The US airline industry is going through a period of consolidation through mergers between leading airlines. A number of recent mergers have been approved by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) based on the presence of Southwest Airlines in merger-affected markets. In doing so, the DOJ makes a key assumption that Southwest is unresponsive to the reduced competition when its competitors merge. We find that Southwest raised fares more in markets where Delta/Northwest and US/America-West used to operate jointly between 2005-2010. However, Southwest's fares either decreased or rose by less if facing direct or adjacent competition from a low-cost carrier (LCC). Furthermore, Southwest is now merging with AirTran Airways, its biggest LCC competitor. This implies that the DOJ should not rely on Southwest Airlines as a post-merger deterrent to fare increases. / Graduation date: 2012

Univ., Diss.--Bern, 2006.

本文以一個簡單賽局理論模型為分析依據,探討企業間的自製或是外包策略對整體社會福利的影響。 傳統經濟理論分析告訴我們自製策略可以解決雙重邊際化的問題。但在本文我們舉出一個反例，亦即當存在研發的可能及上下遊市場的研發外溢效果時，垂直整合可能會造成廠商過度研發的情形，最終產生整體社會福利不效益情形。 / In this paper, we set up a game-theoretic model, in which the whole industry is composed of a downstream monopolist and two upstream firms. This paper discusses the major debate in a firm’s market strategy: to make or to buy the components it needs. Traditionally, economic theories told us that vertical integration strategy (make strategy) can solve the problem of double marginalization and hence increase profits as well as social welfare. Nevertheless, this result does not necessarily hold when R&D possibility is introduced. We show that when there is downstream to upstream R&D spillover, vertical integration may result in an over-investment in R&D from the social standpoint. This result may shed some light on the rationale behind recent antitrust rulings.

在知識經濟時代，智慧財產權在企業發展與競爭力提升上具有相當影響力，其重要性已不言可喻。近年來越來越多的關注焦點落在技術標準的發展上，蓋技術標準是技術成果的規範化、規則化，對企業而言，唯有引領標準，掌握制定規則的權力，才能形成真正的競爭優勢，否則就可能永遠受制於人。而對產業整體而言，技術標準對經濟及科技之發展有相當貢獻，蓋一旦標準形成，產品與零組件間相容性問題就可被解決，製造商之生產成本也可降低。一般認為技術標準的形成是大勢所趨且有利多於弊的效果，然在技術標準的制定與後續相關專利的實施過程，卻可能衍生出許多與反托拉斯法相關之爭議。美國司法部與聯邦交易委員會曾在1995年共同發表「智慧財產授權之反托拉斯準則」，表達對智慧財產權授權行為可能引發競爭法問題之看法，在相隔十二年後，於2007年4月間，又共同發表了「反托拉斯法執行與智慧財產權報告」，當中對技術標準與專利聯盟所牽涉的競爭法議題做了深入探討。 技術標準制定過程中引貣競爭法上疑義的行為態樣有專利劫持及抵制技術標準制定之情形。美國聯邦交易委員會已於2006年8月Rambus一案中，確立專利劫持行為違反聯邦交易委員會法第五條與休曼法第二條規定，聯邦上訴巡迴法院也於2007年6月Qualcomm v. Broadcom一案中，表示專利權人違反FRAND授權原則將形同從事專利劫持之效果，構成休曼法第二條規定之違反。至於抵制技術標準制定情形，法院已於2006年2月在Golden Bridge Technology v. Nokia一案中表示確有違反休曼法第一條規定之見解。 目前各技術標準組織紛紛藉由:1.制定揭露政策，亦即要求成員揭露與欲採定為標準之技術相關之專利權，或2.訂定FRAND政策，要求成員同意未來將在符合公平、合理且無歧視原則下進行授權等方式，以避免專利劫持情形發生。惟由 於技術標準組織除在了解相關技術是否存在專利權之外，需進一步知悉未來專利授權條件，以做為是否將特定專利技術採為技術標準之參考，再加上FRAND字義上不易做成精確解釋，易生文義操弄之空間，仍無法解決專利劫持之問題，因此近期部分技術標準組織漸發展出事先授權條件揭露之政策，例如VITA及IEEE組織，要求欲參與技術標準制定之成員，必須事先揭露將來擬授權金額之上限或授權條件的最嚴苛限度。此外也有論者提出事先多方進行授權條件協商之可行性。 關於事先單方揭露授權條件政策之適法性，美國反托拉斯主管機關已表明不予質疑之立場，並肯定事先單方揭露授權條件有促進技術標準制定效率之優點。至於在事先多方協商授權條件政策方面，反托拉斯主管機關雖強調其對於技術標準組織是否應進行事先協商授權條件並未設立立場，但基本上仍肯定事先授權條件協商具減少專利劫持並達到促進競爭效果之優點，故傾向適用合理原則作為判斷是否違反反托拉斯法規定的依據。惟若專利權人以事先協商授權條件作為掩護，實際上共同約定以標準技術製造生產之下游產品的銷售價格(naked price fixing)，此時仍難逃被認定構成當然違法行為。 在藉由專利聯盟實施技術標準之過程，亦可能有構成競爭法上聯合行為與獨占行為之情形發生。