The environment is seen by different people as being valuable for different reasons. A pervasive debate in Environmental Philosophy revolves around which values should hold sway in the case of conflicts between the various kinds of value associated with the environment. This debate is relevant to, and fuelled by, debates how human communities should make decisions about the environment. By exploring the methods for balancing the various forms of environmental value proposed by Bryan G. Norton, Mark Sagoff, and David Pearce, I will argue that, as of yet, there has been little progress towards constructing a morally satisfactory basis for giving particular environmental values more weight than others. I will argue that to the extent that decision-maker obligations constitute moral obligations to the community, they can act as a basis for justifying giving some environmental values precedence over others in the decision-making context.

This study explores the contemporary practice of Ethical and Socially Responsible Investment and concludes that it is based on an ad hoc construct of empirically derived principles, driven mainly by the commercial self-interest of large financial institutions and fund managers. It explores the relationship between investment and morality, to posit a background theory of investment ethics. The study then proposes a move away from the narrow focus of ethical investment to a broader concern for investment ethics. The study introduces the discipline of investment ethics and examines the criteria that form the basis of morality in investment decisions. The resultant theory is intended to be of practical significance in the business and investment domains and to assist potential investors to evaluate investment opportunities in the context of a consistent set of substantive normative ethical principles.

The aim of the thesis is to systematically present, analyse and critically reflect Hans Jonas's (1903-1993) conception of moral responsibility with respect to his axiological ontology, anthropology, speculative theology and conception of modern technology with account of the most important topically relevant German secondary sources, including the latest ones. The first chapter maps the relevant Czech and Slovak secondary sources, whereby it evaluates to what extent Jonas's ethics of responsibility represented a general or applied approach, whether it was only an ethics of survival and whether in this context Jonas's thinking can be labelled anthropocentric. The second chapter offers insight primarily into Jonas's ethical thought in the chronological context of his life. The third chapter analyses Jonas's axiological ontology, anthropology, speculative theology and conception of modern technology. Against this philosophical and speculative-theological background the fourth chapter critically examines Jonas's conception of moral responsibility proper. The fifth chapter critically reflects on both the philosophical and speculative-theological background of Jonas's conceptions of responsibility and the conception itself. An excursus into applied ethics, which concludes the fifth chapter and the work as a whole, finally solves a topical ethical challenge in the sphere of assisted reproduction having to do with the categorical imperative of Jonas's responsibility for future generations. The main results of critical analysis and reflection: Jonas's ethics of responsibility is a supplementary applied conception, an ethics of survival, whose normative axiom commands the preservation (perpetuation) of the human capacity to responsibility. Jonas's thought is monistically anthropocentric. That follows from Jonas's integral monism, in which the difference between god and world, spirit and matter, reality and possibility is levelled out. These monistic confusions are more or less also projected into the ethical points of departure of Jonas's conception of responsibility, especially his specific axiological onto(theo)logy, in which the difference between ontology and axiology is levelled out. The main characteristic of Jonas's proper conception of responsibility consists in confusion (identification) of the object of responsibility with the instance of responsibility - from which at the level of theory of responsibility Jonas's specific two-place relationship of responsibility (subject - object=instance) follows. Although Jonas within his ethics of responsibility, in order to justify responsibility for future generations, broadened his specific two-place relationship to a three-place one, the author of this thesis finds none of the versions of Jonas's three-place relationship plausible - though the author agrees that an at least three-place conception of responsibility is necessary (instance - subject - object). However, for a more differentiated analysis of responsibility a five-place conception is suitable (normative standard - instance - subject - action - object affected by the action), with respect to the possibility of solving some of the problems of Jonas's responsibility for future generations a six-place conception (last instance - normative standard - instance - subject - action - object affected by the action).

