The primary concern of this piece of work is to reconsider scientific realism debate in the philosophy of science. Accordingly, the overall aim is to come up with the clues of a viable scientific realist attitude in the face of anti-realist interpretations of scientific theories. To accomplish this aim, I make use of two modified versions of scientific realism, that is, &lsquo / epistemic structural realism&rsquo / and &lsquo / entity realism&rsquo / . Epistemic structural realism is a realist position of which proponents claim that the only knowable part of the reality is the structure of it which is expressed by the mathematical equations of our best scientific theories. On the other hand, according to entity realism, the only assured knowledge obtained from scientific theories is the existence of theoretical entities posited by these theories. I argue that a combination of the properly construed versions of these two positions might fulfill the afore-mentioned aim of this thesis.

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O objetivo deste trabalho é pesquisar e classificar as diversas concepções filosóficas sobre o mundo físico e a ciência em um grupo específico de físicos: professores do Instituto de Física da Universidade de São Paulo. O trabalho começou com a criação de um questionário envolvendo julgamentos ou opiniões sobre alguns assuntos da física, sempre procurando abordar conceitos fundamentais da filosofia da ciência, como verdade, realismo, reducionismo, determinismo, natureza do tempo físico, objetivos da ciência e visões religiosas. De posse desse questionário realizamos entrevistas com dez professores do Instituto de Física da USP e então partimos para as análises dessas respostas. A metodologia utilizada seguiu os princípios da pesquisa qualitativa associada à análise de conteúdo. Isso que nos permitiu o estabelecimento de critérios de classificação para as diversas concepções filosóficas encontradas nas respostas dos entrevistados e a criação de categorias que foram ilustradas com representações diagramáticas. Com esta pesquisa, pretende-se deixar abertos caminhos para que, no futuro, possam ser investigadas conexões com o ensino na sala de aula, os livros didáticos, práticas pedagógicas, estratégias de ensino, novas sequências didáticas, etc. Além disso, espera-se que essa pesquisa possa tornar-se um forte aliado no processo de ensino-aprendizagem de determinados fenômenos, influenciando também a maneira como a natureza da ciência é apresentada e como a Física é ensinada. / The aim of this study is to investigate and classify the various philosophical conceptions about the physical world and science in a specific group of physicists: teachers of the Institute of Physics at the University of São Paulo (USP). The work began with the creation of a questionnaire involving judgments or opinions on some subjects of physics, addressing fundamental concepts of philosophy of science, such as truth, realism, reductionism, determinism, nature of physical time, aims of science, and religious views. With this questionnaire, interviews were conducted with ten professors from the Institute of Physics of USP, and then an analysis of the answers was made. The methodology used followed the principles of qualitative research associated with content analysis. This enabled us to establish criteria for classification for the various philosophical concepts found in the answers of the respondents, and to create categories that were illustrated with diagrammatic representations. We hope that in the future this research can be connected to issues in classroom teaching, textbooks, teaching practices, teaching strategies, new didactic sequences, etc. In addition, we hope that this research can become a strong ally in the teaching-learning process of certain phenomena, influencing the way the nature of science is presented and how physics is taught.

Hans-Georg Gadamer rejects objectivism, the position that an interpreter may come to a single correct truth concerning any particular object, in favor of interpretive pluralism. What is not clear is how Gadamer grounds this position. This ambiguity leaves Gadamer open to multiple objectivist counters, ones which he would not wish to allow. The following argument, using a comparative and analytic approach, takes two concepts, pratītyasamutpāda (interdependence) and śūnyatā (emptiness), as they are deployed by Nāgārjuna to provide Gadamer with this much needed anti-objectivist foundation. Specifically, the new foundation is anti-realist in which interpreters and objects of interpretation are metaphysically empty, or devoid of independent existence, and are ultimately dependent on their “position” in a cultural and historical horizon. If there is no metaphysical object apart from the interpreter’s engagement with it, then there is no stable phenomenon to which objectivists may appeal.

