This research aims to offer an original reconstruction of Aristotle’s psychology of music that explains his views on the relation between instrumental music and emotions. I argue that, contrary to the relevant scholarship, for Aristotle instrumental music cannot convey emotions to the listener. What instrumental music does, I claim, is to cause an objectless mood or disposition (διάθεσις) that “prepares the way” (προοδοποιεῖν) for the emotions. Most interpreters of Politics VIII (1340a12-29) argue that for Aristotle a piece of instrumental music would be able to represent emotions and the listener would be moved to the same emotion by a sort of sympathetic contagion. However, this interpretation is inconsistent with Aristotle’s account of emotions. For Aristotle a necessary condition for the emotions is that those experiencing them “judge” (κρίνειν) a situation based on their beliefs. If it is accepted that there is such a thing as an emotional contagion through music, then the cognitive theory of emotion presented by Aristotle is at risk since no such a judgment would be required. The thesis is presented in three chapters. In chapter one the cognitive elements that give rise to emotions are analysed. The nature of the term παθή is explored as well as the difference between its use as a ‘general affection’ and its use as the mental process that we now call ‘emotion.’ In this latter sense the emotions are mental states directed to an object on which a judgment is made and that are accompanied by pain or pleasure. The nature of the emotional judgment is investigated and the possibility of its existence in non-rational animals is explored. It is concluded that, even if we accept emotions in animals, intentionality and predication of an object are necessary conditions for the existence of emotions. In the second chapter, I discuss two instances where it seems Aristotle makes an exception to the judgment as necessary condition for the emotions. First, emotions aroused by the perception of signs of emotions, like the mere voice of the orator (Rhet. 1408a16-26) and the spectacle in the theatre (Poet. 1453b1-10) and second, emotions aroused by bodily changes (De an. 403a25). I argue that in Aristotle’s view in both cases the factors at work (voice, sight, bodily condition) only facilitate the arousal of emotions, but the actual arousal requires an additional narrative context that supplies grounds for the judgment that in turn gives rise to the emotion in question. In the first case the orator’s voice and the theatre’s spectacle work just as a condiment (ἥδυσμα) that helps to intensify (συναπεργάζεσθαι) the object of judgment (Pol. 1340b17; Poet. 1449b25; 1450b16; Rhet. 1386a31). Our emotional response has as its object their story, not the elements that decorate it. In the second case, the bodily changes are the material constituents of emotions; facilitate the generation of emotions: hotness around the heart, for example, makes the subject prone to anger; but the emotion of anger appears only after a particular situation is evaluated by the mind. In the third chapter, I turn to the specific case of music. From an exegesis of Pol. 1340a12-29, I argue that the emotions ostensibly transmitted by music (μουσική) to the listener are due to the lyrics of the songs (μέλη), not to the instrumental music itself. Therefore the question about the nature of the emotional effect of pure instrumental music remains open. My answer to this question is based on the analysis of the causal mechanism by means of which instrumental music affects the listener. Aristotle’s physiology reveals the physical impact of sound on the sense of hearing, and from there to the heart, the first sensorium. Bodily changes in the organ create an objectless disposition (διάθεσις) in the listener by relaxing or agitating his body, without providing any content for the mind besides the perception of the sound. Exciting or relaxing the heart by means of music would leave the listener in the disposition of readiness to react emotionally, but the emotion would appear only once an intentional object, i.e., the content of the emotion, is presented and evaluated by the mind. Finally, I show the relevance of my interpretation of these dispositions to understanding the role of emotions in the education of character in the Politics. Aristotle proposes to use only a certain type of music in his educational curriculum, not one too relaxed or too tense, but a middle between them that puts the students in a stable and noble disposition that would, in turn, lead them to be guided by reason instead of their emotions.

