Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:33:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Saulo Felipe Caldeira de Almeida.pdf: 1106391 bytes, checksum: af2f4ef05707497e6a0ea0b1ccfa1d8f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-08-13 / The scope of this dissertation is to analyze a specific movement of the current Brazilian industrial policy, which organizes its tools to assist certain companies in a real training exercise of national champions. But that, is presents an exhaustive researches about the publications of main agent of Brazilian government at implementation of this policy, the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social BNDES [Brazilian Development Bank]. From the results of this research, as actually observed how this movement occurs, identifying those are this national champions and which operations of BNDES have fostered this movement. As a result, after identifying the criticisms that are made to this model, in which circumstances these national champions were subjected to the Brazilian Antitrust Authorities, we highlight its main performances and analyzed its decisions. / O escopo da presente dissertação é analisar um movimento especifico da atual política industrial brasileira, que organiza seus instrumentos para auxiliar determinadas empresas num verdadeiro exercício de formação de campeões nacionais. Para tanto, apresenta-se uma exaustiva pesquisa sobre as publicações do principal agente do governo brasileiro na implementação desta política, o Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social - BNDES. A partir do resultado desta pesquisa, se observa como realmente ocorre este movimento, identificando quem são estes campeões nacionais e quais as operações do BNDES fomentaram este movimento. Na sequência, após identificar as críticas que se fazem a este modelo, verificamos em que circunstancias estes campeões nacionais foram submetidos ao Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência, elencamos suas principais atuações e analisamos suas decisões.

La condition, la forme et la justification théorique des exceptions sont aujourd’hui au coeur du débat sur l’avenir du droit d’auteur. L’objectif primaire de ces normes particulières est de garantir la cohérence du droit d’auteur. Et pourtant les chercheurs s’accordent sur la nécessité de leur reconceptualisation.Cette thèse a pour but de découvrir la signification, les origines et les conséquences de la crise qu’engendre le ressentiment à l’égard des exceptions aux droits de l’auteur dans leur forme actuelle. Tenant compte d’une certaine fragilité axiologique de la matière, elle essaie d’appréhender les phénomènes étudiés selon une posture épistémologique neutre. À cet égard, la théorie des paradigmes scientifiques lui offre un cadre d’analyse scindé en deux. La reconstruction de l’état normal et voulu des principes élaborés par la tradition française du droit d’auteur en matière des exceptions permet de repérer les signes de leur dépassement par la réalité juridique mouvante.De cette analyse résulte d’abord le modèle d’une exception cohérente, internalisé par le droit d’auteur objectif qui a complètement résolu le conflit entre la création et la consommation des oeuvres de l’esprit. Cette image est ensuite confrontée à des forces destructrices ayant leur origine dans des normes extérieures au droit d’auteur objectif. Celles-ci se substituent aux exceptions prévues par le droit d’auteur et remettent en question l’idée de son autarcie.L’idylle du droit d’auteur autosuffisant n’est toutefois pas une utopie. Entre l’état normal et la maladie des exceptions se noue un lien dialectique. Vus ensemble, ces deux éléments s’éclairent réciproquement, de sorte que la crise qui les résume devient un processus réversible. / The condition,shape and theoretical justification of copyright exceptions are at the heart of the debate on the future of copyright. The main objective of these particular rules is to ensure the consistency of copyright law. Yet, researchers agree on the need of their reconceptualization.This doctoral thesis aims to explore the meaning, origins and consequences of the crisis that brings resentment toward copyright exceptions in their present form. Taking into account a certain axiological fragility of the subject, it tries to apprehend it in the respect of a neutral epistemological posture. Therein, the theory of scientific paradigms offers a framework split in two. The reconstruction of the normal and wanted state of the principles developed by the French tradition of copyright in the field of exceptions allows to identify the signs of their violation by the changing legal reality.This analysis reveals, on the one hand, the model of a consistent exception, internalized by the copyright law which completely resolved the conflict between creation and consumption of works of the mind. On the other hand, this image is faced with the destructive forces that originate in the norms that are external to copyright law. These replace the copyright exceptions and, therefore, question the idea of its autarchy.The idyll of the self-sufficient copyright law is, however, not a utopia. A dialectical link can be traced between the normal state of exceptions and their illness.Seen together, these two elements illuminate each other, so that the crisis that summarize them becomes a reversible process.

