智慧財產權利人有多種方式利用其智慧財產權。最直接的方式是將智慧財產權出售予他人，以獲得價金之報酬。權利人透過一次獲得相當金額，而滿足其創新的對價；但也有可能由於創新尚未獲得市場肯定，而無法獲得他人提供足以滿足其目的之對價。另種方式是自行設廠製造，不過，一方面權利人未必有足夠的財力投資於生產，而另一方面權利人未必了解經營或未必有意願承擔經營之風險。折衷的方式就是將智慧財產權授權他人使用，而不移轉所有權，以獲得持續的報酬給付，並不喪失其最終的權利。 然而，智慧財產權具有排他效力，只有特定權利人可以使用，他人除非經過權利人同意，否則無法使用，限制或排除他人進入該智慧財產權所涉及之商品市場與權利人自由競爭，而形成限制競爭之效果。此種結果是賦予具有排他效力之智慧財產權所必然產生者，如果因而被認定違反競爭法，恐將導致智慧財產權之規範目的無法達成。因此，對於「智慧財產權法對於智慧財產權利人之保護」與「公平交易法對於公平交易秩序之維護」兩者界限該如何權衡，當為十分重要的課題。 本文經由探討美國、歐盟及日本等國家現行競爭法對於技術授權行為之規範：美國”Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property（1995）”、” Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition（2007）”，歐盟” Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements”及其Guidelines，日本2007年新修訂「知的財産の利用に関する独占禁止法上の指針」，以及參考我國公平會（Fair Trade Commission）執法實務之案例經驗，俾掌握技術授權行為如何在鼓勵創新與促進技術流通兩者間加以權衡題，進而試就我國技術授權協議案件處理原則（Fair Trade Commission Guidelines on Technology Licensing Arrangements），提供具體修正建議： 一、適用範圍：歐盟及日本於新修訂的技術授權處理規範中，均將適用客體進一步擴大適用至新式樣專利與軟體著作權（software copyright）。然而，我國公平會目前相關案件量甚少，故是否要隨外國立法例擴大適用範圍，應視我國國情及執法實務加以考量，仍有斟酌餘地。 二、建立「安全區」：適度將對於市場競爭程度影響輕微之案件排除，不但增加執法透明度與明確性，同時避免行政資源錯置，應屬可行。衡諸國情及促進產業發展之考量，本文建議立法初期，針對公平交易法第19條限制競爭或妨礙公平競爭行為，於授權人市場占有率10%以下者，認定較無限制競爭或妨礙公平競爭疑慮，而不須加以審查。 三、不須區分黑（違法）、灰（可能違法）條款：現行技術授權處理原則第6點及第7點規定若從法律效果來看，應無區分必要，亦即無區分黑、灰條款之必要。若競爭法主管機關有意區別兩類行為之非難程度，則可在立法說明或處理原則中對於個別行為之競爭評價，詳為敘明，俾讓業者遵循。倘公平會對於特定行為欲採取較為嚴格的執法立場，採取當然違法之判斷者，條文用語應修改為「授權協議當事人○○行為時，即得認定該行為對特定市場供需功能產生影響…」，亦即不須判斷該行為對於市場競爭實質影響程度，只要當事人行為合致構成要件，即屬違法，如此始有區分規範之必要。 四、修正個別條款內容：針對現行第5點至第7點規定，「不構成違法」共11款，及修正後「可能構成違反公平交易法第19條第6款規定」共12款行為類型，就其條文內容或立法說明提供具體修正意見。 五、標準化與專利聯盟(standardization and patent pool)：從廣受各界關注的「飛利浦案」，公平會對於科技產業的標準化與專利聯盟情形，如何建構妥適的聯合行為管制模式，首要之務是要確立執法立場。對於專利聯盟可能存有惡性卡特爾之風險，一方面仍保有競爭法主管機關的介入空間，亦不能動輒讓產業承擔過高法律風險，導致阻礙創新或影響商機。美國、歐盟、日本立法例多肯定透過專利聯盟集中授權模式，有助減少交易成本等效益，亦建立不少規範與案例，可供公平會借鏡參考。然而，不能忽視的是我國廠商多處於被授權人地位，在高度仰賴技術輸入之現況，如何確保我國廠商得以在公平競爭環境，得以提升產業發展，競爭法主管機關於制定相關法規時，亦須一併加以重視。

Hong Kong is considered to be the most economically free country in the world, but also has the highest amount of income inequality of any developed country. The Hong Kong government is able to sustain laissez faire policies due to its monopoly on land supply. Maintaining high property values allows the government to maximize revenue from property tax, which acts as a hidden tax. A major contributor to income inequality is the formation of oligopolies in Hong Kong that creates an anticompetitive environment. The interests of the government and oligarchs are aligned as both obtain significant portions of revenue from the property sector. As globalization makes Hong Kong even more vulnerable to external shocks, the government faces the challenges of increasing competition, diversifying its revenue streams, and closing the income gap while standing by its principles in order maintain regional competitiveness as an international business hub.