Is open-mindedness necessary for intellectual well-being in education? To answer this question this thesis draws on Aristotle‟s virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. It is argued that in order to understand eudaimonia (well-being) it is necessary to understand phronesis. In this regard, it is implied that in order to understand well-being, it is necessary to understand virtue, thus, well-being needs virtue(s). Just as Aristotelian virtue ethics defends the necessity of virtue(s) for well-being, virtue epistemology defends the priority of intellectual virtues for intellectual well-being. Unlike epistemology, virtue epistemology focuses on how an individual can be a good informant through the cultivation of intellectual virtues. To this end, this thesis proposes an alternative regulative educative virtue epistemology for intellectual well-being in education. In this context, open-mindedness is examined as an intellectual virtue that secures and facilitates other virtues both for individual and collective well-being in education. Bringing together White‟s and Nussbaum‟s seemingly opposed approaches to well-being, this thesis argues that a better theory of well-being in education must be one that equally combines a collective subjective major-informed desire theory with an individual objective list account of well-being. This account of well-being implies a certain understanding of intellectual open-mindedness. Drawing on Wolff‟s and De-Shalit‟s novel ideas of „secure‟ and „fertile functioning‟ as well as on Roberts‟ and Wood‟s „intellectual functionings‟, this thesis proposes a genuine intellectual open-mindedness that is both well-informed, reasonable, and necessary to „secure‟ and „fertile‟ „intellectual functionings‟ for intellectual well-being in education. Throughout the discussion, the thesis asserts that particular attention needs to be paid to the well-being of student teachers. Although it is widely accepted that pupils‟ well-being is important, less attention has been given to teachers‟ well-being. This thesis argues that teachers‟ and pupils‟ well-being is inextricably connected and initial teacher education should focus on student teachers‟ intellectual well-being as they constitute the future teaching workforce. The implications of how this account of well-being might inform Scottish initial teacher education programmes is addressed.

Submitted by PPGE PPGE (pgedu@ufba.br) on 2013-10-30T13:49:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO LUCIANA CRUZ VERSÃO FINAL.pdf: 721230 bytes, checksum: 4acfab4f4d89cd42d53a42ca0c04981a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rodrigo Meirelles (rodrigomei@ufba.br) on 2013-11-26T14:28:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO LUCIANA CRUZ VERSÃO FINAL.pdf: 721230 bytes, checksum: 4acfab4f4d89cd42d53a42ca0c04981a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-26T14:28:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO LUCIANA CRUZ VERSÃO FINAL.pdf: 721230 bytes, checksum: 4acfab4f4d89cd42d53a42ca0c04981a (MD5) / CAPES / Esta dissertação de Mestrado busca ser uma contribuição filosófica para a Educação Contemporânea. A pesquisa foi fundamentada na filosofia prática aristotélica, mas não se constituiu um recorte da obra nem do pensamento de Aristóteles nem objetivou interpretar o vasto pensamento deste filósofo. Considerando que se trata de uma dissertação em filosofia da educação, o que se fez foi uma apropriação de uma ideia cara desde a educação grega, constituída como Paidéia e destacada marcantemente na Ética Nicomaquéia, que é a ideia de virtude (Areté) para a educação contemporânea. De inicio, era apenas isso que se pensava, mas essa dissertação foi muito mais uma navegação e Aristóteles, uma origem. Os ventos me levaram para lugares improváveis; durante a pesquisa houve tempestades e calmarias, nem sei dizer qual a pior. Perdida às vezes no mar de Poseidon, agarrei-me no mastro da filosofia e aportei na educação contemporânea para dissertar acerca de como essa inspiração de um modo de viver e pensar gregos ainda desabrocham na Educação. O afeto é efetivo tanto na vivência quanto na práxis pedagógica; ele é movente educativo e de autoconhecimento. Duas foram as teses de educação contemporânea as quais os ventos e correntes marinhas da pesquisa conduziram-me: as ideias de origem e autoformação extraídas da filosofia de Galeffi e a pedagogia da duração de Rita Célia, produções atuais da FACED-UFBA. A dissertação é um exemplo que confirma as teses acima partindo da origem para a autoformação, relevando-se como uma educação singular, da pessoa, e não de grupo, é o que defende a pedagogia da duração. Como acontece a todo navegante em terras novas, eu mudei nas ideias e nas vísceras. De advogada, tornei-me professora de filosofia, de uma atitude especulativa intelectualista, tornei-me efetivamente afeto. / This Master's thesis seeks to be a philosophical contribution to Contemporary Education. The research was based on Aristotelian practical philosophy, but did not constitute a snip of the work or the thought of Aristotle nor interpret the broad objective thinking of him. Whereas it is a dissertation in philosophy of education, which has done an appropriation of an important idea since the Greek education, Paideia and incorporated as a great markedly in Nicomachean Ethics, which is the idea of virtue (Areté) for contemporary education. Initially it was thought so, but the truth is that this dissertation has been a navigation, and Aristotle was an origin. The winds took me to unlikely places, during the search were lulls and storms, I can not tell what is the worst. Sometimes lost in the sea of Poseidon, I catched to the mast of philosophy and stopped in contemporary education to discussing about how this inspiration of a way of living and thinking Greeks still appears in education. The affection is effective both in experience and pedagogical praxis as it is moving educational and self-knowledge. There were two theses of contemporary education which the winds and ocean currents research has led me: the ideas of origin and self-training extracted from the Galeffi philosophy and the pedagogy of duration of Rita Celia, current productions of UFBA-FACED. The dissertation is an example that confirms the theses above from the origin to the self-training, showing itself as an singular education as advocates the pedagogy of duration. As it happen s to everyone that is in a new lands, I changed, on the ideas and on the visceras. From lawyer became professor of philosophy, from a speculative intellectualist attitude, I became effectively affection. Keywords:

