Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-06-07T14:54:55Z No. of bitstreams: 1 gabrielgouvearabello.pdf: 1303580 bytes, checksum: 6230bd67ce93079d87cb72f16e375515 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-07-13T13:24:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 gabrielgouvearabello.pdf: 1303580 bytes, checksum: 6230bd67ce93079d87cb72f16e375515 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-13T13:24:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 gabrielgouvearabello.pdf: 1303580 bytes, checksum: 6230bd67ce93079d87cb72f16e375515 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-30 / O objetivo desta dissertação é estimar os potenciais efeitos competitivos sobre o mercado relevante das principais fusões ocorridas no Brasil após o Plano Real, avaliando a eficácia da metodologia de estimação ex ante de efeitos efetivamente observados na rentabilidade das firmas fusionadas e rivais ex post. Segundo a análise de modelo teórico proposto por Motta (2004),é possível utilizar o resultado das firmas rivais no mercado em que ocorreu a fusão como indicador da presença de ganhos em eficiência ou de poder de mercado no mercado relevante das firmas fusionadas, em que retornos positivos para as firmas rivais indicam a presença de poder de mercado e, consequentemente, uma diminuição do excedente do consumidor e do bem-estar na economia. Analogamente, retornos negativos para as firmas rivais indicariam a presença de ganhos em eficiência e aumento do bem-estar. Para estimar os efeitos das fusões sobre as firmas rivais e fusionadas, utiliza-se neste trabalho a metodologia de estudo de eventos em que são calculados os retornos anormais das ações das firmas rivais, bem como das firmas fusionadas, decorrentes do anúncio da fusão. Além disso, para verificar se a metodologia de estudo de eventos é capaz de capturar os efeitos competitivos das fusões de maneira adequada, comparam-se os resultados obtidos via metodologia de estudo de eventos com uma medida de desempenho das firmas ex post.Tal comparação foi feita por meio de uma análise de correlação e regressão. Nesse estudo, foi utilizada uma amostra de 42 grandes fusões horizontais entre firmas de capital aberto com ações cotadas na BM&FBOVESPA e suas respectivas rivais no setor, além de um detalhamento para um setor específico, o de Telecomunicações. Os resultados empíricos obtidos na metodologia de estudo de eventos apontam para uma maior presença de efeitos anticompetitivos nas fusões em geral (ganho de poder de mercado) e de ganhos de eficiência para o setor de Telecomunicações. Além disso, foi encontrada, tanto para as firmas rivais como para as firmas fusionadas,correlação positiva e significativa entre os retornos anormais e o efeito na lucratividade ex post, evidenciando a capacidade do mercado em antecipar os efeitos negativos das fusões sobre o bem-estar. Esses resultados também são corroborados pela análise de regressão, cabendo ressaltar a presença do efeito de reversão à média, evidenciando, assim, a utilidade da metodologia de estudo de eventos em capturar os efeitos potenciais das fusões ex ante. / The objective of this dissertation is to estimate the potential competitive effects on the relevant market of major mergers occurred in Brazil after the Real Plan, evaluating the effectiveness of methods used to estimate ex ante effects actually observed in the profitability of merged firms and rivals ex post. According to the analysis of the theoretical model proposed by Motta(2004), it is possible to use the result of rival firms in the market in which the merger occurred as an indicator of the presence of gains in efficiency or market power in the relevant market of the merged firms, where positive returns for rival firms indicate the presence of market power and, consequently, a decrease in consumer surplus and welfare in the economy. Similarly, negative returns for rival firms indicate the presence of efficiency gains and increased well-being. To estimate the effects of mergers on rivals and firms merged, is used in this work to study methodology in which events are calculated abnormal stock returns of rival firms as well as firms merged, resulting from the merger announcement. This comparison was made by means of a correlation analysis and regression. In this study, a sample of 42large horizontal mergers between firms with publicly traded shares listed on the BM&FBOVESPA and their respective rivals in the sector was used, and a breakdown for a specific sector, the Telecommunications. The empirical results obtained in the methodology of event studies show a higher presence of anticompetitive mergers in general (gain market power) and efficiency gains in the sector of Telecommunications effects. Furthermore, it was found for both the rival firms as for firms merged, positive and significant correlation between abnormal returns and the effect on ex post profitability, demonstrating the market's ability to anticipate the negative effects of mergers on the welfare. These results are also corroborated by regression analysis, fitting to emphasize the presence of the effect of mean reversion, thus demonstrating the usefulness of the event study methodology to capture the potential effects of ex ante mergers.