相關引發違法疑慮之行為態樣包括:專利聯盟中包含替代性專利、競爭性敏感資訊之流通、排除他人加入專利聯盟、專屬授權、回饋授權、權利金約定、拒絕部分授權等。惟應注意的是，美國法院及反托拉斯主管機關認為，有鑑於專利聯盟具促進授權活動進行效率之特性，有助於技術提升及產業發展，因此傾向以合理原則判斷專利聯盟限制條款約定之合法性，而不當然認為此等行為態樣違反反托拉斯法相關規定。 在台灣喧騰一時的飛利浦光碟案主要亦是涉及技術標準實施過程產生是否違反公平交易法之疑義，九十六年四月間最高行政法院作出最終判決，纏訟已久的紛爭於是落幕。對於本案衍生問題思考，首先，本文認為公平會或許應審慎思考是否進一步制定有關技術標準與專利聯盟之特別處理準則。公平會似可參酌美國等先進國家之例，詳細規範技術標準的制定與發展，及專利聯盟的形成、對參與者的限制、關鍵性專利的決定、授權管理、授權條件的審查等各項問題。其次，在技術市場的界定與聯合行為的認定上，應回歸專利技術內容與專利技術間的關係加以分析；存在互補關係之技術，彼此間沒有制衡或牽制力量，不應被劃定在同一技術市場，也就不會成立聯合行為。而在獨占地位的認定上，應認為只要擁有製造某一產品之部分關鍵性專利技術，足以專利法所賦予之權利牽制他人對該產品之製造、銷售等行為，而該產品在相關產品市場可被認為具獨占地位，即應可認定專利技術擁有者之獨占地位成立。最後，在獨占地位濫用之救濟措施方面，公平會應依公平法第41條規定，妥善運用法律所賦予之裁量權限，縝密思索對於該當具體事案最為合理、適當的救濟措施，給予當事人最直接有效的救濟，而非僅消極地命令其不得繼續從事違法行為或處以罰鍰，對於事態之解決，並無法有效發揮回復市場競爭應有狀態之公平法規範目的。美國聯邦交易委員會於Rambus案及其他相關案例中極富創意地提出消極、積極的更正措施交錯運用模式，當可作為我國公平會未來對類似案件處理之參考。 為了成功地制定技術標準以引領產業發展，本文認為，有志於參與技術標準活動業者，在這個主要由歐美大廠主導技術標準制定的產業環境中，應注意歐美等國法規範內容與法院、相關主管機關之實務見解，才能知悉特定行為之法律風險以避免誤觸法網，並適當主張自己的權利。其次，可善用技術標準組織政策訂定方式解決專利劫持問題。再者，在技術標準制定之高度角力競爭下，必須培育跨領域人才參與技術授權談判才能增加脫穎而出之機會。而若欲藉由成立專利聯盟方式進行專利交互授權或對外授權，專利聯盟的組成與授權進行至少應符合本 文第七章所歸納的幾個基本要件，始不易產生違反競爭法之疑慮。至於在被控專利侵權業者方面，在面對專利侵權訴訟而進行訴訟攻防時，可朝專利權人參與技術標準或專利聯盟活動的行為是否違反反托拉斯法規定之方向加以思考，以冀增加勝訴之機會。 / In this era of knowledge-economy, intellectual property plays an important role in business developments. The significance of standard setting is thus much emphasized in recent years. It is generally recognized that standard setting brings many benefits to industries, such as costdown of manufacturing process and improvement of product compatibility, and patent pools can help to decrease transaction costs of licensing negotiations and to mitigate royalty stacking problems. However, disputes regarding the violation of antitrust law can be caused in the process of setting standards and the formation and the operation of patent pools. The U.S. DOJ and the U.S. FTC has discussed about antitrust issues related to standard setting and patent pools in “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property” in April 1995 and “Antitrust Enforcement And Intellectual Property Right：Promoting Innovation and Competition” in April 2007. Patent holdup and group boycott are controversial in standard setting. In August 2006, the U.S. FTC ruled in In re Rambus that patent holdup would violate section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the FTC Act. In June 2007, the Federal Circuit also ruled in Qualcomm v. Broadcom that patent owner who has broken one’s previous commitment on FRAND licensing would violate section 2 of the Sherman Act. As to group boycott, the court opinioned in Golden Bridge Technology v. Nokia that group boycott in the process of setting standard could be per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Many standard setting organizations (SSOs) have tried to avoid patent holdup by making patent disclosure and FRAND licensing policies. Recently some SSOs have implemented policies of ex ante unilateral announcement of licensing terms by patent holders or ex ante multilateral licensing negotiation between patent holders and SSO members to deal with patent holdup problems. These ex ante approaches facilitate competition between patent holders on licensing terms and allow SSOs to gain more