se a análise, a reflexão sobre o princípio reintegrador perante a inexorabilidade, o desconhecimento e a incerteza do real, com vistas à reconciliação proporcional, ao desenvolvimento satisfatório da integridade razoável, para que o homem possa adquirir não somente a compreensão filosófica, mas também condições de resistência, de flexibilidade estratégica - enfim, a capacidade suficiente de transformação e relacionamento com os problemas fundamentais da existência. / From the paradigmatic reference and example of socratic discipline (eu zen) in the Xenophons works, the reflections about the re-integrating principle facing the inexhaustible, uncertain and unknown reality can be developed, searching the proportional reconciliation, the satisfactory and reasonable integrity for the human being to acquire not only the philosophical understanding, but also the conditions of resistence, of strategic flexibility the sufficient capacity to deal with and transform the fundamental problems of existence.

Nossa investigação explora a possibilidade de o tema da paideia ser um eixo comum em torno do qual se articulam os textos de Xenofonte de Atenas, autor do século IV a.C. Julgamos que essa perspectiva se justifica em razão da importância que esse autor atribui à construção de retratos de homens paradigmáticos. Ilustramos esse procedimento com a análise do retrato que o próprio Xenofonte constrói para si, na Anabase. É sobretudo a partir da análise desses retratos que podemos ver, em Xenofonte, a discussão do tema da paideia. Os estudos que aqui empreendemos concentram-se no tema da paideia do governante. Nesse horizonte, oferecemos uma possível leitura para o retrato daquele que o autor considera a contrafacção do governante ideal, o tirano Hierão, de diálogo homônimo. Por fim, ocupamo-nos dos elementos que compõem o retrato xenofôntico do governante paradigmático, Ciro, o velho, da Ciropédia. / Our research explores the possibility of the theme of paideia as a common axis around which are articulated the texts of Xenophon of Athens, author of the fourth century BC. We believe that this perspective is justified because of the importance this author gives to the construction of portraits of paradigmatic men. We illustrate this procedure with the analysis of the portrait which Xenophon builds for himself in the Anabasis. It is mainly based on the analysis of such portraits that we can see, in Xenophon, the discussion on the theme of paideia. The studies undertaken here focus on the theme of the ruler\'s paideia. In this horizon, we offer a possible reading for the portrait of the man the author considers the counterfeiting of the ideal ruler, the tyrant Hiero, in the corresponding dialogue. Finally we deal with the elements that make up the portrait of Xenophons paradigmatic ruler, Cyrus the Great, of the Cyropaedia.