Parler de négociation en matière pénale peut, de prime abord, semblerantinomique. Issue par tradition du modèle accusatoire de justice pénale, la logiqued’intégration du consensus dans le champ de la répression s’observe pourtant dans lesystème procédural à l’égard de procédures dont le fonctionnement est entièrementconditionné par l’aveu. Instrument au service de la répression des pratiquesanticoncurrentielles, du traitement du contentieux de masse ou de la lutte contre lacriminalité organisée, la négociation se présente aujourd’hui comme un processus dont lelégislateur ne peut plus faire l’économie. De ce constat est née la volonté d’appréhender lephénomène au moyen d’une définition qui permet d’une part, de mieux cerner l’articulationdes diverses modalités de la négociation avec les modes de réponse pénale traditionnels,d’autre part d’en apprécier les conséquences notamment au regard des principes directeursde la matière. Plaçant l’autorité de poursuite au rang d’acteur principal du système judiciaire,le processus de négociation nécessite l’élaboration d’un cadre juridique strict afin d’assurerla garantie des droits fondamentaux du justiciable. Si l’échange qui s’établit entre l’autoritéde poursuite et la personne mise en cause révèle l’existence d’un accord, l’étude dufonctionnement concret des procédures de négociation ne permet pas de conclure à laréalité d’un contrat. Illustration de la logique probatoire à l’oeuvre dans le système répressifnord-américain, le développement de la négociation doit s’inscrire dans le respect d’unéquilibre entre les impératifs d’efficacité et le respect des principes qui confèrent à la justicepénale française son identité. / One can have reservations about the idea of negotiation in criminal law. Yet, theinitiative of reaching consensus in the field of repression – an initiative that derives from thetraditional adversarial model of criminal justice – can nevertheless be observed in theprocedural system with regard to procedures the implementation of which is entirelydetermined by the confession. The negotiation has been used to curb anti-competitivepractices, to handle class action lawsuits or to fight organized crime, and has definitelybecome a key process for lawmakers to consider. This observation has led to an examinationof this phenomenon through a definition which shall help to understand, on the one hand, thearticulation of the many forms of negotiation with the standard criminal procedure, and on theother, to appraise its consequences, especially those that are in conformity with the mainguiding principles of criminal justice. By placing the prosecution at the center of the justicesystem, plea-bargaining requires a strict legal framework to protect the basic rights of peoplesubject to trial. If discussions between the prosecution and the defendant have brought tolight some sort of agreement, the study of the inner workings of the bargaining procedureshas not exposed the existence of a contract. This dissertation aims to demonstrate that thecurrent development of plea-bargaining, a process which is illustrative of the probationaryrationale of the repressive North American criminal justice system, calls for some balancebetween the imperatives of efficiency and the respect of the distinctive characteristics of theFrench justice system.