information on patents. In light of the competitive effects these ex ante approaches generate, FTC and DOJ declared that they will review related policies and conduct under the rule of reason. But any efforts to reduce competition by using ex ante disclosure or negotiation process as a cover to fix downstream prices of products would be reviewed a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The standard patent licensing by patent pools could also give rise to cautions of violating antitrust law. Certain behavior in patent pools can be deemed controversial, such as including substitute patents, exchanges of competitively sensitive information, exclusive membership, exclusive license, grantback license, package license, and so on. The DOJ and the FTC expressed that they will examine similar behavior in patent pools under the rule of reason, since patent pools provide a more efficient way for patent licensing, which help to improve technology qualities and industry developments. The case, Philips v. Fair Trade Commission, R.O.C., also involved some disputes of violating Fair Trade Act. From the case, the thesis claims that first, there is a need for FTC to enact a guideline regarding standard setting and patent pools for the industries to follow. Second, while defining technology markets and concerted actions, one should analyze the relationship between patents. Complementary patents belong to different technology markets, so it would be impossible for complementary patent owners to collude with each other. Third, to identify monopolization, the thesis asserts that the patent owner of technology essential for certain product will acquire monopoly positions in certain product market, and thus will be deemed as monopolists in the related technology market. Last but not the least, the thesis proposes that the FTC should not only passively prohibit the abuse of monopoly position and issue punishments, but also come up with some proper solutions, such as compulsory license, to actively maintain fair competition in the market. Some measures delineated by the U.S. FTC in In re Rambus can be referred for future cases in Taiwan. To successfully participate in standard setting and patent pool activities, the thesis proposes certain suggestions. First, because most SSOs are led by U.S. and European enterprises and most SSOs are subject to U.S. and European legal jurisdiction, it is important to follow up to U.S. and European law and legal developments to avoid legal risks. Second, properly structuring SSO patent policies might enable SSOs to mitigate patent holdup problems. Third, the cultivation of inter-disciplinary professionals of technology, law, finance, and business management can be significant for industries in the standard setting competition. The thesis as well indicates several principles that might help to avoid the risks of violation of antitrust law during the formation and operation of patent pools. On the other hand, those who are accused of patent infringement might gain a better chance to win the lawsuit, if the violations of antitrust of patent owners in standard setting and patent pools are taken into consideration.

