A presente pesquisa objetiva analisar os principais aspectos relacionados ao tema de danos em cartel: sobrepreço, efeito repasse (pass-on) e multa ótima. Com o aumento de políticas de combate a cartéis, pelo sério caráter lesivo à concorrência e à sociedade, intensificaram-se os esforços para estimar o impacto econômico no bem-estar provocado por tais condutas. O estudo confirma que a principal medida de dano econômico do cartel é o sobrepreço, ainda que os demais fatores, como o repasse (pass-on) e o efeito perda de vendas também devam ser considerados na mensuração do dano privado. Metodologias para o cálculo destes três componentes foram mapeadas, revelando que as técnicas disponíveis não são complexas, até fáceis de serem aplicadas, quando se tem amplo acesso a dados. Como avaliação empírica, apresenta-se o caso inédito do cartel dos compressores, sobre danos causados por tão nociva prática, comprovando-se que os valores de sobrepreço calculado estão em linha com a literatura. Por fim, a tese apresenta o histórico de multas impostas por autoridades, em casos de cartel, em diversas jurisdições, e questiona a efetividade dos montantes aplicados para devida dissuasão ou restabelecimento do bem-estar à sociedade. Análise de casos condenados pelo CADE recentemente mostram que as multas não têm sido suficientes para impor dissuasão, recomendando-se o uso de parâmetros que tragam racionalidade econômica e desestimulem as práticas anticompetitivas. / The present research had the aim of analyzing the main aspects related to cartel damages: overcharge, pass-on effect and optimal fine. With the growth of anti-cartel enforcement efforts and given the detrimental nature of conduct, efforts to estimate the economic impact on the welfare have increased. The study shows that the main measure of economic damage of the cartel is the overcharge, although other factors such as the pass-on effect and the output effect cannot be neglected in the calculation of private damage. Methodologies for these three components were mapped, revealing that the available techniques are not complex and even easy to apply when data is available. An empirical evaluation is presented using an unprecedented in the Brazilian market \"compressors cartel case\", showing an overcharge in line with the literature. Finally, the thesis presents the history of fines imposed by authorities in cartel cases in several jurisdictions and questions the effectiveness of the amounts applied for a proper deterrence or restoration of welfare to society. Case studies condemned by CADE recently show that fines have not been sufficient to impose deterrence, recommending the use of parameters that bring economic rationality and discourage anticompetitive practices.

University of Macau / Faculty of Law

University of Macau / Faculty of Law

ABSTRACT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF THE SECTOR-SPECIFIC AND COMPETITION RULES IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR IN TURKEY IN THE LIGHT OF THE EU LAW Aydemir, Duygu M.S., Department of European Studies Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Gamze As&ccedil / ioglu-&Ouml / z May 2008, 189 pages This thesis examines the role of the sector-specific rules and competition rules in the liberalized telecommunications markets. It aims to analyse the design of the legal and institutional framework of these two sets of rules in the liberalized telecommunications sector in Turkey in the light of the EU law. To this purpose, the thesis initially compares and contrasts the main characteristics of and shared responsibilities between the sector-specific and economy-wide competition rules and institutions in the post-liberalization and post-privatization period. Then, the thesis explores the EU approach on the balance of influence between these two sets of rules and institutions. Against this background, the thesis examines role, design and interaction of the sector-specific and competition rules and institutions in the recently liberalized Turkish telecommunications markets. It, also, analyses some important competition law cases concluded by the Competition Authority. The thesis has two main arguments. Firstly, it argues that liberalization and privatization in the telecommunications sector does not automatically lead to the competitive environment in the sector. Competitiveness of the markets after the postliberalization and post-privatization period critically depends on the existence of a robust, coherent, and transparent regulatory framework ensuring a smooth balance between the sector-specific and the competition rules and institutions. Second argument is that sector-specific rules have a transitional character. As telecommunications markets move towards effective competition, sector-specific regulation will be reduced and the role of the competition rules in those markets will increase.