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University. / 1. Problem. The problem of this dissertation is to examine the doctrines of the will in the thought of Plato; Aristotle, Augustine, and Kant and to relate their conceptions of freedom to their doctrines of the will. 2. Method. The method consists in examining primary sources which define and interpret the will and its freedom. [TRUNCATED]

Legal positivism posits that the observation of how officials and citizens treat the legal system’s rules combine to constitute law’s existence. This is not an understanding verified by cases such as Nigeria’s legal system. Using historical evidence from the UK National Archives, and examples of recent court cases, I attempt to show that although such legal systems do, in fact, exist, they defy positivism’s conceptualization. They suggest that while the legal legitimacy of law is one thing, it does not account for obedience; and neither is the social fact of obedience necessary in defining legal validity. This thesis aims to suggest that far from being an outlying case, Nigeria provides interesting philosophical illumination about what positivism does not explain about legal systems in general—namely, what determines obedience. This thesis uses the political philosophies of Aristotle and Rousseau to construct a philosophical understanding of the basis for obedience to law. It suggests that it is by participation in the function of a legal system, that law is shown to a given population to have a specific purpose that is tied to the moral nature of the state. This thesis asserts that participation serves to illuminate law’s moral legitimacy as an especial type of legitimacy that is, in a sense, prior to its legal legitimacy and as what explains obedience separately from law’s legal validity, which simply explains its plain existence. This thesis further uses a field experiment centred on a transportation system in Lagos, Nigeria to test, empirically, the hypotheses generated by its theoretical investigations that: 1: the greater a people’s direct participation in creating their laws, the greater they perceive of the law’s moral legitimacy. and 2: The greater the people’s belief in the law’s moral legitimacy, the greater their free obedience to the law. The results suggest that the manner in which citizens are allowed to participate on the formulation and enactment of rules affects the extent to which they go on to obey those rules. These results, further, give empirical grounds for the thesis’ theoretical combination of an Aristotelian understanding of law’s authority with a reformulation of Rousseau’s argument that participation is necessary for, and derived from, freedom.

There have historically been numerous connections between the way that medieval Iberian Muslims conceptualized love, lust, and desire and the ways in which Western Europeans have expressed those same concepts, especially as potentially derived from the literary genre of the muwashshah, a particular form of (primarily) medieval Hispano-Arabic poetry. Specifically, the muwashshah and its particular expression(s) of romantic love have helped in causing a series of paradigm shifts (with a definition borrowed from Kuhn to apply to the humanities) within Western ideology. This thesis focuses on the transformative effect of such Hispano-Arabic poetry within Western culture, as well as its connections with the following: Greco-Roman concepts of poetics, earlier Arabic poetry, and post-Hispano-Arabic Arabic poetry. It explores the concept of intersectionality within Hispano-Arabic culture, demonstrating how Hispano-Arabic sources may have influenced European interpretations of romantic relationships as well as how the muwashshah survived within an Arabic context. While mostly existing as a substratum within European culture, the muwashshah has had lasting influence upon European culture. The domains of love and desire provide a particularly apt example, as they involve not simply technology (civilian or military) but demonstrate the origin of a distinct change in the expression of emotion within European culture. At a fundamental level, Western Europe has adopted some of these Hispano-Arabic (as derived from a Muslim viewpoint) values. Regardless of further conflict between Europeans and Muslim cultures, they share parts of a common heritage, expressed differently, but with partial derivations, large or small, from a single source. Such exploration demonstrates the deep interconnectedness of what has heretofore been considered a separated, solely Western (Christian) European culture and that of the Islamic world, derived from one of the original points of intersection between Muslim culture and Western Christian culture, as well as how Arabic culture addressed its outliers.

In dominant seventeenth-century thinking women's bodies, minds, and spirits were not only inferior to men's, but also more prone to evil. This study explores the ways in which the women writers attempted to redefine these assumptions. Through an analysis organised along various spiritual transformations the writers claim to go through, the study presents an insight into seventeenth-century women's construction and redefinition of femininity. The symbolic process of women's spiritual transfiguration results in them identifying with the metaphorical figure of Zion and in positioning women as godly agents of God, whereas male writers' transformations eventuate in their being effeminized and being turned into 'Crooked Agents' of God. Therefore, the study shows how the potentials inherent in the biblical figure of Zion were used in establishing a connection with God and in forming female and male authorial identity. The thesis draws on the understudied voices of women such as the anonymous Eliza, Elizabeth Major, An Collins or Gertrude More, and is contextualized by male-authored texts, some of them considered as canonical and popular in contemporary literature.