L’accompagnement des rythmes sociaux et de la complexité urbaine sont une priorité pour les décideurs. Cependant, les réponses fournies sont soumises à une analyse permanente de l’adéquation entre risque et anticipation. Cette thèse propose une réflexion sur la prise en compte de l’éthique dans les pratiques de gestion de crise. Dans une première partie, un état de l’art du concept nous montre que la « ville intelligente » semble être une réponse séduisante pour le décideur. Elle se développe dans une continuité assurée par une résilience programmée dans la globalité. Or, lorsque ce système basé sur le principe de continuité est remis en cause subitement, la surprise soumet le décideur à une réaction de rupture. La disqualification des services technologiques impose alors de réagir en se référant aux concepts fondamentaux de la socialisation humaine. Recherchée au plus profond de la conscience de l'individu dans le collectif, nous montrons dans une deuxième partie que la rupture se matérialise pour les décideurs sous la forme de dilemmes éthiques. Notre analyse s’appuie sur une mise en perspective de l’éthique des situations extrêmes (conflits, santé), et sur une enquête réalisée auprès de décideurs. Nous mobilisons le concept de culture organisationnelle, appliqué aux acteurs de la sécurité civile ainsi qu’aux organisations ayant mis en œuvre une gouvernance collaborative des risques. Enfin, dans une troisième partie, nous montrons que le questionnement éthique réalisé lors de la phase de préparation est une voie d’anticipation des incertitudes associées à la prise de décision en contexte de crise / The support of the social rhythms and the urban complexity are a priority for the decision-makers. However, the supplied answers are subjected to a permanent analysis of the adequacy between risk and anticipation. This thesis proposes a reflection on the consideration of the ethics in the practices of crisis management. In a first part, a state of the art of the concept shows us that the "smart city" seems to be an attractive answer for the decision-maker. She develops in a continuity assured by a resilience scheduled in the global nature. Yet, when this system based on the principle of continuity is suddenly questioned, the surprise subjects the decision-maker to a reaction of break. The disqualification of the technological services imposes then to react by referring to the fundamental concepts of the human socialization. Looked for in the depths of the consciousness of the individual in the collective, we show in a second part that the break materializes for the decision-makers under the form of ethical dilemmae. Our analysis leans on one put in perspective by the ethics of the extreme situations (conflicts, health), and on an investigation realized with decision-makers. We mobilize the concept of organizational culture, applied to the actors of the civil safety as well as to the organizations having implemented a collaborative governance of the risks. Finally, in the third part, we show that the ethical questioning realized during the phase of preparation is a way of anticipation of the uncertainties associated with the decision-making in context of crisis

Are implicit biases something we can rightly be held responsible for, and if so, how? A variety of social and cognitive psychological studies have documented the existence of wide-ranging implicit biases for over 30 years. These implicit biases can best be described as negative mental attitudes that operate immediately and unconsciously in response to specific stimuli. The first chapter of this thesis surveys the psychological literature, as well as presents findings of real-world experiments into racial biases. I then present the dominant model of implicit attitudes as mere associations, followed by evidence that at least some implicit attitudes take on a propositional form and involve making inferences based on evidence. I then reject adopting either of these two rigid models in favor of a dispositional approach that treats implicit biases as on the same spectrum of, but adjacent to, beliefs. I then evaluate the moral wrongdoing associated with holding explicitly prejudicial beliefs, appealing first to Kantian notions of respecting individuals as agents, then appealing to Strawson’s argument that we are responsible for expressions of our will. Our status as human agents involves participating in complex and sustained interactions with others, which necessarily implies that we take part in the social practice of holding each other responsible for the quality of their will. The reactive attitudes we display in our everyday interactions indicate which features and circumstances are most important when investigating this practice. After applying this approach to implicit attitudes, I then pose the objection that their unconscious and unendorsed nature disqualifies implicit attitudes as proper expressions of our will. I develop this objection using Scanlon’s account of moral responsibility, which requires the capacity to self-govern in light of principles that are generally agreed upon as good reasons for guiding interactions with one another. Finally, I critique Real Self theories that seek to arbitrarily privilege one part of ourselves in favor of the Whole Self, which privileges those features that are most integrated into our overall character.

The Charter of rights of children in hospital (the EACH Charter) is an international document authored by the European Association for Children in Hospital (EACH) in the eighties of the twentieth century. The Charter can be perceived as a response to the fact that a child's stay in hospital - and paediatric hospital as an institution - is strongly influenced and formed by economical, technological and administrative aspects prevailing over the ethical ones. The Charter highlights specific situations where the health care profession - by neglecting children's needs and ignoring and/or tolerating avoidable suffering - becomes unethical. The aim of my thesis is to scrutinize the ethical appeal of the EACH Charter and to explore the Charter's ethical implications for contemporary paediatric practice in the Czech Republic.