Après 30 ans de réforme économique et juridique, la Chine a enfin adopté sa loi nationale en matière de concurrence: la Loi antimonopole du 30 août 2007, entrée en vigueur le 1er août 2008. Cette thèse porte sur l’effort que le Gouvernement chinois a consacré à réformer le droit de la concurrence pour établir et protéger son économie de marché socialiste afin de permettre aux entreprises nationales et étrangères de participer au jeu de la concurrence sur la base de principes d’égalité, de liberté et de transparence. Dans cette thèse, une étude comparée est menée selon deux dimensions : verticale et horizontale. Dans la dimension verticale, le droit chinois de la concurrence montre une continuité dans le temps de la culture juridique traditionnelle remontant à plus de 2000 ans, tandis qu’horizontalement, il se place dans le sillage du droit de la concurrence de l’Union européenne qui constitue une source inépuisable d’inspiration. La loi antimonopole de la Chine comprend notamment une interdiction des pratiques anticoncurrentielles (l’interdiction des ententes et celle de l’abus de position dominante), un contrôle des concentrations et des monopoles administratifs, des règles institutionnelles et des règles de la responsabilité juridique de l’infraction à la loi. Il est à noter que le périmètre de la réforme du droit de la concurrence en Chine ne se borne pas qu’au droit antitrust au sens propre, elle implique aussi le développement du droit contre la concurrence déloyale et l’évolution de la relation entre le droit de la concurrence et le droit de la propriété intellectuelle. / After 30 years of economic and legal reform, China finally enacted its competition law: the Anti-Monopoly Law of August 30, 2007 which came into force on August 1, 2008. This thesis reviews firstly China’s efforts to reform its legal system of competition in order to establish and to protect the socialist market economy, in which not only the national enterprises but also foreign commercial entities will be able to participate in the game of competition on the Chinese market on the basis of equality on legal status, of freedom to fix prices and of transparency in the market information in the Chinese substantive and procedural legal framework. Secondly, the comparative method used in this thesis touches upon two aspects: the vertical and the horizontal. (The vertical dimension is unfurled in the historical process whereby the Chinese legal system de la concurrence has demonstrated how it is influenced by its traditional legal culture of more than two thousand years, on one hand; and on the other hand, the horizontal comparative study makes it clear that the Chinese competition law follows in the wake of the European Union whose competition legal system is an inexhaustible resource of inspiration for the Chinese antimonopoly law. So, we focus our study on the contents of the Chinese antimonopoly law which include a merger control, the prohibition of anticompetitive practices (the cartel prohibition and the prohibition of abuses of dominance), and the control of anticompetitive behaviors of public authorities, the institutional rules and the rules of legal responsibility in the breach of law. However, the area of Chinese legal reform in the domain of competition is not confined to the antitrust law in its strict sense; it implicates also the enactment of the law for Countering Unfair Competition and the evolution of the relationship between the antitrust law and the intellectual property law. This constitutes our last focus of study.