Neste trabalho investigamos, teoricamente e empiricamente, quais são os possíveis aspectos da natureza da ciência, relacionados ao debate realismo e antirrealismo científicos, que emergem da história e filosofia da teoria da relatividade especial e têm potencial para promover debates no ensino de física. Para tal, primeiramente reconhecemos a importância da aproximação histórico-filosófica ao ensino de ciências, assim como a relevância dos aspectos consensuais e não consensuais da natureza da ciência. Argumentamos, em especial, que estes aspectos controversos e não consensuais podem trazer uma visão ainda mais rica e realista da ciência. Fazemos uma exposição sintética sobre algumas das principais características do debate realismo e antirrealismo científicos, suas principais vertentes, categorias e argumentos correntes. Fazemos também um estudo teórico histórico e filosófico sobre a teoria da relatividade, no qual enfatizamos a capacidade do formalismo matemático da teoria ser filosoficamente interpretável. Quatro interpretações históricas da teoria, a de Lorentz (1904), a de Einstein (1905), a de Poincaré (1906) e a de Minkowski (1907) são discutidas e caracterizadas com base no estudo sobre o debate realismo e antirrealismo científicos. Descrevemos em seguida uma pesquisa de campo realizada no primeiro semestre de 2013 aplicada a estudantes de física, de licenciatura e bacharelado, da Universidade de São Paulo. Seus objetivos foram investigar as concepções filosóficas dos estudantes sobre o debate realismo e antirrealismo científicos no contexto da teoria da relatividade especial e mostrar como ele pode trazer ricas discussões no ensino de ciências . A pesquisa foi dividida em três etapas: aplicação de questionário específico sobre o tema filosófico; análise de resenhas entregues pelos estudantes, e; realização de grupo focal. O resultado da análise e triangulação dos dados sugere que o debate mostra-se, também entre os estudantes, de uma forma não consensual e filosoficamente rica. / In this work we investigate theoretically and empirically some possible aspects of the nature of science, related to scientific realism and anti-realism debate emerging from the history and philosophy of the special theory of relativity which can potentially encourage related discussions in physics education. For such, first we acknowledge the importance of historical-philosophical approach to teaching science, as well the educational relevance of the consensual and nonconsensual aspects of nature of science. We argue, particularly, that these controversial and non-consensual aspects can provide an even richer and more realistic view of science. We make a summary of some of the main features of scientific realism and anti-realism debate, its main categories and current arguments. We also make a historical and philosophical theoretical study on the special theory of relativity, wherein we emphasize the capacity of its mathematical formalism be philosophically interpretable. Four historical interpretations of the theory, Lorentz\'s (1904), Einstein\'s (1905), Poincaré\'s (1906) Minkowski\'s (1907), are discussed and characterized based on earlier study on scientific realism and anti-realism debate. We report then a field research conducted in the first semester of 2013 applied to undergraduated physics students at the University of São Paulo. Its objectives went to investigate the philosophical conceptions of students about scientific realism and anti-realism debate under the special theory of relativity and its subjects, and to show how rich can it be for science education. This research was divided into three stages: the application of a specific questionnaire on the philosophical subject; the analysis of papers submitted by students, and; the performing of a focus group. The outcome of data triangulation suggests that the debate reveals itself also among students, in a non-consensual and philosophically rich way.

No description available.