Red-Hat Linux之CEO，Robert Yang曾對微軟行為作如此論述：「微軟很壞，但壞的很成功！」本文內容可分為三部分。首先在於釐清微軟成功之原因，針對形成微軟獨佔個人電腦作業系統之原因，做一有系統之經濟觀點分析：將軟體產業特殊之競爭策略層面考量與相關網路外部性理論經濟模型推論、驗證過程透過本文架構重新整合，發展出不同於一般管理文獻論述之方式以建立微軟獨佔地位之經濟理論基礎。第二部份針對微軟破壞競爭規範等違法行為作研究，主要針對微軟1998年對網景之反托拉斯此案，以美國司法部公布之事實認定書與休曼法為基礎，加以延申並做詳盡之探討。第三部分則針對微軟被宣判違反反托拉斯法後，政府在網際網路時代下執行反托拉斯法以回復競爭規範之角色、補救原則、措施做一探討並與AT＆T案例比較；最後並提出兩種分割方式經濟模型分析與最適分割條件之政策性建議。 / The CEO of Red-Hat Linux, Robert Yang, has made such comments on the behavior of Microsoft that:” Microsoft is very bad, but very successful.” This thesis mainly focuses on three parts. The first part is to clarify the reasons why Microsoft is so successful and analyze its monopolistic position on personal computer operating system market in light of a systematic、economic method combining strategic competitive characteristics of software industry with economic theories of network externalities, making its foundations of monopoly and distinguish from general managerial arguments through the framework of this thesis. The second part primarily focuses on the antitrust case of Microsoft’s behavior against Netscape proposed by DOJ in 1998. Basing on the DOJ’s findings of fact and the antitrust law of Sherman act, we made explorative research on the case. The third part is to explore the role、principles and methods of antitrust remedy enforcements by government under the era of networks and Internet and compare with the AT&T case in 1982. Finally, we compare between two different ways that divide Microsoft into two companies in light of economic analysis and propose policy recommendation about condition that will optimize upon exploiting such remedy method.

反托拉斯法所規範的層面，大致可將之歸納為結構面(marketstructure)與行為面(Conduct)。前者主要規範獨占、寡占及主要廠商(Dominant Firms)與廠商結合（合併）所形成的市場結構；後者則規範諸多廠商水平的合作行為與垂直限制交易行為。本文之目的，即在探討美國法上，如何致力於「競爭性結構」的規範制度與執行方法，以做為我國公平交易法執法及修法上的參考。研究發現以下各點：1.規模經濟的考量與廠商合併的運作，可謂美國產業結構形成的重要因素。台灣經濟發展的過程中，政府介入程度頗深，寡占與獨占事業多為法令造成。就我國實證而言，發現結構、行為、績效三者間具有高度相關，而競爭性之結構亦較能帶來整體績效最大。我國公平法目前對獨佔及寡占事業僅規範行為面，對建立公平競爭秩序成效恐屬有限；蓋就市場結構之控制而言，在我國多為中小企業之情勢下，獨佔、寡占之問題較諸結合，更為嚴重，在此特殊產業結構背景下，欲建立一真正具競爭性之環境，應自市場結構面(market structure)著手，可考慮賦予我國公平會或法院類似聯邦法院所具之衡平權，使公平會得將濫用市場力量的寡占、獨占事業解體(dissolution)或分割獨占公司之資產以建立另一與之競爭的實體等權限，以重建競爭結構，以建立競爭秩序。2.經濟理論與工具應妥善運用，以符立法本旨，美國聯邦交易委員會及司法部反托拉斯局均設有經濟分析專責單位，我國公平會亦宜指定專責單位，加強產業發展之研究並負責經濟分析事宜，俾針對業務單位進行個案所需，提供相關經濟分析協助。3.美國在規範結合行為方面，係以訂定指導準則方式為之，此法無論對執法機關或事業而言，皆有遵循之標準，避免雙方在執法及適法上產生不確定性之困擾。我國可參考之。4.近來我國貿易自由化進展迅速，企業經營環境已隨著大幅改變,競爭法的實施（如「市場」之定義等）應考量此一因素，才不會失之偏頗，造成國內產業不利損失。附錄：限制營業競爭行為與國際經濟的關係

Notre étude a pour objectif d'une part de comprendre pourquoi dans notre système juridique, certaines fautes peuvent profiter à leur auteur et d'autre part de les empêcher. Pour ce faire, dans une première partie, nous qualifierons la faute lucrative. Cette étape de qualification nous permettra de mettre en lumière l'unité de la notion de faute lucrative, en dépit de sa diversité de visages ; unité reposant sur des caractéristiques qui lui sont propres. A travers l'examen de chaque composante de la faute lucrative, nous mettrons en exergue les failles du Droit qui alimentent les stratégies spéculatives sur la violation de la règle de droit. La diversité de l'élément légal nous amènera à ausculter différentes disciplines du droit privé, dont principalement le droit pénal, le droit de la concurrence et le droit de la responsabilité civile. Les insuffisances de chacune de ces disciplines nous conduiront à proposer la reconnaissance par le Droit, de la faute lucrative, dans toute son singularité afin d'en ajuster le régime. Cette consécration en droit positif s'effectuera par la création d'une nouvelle circonstance aggravante, le dol lucratif, en droit répressif et l'assimilation de la faute lucrative à la faute intentionnelle