O trabalho submete a teste a hipótese de que o direito concorrencial brasileiro não possui hoje grau de sofisticação institucional adequado para lidar com arranjos cooperativos interempresariais utilizados por empresas a fim de desenvolver, implantar e difundir inovações tecnológicas. O critério da sofisticação institucional empregado para tanto consiste na verificação da implementação deliberada e estratégica de mudanças institucionais pelo Estado para prover vantagens institucionais comparativas para as empresas nele baseadas, em termos de maior segurança jurídica e menores custos de compliance. A fim de identificar os fatores relevantes para tal análise são empregados conceitos teóricos das linhas de pesquisa conhecidas como Nova Economia Institucional (NEI) e Variedades de Capitalismo (VdC), bem como uma análise empírica comparativa da política concorrencial aplicável a tais arranjos cooperativos nos Estados Unidos e no Brasil. / This work tests the hypothesis that the Brazilian competition law has not today an appropriate degree of institutional sophistication to deal with interfirm cooperative arrangements employed by companies to develop, deploy and disseminate technological innovations. The criterion of institutional sophistication hereby employed consists on the verification of the deliberate and strategic implementation of institutional changes by the State in order to provide comparative institutional advantages for the companies based therein, in terms of more legal certainty and lower compliance costs. In order to identify the relevant factors for such analysis, theoretical concepts from New Institutional Economics (NIE) and Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literatures are employed, as well as a comparative empirical analysis of the competition policy applicable to such cooperative arrangements in the United States and Brazil.

Tratamos neste trabalho de um tema quase esquecido no direito brasileiro: a inconsistente interação entre antitruste e política de emprego na ação administrativa do CADE. Nesse contexto, o problema que se enfrenta é a falta de transparência do Conselho quanto às razões jurídicas para o abandono de antigas preocupações com nível de emprego no controle de concentrações. A questão que propomos responder é a seguinte: como o CADE deveria justificar seu definitivo distanciamento da regulação do mercado de trabalho? Em resposta, defendemos a tese normativa de que a utilização da análise econômica para justificar o rompimento da interação entre antitruste e política de emprego produziria uma forma de argumentação inaceitável do ponto de vista lógico. Diante da questão posta acima, este trabalho busca oferecer um juízo de valor acerca da plausibilidade de argumentos baseados em teoria econômica eventualmente adotados pelo CADE como justificativa para o abandono de suas preocupações com nível de emprego. Para tanto, tomamos o direito concorrencial como uma forma de discurso produzido por raciocínios práticos, dentro do qual a análise econômica do direito torna-se uma técnica de argumentação consequencialista. / This masters thesis deals with an almost forgotten topic in Brazilian competition law: the inconsistency in CADE decision-making as to the interactions between antitrust and employment policy. In this context, we face the problem of lack of transparency regarding the legal reasons for the Council to abandon its concerns with employment level in merger control. The research question to be answered is the following one: how should CADE justify its decision to definitively withdraw from the regulation of labor markets? In response, our claim is that the use of economic analysis to justify the broken interaction between antitrust and employment policy could lead to a form of argumentation logically unacceptable. In view of the question above, this thesis offers a plausibility evaluation of arguments derived from economic theory that CADE may further in support of its decision to give up concerns with employment level. To do so, we take competition law as a discourse produced by practical reasoning, in which the economic analysis of law becomes a technique for consequentialist argumentation.