The overriding theme of this thesis concerns the level of antitrust enforcement within the U.S. airline industry by the agencies entrusted with this task. / After a brief Introduction, Chapter I will examine whether concentration within the U.S. airline industry is a natural phenomenon or an ordinary monopoly/oligopoly resulting from the behaviour of competitors. In concluding that a natural monopoly/oligopoly does not exist, Chapter II will analyse the policy being antitrust enforcement in the industry. / Chapter III will then use the implementation of S 408 of the Federal Aviation Act (FAA) by the Department of Transportation (DOT) as an example of such a policy. Finally, the remaining chapters are dedicated to an analysis of the CRS industry. By using this industry as an example, the writer will suggest that, by removing barriers to entry through aggressive use of S 411 of the FAA, the future may see new entrants enter the market. Emphasis will be placed on the attitude of the DOT in this regard.

This dissertation consists of three essays on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The first essay studies horizontal and vertical investments between Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, while the second essay examines how investment patterns vary by country development. The third essay estimates the effect of merger policy reform on cross-border M&A activity in Europe. The first essay tests how well theories of horizontal and vertical foreign direct investment (FDI) explain observed patterns of cross-border M&As in OECD countries. Horizontal investment occurs when multinational firms produce in foreign countries to serve the foreign market, whereas vertical investment occurs when multinational firms source intermediate goods from foreign affiliates for final assembly and sales at home. The former is often used to displace exports when transport costs exceed local production costs, while the latter is often driven by cross-country factor price differentials. Little support is found for the traditional explanations of FDI as results indicate horizontal and vertical investments look much more similar than previously believed. The second essay challenges long-standing beliefs that the majority of FDI within the developed world is horizontal, whereas investments into developing nations are predominantly vertical. Developed-developed FDI is largely cross-border M&As and FDI into developing nations typically consists of greenfield investments. However, cross-border M&As are becoming more popular in developing countries and, contrary to previous beliefs, the proportion of horizontal and vertical investment is independent of country development. Results suggest trade costs have a stronger effect on developing countries, while no clear support is found for the idea that factor endowment drives vertical investments in developing nations. The third essay examines how reforms to European Commission Merger Regulation (ECMR) in 2004 affected cross-border M&A activity in Europe. The ECMR outlines competition rules and empowers the European Commission (EC) to block anti-competitive mergers adversely affecting the European market. Details of the reform suggest the law was expanded to cover more mergers, which is expected to have a non-positive effect on merger activity. Difference-in-differences results suggest the reform had no significant effect on cross-border merger activity in countries within the EC’s jurisdiction.

Zugl.: Tübingen, Univ., Diss., 2006

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Bayreuth, 2004/05. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 421-438) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1958. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 1017-1096).

Within the framework of the process of constitutionalization of Law, the treatment towards antitrust  regulation is being discussed on the jurisprudential level. An idea has appeared that suggests that deciding against antitrust regulationis  beneficial for companies, but has a negative impact towards societyIn the present article, the author does a comparison between the Peruvian Constitutional Court jurisprudence about antitrust and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States, demonstrating that tending towards regulation is harmful for society.The author also raises the question about the reasons for which the Supreme Court of the United States has a clear and defined criteria to decide when it is convenient to regulate antitrust, called “decision theory”, while the Peruvian  Court  has an erratic and unjustified criteria to decide aboutregulation of antitrust. / En el marco del proceso de constitucionalización del Derecho, el tratamiento de la libre competencia se ha venido discutiendo a nivel jurisprudencial. Así, ha surgido la idea de que decidir no regu-lar la libre competencia beneficia a las empresas,mas no a la sociedad en general.En el presente artículo, el autor propone una comparación entre la jurisprudencia respecto a la libre competencia del Tribunal Constitucional peruano y la de la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, buscando demostrar que, más bien, tender a la re- gulación es perjudicial para la sociedad.Asimismo, el autor abre la interrogante acerca de las razones por las cuales la Corte estadounidense tiene un criterio claro respecto a cuándo no es conveniente la regulación, mientras que el Tribunal peruano tiene un criterio errático y no justificado para tomar decisiones al respecto.