本文所稱之「自律公約」，係指經濟上、實質上之自律公約，意指事業間相互約束經濟活動，從事正當競爭之自律公約，如不涉競爭參數，僅係單純之道德呼籲，則非本文所討論之自律公約。符合上開要件，縱不名為「自律公約」，也為本文所討論之對象。 　　近年台灣社會邁向管制開放，同時公平交易委員會功能是否發揮預期功能，相關討論為數不少。競爭的基本理念是相信市場有自我治癒之功能，如果市場有自我治癒的能力，政府是否還有積極介入之必要？如果市場功能不彰，政府究竟應採取逕行介入之思考，或培養市場自我治癒之能力？如果市場自我治癒之功能彰顯，相對而言，政府行政任務即相對減輕，亦減少政府過多之干預。因此本文希望藉由文獻分析方式，參酌外國立法例、分析事業遵循自律公約之誘因，以提高自律公約之可行性，並期將來能建立自律公約制度，由事業自行負起監督之責，使公平交易委員會之行政任務得以簡輕，使事業不為不公平競爭，達到促進競爭之目的。 / This thesis focus on the topic of self-regulation issues in competition law. By observing Germany, Japan and US how to carry out self-regulation , we can know the value of self-regulation. This article also discuss whether self-regulation agaist Competition Law. In pursuit of successful self-regulation , it’s necessary to know what’s industry’s incentive to obey slef-regulation and self-regulation how to work smooth. Successful self-regulation can ease the burden of government and improve the effect of market, so it’s expected self-regulation comes ture.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:27:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mariana Duarte Garcia de Lacerda.pdf: 525165 bytes, checksum: 22ce7fd5ca283ad21f2a5c8fb5bb9011 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-06-17 / The work presented herein has its purpose in the study of Antitrust Law from a perspective of the private law as to an attempt to understand the restrictions imposed by CADE to corporations when reviewing mergers and acquisitions that would allegedly likely to reduce competition. In this sense, the paper will examine the market as an institution established by Law in accordance with the social and economical development of a given society and which, without the proper guidelines and institutionalization, it functions incorrectly, thus it moving away from the primary objectives established in its idealization and inception. In fact, market power produces the biggest distortions in this institution, operating the three existing flaws: monopoly, information asymmetry and consumers losses. Therefore; it is the very Law that conceives boundaries and limits, employing a variety of techniques, in order to regulate the market and ensure its correct functioning. Bearing this concept of market in mind, the paper considers the formation of the State and consequently its own market - and of the current legislation as to the understanding of State s economic intervention and corporation regulation. In determining the courses of action from both the government and the corporation its boundaries will be met in the moment of the antitrust analysis, in order to verify that once the State s intervention is justified, it shall be done with respect to the laws and constitutional rules applied to the principles of the right of property, fundamental rights and stony clause. As a conclusion to this work, it will surface that limiting a company s actions for the sake of free competition is of utmost necessity. Further, it is legislative based and it is imperative to the State to carry it out. However, when imposing the restrictions it deems necessary, the State also by force of national legislation - must not guide private activity nor neglect the rights withheld by corporations when determining the required restrictions. Thus, the State shall then see that the parties may choose on the best way to be remunerated or guarantee the indemnification due to the damages caused by the imposed restrictions / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo estudar o direito antitruste de uma perspectiva de direito privado, de forma a compreender as restrições impostas pelo CADE à empresa no que se refere à análise de atos de concentração. Desta forma, o trabalho analisará o mercado como uma instituição criada pelo Direito de acordo com a evolução social e econômica de determinada sociedade e que, sem a devida institucionalização e balizamento, funciona de forma incorreta, afastando-se dos objetivos estabelecidos na sua idealização e criação. A detenção de poder de mercado por parte de alguns participantes gera as maiores distorções nessa instituição, operando as três falhas existentes: o monopólio, a assimetria de informações e o prejuízo ao consumidor. Desta forma, o próprio Direito cria limites utilizando-se de técnicas diversas para regular o mercado e garantir o seu correto funcionamento. A partir dessa concepção do mercado, far-se-á uma análise da formação do Estado e conseqüentemente do mercado brasileiro e da legislação em vigor no que se refere ao entendimento da intervenção do estado na economia e também da regulamentação da empresa. Após delimitada as formas de atuação do estado e as formas de atuação da empresa e do seu modo de intervir no processo concorrencial, far-se-á o encontro desses limites no momento da análise antitruste, de forma a verificar que, justificada a intervenção do Estado, a mesma está circunscrita a normas legais e constitucionais