ou dolosive en droit de la responsabilité civile. Cette réception de la faute lucrative en Droit justifiera l'élaboration d'un régime adéquat à la faute lucrative, poursuivant un objectif de dissuasion. Dans une seconde partie, nous proposerons donc un régime dissuasif, conçu à la lumière de la théorie économique de la dissuasion. Ce dernier reposera sur des modalités substantielles et procédurales, garantissant à la fois l'efficacité et l'effectivité de la sanction dissuasive. Au titre des premières, il s'agira d'augmenter le quantum chiffrable de la sanction, afin qu'il devienne au moins égal au profit illicite. Mais pas seulement : il s'agira également d'aggraver le quantum non chiffrable de la sanction, de sorte que le coût d'une faute ne puisse pas être intégralement anticipé, maîtrisé par les opérateurs économiques. Inévitablement, l'objectif de dissuasion des sanctions aura pour effet d'aggraver la responsabilité de l'auteur d'une faute lucrative. Aussi les modalités confiscatoires et dissuasives devront être passées au crible de la qualification de sanction répressive. Il en résultera une distinction nette entre le champ de la dissuasion et celui de la répression, le premier étant plus large que le second. Une sanction civile non répressive, simplement normative pouvant donc être dissuasive. Notre thèse a donc pour objectif de proposer une méthode de traitement des fautes lucratives afin de renverser le rapport coût-avantage d'une violation de l'ordre public. / Under french law, some faults can provide to their author more than the fault costs to them. In others words, some faults can procure an illegal profit because Law doesn't confiscate it or not efficiently. For example, it can be a cartel on prices, a violation of private life by a paparazzi magazine, or a fraud on consumer goods.... The aim of our thesis is twice. Fistly, we will try to understand why such behaviour is possible : what is the legal classification stage, after which we will propose a definition of lucrative fault in tort law, criminal law and competition law. Secondly, we are going to suggest a legal processing, method to deter this misbehaviour, what is the second step of our demonstration. Thus, in support of the economic model of deterrence by Gary Becker, we will determinate the conditions of effectiveness of a public punishment and of a private punishment. Among them, we will make the difference between the choice of the punishment and the probability of being decided.

寬恕政策為政府打擊卡特爾不可或缺的重要工具，為了維持市場競爭公平性，各國相繼將其引入法條之中，該政策透過廠商主動揭露涉案行為，使得政府可有效掌握證據將其處置。本文建立兩種賽局模型並分別利用子賽局完全均衡及序列均衡的概念，嘗試討論一般情況下寬恕政策的效率及納入資訊不對稱情形下的政策有效性，並由兩模型推論出：實行寬恕政策且廠商主動申報聯合行為為社會最有效率的均衡、透過政府制定適當的罰鍰區間引導下，主動申報聯合行為的行為可視為一區隔廠商型態的訊號。 / The leniency policy plays an indispensable role in thwarting cartel formation. To maintain the fairness of market competition, most countries successively bring this policy into their antitrust legislation. After the enforcement of the policy, the involved firms may have incentive to self-report and provide evidences to the Antitrust Authority. Therefore, the authorities can get enough evidences to convict those firms of being cartel members. In this paper, we develop two kinds of game theoretical model and use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss the efficiency of leniency policy in general conditions, and the effectiveness of the policy under the condition of information asymmetry. We show that it is efficient to the society and the authorities when the cartel members self-report under the enforcement of leniency policy. Moreover, by setting up an appropriate fine payment, self-reporting can be a signal for the authorities to segment the type of the involved firms.