A presente dissertação consiste em uma análise dos critérios utilizados pelo Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE) para aplicação de penas contra condutas de cartel clássico, sob o ponto de vista dissuasório da punição. Acessoriamente, também integra este trabalho um panorama institucional da política de repressão a cartéis, de modo que se possam vislumbrar os fatores que, direta ou indiretamente, afetam o formato e a efetividade da punição de cartéis. Para isso, foi realizada uma análise da jurisprudência, por meio de uma investigação retrospectiva de todos os processos administrativos em que houve condenação pelo CADE envolvendo condutas de cartel em geral. A análise jurisprudencial se limitou às penas de multa aplicadas às empresas incluídas no polo passivo do processo administrativo, bem como às obrigações de fazer e não fazer, previstas nos arts. 23, I, e 24 da Lei n. 8.884/1994; e nos arts. 37, I, e 38 da Lei n. 12.529/2011, respectivamente. Ademais, a análise da jurisprudência também investigou variáveis materiais, relacionadas à definição da conduta de cartel; procedimentais, envolvendo o tempo de análise despendido pela autoridade; e institucionais, relacionada à interface do CADE com as esferas civil e criminal. No primeiro capítulo, foi feita uma abordagem geral dos efeitos negativos produzidos pela prática de cartel ao mercado e sua necessidade de punição, traçou-se um panorama internacional em relação ao combate a cartéis e exibiu-se um histórico de repressão a cartéis no Brasil. No segundo capítulo, foram apresentadas as previsões das legislações antitruste brasileiras sobre penas às infrações da ordem econômica; paralelamente, estudaram-se regimes de penas de jurisdições internacionais e apresentaram-se as discussões da literatura especializada acerca do caráter dissuasório de punição de cartéis. No terceiro capítulo, foi analisada a prática decisória do CADE, fundamentada no arcabouço legislativo brasileiro, nas melhores práticas internacionais e na literatura especializada sobre o tema. Ao final, foi possível concluir que o CADE ainda precisa aperfeiçoar os critérios de formulação de penas, de modo que estes sejam baseados em um método sistemático, a fim de que a jurisprudência seja construída de modo consistente e coerente. Concluiu-se, também, que há algumas inconsistências procedimentais e materiais que podem afetar a política de combate a cartéis, seja no modo de enquadramento da tipicidade da conduta de cartel que pode afetar a eficiência da análise do ilícito, seja no tempo de investigação de condutas de cartel e da inter-relação do CADE com outras esferas jurídicas, i.e., civil e criminal. / This dissertation consists of an analysis of the criteria used by the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (namely CADE), the Brazilian antitrust Agency, related to the imposition of penalties against hardcore cartels, under the standpoint of the deterrence of the punishment. In addition, an institutional prospect of the policy of fighting cartels composes this research in order to highlight the factors which, directly or indirectly, can affect the format and effectiveness of the punishment. Aiming that, an analysis of the case law was made through a retrospective investigation of all administrative proceedings in which there have been condemnations imposed by CADE, involving conducts of cartels. The analysis of the case law was limited to the fines applied to companies qualified as defendants in the administrative proceeding, as well as the behavioral obligations pursuant to article 23, section I and 24, of Law No. 8,884/1994 and article 37, section I and 38, of Law No. 12,529/2011. Moreover, the case law analysis investigated material variables related to the definition of cartel conduct; procedural variables related to the period taken by the antitrust authorities for analysis of cartel conducts; and institutional variables related to the intersection of CADE with both the civil and criminal spheres. In Chapter one, a general approach of the negative effects produced by the cartel practice to the market and its necessity of punishment was adopted; an international overview related to fighting cartels was delineated; and a historical presentation of cartels repression in Brazil was exposed. In Chapter two, the forecasts of penalties related to the infringements of the economic order in the Brazilian antitrust laws were introduced. In parallel, the regimes of fines of international jurisdictions and the discussions of the specialized literature related to the deterrence of cartel punishment were studied. In Chapter three, CADEs decision-making practice was analyzed, based on the Brazilian legislation framework, the best international practices and the specialized literature on this particular issue. In the final topic, it was possible to conclude that CADE still needs to improve its formulation of penalties criteria, so that they become supported by a systematic method, providing a consistent and coherent building of the case law. The conclusion also indicates that currently there are some procedural and material inconsistencies which may affect the policy of fighting cartels, namely framing the definition of the cartel conduct, likely to affect the analysis efficiency of the illicit, along with the investigation of the cartel conduct and the interrelation of CADE with both the civil and criminal spheres.