que se lhe exige seja feita com respeito ao direito de propriedade; direito fundamental e cláusula pétrea. Exsurge, então, como conclusão do trabalho que a limitação à atuação da empresa para proteção da concorrência é de extrema necessidade e guarda total embasamento legislativo e que ao Estado é imperativo realizá-la. No entanto, ao impor as restrições que entender necessárias, ao Estado não cabe, também por força da legislação nacional, dirigir a atividade privada com as suas restrições e tampouco negligenciar os direitos detidos pelas empresas no momento de determinar as restrições necessária, devendo assim, cuidar de dar às partes a opção de escolher a forma que melhor remunerá- la, ou garantir indenização pelos danos causados pela restrição determinante

À partir de la première décennie du XXe siècle, tous les pays de l’Europe occidentale sont intervenus dans le secteur du cinéma pour poursuivre des objectifs publics, à la fois culturels et économiques, qui ont évolué au rythme des régimes politiques successifs. Le droit public du cinéma s’est donc développé autour de trois formes d’intervention étatique : le contrôle des œuvres, la promotion de l’industrie et de l’art cinématographiques et la régulation du marché du cinéma. À l’heure actuelle, le cinéma vit des transformations économiques et technologiques importantes, qui perturbent le droit public du cinéma au point d’en remettre en discussion la nécessité. Notre travail de recherche vise à démontrer qu’une fois qu’un État considère que la protection de la diversité et de la liberté de la création, la garantie d’une offre cinématographique plurielle et la protection de la sensibilité des mineurs sont essentiels pour le développement de la société démocratique, l’intervention publique dans le domaine du cinéma s’impose. La France et l’Italie sont à cet égard deux pays emblématiques. Parmi les premiers à élaborer un droit public du cinéma fort et étendu, les deux pays passent de la construction d’un modèle normatif commun à une divergence radicale de leurs législations en matière de cinéma. La comparaison entre la France et l’Italie montre, tout d’abord, la nécessité constante du droit public du cinéma pour la promotion de la diversité cinématographique et la protection des mineurs. Ensuite, elle met en valeur à quel point l’efficacité du droit public du cinéma dépend de la capacité du législateur d’interpréter les transformations du marché et de la technologie et de les traduire en droit. Enfin, la confrontation des deux droits indique qu’à l’ère du numérique, l’axe d’intervention publique le plus important devient la régulation de la concurrence du marché interne au cinéma et du marché de ses moyens de diffusion. / In the cinema industry, since the early twentieth century, all the Western European countries pursued different objectives within their respective cultural and economical policies. These were based accordingly to their varying systems of government.European cinema public law developed according to three public intervention modalities. These modalities are the following key aspects; film censorship, the promotion of the art and industry of the cinema, and finally cinema market regulation.Currently the cinema is going through important economic and technological transformations. These changes cloud over the law of cinema to such an extent that the necessity of which is being questioned.This thesis means to prove the necessity of state intervention in film to protect cultural diversity, freedom of expression, and underage sensibility in the virtual vehicle of film. This thesis proposes that if State considers these concepts important for a democratic society then it is vitally essential to intervene. In this light, Italy and France are two emblematic countries that are among the first to elaborate a strong articulated public law of cinema. France and Italy have moved from the construction of a common normative model to a framework of radically diverging laws. The comparison between these two countries demonstrates some principal dynamics. The most imperative of these is the permanent need for a common cinema law oriented to the promotion of cinema diversity and the protection of the underage population. Furthermore, this comparison underlines how much the efficacy of public cinema law depends on the legislator’s capacity to interpret the market of cinema and relevant technological transformations and thus, how they are integration into the law. Finally, this Franco-Italian comparison points out that in today’s digital era, the most important public intervention becomes the regulation of the following two base concepts. Regulating the cinema’s market competition is essential in this public intervention. It is equally critical for cinema law to allow equal access to the diffusion of cinematic works in the varying media outlets such as television and the Internet.