Neste trabalho investigamos, teoricamente e empiricamente, quais são os possíveis aspectos da natureza da ciência, relacionados ao debate realismo e antirrealismo científicos, que emergem da história e filosofia da teoria da relatividade especial e têm potencial para promover debates no ensino de física. Para tal, primeiramente reconhecemos a importância da aproximação histórico-filosófica ao ensino de ciências, assim como a relevância dos aspectos consensuais e não consensuais da natureza da ciência. Argumentamos, em especial, que estes aspectos controversos e não consensuais podem trazer uma visão ainda mais rica e realista da ciência. Fazemos uma exposição sintética sobre algumas das principais características do debate realismo e antirrealismo científicos, suas principais vertentes, categorias e argumentos correntes. Fazemos também um estudo teórico histórico e filosófico sobre a teoria da relatividade, no qual enfatizamos a capacidade do formalismo matemático da teoria ser filosoficamente interpretável. Quatro interpretações históricas da teoria, a de Lorentz (1904), a de Einstein (1905), a de Poincaré (1906) e a de Minkowski (1907) são discutidas e caracterizadas com base no estudo sobre o debate realismo e antirrealismo científicos. Descrevemos em seguida uma pesquisa de campo realizada no primeiro semestre de 2013 aplicada a estudantes de física, de licenciatura e bacharelado, da Universidade de São Paulo. Seus objetivos foram investigar as concepções filosóficas dos estudantes sobre o debate realismo e antirrealismo científicos no contexto da teoria da relatividade especial e mostrar como ele pode trazer ricas discussões no ensino de ciências . A pesquisa foi dividida em três etapas: aplicação de questionário específico sobre o tema filosófico; análise de resenhas entregues pelos estudantes, e; realização de grupo focal. O resultado da análise e triangulação dos dados sugere que o debate mostra-se, também entre os estudantes, de uma forma não consensual e filosoficamente rica. / In this work we investigate theoretically and empirically some possible aspects of the nature of science, related to scientific realism and anti-realism debate emerging from the history and philosophy of the special theory of relativity which can potentially encourage related discussions in physics education. For such, first we acknowledge the importance of historical-philosophical approach to teaching science, as well the educational relevance of the consensual and nonconsensual aspects of nature of science. We argue, particularly, that these controversial and non-consensual aspects can provide an even richer and more realistic view of science. We make a summary of some of the main features of scientific realism and anti-realism debate, its main categories and current arguments. We also make a historical and philosophical theoretical study on the special theory of relativity, wherein we emphasize the capacity of its mathematical formalism be philosophically interpretable. Four historical interpretations of the theory, Lorentz\'s (1904), Einstein\'s (1905), Poincaré\'s (1906) Minkowski\'s (1907), are discussed and characterized based on earlier study on scientific realism and anti-realism debate. We report then a field research conducted in the first semester of 2013 applied to undergraduated physics students at the University of São Paulo. Its objectives went to investigate the philosophical conceptions of students about scientific realism and anti-realism debate under the special theory of relativity and its subjects, and to show how rich can it be for science education. This research was divided into three stages: the application of a specific questionnaire on the philosophical subject; the analysis of papers submitted by students, and; the performing of a focus group. The outcome of data triangulation suggests that the debate reveals itself also among students, in a non-consensual and philosophically rich way.

No description available.

This study in philosophical-theology investigates the problems and prospects of theological non-realism, as proposed and developed by the Cambridge philosopher of religion Don Cupitt. After contextualising non-realism within the worldview, epistemology and theology of pre-modernity, modernity and postmodernity, the study appraises the prospects of non-realism as a new philosophical and theologica default position for Christianity and how it relates to what has been referred to as the New Reformation. The study hypothesises and contends that, although radical in orientation and multifarious in prospect, it is a viable and valid basis for Christian reformation. After contextualising, considering some religious and theological content, as well as critique and contrapuntal positions, the study delineates theoretical and practical reformatory options. By and large concurring with Cupitt, the study also deviates from him, particularly with respect to the prospect of ecclesiastical post-Christianity. Although this is not a study in practical theology, this study nevertheless aims to move the debate about the New Reformation forward by proposing non-realism as a basis for a new Church / Biblical and Ancient Studies / Thesis (D. Th. (Religious Studies))

This study in philosophical-theology investigates the problems and prospects of theological non-realism, as proposed and developed by the Cambridge philosopher of religion Don Cupitt. After contextualising non-realism within the worldview, epistemology and theology of pre-modernity, modernity and postmodernity, the study appraises the prospects of non-realism as a new philosophical and theologica default position for Christianity and how it relates to what has been referred to as the New Reformation. The study hypothesises and contends that, although radical in orientation and multifarious in prospect, it is a viable and valid basis for Christian reformation. After contextualising, considering some religious and theological content, as well as critique and contrapuntal positions, the study delineates theoretical and practical reformatory options. By and large concurring with Cupitt, the study also deviates from him, particularly with respect to the prospect of ecclesiastical post-Christianity. Although this is not a study in practical theology, this study nevertheless aims to move the debate about the New Reformation forward by proposing non-realism as a basis for a new Church / Biblical and Ancient Studies / Thesis (D. Th. (Religious Studies))