Die Arbeit untersucht die Durchsetzung von Ansprüchen auf Unterlassung aus standardessentiellen Patenten (SEP). Ausgehend von den ökonomischen und rechtsdogmatischen Grundlagen des Patentrechts wird zunächst die Legitimation des Anspruchs auf Unterlassung im Gefüge des Patentrechts untersucht und der Frage nachgegangen, inwieweit die Gewährung von Ausschließlichkeitsbefugnissen zur Verwirklichung der Ziele von Innovationsschutz und -förderung notwendig ist. Die Prüfung kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die Ausübung des Anspruchs auf Unterlassung aus SEP unter Umständen eine ökonomisch und rechtsdogmatisch unerwünschte Blockadeposition herbeiführen kann, so dass eine Einschränkung des Anspruchs zur Sicherung der innovationsfördernden Funktionen des Patentrechts geboten sein kann. Sodann werden verschiedene Lösungsansätze diskutiert und dabei besonderes Augenmerk auf die durch die deutsche und europäische Rechtsprechung entwickelte kartellrechtliche Lösung gelegt. Nach einer Betrachtung der Tatbestandsmerkmale des kartellrechtlichen Verbots des Missbrauchs von Marktmacht nach Art. 102 AEUV bzw. §§ 19, 20 GWB und deren Anwendung auf Fälle der Erhebung von Unterlassungsklagen aus SEP wird diese Lösung abgelehnt. Der Tatbestand des Missbrauchs von Markmacht vermag wegen der Fokussierung auf (Produkt-)märkte und des Erfordernisses einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung als Anwendungsvoraussetzung bei stringenter Auslegung der Vorschrift nicht alle relevanten Fälle zu fassen. Im Folgenden werden Ansätze diskutiert und bewertet, welche eine rechtliche Verankerung der Einschränkung des Anspruchs auf Unterlassung eher im Vertrags- oder im Patentrecht selbst suchen. Als Ergebnis wird sich schließlich dafür ausgesprochen, das in § 23 PatG für die Abgabe einer Lizenzbereitschaftserklärung vorgesehene Verfahren mit seinen wechselseitigen Pflichten analog auf Fälle der Erhebung einer Unterlassungsklage aus SEP anzuwenden und die Zulässigkeit der Erhebung von Unterlassungsklagen nach diesem Maßstab zu beurteilen. / The work analyzes the enforcement of claims for injunctive relief based on standard-essential patens (SEP). Taking the economic and legal foundations of patent law as a starting point, the legitimacy of the claim for injunctive relief within the system of patent law is assessed, as is the question of whether granting the power to exclude others from use of a patented technology is necessary for protecting and promoting innovation. It is found that injunctive relief based on a SEP can lead to an economically and legally unwanted blocking position, in favor of the patent holder, which may require restricting the exclusive right of the patent holder in order to ensurethe patent's function of promoting innovation. Following this, different approaches for solving the issue are discussed. A special focus is put on antitrust law which has been used as a basis to limit injunctive relief by the German and European courts. After considering the elements of Art. 102 TFEU, §§ 19, 20 of the German Antitrust Code (GWB) respectively, the application of antitrust law is rejected. Due to its focus on (product-)markets and the requirement of a dominant market position, antitrust law is not fit to sufficiently limit the negative impact that injunctive relief from a SEP might have on innovation. The work further discusses and assesses other approaches which are trying to apply contract law or certain provisions of patent law. As a result, it is suggested to analogously apply the procedure set out in § 23 PatG (German Patent Code) and its system of mutual obligations to assess the legitimacy of injunctive relief in SEP-cases

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:30:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gustavo Lage Noman.pdf: 1230599 bytes, checksum: 006d72db3763867a419806042dcc94d0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-25 / Evidences are very important for the antitrust procedure, as well as in any and all types of procedures. However, for a long time the discussion of evidences was set aside by the Brazilian antitrust community. Due to the increase in the activities of the Brazilian antitrust authorities, in both the merger control revision and the investigation of anticompetitive behaviors, there is an increase in the discussion regarding evidences. For example, which is the standard of proof necessary for a decision of any concrete case? What type of evidences is necessary for a decision in an antitrust procedure? What type of evidences can be used by the authorities? Which is the role of the economic evidences in the antitrust procedure? How to produce such economic evidences? Which are the limits for the use by the antitrust authorities of the borrowed evidences? Which are the limits that the antitrust authorities face for the evidences collected, in special regarding the new mechanisms available (leniency agreements, dawn raids and inspections)? The purpose of the present essay is to analyze these questions, seeking in CADE s case law, in commentators and in the foreign experience, the best approach to deal with the evidences in antitrust cases / As provas são muito importantes para o processo concorrencial, da mesma forma que elas são importantes para