La notion de « concurrence » est traditionnellement associée au droit de la concurrence, entendu, dans sa vocation restrictive et européenne, comme le corpus gouvernant ententes et abus de position dominante. Si le droit de la concurrence a vocation à saisir les marchés financiers en vertu du droit commun, force est toutefois d’observer que, animé par une spécificité concurrentielle, le droit financier s’est investi lui-même de la mission consistant à assurer ses propres intérêts concurrentiels : sur les marchés financiers, modèles archétypique de concurrence « pure et parfaite », la concurrence s’est développée non pas dans le cadre des règles communes de la concurrence, mais en dehors de ces dernières. C’est de cette « spécificité concurrentielle » du droit financier que la présente recherche, enrichie des apports notables du droit américain, se propose de rendre compte : bouleversant les monopoles traditionnels et favorisant une dynamique de compétition normative le droit financier organise la concurrence sur les marchés financiers d’abord. Sur le modèle du droit commun de la concurrence, le droit financier assure la protection de la compétition, ensuite, la transparence jouant à cet égard un rôle de premier plan. La confrontation du droit financier au principe de concurrence atteste d’une véritable « spécificité concurrentielle » en matière financière. De façon plus globale, l’analyse conduit à remettre en cause les ordres établis, suggérant une clé de compréhension renouvelée autour d’une nouvelle cohérence : le droit financier ne serait in fine pas réductible à une branche du droit de la régulation tourné par l’ouverture à la concurrence via la mise en œuvre de politiques dites de « libéralisation ». Corrélativement, le droit de la concurrence pourrait ne pas être que le droit de la protection de l’ordre concurrentiel sur le marché des biens et services, les « Grandes libertés » étant appelées à compléter un édifice commun voué non seulement à protéger la concurrence, mais également à l’organiser. Au final, et cela ne serait pas le moindre des paradoxes de souligner la spécificité du droit financier tout en relativisant la notion de « droit de la régulation », avec en point de mire un « droit de la régulation économique ». / The concept of « Competition » traditionally refers to Antitrust Law, heard in its restrictive and European meaning as governing both Trusts and abuse of dominant position. If Antitrust Law is intended to capture financial markets under common rules, however, it is observed that, animated by a competitive specificity, Financial Law has invested himself the task of ensuring its own competitive interest: financial market, competition archetypal models of « pure and perfect » competition, has not developed in the framework of common rules of competition, but outside them. It is precisely this kind of Financial Law’s « competitive specificity » that this research, enriched by notable contributions of US Law, proposes to report here : contesting classic monopolistic positions that have long characterized the financial infrastructures while sustaining a Law competition dynamic, Financial Law organizes competition in financial markets. More, not only does Financial Law organizes competition, it also protects competition, in the context of the influence of common Antitrust principles and market transparency.Financial Law and the competition principle comparison is rich teaching : it allows to demonstrate Financial Law’s competitive specificity. More broadly, the research led to challenge the « established order », suggesting a renewed key to understanding based on a new consistency: Financial Law would ultimately not be reduced to a branch of « Regulation Law », regulating the entire shot the opening to competition through the implementation of « Liberalization » policies. Correlatively, Antitrust Law may not be only confined in the protection of the competitive order on the goods and services market, « European freedoms of Mouvement » being then asked to complete a common building dedicated not only to protect the competition, but also to organize it. In the end, it would not be the least of paradoxes emphasizing the specificity of Financial Law while relativizing the notion of « Regulation Law », in focus with an « Economic Regulation Law ».