為了維護全球經濟的穩定與公平，近年來各國無不致力於反壟斷政策的執行，以期有效打擊卡特爾式的企業聯合行為。本文從三種不同的環境條件下，逐一探討採取聯合行為的廠商和反托拉斯政府之間的互動情況。透過本研究可發現，廠商在以利潤為優先考量下，來決定是否採取聯合結盟，以及合法或非法的合作型態。此外，為了朝全社會效率極大的目標邁進，本文針對三種環境設定下的均衡結果進行效率性的比較，得知其差異的成因在於政府和廠商報酬差異的大小。 / In order to keep the stability and fairness of global economy, most of the authorities around the world have been fighting for cutting down cartels by implementing Antitrust/Competition Law. In this paper, we analyze the interaction between joint ventures and antitrust authorities in three different cases. And we find that profit always takes priority in firms’ decision, no matter how the economic environment changes. Finally, in discussing social utility, we compare efficiency among the three cases, and reach our conclusion that the difference of government’s and firm’s return causes the efficiency or non-efficiency of those optimal strategies.

Univ., Diss.--München, 2002. / Literaturverz. S. 241 - 250.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T19:33:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 CARDOSO_Diego_2013.pdf: 1706794 bytes, checksum: 52ad0ebf4915ad86f6ac9a9529176b01 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-05-20 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / The goal of competition policy, also known as antitrust policy, is promoting the welfare and economic efficiency by preserving fair competition in markets. Merger control is one of the main responsibilities of antitrust institutions. Prohibitions and restrictions of merger operations affect market structures, thus making these decisions relevant to economic agents. This Master's thesis analyzes the decisions made by Brazilian antitrust institutions regarding merger processes. Data was collected from public documents issued from 2004 to 2011. Bivariate analysis, discrete choice models and classification decision trees show that these merger control decisions are consistent with Brazilian antitrust law. Consistent competition policy reduces uncertainty, aligns expectations and increases the efficiency of antitrust law enforcement. Therefore, this research contributes to better understanding Brazilian competition policy related to merger control and its decision drivers. / As políticas de defesa da concorrência, ou políticas antitruste, visam ao maior bem-estar social por meio da manutenção de ambientes concorrenciais que promovam a eficiência econômica. No Brasil, os órgãos que compõem o Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência são os responsáveis pelas decisões sobre os agentes econômicos a fim de atingir os objetivos das políticas antitruste. Nesse âmbito, as decisões que influenciam a estrutura de mercados por meio das restrições e vetos a processos como fusões e aquisições de empresas - os julgamentos de Atos de Concentração - apresentam elevada relevância. Este trabalho realiza uma avaliação das decisões do Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência relativas aos Atos de Concentração. Para tal, foram coletados dados a partir dos documentos públicos emitidos pelos órgãos antitruste no período entre 2004 e 2011. Por meio da aplicação de modelos de regressão de escolha discreta e árvores de decisão induzidas, verificou-se que tais decisões são consistentes com as regras antitruste brasileiras. A consistência com regras estabelecidas possibilita uma maior eficiência na aplicação das políticas de defesa da concorrência, uma vez que reduz as incertezas dos agentes econômicos, alinha as expectativas e facilita a condução dos processos. Nesse sentido, esta investigação contribui para uma melhor compreensão dos fatores que influenciam as decisões dos órgãos brasileiros de defesa da concorrência, oferecendo também indicativos que auxiliam na verificação da eficiência da aplicação de tais políticas.