The present thesis deals with the question of goodness in ethical thinking of Plato and Aristotle. The work aims to answer two research questions: How did Plato and Aristotle perceive the essence of goodness in human life? What are we supposed to do in order to accomplish human well-being? The first chapter contains a brief summary of ethical ideas of both philosophers. In the following chapters their concepts of areté, soul and goodness are analysed and compared. The comparison supports the fact that both Plato and Aristotle basically agreed on the essence of human goodness. They consider it the sole criterion of human well-being, both of them connect it with moral values and argue that it can be only achived through life in accordance with the virtues. On the other hand, Plato and Aristotle differ from each other in the way how can be such human goodness and well-being achieved. Aristotle's views based on the ethical issues, however, can not be perceived as totally different from those of Plato, but rather as a further elaboration and supplement of his ideas and opinions.

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / O objetivo deste trabalho é estudar a melancolia em duas vias: uma primeira via que chamaremos histórico-investigativa e que estudará esse conceito na filosofia antiga (Aristóteles) que carrega o legado direto da medicina hipocrática, e estudará ainda a trajetória da melancolia na psiquiatria moderna. Em outras palavras, estudar a forma como a melancolia foi construida como uma afecção do corpo nesses dois momentos históricos fundamentais do termo. Uma segunda via analisará o papel fundamental da construção do conceito de melancolia no interior e ao longo da obra de Freud, tanto na sua função de delimitação de um campo propriamente psicanalítico de reflexão sobre essa doença, como nas suas relações de vizinhança conceitual (onde estão envolvidos alguns dos conceitos mais fundamentais da obra freudiana) / This works aim is to study melancholy in two ways: the first way we call historical investigative will search for this concept in the ancien philosophy (Aristote) wich takes the legacy of hipocratical medicine, and will also study melancholy in modern psichiatry. In other words, we are going to study the way melancholy was build as a body afection in this two fundamental historical moments of the term. The second research way will analyse the fundamental inner function of melancholys concept in freudians work: its function in the construction of a proprierly psycoanalitical base of reflection on this disease, and its conceptual neighborhood relations (where are engaged some of the most important concepts of the freudian work)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 6601.pdf: 871756 bytes, checksum: 096f8294b0dc42c7a4f5f8eece8bb33b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-02-23 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / According to Aristotle, sensation is a process in which the sense becomes similar to the sensible. In order to explain this transition from dissimilarity to similarity it is required that one grasps that sensation is a kind of alteration. It is an affection which can be better described as preservation of what is potential (the sense) by what is actual (the sensible). In order to do so, the sense must be constituted in a similar manner in respect of the intermediary which needs to be between the sense and the sensible. So construed, the affection that explains sensation introduces two main characteristics: it establishes a threshold for the intensity of the sensible and it sets how the sense-organs should be composed. They must grasp the sensible without causing the destruction of the senses potentiality, since the intermediary is always something that enables the sensible to appear through it. Sensation as an affection explains primarily the affection of one of the sense objects, namely, the proper sensible. So, it stands as a difficulty how another kind of sense object is grasped: the common sensible. The senses are not physiologically constituted to perceive the common sensible. It happens that common sensibles accompany the proper sensibles, so there is a specific capacity to perceive them, and this capacity is shared by all five senses. / Para Aristóteles, a sensação é um processo no qual o sentido se torna semelhante ao sensível. Para explicar a passagem da dessemelhança à semelhança é preciso compreender que a sensação é um tipo de alteração. Trata-se de uma afecção em que o ser em potência (o sentido) é preservado pelo ser em ato (o sensível). Assim compreendida, a afecção que descreve a sensação apresenta duas características principais: estabelece um limite dentro do qual a sensação é possível e apresenta um padrão para a constituição dos órgãos dos sentidos. Estes devem poder apreender os sensíveis sem que essa apreensão implique na perda da potencialidade dos sentidos. Para isso, os sentidos devem ser constituídos de maneira semelhante ao meio que se interpõe entre o sentido e o sensível, pois o meio é sempre algo que permite aos sensíveis aparecerem através dele. A sensação descrita como uma afecção explica primordialmente a afecção de um dos objetos dos sentidos, a saber, os sensíveis próprios. Então, se coloca como problemática a apreensão dos sensíveis comuns, já que os órgãos dos sentidos não são constituídos com a finalidade de percebê-los. Ocorre que os sensíveis comuns acompanham os sensíveis próprios, de modo que sua apreensão se dá por uma capacidade específica que é compartilhada pelos cinco sentidos.