Notre étude a pour objectif d'une part de comprendre pourquoi dans notre système juridique, certaines fautes peuvent profiter à leur auteur et d'autre part de les empêcher. Pour ce faire, dans une première partie, nous qualifierons la faute lucrative. Cette étape de qualification nous permettra de mettre en lumière l'unité de la notion de faute lucrative, en dépit de sa diversité de visages ; unité reposant sur des caractéristiques qui lui sont propres. A travers l'examen de chaque composante de la faute lucrative, nous mettrons en exergue les failles du Droit qui alimentent les stratégies spéculatives sur la violation de la règle de droit. La diversité de l'élément légal nous amènera à ausculter différentes disciplines du droit privé, dont principalement le droit pénal, le droit de la concurrence et le droit de la responsabilité civile. Les insuffisances de chacune de ces disciplines nous conduiront à proposer la reconnaissance par le Droit, de la faute lucrative, dans toute son singularité afin d'en ajuster le régime. Cette consécration en droit positif s'effectuera par la création d'une nouvelle circonstance aggravante, le dol lucratif, en droit répressif et l'assimilation de la faute lucrative à la faute intentionnelle ou dolosive en droit de la responsabilité civile. Cette réception de la faute lucrative en Droit justifiera l'élaboration d'un régime adéquat à la faute lucrative, poursuivant un objectif de dissuasion. Dans une seconde partie, nous proposerons donc un régime dissuasif, conçu à la lumière de la théorie économique de la dissuasion. Ce dernier reposera sur des modalités substantielles et procédurales, garantissant à la fois l'efficacité et l'effectivité de la sanction dissuasive. Au titre des premières, il s'agira d'augmenter le quantum chiffrable de la sanction, afin qu'il devienne au moins égal au profit illicite. Mais pas seulement : il s'agira également d'aggraver le quantum non chiffrable de la sanction, de sorte que le coût d'une faute ne puisse pas être intégralement anticipé, maîtrisé par les opérateurs économiques. Inévitablement, l'objectif de dissuasion des sanctions aura pour effet d'aggraver la responsabilité de l'auteur d'une faute lucrative. Aussi les modalités confiscatoires et dissuasives devront être passées au crible de la qualification de sanction répressive. Il en résultera une distinction nette entre le champ de la dissuasion et celui de la répression, le premier étant plus large que le second. Une sanction civile non répressive, simplement normative pouvant donc être dissuasive. Notre thèse a donc pour objectif de proposer une méthode de traitement des fautes lucratives afin de renverser le rapport coût-avantage d'une violation de l'ordre public. / Under french law, some faults can provide to their author more than the fault costs to them. In others words, some faults can procure an illegal profit because Law doesn't confiscate it or not efficiently. For example, it can be a cartel on prices, a violation of private life by a paparazzi magazine, or a fraud on consumer goods.... The aim of our thesis is twice. Fistly, we will try to understand why such behaviour is possible : what is the legal classification stage, after which we will propose a definition of lucrative fault in tort law, criminal law and competition law. Secondly, we are going to suggest a legal processing, method to deter this misbehaviour, what is the second step of our demonstration. Thus, in support of the economic model of deterrence by Gary Becker, we will determinate the conditions of effectiveness of a public punishment and of a private punishment. Among them, we will make the difference between the choice of the punishment and the probability of being decided.