O presente trabalho estuda a vedação da discriminação de preço nas redes contratuais de distribuição, tanto pelo aspecto concorrencial, quanto pelo aspecto civil. A abordagem concorrencial decorre da existência de um ilícito assim tipificado na Lei Antitruste brasileira. É preciso identificar os requisitos de aplicação próprios do direito concorrencial, que tem como bem jurídico tutelado a defesa da concorrência. Fez-se um estudo de direito comparado com o direito concorrencial norte-americano, em que vigente o Robison-Patman Act. A abordagem de direito civil-contratual depende da identificação dogmática da existência de uma rede contratual, a partir da verificação da finalidade econômica global em um dos elementos essenciais dos contratos individuais que formam a rede. Necessário, ainda, proceder à qualificação jurídica dos contratos de distribuição, partindo da sua causa e dos demais elementos estruturais que informam se tratar de um contrato atípico. A vedação à discriminação decorre da incidência da cláusula geral do art. 187 do CC/02, que proíbe o abuso do direito em razão de um exercício que exceda manifestamente os limites impostos pelos dois critérios trabalhados: a finalidade econômica ou social do direito e a boa-fé. Distingue-se a boa-fé enquanto criadora de deveres laterais de conduta da confiança enquanto protetora de uma situação de confiança. A vedação à discriminação de preço decorre do standard de boa-fé na função de criadora de deveres de conduta para o organizador da rede diante dos distribuidores que lhe estejam vinculados nessa rede contratual. O referencial valorativo é a lealdade que se espera do organizador da rede nesse contexto negocial. Estuda-se os diversos critérios econômicos justificativos do que seja uma justa e leal diferenciação de preço sob o influxo do conceito operativo de igualdade elaborado no âmbito do direito público. / This paper studies the prohibition of price discrimination in contractual networks of distribution, both by the competitive aspect, as the civil aspect. The competitive approach stems from the existence of an unlawful this way typified in Brazilian Antitrust Law. One need to identify the requirements for application of competition law, which legal interest is to protect competition, not competitors. There is a comparative study with the U.S. competition law, because of the current rules of Robinson-Patman Act. The approach of civil-contract law depends on the identification of a network contract from the scanning of the global economic interest in one of the essential elements of individual contracts that compose the network. Also necessary to proceed with the legal classification of the distribution contracts, from his structural and functional (“consideration”) elements that informs it as an atypical contract. The prohibition of discrimination price arises from the general clause of art. 187 of the Civil Code of 2002, which prohibits the abuse of rights in respect of an exercise that clearly exceed the limits imposed by the two criteria worked: the economic or social purpose of the right and good faith. It is distinguished the good faith in its function of create duties of the confidence of a trust situation. The prohibition of price discrimination stems from the standard of good faith in its function of create duties of conduct to the organizer of the network of distributors. The reference value is the loyalty expected of the organizaer of the network in this negotiating context. We study the different economic criteria to be evidence of an equitable and fair price differentiation under the influence of the operating concept of equality established under public law.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:20:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bruno Falcone.pdf: 2322508 bytes, checksum: aa7fd42a85ac89e83485953407c2ac71 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-04-26 / In the era of knowledge, by triggering a real technology race by the various economic agents, the industrial property, more than an exclusive right, consists in a powerful instrument of competition. Unfortunately, such a facet of industrial property has never been exploited and disseminated either by the local legal community or national companies. The first one preferred to adopt a position characterized by a strong social appeal (not always technically grounded) and the second ones did not do so because they simply lacked a culture of protection of their intangible assets. A simplistic and perfunctory judgment of the matter may suggest that industrial property and competition law are two areas of Law completely antagonistic and irreconcilable with each other. Such a construction could jeopardize the legal safety that economic agents need to invest in scientific development and technology research. This study therefore aims at examining, in a scientific fashion, the relationship between industrial property law and competition law. First and foremost, an assessment of both foreign and Brazilian experiences will be conducted as a preparatory field for a principiologic analysis of both areas of Law. Once the relevant principles are identified in both foreign and Brazilian experiences according to the deductive method, it will be investigated which principles are either coincident or harmonic and the theoretical formulation of Robert Alexy will be applied to cases of conflict, in order to demonstrate that the relationship between both legal areas is actually harmonic and complementary / entre os vários agentes econômicos, a propriedade industrial, antes de um direito de exclusiva, consiste num poderoso instrumento de concorrência. Esta faceta da propriedade industrial infelizmente não foi, até o momento, explorada e difundida tanto entre a comunidade jurídica local quanto pelo empresariado brasileiro. A primeira preferiu um discurso pautado em forte apelo social (e nem sempre tecnicamente fundamentado); e o segundo não o fez simplesmente porque lhe faltava a cultura da proteção de seu capital imaterial. Uma análise simplista e perfunctória da questão