todo e qualquer tipo de processo. Entretanto, por um período essa discussão foi deixada de lado pela comunidade de defesa da concorrência no Brasil. Ocorre que com o incremento das atividades das autoridades brasileiras de defesa da concorrência, quer seja na análise de estruturas, quer seja na investigação de condutas anticoncorrenciais, estão começando a surgir diversas questões envolvendo provas. Por exemplo, qual é o padrão de prova necessário para que um caso seja decidido? Que tipo de prova é necessária para que se decida um processo concorrencial? Que tipos de provas podem ser utilizadas pelas autoridades? Qual é o papel da prova econômica no processo concorrencial? Como produzir as provas econômicas? Qual é o limite para o uso das provas emprestadas pelas autoridades de defesa da concorrência? Quais são os limites que as autoridades enfrentam para a produção de provas, em especial considerando os novos mecanismos à disposição (acordo de leniência, busca e apreensão e inspeção)? A presente dissertação tem por objeto analisar essas questões, buscando, na jurisprudência do CADE, na doutrina e na experiência estrangeira a melhor forma de tratar as provas

O Direito da Concorrência e o Direito Internacional da Concorrência são recentes ramos na história da Ciência Jurídica. A dimensão unilateral do Direito Internacional da Concorrência relaciona-se à aplicação extraterritorial das legislações de defesa da concorrência, o que desencadeia problemas e limitações no plano internacional. Não existe regramento multilateral para a regulação da matéria concorrencial no plano internacional. Na dimensão regional são considerados os acordos regionais (Mercosul, União Europeia e NAFTA). No plano bilateral são encontrados os casos mais concretos de aplicação do Direito Internacional da Concorrência, os quais atualmente relacionam-se a processos de cooperação jurídica internacional. Há um amplo espaço para avanço na regulação da cooperação internacional em sede de atos de concentração multijurisdicionais. / Competition Law and International Competition Law are recently developed branches of the legal sciences. The unilateral dimension of the International Competition Law relates to the extraterritorial enforcement of competition laws, which causes problems and limitations on the international arena. There is a lack of multilateral set of rules for the competition regulation at an international level. The regional agreements shall be considered at regional dimension (Mercosur, European Union and NAFTA). The most concrete cases for the application of the International Competition Law are found at the bilateral level, which are currently related to the international legal cooperation process. There is a wide range for development on the regulation of the international cooperation in relation to the multijurisdictional concentration acts.

A Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos da América exige, para a configuração da sham litigation, exceção à imunidade antitruste do direito de petição prevista na doutrina Noerr-Pennington, que: (i) a ação ou petição objetivamente não tenha fundamentos, de maneira que nenhum litigante razoável possa esperar sucesso em seu mérito; e que (ii) o litigante possua motivação subjetiva que permita verificar se a ação ou petição camufla uma tentativa de interferir diretamente nas relações negociais de um concorrente. No Brasil, ao investigar e punir infrações anticoncorrenciais, o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica CADE vem aplicando tais critérios, o que, além de cientificamente inadequado, carece de fundamentação legal no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, em possível restrição injustificada dos princípios da livre iniciativa e livre concorrência. Propõe-se, neste trabalho, que o abuso do direito de ação e/ou de petição instituto consagrado no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro , poderá ser considerado uma infração à ordem econômica passível de punição pelo CADE, se produzir ou puder produzir os efeitos previstos no caput do artigo 36 da Lei nº 12.529/2011. / For the configuration of sham litigation an exception to the right of petition immunity created by the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine the Supreme Court of the United States of America established the following requirements: (i) objective baseless claim, so that no reasonable litigant might expect success on the merits; and (ii) subjective motivation of the litigant, which enables to verify whether the baseless suit conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor. In Brazil, in order to investigate and punish antitrust infringements, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense CADE has been applying the aforementioned criteria, which is scientifically inappropriate and baseless under the Brazilian legal system, and may result in an unjustified restriction of the principles of freedom of enterprise and freedom of competition. This thesis proposes that the abuse of the rights of action and petition institutions already enshrined in the Brazilian legal system may be considered infringements of the economic order punishable by CADE, if they produce or are able to produce the effects listed in Article 36, caput, of Law No. 12.529/2011.