La thèse vise à examiner l’applicabilité des règles du droit de la concurrence, comme une solution alternative aux solutions existantes de la propriété intellectuelle dans le cas spécifique d'un de refus du titulaire d’un tel brevet. Sont étudiés: les solutions existantes, l'étendue de la protection conférée par un tel brevet, et si un tel refus du titulaire d’un brevet sur une séquence d’ADN est donc examiné en tant que pratique potentiellement répréhensible en vertu du droit de la concurrence. / Doctorat en droit / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Les accords de report d’entrée sont des accords conclus dans le secteur pharmaceutique. Conçus par les laboratoires princeps, ils ont pour objet ou pour effet de retarder l’entrée de concurrents génériques sur le marché. Nés aux États-Unis à la fin des années 1990, ces accords continuent jusqu’à ce jour de générer de nombreux problèmes juridiques. Malgré plus de deux décennies de contentieux, les accords « pay- for-delay » produisent toujours un grand scepticisme outre-Atlantique et ne bénéficient pas d’un régime juridique clair. La difficulté tient à ce que ces accords cristallisent à la fois des problèmes de droit de la concurrence et de droit des brevets. De son côté, l’Union européenne a été récemment touchée par cette pratique. La Commission européenne s’est jusqu’alors saisie de trois cas. À chaque reprise, cette dernière a conclu que les accords restreignaient la concurrence en raison de leur objet. L’institution bruxelloise a ainsi fait preuve d’une grande intransigeance et d’une étonnante sévérité eu égard à sa faible expérience sur le sujet. Ce travail de recherche se propose de répondre aux problèmes posés par les accords de report d’entrée en mobilisant une approche comparatiste. Par ce biais, l’objectif de cette étude est double. D’une part, il s’agira de mieux comprendre le mécanisme qui se cache derrière ces accords. D’autre part, il s’agira de formuler des recommandations afin d’améliorer le contrôle actuel des « pay-for-delay » dans l’Union européenne / Pay-for-delay agreements are agreements concluded in the pharmaceutical sector. Designed by brand laboratories, they have for object or for effect to delay generic entry on the market. Born in the United States in the late 1990s, these agreements continue to generate many legal problems. Despite more than two decades of litigation, the pay-for-delay agreements still produce great skepticism across the Atlantic and do not have a clear legal regime. The difficulty is that these agreements crystallize both competition law and patent law issues. The European Union has recently been affected by this practice. The European Commission has prononced three decisions. In each of them, the commission concluded that the agreements restricted competition by their object. Thus, the commission showed a great intransigence and an astonishing severity in view of its weak experience on the subject. This research aims to address the problems posed by pay-for-delay agreements by mobilizing a comparative approach. In this way, the objective of this study is twofold. On the one hand, the purpose is to better understand the mechanism behind these agreements. On the other hand, the goal is to formulate recommendations to improve the current pay-for-delay control in the European Union

La ricerca prende avvio dalla ricostruzione dei processi socio-economici che hanno portato alla crisi del modo di produzione taylorista-fordista. Muovendo da tali riflessioni, si constata come le imprese “post-fordiste” si avvalgano in misura crescente di lavoratori autonomi, un tempo coordinati e continuativi e, oggi, a progetto (artt. 61 e ss., d.lgs. 276/2003). Tali collaboratori sono, dunque, soggetti ad un potere (contrattuale) di coordinamento del committente che, alle volte, si somma ad una condizione di dipendenza economica dal committente medesimo. Si crea, quindi, una differenziazione interna all'area dell'autonomia coordinata che non pare adeguatamente valorizzata dal legislatore ordinario, ma che sembra interessare i sindacati. Il dato reale vede, infatti, agire rappresentanze varie, sicché occorre circoscrivere l'ambito di applicabilità degli artt. 39 e 40 Cost. L'assenza di un genuino interesse collettivo e di un'effettiva attività di autotutela inducono a ritenere che i collaboratori “forti” e il relativo associazionismo possano beneficiare delle sole tutele poste dagli artt. 2, 18 e 41 Cost. A conclusione si affrontano le problematiche che la ricostruzione così svolta solleva, ovverosia come garantire l'effettività delle tutele riconosciute al sindacalismo dei collaboratori “deboli” e come contemperare l'associazionismo dei collaboratori “forti” con il diritto antitrust comunitario. / The search starts with the reconstruction of socio-economic processes. Moving from these reflections, it's possible to see that today's companies take advantage of increasingly self-employed coordinated and continuous and, after d.lgs. 276/2003 “lavoratori a progetto”. These employees are, therefore, subject to a power (contractual) coordination of the customer that, at times, it adds up to a state of economic dependence by the same. It then creates an internal differentiation into autonomy area that does not seem properly valued by the ordinary legislator, but that seems to involve trade unions. Given that in reality there are different representations, we move to circumscribe the scope of applicability of the Arts. 39 and 40 Const. The absence of a genuine interest and genuine self activities suggest that employees "strong" and its associations can only benefit from the protections posed by Arts. 2, 18 and 41 Const. At the end tackling the problems so that the reconstruction turn raises, namely how to ensure the effectiveness of the safeguards recognized unionism collaborators "weak" and reconcile the associations of employees "strong" with the antitrust law.