poderia levar ao entendimento de que a propriedade industrial e o direito da concorrência seriam duas áreas da ciência jurídica completamente antagônicas e inconciliáveis, interpretação esta que poderia colocar em risco a segurança jurídica de que os agentes econômicos necessitam para investir em desenvolvimento científico e pesquisa tecnológica. O objetivo do presente estudo consiste, pois, em discorrer, de forma científica, sobre as relações entre direito de propriedade industrial e defesa da concorrência. Proceder-se-á, por primeiro, a um estudo da experiência estrangeira e brasileira como campo preparatório para a análise principiológica. Uma vez identificados os princípios atinentes aos dois campos do direito, extraídos da experiência estrangeira e brasileira segundo método dedutivo, investigar-se-ão quais são coincidentes ou harmônicos e aplicar-se-á a formulação teórica de Robert Alexy aos casos de colisão, a fim de demonstrar que a relação existente entre ambos é, em verdade, de harmonia e complementaridade

O direito antitruste, atualmente ditado pela Lei 12.529 de 30 de novembro de 2011, e o direito da propriedade intelectual permeiam o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro buscando regrar condutas e procedimentos com vistas a tutelar, de um lado, a livre concorrência e, de outro, estimular a inovação e o desenvolvimento tecnológico do país. No exercício de ambos os direitos, muitas vezes observam-se conflitos, que aparentemente revelam uma contradição: a concessão de exclusividade de exploração de bens intangíveis, tais como patentes e desenhos industriais, conflita com a livre concorrência, sendo uma excludente da outra. Entretanto, essa contradição, como se verá, encontra-se superada. Em nosso sistema jurídico não há direitos absolutos que possam justificar a dominância pura e simples de um sobre o outro sem medir as consequências. O equilíbrio é buscado através da vedação legal aos abusos de direito, especialmente abusos de direito de propriedade intelectual e o exercício abusivo de poder econômico. Adicionalmente, a Constituição Federal subordina o uso da propriedade à sua função social. O presente estudo analisa as questões que envolvem esse aparente conflito e os abusos decorrentes do exercício desses direitos. O tema é introduzido com a análise da interface entre o direito da propriedade intelectual e o antitruste e as questões de direito dela decorrentes. A seguir, são analisados o abuso de direito, o abuso de poder econômico e o abuso de posição dominante, com destaque para o entendimento da existência de venda casada mesmo que o vínculo ocorra com diferimento no tempo. O estudo prossegue discorrendo sobre a livre iniciativa e a livre concorrência, bem como o instituto do desenho industrial e seu eventual uso abusivo. Também são analisados o mercado de reposição de peças e partes de produtos complexos e sua repercussão no Brasil e no exterior, e a posição do CADE sobre eventuais condutas anticompetitivas. A jurisprudência comentada ilustra as diversas posições doutrinárias acerca da matéria. O monopólio decorrente de direito de propriedade intelectual seria benéfico para a eficiência e regulação dos mercados, apesar de seus eventuais efeitos contra os interesses do consumidor? Este ensaio procura responder essa indagação, aprofundando o debate sobre o conflito entre o monopólio concedido por desenho industrial às peças de reposição de objetos complexos e a liberdade de escolha do consumidor. Oferece ainda uma proposta legislativa que visa assegurar o equilíbrio entre os direitos dos envolvidos. / The antitrust law, currently under Law 12,529, of November 30, 2011, and the intellectual property law is within the Brazilian juridical ordination, seeking to rule conducts and procedures intended to protect the free competition, on one hand, and to stimulate the innovation and technological development of the country, on the other hand. In the performance of both rights, conflicts are many times observed, which apparently reveal a contradiction: the granting of exclusivity for the exploitation of intangible goods, such as patents and industrial designs, conflicts with the free competition, excluding one another. Said contradiction, however, has been overcome, as it will be noticed. Our juridical system encompasses no absolute rights liable to justify the pure and simple dominance of one on the other, without assessing the consequences. The balance is searched by means of the legal prevention of the abuses of right, especially the abuses of the intellectual property law and the abusive exercise of the economic power. In addition, the Federal Constitution subordinates the use of property to its social function. This study analyzes the issues involving this apparent conflict and the abuses resulting from the enforcement of said rights. The theme is introduced with the analysis of the interface between the intellectual property right and the antitrust one and the resulting legal issues. Then, the abuse of right, the abuse of economic power and the abuse of the dominant position are analysed, pointing out the understanding of the existence of a tying arrangement, even though the binding occurs with deferral in time. The study proceeds by analyzing the free initiative and the free competition, as well as the industrial design institute and its eventual abusive use. The parts reposition and parts of complex products and their repercussion in Brazil and overseas, the CADE´s position as to eventual anticompetitive conducts are also analyzed. The commented jurisprudence illustrates the several opinion of jurists on this matter. Would the monopoly resulting from the intellectual property right benefit the market efficiency and regulation, despite the eventual effects against the consumer interests ? This paper seeks to reply such a question, by deepening the debate on the conflicts between the monopoly granted by industrial design to spare parts of complex objects and the consumer´s free choice. It also offers a legislative proposal intended to ensure the balance between the involved parties´ rights.