No description available.

Ce mémoire eut pour ambition première d’aborder les enjeux éthiques de la robotique sexuelle selon une perspective critique féministe. Nous avons défendu la thèse selon laquelle les robotes sexuelles telles que développées à ce jour constituaient le continuum de la domination masculine en contexte sexuel. Il s’agissait alors dans un premier temps de distinguer les fondements sur lesquels la robotique sexuelle prenait forme, à savoir une structure de pouvoir inégalitaire, l’utilisation de normes dominantes et des schémas relationnels oppressifs. Dans un deuxième temps, il s’agissait de mettre en lumière les implications symboliques, c’est-à-dire au niveau de la représentation du groupe des femmes et matérielles, autrement dit en ce qui concerne le renforcement des inégalités de statuts, nous amenant alors à déterminer les caractéristiques propres à la robotique sexuelle, en d’autres termes, la réitération de paradigmes de domination sous une forme novatrice, soit celle d’un.e robot.e intelligent.e. / The primary aim of this paper was to address the ethical issues of sexual robotics from a feminist critical perspective. We argued that sexual robotes as developed to date constituted the continuum of male domination in a sexual context. The first step was to distinguish the foundations on which sexual robotics was taking shape, namely an unequal power structure, the use of dominant norms and oppressive relational patterns. The second step was to highlight the symbolic implications, that is to say the representation of women’s group and material effects, in other words, the reinforcement of inequalities of status. This led us to determine the characteristics of sexual robotics, otherwise stated, the repetition of domination paradigms in an innovative form, that of an intelligent robot.

Thesis is focused on media ethics and concentrate on moral values in film. The goal of thesis is to confirm or to disprove the need of applied ethics in film production. Thesis is divided into three parts. First part is focused on media ethics in film in general. Second part advise about several media theories and film in relation to ethics. Thirt part is dedicated to film semiothics and values. The core of theses is created of several aspect of film such as film editing, language and meaning through out film acting, sounds and costume. We do not emphasise good or bad impact on film on moral values but we bring out significance of value creation process. We underline film creation itself and tools of film production. The structure of thesis is interdisciplinary. I tis verz sensitive connection of ethics knowledge, media and semiothics. Interdisciplinar view brings toghether known facts and new approach. Key words: applied ethics, media ethics, film theory, film semiothics, moral values

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Applied ethics for professionals Johannesburg / The advent of digital ICT has raised a range of privacy problems that previously did not occur, owing to the scope and volume of data that can be collected, as well as the processing capacity of the application. These digital privacy problems are arguably not easily addressed within any particular traditional macroethical framework. We may therefore need to find an alternative approach. One such approach is proposed by Luciano Floridi, who has devised “Information Ethics” - a macroethics for the identification, clarification and solution of digital ethical issues. While IE is useful in that it highlights questions of digital agency, it will be demonstrated that it is flawed when applied to problems of privacy posed by digital ICT. IE, however, points us in the right direction: An object-oriented ethics may be able to address the issue of digital agents. In this essay I develop an argument for the moral intentionality of digital agents, based on the concepts of emergent value and indirect intentionality, that can underpin an object-oriented ethical approach to digital privacy for both digital and human agents. Using Nissenbaum’s concept of contextual spheres, I provide normative guidelines for evaluating the competing interests of agent-objects in various digital spheres. A brief evaluation of the approach, by way of an example, shows that the object-oriented LoA that I am proposing can be adopted for digital privacy problems. In such cases, and for the specific purpose of weighing up the competing rights and values of the agents and patients, we can treat all agents (human and non-human) as both intentionality and real. This provides a reading of the case that goes beyond the consequentialist or ownership-based approaches, and arguably gets closer to the heart of the issue. Where the approach is still open, however, is that we still have to justify and balance these interests. There is no simple formula to apply. A need for practical wisdom or Phronesis, in the form of a judicious weighing of moral interests, continues to apply to digital problems posed by ICT. / GR2017