隨著世界各國開放市場，事業間的競爭已步入國際化，是以競爭法制與政策也必須國際化，然而各國間競爭法規範的調和並未隨著經貿自由化而自然達成。本文點出競爭法與國際接軌的重要性，進一步檢視各國就競爭法案件在單邊、雙邊、複邊等層次將面臨哪些執法上的問題。又因國際反競爭案件越趨頻仍，競爭法主管機關間的合作需求隨之提高，究竟在執法合作上可能面臨哪些困難與限制，未來在合作上發展的趨勢如何，本文將循序漸進加以探討。目前國際間迄未形成一套強勢的競爭法制，世界貿易組織（World Trade Organization, WTO）亦放棄在杜哈談判回合處理競爭議題，然經貿自由化對國際競爭法制仍持續注入新元素。譬如各國簽訂之自由貿易協定與區域經濟整合，多設有競爭相關章節，並開始關注國營事業涉及的反競爭問題（即競爭中立的問題），此等新發展亦屬本文探討之範圍。 / Along with the trend of trade liberaliztion, the competition among enterprises has gone global. However, the competition rules seem to have no chance to reach international coordination in the near future. This article emphasizes that it’s important for a nation to coordinate its own competition law with other countries. Thus, the issues of competiton law enforcement at unilateral level, bilateral level, plurilateral level, regional level, and mutilateral level are also well discussed in this article. Due to the increasing number of anti-competition cases, the need for enforcement cooperation has risen. As a result, this article spends many efforts on recognizing the restraints and obstacles when cooperating with other competition authorities, trying to find the solutions to the problems of cooperation. Despite the fact that WTO failed to deal with international competition issues, there are many ambitious FTAs and reginal trade agreements trying to make common competition rules, which induce new elements into the field of international competition laws and policies. For exaples, TPP and many FTAs are in the negotiation of competitive neutrality requirement in the draft agreements. Such new development will not be excluded when speaking of international competition laws and policies.

本論文主要是在探討現行公平交易法第四十五條「依照著作權法、商標法或專利法行使權利之正當行為，不適用本法之規定」，其中有關專利權之部分。蓋專利權屬於智慧財產權之一種，係國家以法律授予私人的一種獨占、排他權利，亦即，專利權人就其所獲之專利請求範圍，係處於一種法定專有排除他人未經其同意而製造、販賣、使用或進口該專利之獨占權能地位。專利法藉由此一賦予專利權人特定期間之專屬排他權 (Exclusive Right)/獨占壟斷權，以提供一定之經濟上利益為誘因，藉此鼓勵發明人『公開』符合可專利要件；而競爭法制係為維護公平、自由競爭秩序與環境而必須規範獨占、聯合、結合等限制競爭行為及不公平競爭行為，兩者之糾結關係應如何釐清？素有經濟憲法高地位之稱之競爭法制，應如何在法律特設專利獨占權之制度目的考量下，揮舞它這把大刀？又法律特設專利獨占權之制度目的，又會如何影響競爭法制規制專利權利之界線，是本文想要探究、嘗試解決之議題亦為本文研究目的所在。 鑑於目前我國對於公平交易法第四十五條之法律定位爭議甚大，復以目前我國對於專利權之正當權利行使行為之實務摸索尚處於萌芽之未臻成熟階段，本文擬以專利制度之制度目的及專利財產之本質出發，再借鏡國美國法制百餘年之行政執法、司法實務之實證觀察方式，試圖對目前我國越來越多之專利權權利行使與公平交易法之交錯相關議題及爭議，提出一些可能的思考方向與解決之道，並以法律體系解釋、法律目的解釋、市場經濟以及專利制度之制度目的等思維角度，嘗試定義公平交易法第四十五條之專利權正當權利行使行為，並將本文所建議之審查基準與審查步驟作成審查流程圖，作為本文之總結。

Univ., Diss.--Basel, 2002.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T19:33:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FALCO_Guilherme_2014.pdf: 1282193 bytes, checksum: a75487fda8645a23d2b25547a581009f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-26 / Market regulation brings on the expectation that government's intervention improves the economy. For example, the assumption that competitive environments enable efficient allocation of resources influences the development of antitrust policies and encourages free competition. The promotion of competition through laws and regulatory agencies follows this reading and public antitrust policies are disseminated throughout developed and developing countries. However, despite its wide application, these regulations lack empirical mechanisms that organize their major institutional properties and allow proper assessment of policy operation and its effects over the economy. This master thesis replicates to the Brazilian reality a set of indexes - previously developed for 13 other jurisdictions - that seek to translate institutional and qualitative information into objective, quantitative and comparable cross-country information. The indexes are created upon the compilation and classification of the characteristics of a particular jurisdiction with respect to a benchmark of best practices in deterring anticompetitive conducts. The immediate goal is to review and critique different designs of competition policy agencies and statutes, allowing cross-time and cross country analysis. The results for the Brazilian policy are positive regarding institutional features (rules of the game), both in cross-time and cross-country perspectives; Brazil presents inferior results regarding enforcement (human/financial resources and volume of cases analyzed by the competent agency); the aggregate index presents high levels in a cross-country analysis. / A regulação de dinâmicas de mercado traz a expectativa de que a interferência estatal melhora a economia. A defesa e a promoção da concorrência por meio de leis e agências estatais se encaixam nessa leitura regulatória e constituem política pública disseminada entre a maioria dos países desenvolvidos e em desenvolvimento. Entretanto, apesar de sua vasta aplicação, essas regulações carecem de mecanismos empíricos que organizem suas principais propriedades institucionais e permitam análises satisfatórias acerca do funcionamento da política e da extensão de seus efeitos sobre a economia, especialmente em perspectiva comparada. Essa dissertação replica para a realidade brasileira um conjunto de Índices de Política de Concorrência, anteriormente construídos para outras 13 jurisdições pelo trabalho de Buccirossi et al (2011), que busca traduzir informações institucionais e qualitativas de uma política antitruste em informações objetivas, quantitativas e comparáveis entre países. Os índices são construídos a partir da compilação e classificação das características de determinada jurisdição com relação a um benchmark de melhores práticas em dissuasão de condutas anticompetitivas. O objetivo imediato é desenvolver instrumento que permita avaliação e comparação de diferentes modelos de política de concorrência, o que engloba tanto análises intertemporais da evolução do modelo aplicado por cada jurisdição quanto análises comparativas entre a evolução de políticas de diferentes jurisdições. O Brasil apresenta resultados positivos do ponto de vista institucional (regras do jogo), seja em avaliação intertemporal seja em caráter comparado; o desempenho nacional é inferior no que se refere à capacidade de enforcement (recursos humanos, financeiros e volume de casos analisados pelas autoridades). De forma agregada, o Brasil possui índices de concorrência elevados em perspectiva internacional.